1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
249 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
250 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
252 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
255 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
256 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
257 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
261 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
266 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
267 payment_id.hash(hasher);
268 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
269 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
270 payment_params.hash(hasher);
275 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
278 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
281 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
282 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
283 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
284 payment_secret: None,
285 payment_params: None,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
297 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
299 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
300 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
301 pub enum FailureCode {
302 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
303 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
304 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
305 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
306 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
307 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
308 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
309 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
310 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
311 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
312 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
315 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
317 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
318 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
319 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
320 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
321 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
323 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
324 err: msgs::LightningError,
325 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
326 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
328 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
330 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
347 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
350 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
352 err: LightningError {
354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
355 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
361 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
362 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
366 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
369 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
372 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
376 log_level: Level::Warn,
379 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
383 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
385 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
386 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
399 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
400 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
401 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
402 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
403 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
405 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
406 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
407 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
408 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
409 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
410 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
411 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
413 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
417 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
418 struct ClaimingPayment {
420 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
421 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
423 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
424 (0, amount_msat, required),
425 (2, payment_purpose, required),
426 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
429 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
430 struct ClaimablePayments {
431 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
432 /// failed/claimed by the user.
434 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
435 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
437 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
438 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
439 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
441 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
442 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
443 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
444 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
447 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
448 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
449 /// quite some time lag.
450 enum BackgroundEvent {
451 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
452 /// commitment transaction.
453 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
457 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
458 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
459 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
460 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
461 /// event can be generated.
462 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
463 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
464 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
468 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
469 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
472 /// State we hold per-peer.
473 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
474 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
476 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
477 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
479 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
480 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
481 latest_features: InitFeatures,
482 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
483 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
484 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
485 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
486 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
488 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
489 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
490 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
491 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
493 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
494 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
495 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
496 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
497 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
498 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
499 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
500 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
501 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
502 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
506 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
507 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
508 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
509 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
510 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
511 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
514 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
518 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
519 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
521 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
524 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
525 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
526 struct PendingInboundPayment {
527 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
528 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
529 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
530 /// this payment being removed.
532 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
533 user_payment_id: u64,
534 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
535 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
536 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
539 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
540 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
541 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
542 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
543 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
544 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
545 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
547 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
548 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
556 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
558 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
563 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
564 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
565 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
566 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
567 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
568 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
569 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
570 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
572 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
573 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
575 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
576 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
578 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
579 /// to individual Channels.
581 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
582 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
583 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
584 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
586 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
587 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
588 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
589 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
590 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
591 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
592 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
594 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
595 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
596 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
597 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
600 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
601 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
602 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
603 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
604 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
606 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
607 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
608 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
609 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
611 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
612 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
613 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
615 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
616 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
617 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
618 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
619 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
622 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
623 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
624 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
625 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
626 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
630 // `total_consistency_lock`
632 // |__`forward_htlcs`
634 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
636 // |__`per_peer_state`
638 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
640 // | |__`claimable_payments`
642 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
648 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
650 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
654 // | |__`pending_events`
656 // | |__`pending_background_events`
658 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
660 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
661 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
662 ES::Target: EntropySource,
663 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
664 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
665 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
669 default_configuration: UserConfig,
670 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
671 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
677 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
679 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
681 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
682 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
684 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
685 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
686 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
687 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
689 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
690 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
692 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
693 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
694 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
695 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
696 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
697 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
698 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
699 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
701 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
703 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
704 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
706 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
708 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
709 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
710 /// and via the classic SCID.
712 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
713 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
715 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
719 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
720 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
721 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
723 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
724 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
726 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
727 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
729 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
730 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
732 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
733 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
734 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
735 /// active channel list on load.
737 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
738 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
740 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
742 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
743 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
744 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
746 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
747 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
748 /// the handling of the events.
750 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
751 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
754 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
755 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
756 /// would break backwards compatability.
757 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
758 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
759 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
764 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
766 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
767 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
768 /// confirmation depth.
770 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
771 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
772 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
774 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
776 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
778 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
780 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
782 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
784 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
785 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
786 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
788 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
789 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
791 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
792 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
793 /// keeping additional state.
794 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
796 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
797 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
798 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
799 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
801 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
802 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
804 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
805 /// are currently open with that peer.
807 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
808 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
811 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
813 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
814 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
815 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
816 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
817 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
821 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
822 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
823 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
824 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
825 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
826 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
827 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
828 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
829 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
831 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
840 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
842 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
843 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
844 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
845 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
846 pub struct ChainParameters {
847 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
848 pub network: Network,
850 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
852 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
853 pub best_block: BestBlock,
856 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
862 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
863 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
864 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
865 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
866 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
867 /// updates are ready for persistence).
869 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
870 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
871 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
872 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
873 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
875 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
876 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
879 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
880 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
881 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
884 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
885 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
887 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
888 persistence_notifier: notifier,
889 should_persist: persist_check,
890 _read_guard: read_guard,
895 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
897 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
898 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
903 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
904 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
906 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
908 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
909 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
910 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
911 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
912 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
914 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
915 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
917 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
919 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
920 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
921 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
922 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
923 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
924 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
925 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
926 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
927 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
928 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
929 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
930 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
931 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
933 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
934 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
936 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
937 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
938 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
939 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
941 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
942 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
943 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
944 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
945 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
946 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
949 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
951 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
952 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
955 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
957 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
958 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
960 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
961 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
962 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
963 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
965 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
966 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
967 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
968 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
970 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
971 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
972 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
974 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
975 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
976 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
978 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
979 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
980 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
981 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
982 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
983 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
984 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
985 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
986 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
987 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
988 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
991 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
992 /// to better separate parameters.
993 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
994 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
995 /// The node_id of our counterparty
996 pub node_id: PublicKey,
997 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
998 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
999 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1000 pub features: InitFeatures,
1001 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1002 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1003 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1005 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1007 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1008 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1009 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1010 /// payments to us through this channel.
1011 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1012 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1013 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1014 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1015 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1016 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1017 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1020 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1021 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1022 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1023 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1024 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1025 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1026 /// lifetime of the channel.
1027 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1028 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1029 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1030 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1031 /// our counterparty already.
1033 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1034 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1035 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1036 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1038 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1039 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1040 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1041 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1043 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1044 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1046 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1047 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1049 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1050 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1051 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1052 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1053 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1054 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1055 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1056 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1057 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1060 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1062 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1063 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1064 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1065 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1066 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1067 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1068 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1070 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1071 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1073 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1074 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1075 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1076 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1077 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1078 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1079 /// this value on chain.
1081 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1083 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1085 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1086 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1087 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1088 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1090 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1091 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1092 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1093 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1095 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1096 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1097 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1098 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1100 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1101 pub balance_msat: u64,
1102 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1103 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1104 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1105 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1107 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1109 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1110 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1111 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1112 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1113 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1114 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1115 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1116 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1118 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1119 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1120 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1121 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1122 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1123 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1124 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1126 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1127 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1128 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1129 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1130 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1131 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1132 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1133 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1134 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1136 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1138 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1139 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1140 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1141 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1142 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1144 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1145 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1146 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1147 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1148 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1149 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1150 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1152 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1153 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1154 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1155 pub is_outbound: bool,
1156 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1157 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1158 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1159 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1160 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1162 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1163 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1164 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1165 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1167 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1168 pub is_usable: bool,
1169 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1170 pub is_public: bool,
1171 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1172 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1173 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1174 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1175 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1176 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1178 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1179 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1182 impl ChannelDetails {
1183 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1184 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1185 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1187 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1188 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1189 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1190 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1193 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1194 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1195 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1197 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1198 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1199 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1200 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1204 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1205 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1206 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1207 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1208 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1210 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1212 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1213 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1214 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1217 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1218 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1219 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1221 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1222 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1223 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1225 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1226 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1227 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1229 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1234 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1236 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1238 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1239 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1240 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1241 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1243 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1244 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1245 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1248 macro_rules! handle_error {
1249 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1252 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1253 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1254 // entering the macro.
1255 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1256 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1258 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1260 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1261 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1262 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1263 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1267 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1268 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1269 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1270 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1275 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1276 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1278 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1279 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1280 action: err.action.clone()
1284 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1285 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1286 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1287 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1288 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1292 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1299 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1300 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1301 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1302 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1303 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1304 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1306 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1307 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1308 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1309 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1310 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1312 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1313 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1315 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1319 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1320 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1321 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1323 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1324 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1326 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1327 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1329 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1330 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1331 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1332 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1333 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1334 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1340 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1341 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1345 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1347 $entry.remove_entry();
1355 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1356 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1360 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1362 $entry.remove_entry();
1370 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1371 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1373 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1374 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1380 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1381 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1382 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1383 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1384 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1386 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1387 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1388 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1389 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1390 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1391 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1392 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1393 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1394 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1395 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1400 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1401 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1402 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1404 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1405 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1406 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1407 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1408 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1409 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1412 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1417 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1418 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1419 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1420 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1421 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1422 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1423 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1424 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1425 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1426 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1427 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1429 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1430 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1431 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1437 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1438 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1440 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1441 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1442 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1443 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1444 updates.announcement_sigs);
1445 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1446 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1449 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1450 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1451 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1453 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1455 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1456 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1458 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1459 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1460 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1461 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1466 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1467 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1468 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1469 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1470 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1472 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1473 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1474 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1477 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1478 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1479 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1480 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1481 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1482 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1483 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1484 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1488 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1489 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1490 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1491 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1492 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1494 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1500 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1501 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1505 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1507 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1508 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1509 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1510 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1511 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1512 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1516 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1518 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1519 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1521 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1523 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1524 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1525 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1526 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1527 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1528 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1529 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1530 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1532 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1533 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1534 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1539 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1541 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1542 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1543 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1544 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1545 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1546 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1547 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1548 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1550 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1553 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1554 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1556 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1558 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1560 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1562 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1563 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1564 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1565 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1575 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1576 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1577 &self.default_configuration
1580 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1581 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1582 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1585 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1586 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1588 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1590 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1594 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1599 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1601 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1602 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1603 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1604 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1605 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1607 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1608 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1610 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1611 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1612 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1614 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1615 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1616 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1617 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1618 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1619 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1621 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1622 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1623 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1624 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1625 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1626 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1630 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1631 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1635 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1636 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1638 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1640 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1641 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1642 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1643 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1644 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1645 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1649 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1654 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1656 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1657 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1660 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1662 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1668 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1669 node_id: their_network_key,
1672 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1675 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1676 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1677 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1678 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1679 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1680 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1681 // the same channel.
1682 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1684 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1685 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1686 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1689 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1690 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1691 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1692 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1693 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1694 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1695 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1696 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1697 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1698 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1699 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1700 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1701 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1702 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1703 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1704 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1705 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1706 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1707 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1709 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1710 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1711 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1712 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1713 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1714 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1715 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1716 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1717 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1718 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1719 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1720 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1721 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1722 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1723 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1724 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1725 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1726 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1727 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1728 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1729 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1730 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1731 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1732 config: Some(channel.config()),
1740 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1741 /// more information.
1742 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1743 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1746 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1747 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1749 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1750 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1752 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1753 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1754 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1755 // really wanted anyway.
1756 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1759 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1760 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1762 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1763 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1764 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1766 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1767 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1768 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1769 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1770 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1771 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1772 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1773 total_msat: *total_msat,
1776 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1777 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1779 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1780 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1782 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1787 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1788 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1789 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1790 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1791 Some(transaction) => {
1792 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1796 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1797 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1798 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1799 reason: closure_reason
1803 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1806 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1807 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1808 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1810 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1811 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1815 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1817 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1818 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1819 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1820 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1821 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1823 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1824 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1825 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1826 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1827 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1831 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1832 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1833 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1834 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1835 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1838 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1839 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1840 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1841 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1845 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1853 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1854 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1855 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1856 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1859 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1863 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1864 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1865 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1867 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1868 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1870 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1871 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1872 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1873 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1875 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1877 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1878 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1879 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1880 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1881 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1884 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1885 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1886 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1888 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1889 /// the channel being closed or not:
1890 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1891 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1892 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1893 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1894 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1895 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1896 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1898 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1900 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1901 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1902 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1903 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1904 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1908 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1909 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1910 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1911 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1912 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1913 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1914 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1915 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1917 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1918 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1919 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1920 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1921 // ignore the result here.
1922 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1926 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1927 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1928 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1929 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1931 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1932 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1934 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1935 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1936 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1937 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1938 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1940 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1942 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1944 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1947 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1948 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1949 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1950 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1951 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1956 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1959 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1961 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1962 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1964 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1965 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1966 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1967 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1968 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1969 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1970 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1981 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1982 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1983 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1985 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1986 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1987 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1990 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1991 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1992 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1994 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1995 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1996 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1997 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1998 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2001 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2002 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2003 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2004 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2005 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2009 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2010 /// local transaction(s).
2011 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2012 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2013 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2017 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2018 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2020 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2021 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2022 return Err(ReceiveError {
2023 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2025 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2028 // final_expiry_too_soon
2029 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2030 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2032 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2033 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2034 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2035 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2036 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2037 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2038 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2039 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2040 return Err(ReceiveError {
2041 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2042 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2045 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2046 return Err(ReceiveError {
2048 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2049 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2053 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2054 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2055 return Err(ReceiveError {
2056 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2057 err_data: Vec::new(),
2058 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2061 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2062 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2063 return Err(ReceiveError {
2064 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2065 err_data: Vec::new(),
2066 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2068 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2069 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2071 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2072 phantom_shared_secret,
2074 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2075 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2076 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2077 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2078 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2079 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2080 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2081 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2084 err_data: Vec::new(),
2085 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2089 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2091 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2094 return Err(ReceiveError {
2095 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2096 err_data: Vec::new(),
2097 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2102 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2105 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2106 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2107 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2108 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2112 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2113 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2114 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2116 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2117 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2118 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2119 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2120 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2121 failure_code: $err_code,
2127 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2128 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2131 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2132 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2133 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2135 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2136 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2137 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2138 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2139 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2140 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2141 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2142 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2144 macro_rules! return_err {
2145 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2147 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2148 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2149 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2150 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2151 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2152 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2158 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2160 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2161 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2163 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2164 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2168 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2169 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2171 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2173 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2174 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2175 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2176 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2177 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2179 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2182 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2183 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2184 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2186 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2187 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2188 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2191 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2192 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2193 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2194 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2198 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2199 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2200 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2203 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2204 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2205 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2206 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2207 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2212 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2213 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2214 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2215 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2216 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2217 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2218 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2219 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2220 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2221 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2222 // phantom or an intercept.
2223 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2224 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2225 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2229 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2232 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2234 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2235 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2236 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2237 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2238 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2241 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2242 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2244 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2245 // have no consistency guarantees.
2246 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2250 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2251 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2252 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2253 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2254 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2256 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2257 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2258 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2259 // we don't have the channel here.
2260 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2262 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2264 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2265 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2266 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2267 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2268 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2269 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2270 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2272 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2273 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2275 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2276 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2280 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2281 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2282 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2283 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2285 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2292 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2293 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2294 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2295 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2296 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2297 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2299 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2300 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2302 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2303 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2304 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2305 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2306 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2307 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2308 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2309 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2310 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2311 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2317 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2318 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2319 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2320 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2322 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2323 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2325 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2326 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2327 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2329 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2330 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2331 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2332 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2333 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2334 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2335 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2339 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2344 pending_forward_info
2347 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2348 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2349 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2351 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2352 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2353 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2354 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2355 if !chan.should_announce() {
2356 return Err(LightningError {
2357 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2361 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2362 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2365 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2368 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2369 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2370 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2371 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2373 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2374 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2375 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2376 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2378 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2379 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2383 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2385 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2387 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2389 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2390 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2392 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2393 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2394 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2395 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2396 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2397 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2398 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2399 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2401 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2402 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2403 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2405 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2407 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2414 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2415 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2416 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2419 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2420 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2421 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2424 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2425 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2427 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2428 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2429 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2430 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2431 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2433 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2435 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2436 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2437 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2438 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2442 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2443 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2446 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2447 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2448 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2450 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2451 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2452 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2454 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2455 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2457 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2458 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2459 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2460 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2461 Some(monitor_update) => {
2462 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2463 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2464 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2467 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2468 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2469 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2470 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2471 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2472 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2473 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2474 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2480 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2481 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2482 // `channel_by_id` map.
2483 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2484 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2489 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2490 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2492 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2497 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2499 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2500 /// fields for more info.
2502 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2503 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2505 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2507 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2508 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2509 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2510 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2511 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2513 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2514 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2515 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2516 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2517 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2519 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2520 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2521 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2522 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2524 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2526 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2527 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2528 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2530 /// In general, a path may raise:
2531 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2532 /// node public key) is specified.
2533 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2534 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2536 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2537 /// relevant updates.
2539 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2540 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2541 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2543 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2545 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2546 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2547 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2548 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2549 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2551 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2552 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2553 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2555 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2556 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2557 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2558 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2559 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2560 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2562 self.pending_outbound_payments
2563 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2564 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2565 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2568 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2569 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2570 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2571 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2573 self.pending_outbound_payments
2574 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2575 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2576 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2577 &self.pending_events,
2578 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2579 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2583 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2586 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2587 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2588 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2592 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2593 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2594 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2598 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2599 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2600 /// retries are exhausted.
2602 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2603 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2605 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2606 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2607 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2609 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2610 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2612 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2613 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2614 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2616 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2619 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2620 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2621 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2622 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2623 /// never reach the recipient.
2625 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2626 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2628 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2629 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2631 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2633 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2634 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2635 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2637 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2638 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2640 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2641 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2644 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2645 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2647 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2650 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2651 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2652 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2654 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2655 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2656 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2657 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2658 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2659 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2662 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2663 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2664 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2665 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2666 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2668 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2669 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2670 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2673 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2676 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2677 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2680 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2681 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2682 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2683 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2684 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2685 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2686 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2687 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2689 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2690 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2693 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2695 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2697 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2698 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2699 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2700 } else { unreachable!(); })
2703 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2706 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2707 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2710 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2711 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2716 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2717 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2720 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2722 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2725 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2726 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2727 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2736 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2737 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2738 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2742 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2744 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2745 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2747 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2748 /// across the p2p network.
2750 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2751 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2753 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2754 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2755 /// keys per-channel).
2757 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2758 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2759 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2761 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2762 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2763 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2765 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2766 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2767 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2768 /// for more details.
2770 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2771 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2772 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2775 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2776 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2778 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2783 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2784 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2785 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2786 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2787 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2788 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2789 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2793 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2794 let mut output_index = None;
2795 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2796 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2797 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2798 if output_index.is_some() {
2799 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2800 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2803 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2804 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2805 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2808 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2811 if output_index.is_none() {
2812 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2813 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2816 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2820 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2822 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2823 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2824 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2825 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2827 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2828 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2830 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2831 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2833 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2835 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2836 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2837 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2838 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2839 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2840 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2841 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2842 pub fn update_channel_config(
2843 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2844 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2845 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2846 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2847 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2852 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2854 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2855 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2856 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2859 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2860 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2861 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2862 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2866 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2867 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2868 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2871 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2872 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2873 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2874 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2875 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2883 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2884 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2886 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2887 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2889 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2890 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2891 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2892 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2893 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2895 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2896 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2898 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2901 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2902 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2903 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2904 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2905 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2908 let next_hop_scid = {
2909 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2910 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2911 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2912 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2913 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2914 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2916 if !chan.is_usable() {
2917 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2918 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2921 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2923 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2924 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2929 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2930 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2931 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2934 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2935 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2936 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2938 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2940 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2941 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2944 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2945 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2946 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2947 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2948 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2950 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2954 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2955 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2957 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2960 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2961 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2964 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2965 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2966 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2969 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2970 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2971 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2972 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2973 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2974 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2975 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2978 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2979 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2980 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2981 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2986 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2988 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2989 /// Will likely generate further events.
2990 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2993 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2994 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2995 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2997 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2998 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3000 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3001 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3002 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3004 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3005 match forward_info {
3006 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3007 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3008 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3009 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3010 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3013 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3014 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3015 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3017 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3018 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3019 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3020 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3021 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3022 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3025 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3026 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3028 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3031 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3032 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3038 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3039 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3041 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3045 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3046 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3048 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3052 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3053 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3054 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3055 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3056 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3058 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3059 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3060 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3061 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3062 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3064 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3066 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3067 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3071 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3072 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3073 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3074 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3080 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3083 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3086 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3087 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3088 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3089 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3090 // problem, not ours.
3096 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3097 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3099 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3104 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3105 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3106 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3109 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3110 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3111 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3113 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3116 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3117 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3118 match forward_info {
3119 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3120 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3121 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3122 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3123 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3127 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3128 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3129 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3130 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3131 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3132 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3133 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3135 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3136 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3137 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3139 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3142 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3144 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3145 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3146 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3147 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3152 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3153 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3155 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3157 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3158 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3160 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3163 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3165 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3166 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3167 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3176 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3177 match forward_info {
3178 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3179 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3180 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3181 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3184 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3185 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3186 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3187 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3189 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3190 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3192 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3195 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3196 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3197 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3198 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3199 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3200 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3201 phantom_shared_secret,
3203 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3205 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3210 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3211 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3212 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3213 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3214 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3216 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3217 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3218 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3219 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3220 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3221 phantom_shared_secret,
3223 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3224 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3228 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3229 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3230 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3231 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3232 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3235 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3236 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3237 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3239 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3240 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3241 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3244 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3245 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3246 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3249 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3250 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3251 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3252 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3254 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3258 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3259 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3260 total_value += htlc.value;
3261 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3262 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3263 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3265 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3266 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3268 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3270 _ => unreachable!(),
3273 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3275 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3276 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3277 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3278 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3279 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3280 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3281 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3284 amount_msat: total_value,
3285 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3286 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3288 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3290 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3291 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3293 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3295 payment_claimable_generated
3299 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3300 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3301 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3302 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3303 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3304 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3305 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3306 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3308 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3309 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3310 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3311 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3312 Ok(result) => result,
3314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3315 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3319 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3320 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3321 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3323 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3324 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3328 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3330 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3331 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3332 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3333 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3336 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3337 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3338 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3339 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3340 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3341 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3342 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3344 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3346 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3347 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3352 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3359 if payment_data.is_none() {
3360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3361 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3364 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3365 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3367 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3368 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3370 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3371 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3373 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3374 if payment_claimable_generated {
3375 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3381 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3382 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3390 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3391 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3392 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3393 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3394 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3395 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3397 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3398 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3400 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3402 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3403 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3404 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3406 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3408 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3409 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3410 events.append(&mut new_events);
3413 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3415 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3416 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3418 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3419 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3420 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3421 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3422 if background_events.is_empty() {
3426 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3428 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3429 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3430 // monitor updating completing.
3431 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3438 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3439 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3440 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3441 self.process_background_events();
3444 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3445 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3446 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3447 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3449 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3450 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3452 if !chan.is_live() {
3453 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3454 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3455 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3458 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3460 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3461 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3465 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3466 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3467 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3468 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3469 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3470 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3471 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3473 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3476 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3477 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3478 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3479 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3480 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3481 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3489 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3491 /// This currently includes:
3492 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3493 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3494 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3496 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3497 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3498 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3500 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3501 /// estimate fetches.
3502 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3503 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3504 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3505 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3507 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3509 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3510 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3511 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3513 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3514 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3517 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3518 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3519 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3520 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3521 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3523 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3524 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3525 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3526 if needs_close { return false; }
3529 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3530 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3531 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3532 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3533 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3534 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3535 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3536 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3540 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3541 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3543 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3544 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3545 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3549 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3550 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3555 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3559 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3560 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3565 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3566 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3567 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3568 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3569 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3570 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3571 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3572 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3573 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3574 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3575 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3577 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3578 // have no channels to the peer.
3579 let remove_entry = {
3580 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3581 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3584 entry.remove_entry();
3587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3592 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3593 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3594 // This should be unreachable
3595 debug_assert!(false);
3598 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3599 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3600 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3601 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3603 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3604 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3605 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3607 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3614 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3615 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3616 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3617 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3621 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3622 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3625 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3627 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3628 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3629 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3630 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3631 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3638 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3639 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3640 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3642 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3643 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3644 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3645 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3647 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3648 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3649 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3650 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3651 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3652 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3655 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3656 /// reason for the failure.
3658 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3659 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3662 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3663 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3664 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3665 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3666 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3667 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3668 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3673 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3674 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3675 match failure_code {
3676 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3677 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3678 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3679 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3680 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3681 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3686 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3687 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3689 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3691 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3692 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3693 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3694 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3695 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3696 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3697 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3699 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3701 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3702 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3704 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3709 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3710 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3711 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3712 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3713 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3714 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3715 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3716 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3717 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3718 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3720 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3721 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3722 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3723 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3725 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3726 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3727 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3728 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3729 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3733 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3734 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3735 // be surfaced to the user.
3736 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3737 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3738 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3740 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3742 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3743 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3744 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3745 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3747 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3751 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3754 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3755 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3756 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3757 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3761 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3762 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3763 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3764 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3765 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3766 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3767 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3768 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3769 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3772 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3773 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3774 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3777 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3778 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3779 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3781 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3782 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3783 session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3784 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3785 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3787 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3788 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3789 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3791 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3792 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3793 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3794 push_forward_ev = true;
3796 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3798 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3801 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3804 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3805 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3806 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3807 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3808 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3809 failed_next_destination: destination,
3815 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3816 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3818 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3819 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3820 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3822 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3823 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3824 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3825 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3827 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3828 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3829 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3830 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3831 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3832 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3833 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3838 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3839 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3840 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3841 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3842 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3843 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3844 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3845 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3850 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3851 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3852 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3854 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3855 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3856 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3857 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3862 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3864 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3865 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3866 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3867 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3868 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3870 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3871 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3873 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3874 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3875 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3876 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3877 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3879 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3880 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3881 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3882 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3884 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3885 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3886 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3893 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3894 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3899 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3900 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3902 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3907 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3908 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3909 debug_assert!(false);
3914 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3915 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3916 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3917 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3918 if sources.len() != 1 {
3919 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3920 debug_assert!(false);
3926 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3928 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3929 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3930 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3931 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3934 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3935 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3936 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3937 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3941 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3942 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3943 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3944 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3946 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3947 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3948 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3949 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3950 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3955 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3956 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3957 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3958 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3959 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3960 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3961 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3963 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3966 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3967 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3968 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3969 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3973 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3974 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3975 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3976 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3979 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3980 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3981 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3985 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
3986 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
3987 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
3991 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
3992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
3993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3994 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3995 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3996 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
3998 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
3999 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4000 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4001 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4002 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4004 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4005 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4006 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4007 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4008 if let Err(e) = res {
4009 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4010 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4011 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4012 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4013 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4019 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4020 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4021 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4025 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4026 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4027 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4028 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4029 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4030 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4031 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4032 // again on restart.
4033 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4034 payment_preimage, update_res);
4036 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4037 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4038 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4039 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4040 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4041 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4045 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4046 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4049 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4051 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4052 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4054 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4055 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4056 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4057 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4058 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4059 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4060 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4063 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4064 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4066 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4068 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4074 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4075 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4076 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4082 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4083 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4084 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4087 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4088 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4090 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4091 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4092 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4093 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4094 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4098 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4099 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4105 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4106 /// update completion.
4107 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4108 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4109 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4110 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4111 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4112 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4113 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4114 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4115 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4116 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4117 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4118 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4119 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4121 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4123 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4124 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4125 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4126 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4129 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4130 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4132 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4133 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4134 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4139 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4141 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4142 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4144 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4149 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4150 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4151 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4152 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4153 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4158 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4162 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4168 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4169 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4170 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4176 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4177 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4179 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4180 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4182 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4183 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4184 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4185 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4186 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4192 let mut peer_state_lock;
4193 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4194 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4195 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4198 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4203 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4204 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4205 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4208 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4211 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4213 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4214 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4217 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4218 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4219 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4221 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4222 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4223 /// used to accept such channels.
4225 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4226 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4227 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4228 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4231 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4232 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4234 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4235 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4236 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4238 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4239 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4241 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4242 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4244 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4245 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4247 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4248 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4249 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4250 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4253 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4256 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4257 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4258 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4259 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4260 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4261 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4262 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4263 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4265 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4266 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4269 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4270 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4271 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4272 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4274 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4277 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4278 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4279 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4281 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4282 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4283 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4284 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4285 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4286 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4287 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4288 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4291 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4292 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4293 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4297 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4298 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4299 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4303 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4309 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4310 /// or 0-conf channels.
4312 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4313 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4314 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4315 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4316 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4317 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4319 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4320 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4321 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4322 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4323 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4324 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4325 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4329 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4332 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4333 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4335 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4336 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4337 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4338 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4340 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4343 num_unfunded_channels
4346 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4347 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4348 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4351 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4355 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4356 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4357 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4358 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4360 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4361 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4362 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4363 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4366 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4368 debug_assert!(false);
4369 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4371 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4372 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4374 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4375 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4376 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4377 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4378 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4379 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4382 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4383 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4386 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4387 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4388 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4389 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4390 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4393 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4394 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4395 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4398 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4399 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4403 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4405 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4406 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4409 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4410 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4411 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4413 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4414 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4415 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4418 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4419 pending_events.push(
4420 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4421 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4422 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4423 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4424 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4425 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4430 entry.insert(channel);
4436 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4437 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4438 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4439 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4441 debug_assert!(false);
4442 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4446 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4448 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4449 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4454 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4455 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4456 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4457 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4458 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4460 user_channel_id: user_id,
4465 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4466 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4469 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4471 debug_assert!(false);
4472 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4475 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4476 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4477 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4478 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4480 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4485 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4487 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4490 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4492 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4493 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4494 funding_msg.channel_id))
4496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4497 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4501 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4502 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4503 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4504 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4505 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4506 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4507 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4511 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4513 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4514 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4515 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4517 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4518 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4519 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4520 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4521 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4522 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4523 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4524 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4532 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4533 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4535 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4537 debug_assert!(false);
4538 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4541 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4542 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4543 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4545 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4546 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4547 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4548 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4549 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4550 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4551 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4552 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4553 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4554 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4563 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4564 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4565 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4567 debug_assert!(false);
4568 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4572 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4574 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4575 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4576 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4578 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4579 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4580 msg: announcement_sigs,
4582 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4583 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4584 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4585 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4586 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4587 // announcement_signatures.
4588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4589 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4590 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4591 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4597 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4605 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4606 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4607 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4608 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4609 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4611 debug_assert!(false);
4612 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4616 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4619 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4620 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4621 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4622 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4625 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4626 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4627 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4628 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4630 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4631 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4632 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4633 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4635 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4640 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4641 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4642 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4643 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4644 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4648 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4651 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4652 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4653 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4660 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4661 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4662 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4664 debug_assert!(false);
4665 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4667 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4668 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4669 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4670 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4672 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4673 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4674 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4675 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4680 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4681 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4682 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4683 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4684 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4685 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4686 } else { (tx, None) }
4688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4691 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4692 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4693 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4695 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4696 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4697 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4698 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4699 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4703 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4708 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4709 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4710 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4711 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4713 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4714 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4715 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4716 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4718 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4720 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4722 debug_assert!(false);
4723 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4727 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4730 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4731 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4732 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4733 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4734 match pending_forward_info {
4735 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4736 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4737 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4738 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4740 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4741 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4742 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4743 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4744 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4747 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4749 _ => pending_forward_info
4752 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4759 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4760 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4762 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4764 debug_assert!(false);
4765 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4767 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4768 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4769 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4771 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4776 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4780 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4784 debug_assert!(false);
4785 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4789 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4791 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4798 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4802 debug_assert!(false);
4803 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4807 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4809 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4810 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4811 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4813 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4820 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4822 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4824 debug_assert!(false);
4825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4829 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4831 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4832 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4833 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4834 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4835 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4836 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4843 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4844 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4845 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4846 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4847 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4848 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4849 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4850 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4851 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4852 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4853 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4855 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4856 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4858 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4859 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4860 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4862 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4863 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4866 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4867 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4869 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4870 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4871 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4873 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4874 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4875 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4876 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4877 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4880 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4881 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4884 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4885 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4886 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4887 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4888 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4889 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4890 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4893 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4894 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4895 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4900 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4901 // payments are being processed.
4902 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4903 push_forward_event = true;
4905 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4906 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4913 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4914 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4917 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4918 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4919 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4921 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4925 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4926 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4927 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4928 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4929 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4931 if !forward_ev_exists {
4932 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4934 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
4939 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4940 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4942 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4944 debug_assert!(false);
4945 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4946 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
4947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4948 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4950 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4951 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4952 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4953 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4954 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
4955 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4956 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
4958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4961 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4965 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4967 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4969 debug_assert!(false);
4970 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4972 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4973 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4974 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4976 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4983 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4984 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4985 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4987 debug_assert!(false);
4988 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4992 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4994 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4995 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4998 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4999 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5000 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5001 msg, &self.default_configuration
5003 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5004 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5005 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5013 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5014 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5015 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5016 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5018 // It's not a local channel
5019 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5023 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5024 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5025 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5029 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5031 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5032 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5033 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5034 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5035 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5036 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5040 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5041 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5042 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5043 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5045 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5046 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5051 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5054 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5056 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5057 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5059 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5061 debug_assert!(false);
5062 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5066 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5068 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5069 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5070 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5071 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5072 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5073 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5074 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5075 let mut channel_update = None;
5076 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5077 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5078 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5081 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5082 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5083 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5084 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5085 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5086 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5087 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5092 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5093 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5094 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5095 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5096 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5097 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5101 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5105 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5106 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5109 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5110 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5115 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5116 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5117 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5119 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5120 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5121 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5122 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5123 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5124 match monitor_event {
5125 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5126 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5128 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5131 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5132 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5133 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5136 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5137 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5138 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5139 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5141 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5142 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5143 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5144 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5147 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5148 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5149 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5151 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5152 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5153 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5154 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5155 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5156 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5157 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5161 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5162 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5164 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5166 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5167 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5168 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5169 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5170 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5177 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5178 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5184 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5185 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5188 has_pending_monitor_events
5191 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5192 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5193 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5195 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5196 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5197 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5198 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5200 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5205 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5206 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5207 /// update was applied.
5208 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5209 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5210 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5211 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5213 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5214 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5215 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5216 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5218 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5219 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5222 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5223 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5224 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5225 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5226 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5227 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5228 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5229 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5231 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5232 has_monitor_update = true;
5234 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5235 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5236 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5237 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5238 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5239 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5240 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5242 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5244 continue 'peer_loop;
5253 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5254 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5255 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5258 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5259 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5265 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5266 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5267 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5268 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5269 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5270 let mut has_update = false;
5272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5274 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5275 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5276 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5277 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5278 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5279 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5280 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5281 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5284 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5287 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5288 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5289 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5290 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5291 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5296 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5298 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5299 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5300 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5306 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5307 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5315 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5316 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5322 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5323 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5325 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5326 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5327 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5328 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5329 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5330 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5331 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5332 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5333 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5334 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5335 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5336 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5337 assert!(should_broadcast);
5338 } else { unreachable!(); }
5339 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5341 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5345 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5346 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5348 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5349 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5352 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5355 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5356 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5358 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5359 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5360 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5361 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5362 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5363 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5364 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5365 // never fail a payment too early.
5366 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5368 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5376 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5379 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5380 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5382 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5383 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5384 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5385 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5387 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5389 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5390 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5394 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5395 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5397 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5399 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5400 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5402 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5403 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5404 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5405 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5406 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5407 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5408 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5409 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5410 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5411 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5412 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5415 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5416 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5418 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5421 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5423 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5425 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5426 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5427 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5428 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5429 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5432 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5433 /// stored external to LDK.
5435 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5436 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5437 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5439 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5440 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5443 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5444 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5445 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5446 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5448 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5449 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5450 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5451 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5452 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5454 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5455 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5456 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5457 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5458 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5460 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5461 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5463 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5464 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5468 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5469 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5471 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5473 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5474 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5476 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5477 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5478 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5479 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5480 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5481 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5482 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5485 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5486 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5488 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5491 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5493 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5495 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5496 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5499 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5500 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5502 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5503 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5504 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5507 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5508 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5510 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5511 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5513 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5515 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5516 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5517 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5518 Some(_) => continue,
5519 None => return scid_candidate
5524 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5526 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5527 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5529 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5530 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5531 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5535 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5536 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5537 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5539 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5540 /// times to get a unique scid.
5541 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5542 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5543 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5545 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5546 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5547 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5548 return scid_candidate
5552 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5553 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5554 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5555 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5558 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5559 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5560 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5561 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5562 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5563 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5564 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5573 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5574 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5575 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5576 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5577 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5581 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5582 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5583 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5588 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5589 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5590 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5594 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5595 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5599 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5600 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5603 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5604 /// using the given event handler.
5606 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5607 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5610 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5611 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5612 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5614 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5616 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5617 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5618 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5619 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5622 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5623 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5624 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5627 for event in pending_events {
5628 handler(event).await;
5631 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5632 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5637 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5639 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5640 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5641 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5642 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5643 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5644 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5648 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5649 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5650 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5651 /// is always placed next to each other.
5653 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5654 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5655 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5656 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5658 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5659 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5660 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5661 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5662 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5663 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5664 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5666 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5667 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5668 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5669 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5672 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5673 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5675 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5676 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5679 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5680 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5681 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5684 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5685 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5689 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5690 events.replace(pending_events);
5699 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5701 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5702 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5703 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5705 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5710 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5712 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5713 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5714 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5715 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5716 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5718 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5719 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5720 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5721 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5724 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5725 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5726 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5729 for event in pending_events {
5730 handler.handle_event(event);
5738 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5740 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5741 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5742 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5743 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5744 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5745 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5749 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5751 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5752 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5753 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5754 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5755 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5758 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5759 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5762 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5764 let new_height = height - 1;
5766 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5767 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5768 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5769 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5770 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5771 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5774 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5778 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5780 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5781 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5782 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5783 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5784 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5785 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5789 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5790 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5791 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5792 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5794 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5795 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5798 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5799 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5801 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5802 if height < last_best_block_height {
5803 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5804 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5808 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5809 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5810 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5811 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5813 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5814 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5818 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5820 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5822 macro_rules! max_time {
5823 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5825 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5826 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5827 // having an explicit local time source.
5828 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5829 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5830 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5831 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5832 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5838 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5839 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5840 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5841 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5845 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5846 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5847 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5848 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5850 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5851 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5852 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5859 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5861 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5862 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5863 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5864 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5865 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5866 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5871 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5873 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5875 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5876 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5877 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5882 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5883 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5885 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5886 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5887 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5888 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5889 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5891 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5892 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5895 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5898 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5899 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5900 let res = f(channel);
5901 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5902 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5903 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5904 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5905 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5907 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5908 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5909 if channel.is_usable() {
5910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5911 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5912 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5913 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5922 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5924 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5926 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5927 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5928 msg: announcement_sigs,
5930 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5931 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5932 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5934 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5935 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5936 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5941 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5942 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5943 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5944 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5945 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5946 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5947 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5948 // is always consistent.
5949 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5950 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5951 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5952 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5953 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5956 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5957 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5958 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5959 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5960 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5961 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5962 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5966 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5967 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5969 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5970 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5971 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5972 data: reason_message,
5982 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5983 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5984 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5985 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5986 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5987 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5988 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5989 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5990 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5991 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5993 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5994 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5995 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5999 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6002 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6003 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6004 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6005 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6006 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6007 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6008 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6009 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6010 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6013 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6014 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6015 _ => unreachable!(),
6017 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6018 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6019 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6026 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6028 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6029 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6033 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6034 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6035 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6036 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6038 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6040 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6041 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6042 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6043 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6044 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6045 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6048 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6049 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6050 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6052 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6053 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6054 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6055 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6058 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6059 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6060 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6061 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6062 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6065 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6066 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6067 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6070 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6071 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6072 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6073 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6076 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6077 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6078 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6079 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6082 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6083 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6085 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6086 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6087 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6088 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6089 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6092 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6093 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6094 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6095 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6098 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6099 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6100 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6101 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6104 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6105 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6106 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6107 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6111 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6112 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6114 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6115 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6116 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6117 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6118 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6123 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6124 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6125 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6128 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6130 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6133 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6135 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6138 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6140 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6143 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6145 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6148 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6150 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6153 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6155 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6158 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6160 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6163 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6165 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6168 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6170 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6173 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6174 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6175 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6178 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6180 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6183 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6188 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6190 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6193 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6198 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6199 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6200 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6203 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6208 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6210 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6213 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6215 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6216 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6218 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6219 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6220 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6223 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6224 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6225 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6226 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6227 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6228 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6233 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6240 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6241 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6242 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6243 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6244 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6245 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6246 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6247 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6248 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6249 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6250 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6251 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6252 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6253 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6254 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6255 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6258 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6259 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6260 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6261 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6264 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6266 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6268 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6269 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6273 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6274 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6275 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6281 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6282 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6283 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6284 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6285 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6286 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6289 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6290 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6292 if inbound_peer_limited {
6295 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6296 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6297 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6298 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6299 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6304 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6305 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6307 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6308 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6309 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6310 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6315 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6316 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6321 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6324 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6327 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6328 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6329 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6330 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6331 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6332 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6333 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6337 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6338 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6339 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6344 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6345 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6346 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6347 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6348 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6357 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6361 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6362 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6364 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6365 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6366 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6367 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6368 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6369 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6370 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6371 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6373 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6374 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6375 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6379 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6381 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6382 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6383 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6384 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6385 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6386 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6388 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6396 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6397 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6401 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6402 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6405 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6406 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6410 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6411 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6412 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6413 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6416 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6417 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6419 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6420 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6421 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6422 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6423 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6426 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6427 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6428 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6429 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6432 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6433 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6434 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6435 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6438 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6439 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6440 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6441 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6442 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6443 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6444 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6445 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6446 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6447 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6448 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6449 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6450 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6451 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6452 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6453 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6454 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6455 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6457 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6458 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6459 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6465 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6466 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6469 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6470 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6471 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6474 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6475 (2, node_id, required),
6476 (4, features, required),
6477 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6478 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6479 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6480 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6483 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6484 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6485 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6486 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6487 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6488 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6489 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6490 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6491 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6492 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6493 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6494 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6495 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6496 (7, self.config, option),
6497 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6498 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6499 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6500 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6501 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6502 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6503 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6504 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6505 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6506 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6507 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6508 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6509 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6510 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6511 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6512 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6513 (32, self.is_public, required),
6514 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6515 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6516 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6522 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6523 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6524 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6525 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6526 (2, channel_id, required),
6527 (3, channel_type, option),
6528 (4, counterparty, required),
6529 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6530 (6, funding_txo, option),
6531 (7, config, option),
6532 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6533 (9, confirmations, option),
6534 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6535 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6536 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6537 (16, balance_msat, required),
6538 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6539 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6540 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6541 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6542 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6543 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6544 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6545 (26, is_outbound, required),
6546 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6547 (30, is_usable, required),
6548 (32, is_public, required),
6549 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6550 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6551 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6554 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6555 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6556 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6557 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6558 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6562 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6564 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6565 outbound_scid_alias,
6569 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6570 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6572 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6573 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6574 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6575 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6576 confirmations_required,
6578 force_close_spend_delay,
6579 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6580 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6581 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6582 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6583 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6584 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6589 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6590 (2, channels, vec_type),
6591 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6592 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6595 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6597 (0, onion_packet, required),
6598 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6601 (0, payment_data, required),
6602 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6603 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6605 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6606 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6607 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6611 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6612 (0, routing, required),
6613 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6614 (4, payment_hash, required),
6615 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6616 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6617 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6621 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6622 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6624 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6626 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6627 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6628 reason.write(writer)?;
6630 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6631 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6634 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6635 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6636 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6637 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6644 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6645 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6646 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6650 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6651 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6652 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6656 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6657 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6658 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6659 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6660 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6663 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6664 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6665 // messages contained in the variants.
6666 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6667 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6668 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6670 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6671 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6672 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6673 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6674 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6677 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6679 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6680 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6681 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6683 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6688 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6693 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6694 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6695 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6696 (2, outpoint, required),
6697 (4, htlc_id, required),
6698 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6701 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6702 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6703 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6704 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6705 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6707 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6708 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6709 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6710 (2, self.value, required),
6711 (4, payment_data, option),
6712 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6713 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6719 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6720 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6721 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6723 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6724 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6725 let mut total_msat = None;
6726 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6727 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6728 (0, prev_hop, required),
6729 (1, total_msat, option),
6730 (2, value, required),
6731 (4, payment_data, option),
6732 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6733 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6735 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6737 if payment_data.is_some() {
6738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6740 if total_msat.is_none() {
6741 total_msat = Some(value);
6743 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6746 if total_msat.is_none() {
6747 if payment_data.is_none() {
6748 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6750 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6752 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6756 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6759 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6766 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6767 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6768 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6771 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6772 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6773 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6774 let mut payment_id = None;
6775 let mut payment_secret = None;
6776 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6777 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6778 (0, session_priv, required),
6779 (1, payment_id, option),
6780 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6781 (3, payment_secret, option),
6782 (4, path, vec_type),
6783 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6785 if payment_id.is_none() {
6786 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6788 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6790 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6791 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6793 let path = path.unwrap();
6794 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6795 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6796 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6799 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6800 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6801 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6803 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6808 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6809 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6814 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6815 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6817 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6819 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6820 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6821 (0, session_priv, required),
6822 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6823 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6824 (3, payment_secret, option),
6825 (4, *path, vec_type),
6826 (5, payment_params, option),
6829 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6831 field.write(writer)?;
6838 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6839 (0, forward_info, required),
6840 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6841 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6842 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6843 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6846 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6848 (0, htlc_id, required),
6849 (2, err_packet, required),
6854 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6855 (0, payment_secret, required),
6856 (2, expiry_time, required),
6857 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6858 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6859 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6862 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6864 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6865 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6866 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6867 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6868 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6873 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6874 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6876 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6878 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6880 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6881 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6882 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6885 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6887 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6888 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6889 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6890 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6893 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6894 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6896 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6897 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6898 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6899 unfunded_channels += 1;
6904 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6906 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6909 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6910 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6911 channel.write(writer)?;
6918 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6919 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6920 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6921 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6922 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6923 for forward in pending_forwards {
6924 forward.write(writer)?;
6929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6931 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6932 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6933 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6935 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6936 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6937 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6938 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6939 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6940 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6941 htlc.write(writer)?;
6943 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6946 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
6947 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
6948 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6949 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
6950 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
6951 // per_peer_state lock at all.
6952 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
6955 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6956 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
6957 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6958 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6959 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6961 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6962 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6963 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6964 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
6965 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
6966 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6967 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
6972 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6973 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6974 for event in events.iter() {
6975 event.write(writer)?;
6978 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6979 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6980 for event in background_events.iter() {
6982 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6984 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6985 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6990 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6991 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6992 // likely to be identical.
6993 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6994 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6996 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6997 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6998 hash.write(writer)?;
6999 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7002 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7003 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7004 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7005 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7006 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7009 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7010 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7012 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7013 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7014 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7015 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7018 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7019 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7023 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7024 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7025 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7027 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7028 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7029 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7035 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7036 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7037 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7038 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7041 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7042 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7043 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7044 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7045 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7048 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7049 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7050 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7051 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7052 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7053 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7054 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7055 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7056 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7057 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7064 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7066 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7068 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7069 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7070 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7071 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7072 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7073 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7074 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7075 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7076 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7077 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7078 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7079 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7080 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7082 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7083 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7085 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7086 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7088 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7089 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7090 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7091 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7092 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7093 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7095 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7096 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7098 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7099 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7100 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7101 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7102 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7103 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7107 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7108 pub entropy_source: ES,
7110 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7111 pub node_signer: NS,
7113 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7114 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7116 pub signer_provider: SP,
7118 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7120 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7121 pub fee_estimator: F,
7122 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7124 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7125 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7126 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7127 pub chain_monitor: M,
7129 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7130 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7131 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7132 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7133 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7134 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7136 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7138 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7139 /// deserialization.
7141 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7142 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7143 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7145 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7146 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7148 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7149 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7150 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7151 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7153 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7156 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7157 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7160 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7161 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7172 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7173 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7174 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7175 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7176 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7178 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7179 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7184 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7185 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7186 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7187 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7189 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7190 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7191 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7192 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7193 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7198 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7199 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7200 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7204 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7205 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7207 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7208 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7209 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7210 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7211 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7212 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7216 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7217 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7219 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7223 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7225 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7227 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7228 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7229 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7230 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7231 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7232 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7233 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7235 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7236 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7237 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7238 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7239 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7240 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7241 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7242 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7243 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7244 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7245 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7246 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7247 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7248 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7249 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7250 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7251 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7252 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7253 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7254 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7255 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7256 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7257 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7258 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7259 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7260 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7261 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7262 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7263 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7264 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7265 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7266 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7268 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7269 let mut found_htlc = false;
7270 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7271 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7274 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7275 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7276 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7277 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7278 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7279 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7280 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7281 log_info!(args.logger,
7282 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7283 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7284 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7288 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7289 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7290 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7292 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7293 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7295 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7297 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7298 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7301 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7302 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7303 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7307 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7308 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7309 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7310 // safely discard the channel.
7311 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7312 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7313 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7314 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7315 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7318 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7319 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7320 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7321 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7322 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7323 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7327 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7328 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7329 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7330 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7334 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7335 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7336 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7337 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7338 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7339 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7341 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7342 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7344 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7347 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7349 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7350 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7353 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7354 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7356 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7359 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7360 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7361 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7362 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 let peer_state = PeerState {
7364 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7365 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7366 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7367 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7368 is_connected: false,
7370 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7373 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7375 for _ in 0..event_count {
7376 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7377 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7382 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7383 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7384 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7385 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7386 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7387 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7391 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7392 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7394 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7395 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7396 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7397 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7402 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7403 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7404 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7405 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7406 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7407 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7408 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7410 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7411 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7415 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7416 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7417 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7418 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7419 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7420 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7421 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7422 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7423 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7424 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7425 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7426 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7427 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7428 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7429 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7430 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7431 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7432 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7433 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7434 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7436 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7437 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7440 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7441 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7444 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7445 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7446 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7447 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7448 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7449 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7451 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7453 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7454 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7455 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7456 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7457 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7458 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7459 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7461 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7462 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7463 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7464 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7465 if path.is_empty() {
7466 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7469 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7470 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7471 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7472 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7474 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7475 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7476 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7479 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7480 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7481 retry_strategy: None,
7482 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7483 payment_params: None,
7484 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7485 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7487 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7488 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7489 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7490 total_msat: path_amt,
7491 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7493 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7494 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7499 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7500 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7501 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7502 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7503 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7505 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7506 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7507 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7508 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7509 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7510 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7511 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7512 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7513 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7514 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7515 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7520 !forwards.is_empty()
7522 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7523 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7524 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7525 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7526 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7527 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7528 intercepted_id != ev_id
7540 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7541 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7542 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7544 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7545 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7546 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7547 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7548 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7549 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7550 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7551 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7555 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7556 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7558 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7559 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7560 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7561 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7563 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7564 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7567 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7568 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7569 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7570 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7571 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7573 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7574 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7575 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7576 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7577 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7578 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7579 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7580 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7582 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7587 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7589 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7591 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7592 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7594 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7598 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7599 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7601 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7602 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7605 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7607 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7609 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7610 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7611 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7612 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7616 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7617 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7618 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7619 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7620 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7621 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7622 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7624 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7625 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7626 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7628 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7629 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7630 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7631 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7632 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7633 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7635 if chan.is_usable() {
7636 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7637 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7638 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7639 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7640 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7646 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7648 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7649 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7650 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7651 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7652 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7653 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7654 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7655 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7656 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7657 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7658 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7660 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7661 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7663 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7664 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7665 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7666 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7668 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7669 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7670 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7671 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7673 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7674 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7675 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7676 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7678 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7679 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7680 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7683 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7684 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7687 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7688 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7691 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7694 purpose: payment_purpose,
7695 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7701 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7702 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7703 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7705 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7706 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7710 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7712 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7713 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7714 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7715 router: args.router,
7717 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7719 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7720 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7721 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7722 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7724 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7725 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7726 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7727 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7728 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7729 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7731 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7736 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7738 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7740 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7741 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7742 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7743 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7745 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7746 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7747 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7749 logger: args.logger,
7750 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7753 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7754 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7755 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7756 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7757 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7760 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7761 //connection or two.
7763 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7769 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7770 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7771 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7772 use core::time::Duration;
7773 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7774 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7775 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7776 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7777 use crate::ln::msgs;
7778 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7779 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7780 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7781 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7782 use crate::util::test_utils;
7783 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7784 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7787 fn test_notify_limits() {
7788 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7789 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7793 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7795 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7796 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7797 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7798 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7799 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7801 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7803 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7804 // to connect messages with new values
7805 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7806 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7807 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7808 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7810 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7811 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7812 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7813 // ... but the last node should not.
7814 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7815 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7816 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7817 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7819 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7820 // about the channel.
7821 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7822 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7823 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7825 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7827 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7828 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7829 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7830 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7831 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7832 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7834 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7835 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7836 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7838 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7839 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7840 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7841 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7842 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7843 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7845 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7846 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7847 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7848 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7849 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7850 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7852 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7854 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7855 // the channel info has updated.
7856 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7857 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7858 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7859 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7860 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7861 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7865 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7866 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7871 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7872 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7874 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7875 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7876 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7877 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7879 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7880 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7881 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7882 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7883 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7884 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7886 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7888 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7890 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7891 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7893 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7895 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7896 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7899 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7900 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7901 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7903 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7904 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7905 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7906 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7907 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7908 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7909 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7910 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7911 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7913 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7914 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7916 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7918 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7920 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7921 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7922 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7923 // lightning messages manually.
7924 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7925 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7928 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7929 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7930 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7932 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7933 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7935 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7936 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7938 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7939 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7940 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7942 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7943 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7944 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7948 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7950 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7951 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7954 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7955 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7956 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7959 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7960 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7961 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7962 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7967 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7968 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7969 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7970 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7975 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7976 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7977 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7978 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7985 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7986 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7987 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7988 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7989 // fails as expected.
7990 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7991 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7992 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7993 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7994 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7995 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7996 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7998 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7999 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8000 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8002 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8003 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8004 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8005 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8007 let route = find_route(
8008 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8009 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8011 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8013 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8015 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8016 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8017 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8020 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8021 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8022 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8025 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8026 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8027 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8028 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8029 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8030 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8031 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8032 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8033 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8035 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8036 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8038 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8039 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8040 let route = find_route(
8041 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8042 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8044 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8048 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8049 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8050 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8052 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8053 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8058 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8059 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8060 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8062 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8063 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8064 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8066 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8067 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8068 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8069 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8070 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8071 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8072 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8073 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8074 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8076 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8077 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8081 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8082 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8083 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8084 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8085 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8086 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8087 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8089 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8090 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8092 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8093 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8094 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8095 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8097 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8098 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8099 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8100 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8101 let route = find_route(
8102 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8103 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8106 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8107 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8108 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8109 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8112 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8114 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8115 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8116 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8117 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8120 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8124 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8125 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8131 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8132 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8134 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8135 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8136 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8137 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8139 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8140 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8141 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8142 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8143 let route = find_route(
8144 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8145 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8148 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8149 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8150 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8151 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8152 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8155 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8156 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8157 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8159 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8160 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8161 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8163 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8167 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8168 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8170 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8171 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8173 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8174 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8175 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8176 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8178 // Marshall an MPP route.
8179 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8180 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8181 route.paths.push(path);
8182 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8183 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8184 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8185 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8186 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8187 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8189 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8190 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8191 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8192 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8197 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8201 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8203 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8205 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8206 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8208 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8211 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8214 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8215 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8216 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8217 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8218 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8219 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8222 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8225 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8226 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8231 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8232 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8233 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8234 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8235 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8236 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8238 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8239 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8241 total_msat: 100_000,
8244 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8245 // payment verification fails as expected.
8246 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8247 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8248 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8249 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8251 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8255 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8256 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8260 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8261 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8262 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8263 // the channel is successfully closed.
8264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8267 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8269 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8270 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8271 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8272 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8273 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8275 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8276 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8278 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8279 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8280 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8281 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8284 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8286 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8287 // as it has the funding transaction.
8288 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8289 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8290 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8293 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8295 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8297 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8299 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8300 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8301 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8305 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8306 // as it has the funding transaction.
8307 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8308 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8309 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8312 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8313 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8315 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8316 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8317 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8319 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8320 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8321 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8322 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8324 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8325 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8327 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8328 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8329 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8330 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8331 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8332 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8333 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8337 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8338 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8339 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8340 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8341 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8342 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8343 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8346 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8348 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8349 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8350 // closing transaction).
8351 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8352 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8353 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8355 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8356 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8357 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8358 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8359 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8362 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8364 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8366 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8367 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8368 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8370 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8372 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8373 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8376 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8377 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8378 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8381 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8382 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8383 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8386 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8388 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8389 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8391 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8392 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8394 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8395 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8400 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8401 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8402 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8403 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8404 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8405 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8406 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8407 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8410 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8411 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8412 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8414 // Test the API functions.
8415 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8417 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8419 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8421 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8423 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8425 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8427 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8431 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8432 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8438 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8440 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8441 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8443 let mut funding_tx = None;
8444 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8445 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8446 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8449 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8450 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8451 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8452 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8453 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8457 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8462 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8465 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8466 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8467 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8468 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8469 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8471 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8472 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8474 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8475 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8476 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8477 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8478 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8479 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8480 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8482 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8483 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8484 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8485 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8487 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8488 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8489 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8490 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8491 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8492 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8493 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8495 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8496 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8497 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8498 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8500 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8501 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8502 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8503 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8505 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8506 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8508 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8509 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8510 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8511 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8512 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8514 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8515 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], last_random_pk).channel_id,
8516 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8518 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8519 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8520 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8522 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8523 // "protected" and can connect again.
8524 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8525 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8526 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8527 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8529 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8532 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8536 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8537 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8543 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8545 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8546 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8548 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8549 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8550 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8551 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8554 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8556 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8557 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8558 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8560 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8561 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8562 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8564 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8565 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8566 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8567 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8571 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8572 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8573 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8576 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8577 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8579 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8581 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8583 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8584 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8586 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8587 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8588 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8589 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8591 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8593 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8594 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8596 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8597 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8601 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8602 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8605 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8606 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8607 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8608 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8609 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8610 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8611 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8613 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8614 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8615 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8616 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8622 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], last_random_pk).channel_id,
8623 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8625 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8626 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8627 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8629 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8630 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8634 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8639 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8640 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8641 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8642 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8645 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8646 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8647 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8649 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8651 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8652 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8653 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8655 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8656 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8658 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8659 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8664 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8665 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8667 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8668 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8670 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8674 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8676 use crate::chain::Listen;
8677 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8678 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8679 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8680 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8681 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8682 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8683 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8684 use crate::util::test_utils;
8685 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8686 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8688 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8689 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8690 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8692 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8696 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8697 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8698 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8699 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8700 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8701 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8702 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8703 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8708 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8709 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8712 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8713 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8714 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8716 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8718 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8719 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8720 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8721 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8722 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8724 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8725 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8727 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8728 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8729 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8730 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8732 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8734 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8736 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8737 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8738 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8739 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8740 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8742 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8744 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8746 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8747 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8748 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8749 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8750 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8753 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8754 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8755 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8757 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8758 } else { panic!(); }
8760 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8761 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8763 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8766 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8769 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8770 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8772 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8773 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8774 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8775 match msg_events[0] {
8776 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8777 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8778 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8782 match msg_events[1] {
8783 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8787 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8788 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8790 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8791 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8796 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8797 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8799 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8800 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8805 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8807 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8808 macro_rules! send_payment {
8809 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8810 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8811 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8812 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8813 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8814 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8815 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8816 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8817 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8818 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8820 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8821 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8823 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8824 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8826 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8827 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8828 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8829 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8830 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8831 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8832 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8833 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8835 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8836 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8837 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8838 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8840 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8841 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8842 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8843 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8844 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8846 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8849 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8850 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8851 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8852 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8854 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8859 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8860 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);