1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
251 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
252 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
254 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
257 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
258 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
259 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
261 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
263 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
268 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
269 payment_id.hash(hasher);
270 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
271 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
272 payment_params.hash(hasher);
277 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
280 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
283 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
284 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
285 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
286 payment_secret: None,
287 payment_params: None,
292 struct ReceiveError {
298 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
299 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
301 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
302 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
303 pub enum FailureCode {
304 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
305 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
306 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
307 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
308 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
309 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
310 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
311 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
312 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
313 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
314 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
317 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
319 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
320 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
321 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
322 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
323 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
325 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 err: msgs::LightningError,
327 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
328 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
330 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
332 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
349 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
352 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
354 err: LightningError {
356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
357 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
363 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
364 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
368 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
371 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
374 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
378 log_level: Level::Warn,
381 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
385 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
388 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
396 shutdown_finish: None,
401 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
402 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
403 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
404 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
405 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
407 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
408 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
409 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
410 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
411 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
412 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
413 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
415 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
419 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
420 struct ClaimingPayment {
422 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
423 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
425 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
426 (0, amount_msat, required),
427 (2, payment_purpose, required),
428 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
431 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
432 struct ClaimablePayments {
433 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
434 /// failed/claimed by the user.
436 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
437 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
439 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
440 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
441 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
443 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
444 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
445 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
446 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
449 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
450 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
451 /// quite some time lag.
452 enum BackgroundEvent {
453 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
454 /// commitment transaction.
455 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
459 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
460 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
461 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
462 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
463 /// event can be generated.
464 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
465 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
466 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
470 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
471 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, ignorable) },
474 /// State we hold per-peer.
475 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
476 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
478 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
479 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
481 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
482 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
483 latest_features: InitFeatures,
484 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
485 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
486 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
487 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
488 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
490 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
491 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
492 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
493 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
495 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
496 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
497 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
498 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
499 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
500 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
501 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
502 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
503 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
504 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
508 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
509 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
510 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
511 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
512 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
513 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
516 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
520 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
521 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
523 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
526 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
527 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
528 struct PendingInboundPayment {
529 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
530 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
531 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
532 /// this payment being removed.
534 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
535 user_payment_id: u64,
536 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
537 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
538 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
541 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
542 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
543 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
544 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
545 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
546 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
547 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
549 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
550 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
558 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
560 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
565 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
566 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
567 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
568 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
569 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
570 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
571 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
572 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
574 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
575 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
577 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
578 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
580 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
581 /// to individual Channels.
583 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
584 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
585 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
586 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
588 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
589 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
590 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
591 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
592 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
593 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
594 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
596 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
597 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
598 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
599 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
602 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
603 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
604 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
605 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
606 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
608 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
609 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
610 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
611 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
612 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
615 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
616 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
617 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
618 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
619 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
623 // `total_consistency_lock`
625 // |__`forward_htlcs`
627 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
629 // |__`per_peer_state`
631 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
633 // | |__`claimable_payments`
635 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
641 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
643 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
647 // | |__`pending_events`
649 // | |__`pending_background_events`
651 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
653 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
655 ES::Target: EntropySource,
656 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
657 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
658 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
662 default_configuration: UserConfig,
663 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
664 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
670 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
672 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
674 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
675 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
677 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
678 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
679 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
680 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
682 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
683 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
685 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
686 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
687 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
688 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
689 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
690 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
691 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
692 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
694 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
696 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
697 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
699 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
701 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
702 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
703 /// and via the classic SCID.
705 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
706 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
708 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
710 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
712 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
713 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
714 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
716 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
719 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
720 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
731 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
733 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
735 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
736 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
737 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
739 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
740 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
741 /// the handling of the events.
743 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
744 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
747 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
748 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
749 /// would break backwards compatability.
750 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
751 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
752 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
754 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
755 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
757 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
759 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
760 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
761 /// confirmation depth.
763 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
764 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
765 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
769 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
771 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
773 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
775 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
777 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
778 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
779 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
781 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
782 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
784 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
785 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
786 /// keeping additional state.
787 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
789 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
790 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
791 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
792 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
794 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
795 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
797 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
798 /// are currently open with that peer.
800 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
801 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
804 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
806 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
807 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
808 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
809 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
810 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
812 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
813 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
814 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
815 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
816 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
817 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
818 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
819 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
820 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
821 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
822 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
824 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
833 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
835 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
836 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
837 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
838 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
839 pub struct ChainParameters {
840 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
841 pub network: Network,
843 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
845 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
846 pub best_block: BestBlock,
849 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
855 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
856 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
857 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
858 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
859 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
860 /// updates are ready for persistence).
862 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
863 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
864 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
865 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
866 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
868 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
869 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
872 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
873 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
874 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
877 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
878 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
880 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
881 persistence_notifier: notifier,
882 should_persist: persist_check,
883 _read_guard: read_guard,
888 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
890 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
891 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
896 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
897 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
899 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
901 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
902 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
903 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
904 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
905 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
907 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
908 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
910 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
912 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
913 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
914 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
915 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
916 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
917 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
918 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
919 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
920 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
921 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
922 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
923 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
924 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
926 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
927 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
929 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
930 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
931 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
932 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
934 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
935 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
936 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
937 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
938 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
939 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
942 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
944 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
945 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
948 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
950 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
951 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
953 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
954 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
955 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
956 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
958 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
959 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
960 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
961 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
962 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
963 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
964 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
965 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
966 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
967 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
968 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
971 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
972 /// to better separate parameters.
973 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
974 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
975 /// The node_id of our counterparty
976 pub node_id: PublicKey,
977 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
978 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
979 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
980 pub features: InitFeatures,
981 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
982 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
983 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
985 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
987 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
988 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
989 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
990 /// payments to us through this channel.
991 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
992 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
993 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
994 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
995 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
996 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
997 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1000 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1001 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1002 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1003 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1004 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1005 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1006 /// lifetime of the channel.
1007 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1008 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1009 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1010 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1011 /// our counterparty already.
1013 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1014 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1015 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1016 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1018 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1019 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1020 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1021 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1023 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1024 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1026 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1027 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1029 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1030 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1031 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1032 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1033 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1034 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1035 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1036 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1037 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1040 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1042 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1043 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1044 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1045 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1046 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1047 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1048 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1050 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1051 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1053 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1054 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1055 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1056 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1057 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1058 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1059 /// this value on chain.
1061 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1063 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1065 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1066 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1067 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1068 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1070 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1071 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1072 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1073 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1075 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1076 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1077 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1078 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1080 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1081 pub balance_msat: u64,
1082 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1083 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1084 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1085 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1087 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1089 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1090 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1091 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1092 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1093 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1094 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1095 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1096 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1098 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1099 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1100 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1101 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1102 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1103 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1104 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1106 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1107 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1108 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1109 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1110 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1111 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1112 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1113 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1114 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1116 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1118 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1119 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1120 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1121 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1122 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1124 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1125 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1126 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1127 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1128 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1129 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1130 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1132 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1133 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1134 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1135 pub is_outbound: bool,
1136 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1137 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1138 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1139 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1140 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1142 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1143 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1144 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1145 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1147 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1148 pub is_usable: bool,
1149 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1150 pub is_public: bool,
1151 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1152 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1153 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1154 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1155 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1156 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1158 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1159 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1162 impl ChannelDetails {
1163 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1164 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1165 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1167 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1168 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1169 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1170 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1173 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1174 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1175 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1177 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1178 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1179 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1180 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1184 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1185 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1186 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1187 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1188 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1190 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1192 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1193 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1194 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1197 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1198 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1199 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1201 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1202 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1203 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1205 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1206 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1207 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1209 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1210 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1214 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1216 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1218 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1219 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1220 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1221 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1223 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1224 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1225 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1228 macro_rules! handle_error {
1229 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1232 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1233 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1234 // entering the macro.
1235 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1236 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1238 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1240 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1241 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1242 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1243 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1247 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1248 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1249 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1250 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1255 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1256 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1258 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1259 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1260 action: err.action.clone()
1264 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1265 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1266 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1267 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1268 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1272 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1279 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1280 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1281 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1282 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1283 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1284 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1286 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1287 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1288 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1289 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1290 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1292 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1293 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1295 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1299 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1300 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1301 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1303 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1304 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1306 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1307 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1309 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1310 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1311 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1312 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1313 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1314 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1320 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1321 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1325 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1327 $entry.remove_entry();
1335 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1336 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1340 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1342 $entry.remove_entry();
1350 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1351 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1353 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1354 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1360 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1361 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1362 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1363 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1364 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1366 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1367 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1368 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1369 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1370 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1371 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1372 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1373 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1374 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1375 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1380 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1381 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1382 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1384 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1385 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1386 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1387 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1388 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1389 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1392 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1397 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1398 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1399 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1400 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1401 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1402 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1403 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1404 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1405 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1406 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1407 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1409 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1410 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1411 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1417 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1418 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1420 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1421 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1422 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1423 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1424 updates.announcement_sigs);
1425 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1426 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1429 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1430 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1432 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1434 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1435 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1437 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1438 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1439 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1440 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1445 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1446 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1447 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1448 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1449 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1451 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1452 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1453 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1456 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1457 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1458 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1459 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1460 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1461 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1462 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1463 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1467 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1468 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1469 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1470 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1471 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1473 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan);
1479 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1480 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1484 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1486 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1487 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1488 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1489 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1490 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1491 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1495 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1497 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1498 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1500 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1502 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1503 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1504 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1505 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1506 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1507 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1508 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1509 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1511 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1512 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1513 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1518 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1520 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1521 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1522 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1523 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1524 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1525 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1526 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1527 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1529 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1532 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1533 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1535 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1537 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1539 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1541 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1542 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1543 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1544 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1554 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1555 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1556 &self.default_configuration
1559 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1560 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1561 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1564 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1565 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1567 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1569 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1573 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1578 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1580 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1581 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1582 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1583 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1584 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1586 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1587 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1589 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1590 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1591 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1593 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1594 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1595 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1596 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1597 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1598 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1600 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1601 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1602 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1603 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1604 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1605 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1609 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1610 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1614 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1615 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1617 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1619 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1620 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1621 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1622 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1623 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1624 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1628 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1633 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1635 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1636 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1639 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1641 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1647 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1648 node_id: their_network_key,
1651 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1654 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1655 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1656 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1657 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1658 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1659 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1660 // the same channel.
1661 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1663 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1665 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1668 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1669 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1670 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1671 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1672 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1673 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1674 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1675 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1676 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1677 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1678 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1679 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1680 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1681 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1682 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1683 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1684 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1685 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1686 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1688 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1689 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1690 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1691 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1692 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1693 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1694 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1695 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1696 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1697 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1698 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1699 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1700 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1701 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1702 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1703 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1704 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1705 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1706 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1707 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1708 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1709 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1710 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1711 config: Some(channel.config()),
1719 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1720 /// more information.
1721 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1722 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1725 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1726 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1728 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1729 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1732 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1733 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1734 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1735 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1736 // really wanted anyway.
1737 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1740 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1741 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1743 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1744 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1745 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1747 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1748 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1749 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1750 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1751 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1752 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1753 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1754 total_msat: *total_msat,
1757 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1758 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1760 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1761 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1763 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1768 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1769 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1770 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1771 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1772 Some(transaction) => {
1773 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1777 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1778 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1779 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1780 reason: closure_reason
1784 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1787 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1788 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1789 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1791 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1792 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1794 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1795 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1798 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1799 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1800 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1801 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1802 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1804 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1805 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1806 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1808 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1812 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1813 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1814 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1815 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1816 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
1819 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1820 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1821 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1822 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1826 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1834 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1835 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1836 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1837 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1840 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1844 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1845 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1846 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1848 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1849 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1851 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1852 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1853 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1854 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1856 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1858 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1859 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1860 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1861 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1862 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1865 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1866 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1867 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1869 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1870 /// the channel being closed or not:
1871 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1872 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1873 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1874 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1875 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1876 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1877 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1879 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1881 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1882 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1883 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1884 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1885 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1889 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1890 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1891 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1892 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1893 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1894 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1895 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1896 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1898 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1899 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1900 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1901 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1902 // ignore the result here.
1903 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1907 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1908 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1909 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1910 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1912 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1913 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1915 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1917 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1918 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1919 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1921 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1923 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1925 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1928 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1929 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1930 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1931 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1932 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1937 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1940 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1942 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1943 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1945 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1946 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1947 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1948 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1949 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1950 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1951 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1962 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1963 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1964 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1966 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1967 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1968 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1971 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1972 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1973 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1975 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1976 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1977 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1978 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1979 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1982 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1983 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1984 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1985 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1986 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1990 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1991 /// local transaction(s).
1992 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1993 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1994 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1998 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1999 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2001 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2002 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2003 return Err(ReceiveError {
2004 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2006 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2009 // final_expiry_too_soon
2010 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2011 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2013 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2014 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2015 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2016 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2017 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2018 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2019 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2020 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2021 return Err(ReceiveError {
2022 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2023 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2026 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2027 return Err(ReceiveError {
2029 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2030 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2034 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2035 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2036 return Err(ReceiveError {
2037 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2038 err_data: Vec::new(),
2039 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2042 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2043 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2044 return Err(ReceiveError {
2045 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2046 err_data: Vec::new(),
2047 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2049 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2050 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2052 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2053 phantom_shared_secret,
2055 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2056 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2057 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2058 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2059 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2060 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2061 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2062 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2063 return Err(ReceiveError {
2064 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2065 err_data: Vec::new(),
2066 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2070 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2072 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2075 return Err(ReceiveError {
2076 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2077 err_data: Vec::new(),
2078 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2083 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2086 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2087 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2088 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2089 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2093 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2094 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2095 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2097 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2098 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2099 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2100 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2101 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2102 failure_code: $err_code,
2108 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2109 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2112 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2113 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2114 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2116 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2117 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2118 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2119 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2120 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2121 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2122 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2123 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2125 macro_rules! return_err {
2126 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2128 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2129 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2130 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2131 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2132 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2133 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2139 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2141 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2142 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2144 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2145 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2149 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2150 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2152 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2154 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2155 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2156 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2157 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2158 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2160 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2163 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2164 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2165 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2167 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2168 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2169 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2172 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2173 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2174 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2175 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2179 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2180 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2181 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2184 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2185 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2186 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2187 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2188 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2193 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2194 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2195 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2196 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2197 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2198 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2199 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2200 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2201 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2202 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2203 // phantom or an intercept.
2204 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2205 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2206 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2210 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2213 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2215 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2216 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2217 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2218 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2219 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2223 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2225 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2226 // have no consistency guarantees.
2227 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2231 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2232 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2233 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2234 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2235 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2237 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2238 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2239 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2240 // we don't have the channel here.
2241 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2243 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2245 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2246 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2247 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2248 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2249 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2250 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2251 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2253 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2254 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2256 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2257 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2261 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2262 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2263 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2264 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2266 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2273 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2274 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2275 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2276 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2277 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2278 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2280 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2281 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2283 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2284 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2285 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2286 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2287 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2288 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2289 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2290 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2291 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2292 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2298 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2299 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2300 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2301 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2303 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2304 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2306 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2307 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2308 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2310 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2311 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2312 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2313 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2314 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2315 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2316 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2320 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2325 pending_forward_info
2328 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2329 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2330 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2332 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2333 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2334 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2335 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2336 if !chan.should_announce() {
2337 return Err(LightningError {
2338 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2339 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2342 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2343 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2346 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2349 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2350 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2351 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2352 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2354 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2355 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2356 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2357 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2359 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2360 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2364 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2366 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2368 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2370 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2371 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2373 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2374 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2375 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2376 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2377 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2378 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2379 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2380 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2382 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2383 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2384 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2386 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2388 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2394 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2395 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2397 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2398 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2400 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2401 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2402 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2403 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2404 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2406 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2410 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2411 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2412 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2413 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2417 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2418 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2419 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2420 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2421 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2422 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2423 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2425 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2426 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2427 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2429 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2430 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2432 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2433 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2434 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2435 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2436 Some(monitor_update) => {
2437 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2438 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2439 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan) {
2442 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2443 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2444 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2445 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2446 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2447 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2448 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2449 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2455 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2456 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2457 // `channel_by_id` map.
2458 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2459 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2464 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2465 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2467 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2472 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2474 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2475 /// fields for more info.
2477 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2478 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2480 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2482 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2483 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2484 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2485 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2486 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2488 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2489 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2490 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2491 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2492 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2494 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2495 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2496 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2497 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2499 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2501 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2502 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2503 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2505 /// In general, a path may raise:
2506 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2507 /// node public key) is specified.
2508 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2509 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2511 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2512 /// relevant updates.
2514 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2515 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2516 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2518 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2520 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2521 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2522 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2523 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2524 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2526 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2527 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2528 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2530 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2531 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2532 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2534 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2535 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2536 self.pending_outbound_payments
2537 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2538 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2539 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2542 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2543 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2544 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2545 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2546 self.pending_outbound_payments
2547 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2548 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2549 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2550 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2551 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2555 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2556 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2557 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2558 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2559 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2563 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2564 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2565 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2569 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2570 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2571 /// retries are exhausted.
2573 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2574 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2576 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2577 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2578 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2580 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2581 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2583 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2584 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2585 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2587 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2590 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2591 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2592 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2593 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2594 /// never reach the recipient.
2596 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2597 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2599 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2600 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2602 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2604 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2605 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2606 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2607 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2608 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2610 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2611 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2614 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2615 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2617 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2620 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2621 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2622 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2623 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2624 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2625 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2627 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2628 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2631 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2632 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2633 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2634 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2635 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2636 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2637 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2638 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2641 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2644 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2645 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2648 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2649 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2650 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2651 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2652 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2653 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2654 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2655 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2657 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2658 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2661 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2663 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2665 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2666 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2667 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2668 } else { unreachable!(); })
2671 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2674 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2675 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2678 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2679 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2684 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2685 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2688 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2690 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2693 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2694 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2695 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2704 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2705 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2706 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2710 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2712 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2713 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2715 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2716 /// across the p2p network.
2718 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2719 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2721 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2722 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2723 /// keys per-channel).
2725 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2726 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2727 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2729 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2730 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2731 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2733 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2734 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2735 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2736 /// for more details.
2738 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2739 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2740 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2743 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2744 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2745 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2746 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2751 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2752 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2753 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2754 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2755 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2756 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2757 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2761 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2762 let mut output_index = None;
2763 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2764 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2765 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2766 if output_index.is_some() {
2767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2768 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2771 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2773 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2776 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2779 if output_index.is_none() {
2780 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2781 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2784 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2788 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2790 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2791 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2792 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2793 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2795 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2796 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2798 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2799 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2801 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2803 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2804 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2805 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2806 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2807 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2808 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2809 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2810 pub fn update_channel_config(
2811 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2812 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2813 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2814 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2815 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2820 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2823 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2824 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2827 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2828 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2829 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2830 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2834 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2835 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2836 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2839 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2840 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2841 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2842 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2843 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2851 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2852 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2854 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2855 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2857 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2858 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2859 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2860 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2861 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2863 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2864 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2866 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2869 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2870 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2871 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2872 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2873 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2876 let next_hop_scid = {
2877 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2878 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2879 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2882 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2884 if !chan.is_usable() {
2885 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2886 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2889 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2891 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2892 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2897 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2898 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2899 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2902 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2903 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2904 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2906 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2908 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2909 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2912 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2913 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2914 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2915 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2916 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2918 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2922 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2923 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2925 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2928 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2929 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2932 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2933 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2934 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2937 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2938 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2939 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2940 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2941 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2942 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2943 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2946 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2947 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2948 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2949 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2954 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2956 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2957 /// Will likely generate further events.
2958 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2961 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2962 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2963 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2965 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2966 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2968 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2969 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2970 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2972 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2973 match forward_info {
2974 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2975 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2976 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2977 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2978 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2981 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2982 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2983 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2985 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2986 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2987 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2988 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2989 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2990 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2993 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2994 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2996 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2999 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3000 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3006 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3007 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3009 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3013 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3014 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3016 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3020 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3021 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3022 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3023 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3024 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3026 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3027 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3028 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3029 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3030 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3032 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3034 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3035 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3039 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3040 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3041 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3042 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3048 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3051 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3054 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3055 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3056 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3057 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3058 // problem, not ours.
3064 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3065 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3067 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3072 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3073 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3074 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3079 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3081 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3084 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3085 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3086 match forward_info {
3087 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3088 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3089 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3090 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3091 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3095 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3096 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3097 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3098 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3099 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3100 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3101 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3103 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3104 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3105 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3107 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3110 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3112 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3113 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3114 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3115 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3120 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3121 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3123 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3124 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3125 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3126 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3128 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3131 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3133 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3134 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3135 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3144 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3145 match forward_info {
3146 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3147 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3148 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3149 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3152 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3153 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3154 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3155 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3157 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3158 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3160 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3163 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3164 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3165 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3166 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3167 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3168 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3169 phantom_shared_secret,
3171 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3173 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3178 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3179 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3180 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3181 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3182 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3184 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3185 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3186 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3187 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3188 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3189 phantom_shared_secret,
3191 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3192 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3196 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3197 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3198 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3199 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3200 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3203 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3204 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3205 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3207 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3208 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3209 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3212 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3213 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3214 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3217 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3218 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3219 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3220 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3221 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3222 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3226 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3227 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3228 total_value += htlc.value;
3229 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3230 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3231 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3233 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3234 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3236 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3238 _ => unreachable!(),
3241 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3243 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3245 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3246 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3247 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3248 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3249 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3252 amount_msat: total_value,
3253 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3254 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3256 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3258 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3259 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3261 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3263 payment_claimable_generated
3267 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3268 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3269 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3270 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3271 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3272 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3273 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3274 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3276 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3277 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3278 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3279 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3280 Ok(result) => result,
3282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3283 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3287 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3288 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3289 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3291 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3292 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3296 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3298 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3299 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3300 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3301 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3304 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3306 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3307 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3308 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3309 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3310 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3312 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3314 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3315 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3320 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3327 if payment_data.is_none() {
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3329 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3332 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3333 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3334 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3335 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3336 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3338 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3339 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3341 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3342 if payment_claimable_generated {
3343 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3349 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3350 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3358 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3359 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3360 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3361 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3362 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3363 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3365 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3366 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3368 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3370 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3371 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3372 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3374 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3376 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3377 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3378 events.append(&mut new_events);
3381 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3383 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3384 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3386 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3387 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3388 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3389 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3390 if background_events.is_empty() {
3394 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3396 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3397 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3398 // monitor updating completing.
3399 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3406 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3407 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3408 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3409 self.process_background_events();
3412 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3413 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3414 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3415 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3417 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3418 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3420 if !chan.is_live() {
3421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3422 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3423 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3426 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3428 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3429 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3433 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3434 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3435 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3436 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3437 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3438 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3439 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3441 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3444 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3447 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3448 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3449 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3457 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3459 /// This currently includes:
3460 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3461 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3462 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3464 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3465 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3466 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3468 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3469 /// estimate fetches.
3470 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3471 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3472 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3473 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3475 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3477 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3478 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3479 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3482 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3483 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3484 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3485 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3486 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3487 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3488 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3489 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3491 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3492 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3493 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3494 if needs_close { return false; }
3497 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3498 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3499 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3500 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3501 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3502 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3503 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3508 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3509 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3511 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3512 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3513 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3517 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3518 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3523 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3527 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3528 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3533 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3534 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3535 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3536 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3537 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3538 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3539 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3540 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3541 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3542 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3543 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3544 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3545 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3546 // have no channels to the peer.
3547 let remove_entry = {
3548 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3549 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3552 entry.remove_entry();
3555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3560 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3561 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3562 // This should be unreachable
3563 debug_assert!(false);
3566 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3567 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3568 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3569 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3571 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3572 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3573 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3575 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3582 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3583 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3584 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3585 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3586 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3589 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3590 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3593 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3595 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3596 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3597 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3598 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3599 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3606 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3607 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3608 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3610 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3611 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3612 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3613 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3615 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3616 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3617 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3618 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3619 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3620 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3623 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3624 /// reason for the failure.
3626 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3627 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3630 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3631 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3632 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3633 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3634 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3635 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3636 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3641 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3642 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3643 match failure_code {
3644 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3645 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3646 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3647 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3648 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3649 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3654 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3655 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3657 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3659 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3660 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3661 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3662 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3663 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3664 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3665 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3667 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3669 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3670 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3672 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3677 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3678 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3679 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3680 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3681 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3682 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3683 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3684 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3685 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3686 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3688 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3689 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3690 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3691 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3693 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3694 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3695 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3696 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3697 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3701 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3702 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3703 // be surfaced to the user.
3704 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3705 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3706 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3708 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3710 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3715 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3719 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3722 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3723 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3724 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3725 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3729 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3730 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3731 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3732 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3733 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3734 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3735 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3736 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3737 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3740 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3741 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3742 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3745 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3746 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3747 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3749 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3750 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3752 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3753 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3754 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3756 let mut forward_event = None;
3757 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3758 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3759 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3761 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3763 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3765 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3766 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3769 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3770 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3771 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3772 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3773 time_forwardable: time
3776 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3777 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3778 failed_next_destination: destination,
3784 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3785 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3787 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3788 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3789 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3791 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3792 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3793 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3794 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3796 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3797 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3798 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3799 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3800 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3801 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3802 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3807 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3808 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3809 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3810 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3811 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3812 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3813 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3814 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3819 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3820 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3821 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3823 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3824 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3825 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3826 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3831 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3833 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3834 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3835 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3836 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3837 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3839 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3840 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3842 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3843 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3844 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3845 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3846 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3848 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3849 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3850 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3851 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3853 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3854 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3855 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3862 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3863 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3871 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3876 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3877 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3878 debug_assert!(false);
3883 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3884 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3885 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3886 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3887 if sources.len() != 1 {
3888 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3889 debug_assert!(false);
3895 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3897 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3898 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3899 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3900 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3903 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3904 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3905 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3906 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3910 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3911 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3912 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3913 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3915 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3916 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3917 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3918 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3919 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3924 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3925 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3926 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3927 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3928 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3930 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3932 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3935 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3936 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3937 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3938 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3942 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3943 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3944 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3945 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3948 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3949 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3950 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3954 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
3955 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
3956 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
3960 if let Some(mut peer_state_lock) = peer_state_opt.take() {
3961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3962 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3963 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3964 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
3966 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
3967 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
3968 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
3969 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
3970 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
3972 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3973 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
3974 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
3976 if let Err(e) = res {
3977 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
3978 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
3979 // update over and over again until morale improves.
3980 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
3981 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
3987 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3988 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3989 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3993 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3994 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3995 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
3996 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3997 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3998 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3999 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4000 // again on restart.
4001 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4002 payment_preimage, update_res);
4004 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4005 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4006 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4007 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4008 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4009 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4013 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4014 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4017 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4019 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4020 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4022 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4023 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4024 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4025 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4026 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4027 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4028 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4031 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4032 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4034 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4036 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4042 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4043 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4044 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4050 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4051 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4052 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4055 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4056 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4058 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4059 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4060 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4061 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4062 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4066 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4067 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4073 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4074 /// update completion.
4075 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4076 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4077 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4078 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4079 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4080 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4081 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4082 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4083 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4084 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4085 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4086 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4087 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4089 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4091 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4092 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4093 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4094 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4097 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4098 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4100 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4102 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4107 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4109 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4110 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4111 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4112 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4117 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4118 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4119 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4120 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4121 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4126 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4130 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4136 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4137 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4138 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4144 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4147 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4148 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4150 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4151 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4152 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4153 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4154 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4160 let mut peer_state_lock;
4161 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4162 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4163 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4166 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4167 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4171 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4172 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4173 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4176 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4179 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4181 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4182 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4185 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4186 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4187 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4189 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4190 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4191 /// used to accept such channels.
4193 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4194 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4195 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4196 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4199 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4200 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4202 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4203 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4204 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4206 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4207 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4209 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4210 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4212 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4213 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4215 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4216 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4217 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4218 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4221 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4225 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4226 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4227 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4228 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4229 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4231 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4232 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4235 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4236 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4237 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4238 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4239 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4240 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4243 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4244 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4245 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4248 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4249 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4250 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4254 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4260 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4261 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4262 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4265 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4269 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4270 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4271 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4273 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4275 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4277 debug_assert!(false);
4278 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4282 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4283 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4284 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4287 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4288 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4292 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4294 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4295 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4297 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4298 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4299 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4302 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4303 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4304 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4307 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4308 pending_events.push(
4309 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4310 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4311 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4312 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4313 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4314 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4319 entry.insert(channel);
4325 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4326 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4328 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4330 debug_assert!(false);
4331 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4335 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4337 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4338 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4343 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4344 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4345 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4346 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4347 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4349 user_channel_id: user_id,
4354 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4355 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4357 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4358 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4360 debug_assert!(false);
4361 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4364 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4365 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4366 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4367 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4368 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4369 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4374 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4376 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4379 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4382 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4383 funding_msg.channel_id))
4385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4386 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4390 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4391 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4392 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4393 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4394 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4395 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4396 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4400 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4402 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4403 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4405 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4406 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4407 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4408 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4409 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4410 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4411 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4412 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4420 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4421 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4423 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4425 debug_assert!(false);
4426 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4429 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4430 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4431 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4432 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4433 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4434 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4435 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4436 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan);
4437 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4438 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4439 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4440 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4441 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4442 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4451 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4452 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4453 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4455 debug_assert!(false);
4456 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4458 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4459 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4460 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4461 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4462 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4463 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4464 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4466 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4467 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4468 msg: announcement_sigs,
4470 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4471 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4472 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4473 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4474 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4475 // announcement_signatures.
4476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4477 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4479 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4485 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4493 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4494 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4495 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4497 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4499 debug_assert!(false);
4500 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4502 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4503 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4504 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4507 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4508 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4509 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4510 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4513 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4514 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4515 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4516 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4518 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4519 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4520 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4521 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4522 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4523 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4528 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4529 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4530 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4531 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4532 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
4536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4539 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4540 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4541 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4542 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4548 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4549 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4550 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4552 debug_assert!(false);
4553 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4555 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4558 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4560 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4561 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4562 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4563 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4568 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4569 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4570 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4571 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4572 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4573 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4574 } else { (tx, None) }
4576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4579 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4580 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4581 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4583 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4584 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4585 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4586 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4587 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4591 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4596 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4597 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4598 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4599 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4601 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4602 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4603 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4604 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4606 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4608 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4610 debug_assert!(false);
4611 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4613 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4614 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4615 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4618 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4619 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4620 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4621 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4622 match pending_forward_info {
4623 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4624 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4625 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4626 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4628 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4629 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4630 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4631 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4632 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4635 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4637 _ => pending_forward_info
4640 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4647 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4648 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4650 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4652 debug_assert!(false);
4653 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4655 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4656 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4657 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4659 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4664 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4668 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4672 debug_assert!(false);
4673 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4677 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4679 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4686 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4688 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4690 debug_assert!(false);
4691 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4695 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4697 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4698 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4699 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4701 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4708 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4710 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4712 debug_assert!(false);
4713 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4717 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4719 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4720 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4721 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4722 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4723 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4731 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4732 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4733 let mut forward_event = None;
4734 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4735 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4736 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4737 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4738 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4739 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4740 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4741 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4743 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4744 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4746 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4747 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4748 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4750 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4751 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4754 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4755 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4757 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4758 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4759 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4761 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4762 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4763 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4764 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4765 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4768 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4769 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4772 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4773 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4774 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4775 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4776 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4777 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4778 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4781 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4782 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4783 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4788 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4789 // payments are being processed.
4790 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4791 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4793 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4794 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4801 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4802 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4805 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4806 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4807 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4810 match forward_event {
4812 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4813 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4814 time_forwardable: time
4822 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4823 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4824 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4825 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4827 debug_assert!(false);
4828 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4832 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4834 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4835 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4836 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4837 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4838 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4840 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
4842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4845 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4849 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4851 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4853 debug_assert!(false);
4854 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4858 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4860 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4867 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4869 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4871 debug_assert!(false);
4872 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4874 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4875 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4876 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4878 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4882 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4883 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4884 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
4885 msg, &self.default_configuration
4887 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4888 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4889 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
4892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4897 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4898 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4899 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4900 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4902 // It's not a local channel
4903 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4907 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
4908 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4909 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4911 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4912 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4913 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4914 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4915 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4916 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4917 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4918 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4919 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4920 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4924 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4925 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4926 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4927 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4929 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4930 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4935 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4938 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4940 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4943 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4945 debug_assert!(false);
4946 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4950 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4952 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4953 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4954 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4955 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4956 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4957 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
4958 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
4959 let mut channel_update = None;
4960 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4961 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4962 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4965 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4966 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4967 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4968 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4969 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4970 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4971 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4976 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4977 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
4978 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4979 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4980 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4981 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4989 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4990 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4993 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4994 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4999 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5000 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5001 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5002 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5003 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5004 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5005 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5006 match monitor_event {
5007 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5008 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5009 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5010 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5012 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5013 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5014 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5015 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5018 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5019 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5020 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5021 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5023 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5024 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5025 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5026 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5029 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5031 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5034 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5035 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5036 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5037 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5038 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5039 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5043 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5044 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5046 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5048 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5049 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5050 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5051 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5052 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5059 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5060 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5066 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5067 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5070 has_pending_monitor_events
5073 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5074 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5075 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5077 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5078 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5081 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5082 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5083 /// update was applied.
5084 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5085 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5086 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5087 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5090 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5092 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5093 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5094 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5095 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5096 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5097 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5098 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5099 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5100 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5102 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5103 has_monitor_update = true;
5105 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5106 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5107 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5108 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5109 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5110 peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5111 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5113 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5115 continue 'chan_loop;
5122 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5123 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5124 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5127 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5128 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5134 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5135 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5136 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5137 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5138 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5139 let mut has_update = false;
5141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5143 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5144 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5145 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5146 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5147 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5148 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5149 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5150 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5152 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5153 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5156 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5157 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5158 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5159 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5160 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5165 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5167 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5168 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5169 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5175 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5176 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5184 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5185 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5191 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5192 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5194 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5195 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5196 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5197 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5198 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5199 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5200 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5201 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5202 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5203 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5204 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5205 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5206 assert!(should_broadcast);
5207 } else { unreachable!(); }
5208 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5210 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5214 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5215 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5217 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5218 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5221 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5224 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5225 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5227 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5228 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5229 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5230 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5231 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5232 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5233 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5234 // never fail a payment too early.
5235 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5237 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5245 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5248 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5249 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5251 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5252 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5253 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5254 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5256 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5258 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5259 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5263 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5264 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5266 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5268 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5269 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5271 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5272 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5273 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5274 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5275 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5276 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5277 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5278 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5279 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5280 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5281 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5284 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5285 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5287 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5290 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5292 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5294 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5295 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5296 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5297 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5298 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5301 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5302 /// stored external to LDK.
5304 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5305 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5306 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5308 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5309 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5312 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5313 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5314 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5315 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5317 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5318 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5319 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5320 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5321 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5323 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5324 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5325 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5326 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5327 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5329 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5330 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5332 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5333 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5337 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5338 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5340 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5342 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5343 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5345 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5346 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5347 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5348 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5349 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5350 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5351 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5354 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5355 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5357 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5360 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5362 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5364 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5365 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5368 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5369 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5371 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5372 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5373 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5376 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5377 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5379 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5380 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5381 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5382 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5384 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5385 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5386 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5387 Some(_) => continue,
5388 None => return scid_candidate
5393 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5395 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5396 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5398 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5399 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5400 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5404 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5405 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5406 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5408 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5409 /// times to get a unique scid.
5410 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5411 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5412 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5414 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5415 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5416 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5417 return scid_candidate
5421 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5422 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5423 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5424 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5427 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5430 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5431 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5432 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5433 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5442 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5443 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5444 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5445 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5446 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5450 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5451 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5452 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5457 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5458 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5459 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5463 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5464 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5468 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5469 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5472 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5473 /// using the given event handler.
5475 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5476 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5479 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5480 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5481 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5483 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5485 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5486 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5487 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5488 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5491 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5492 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5493 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5496 for event in pending_events {
5497 handler(event).await;
5500 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5501 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5506 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5508 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5510 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5511 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5512 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5517 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5518 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5519 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5520 /// is always placed next to each other.
5522 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5523 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5524 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5525 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5527 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5528 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5529 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5530 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5531 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5532 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5533 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5535 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5536 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5537 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5538 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5541 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5542 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5544 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5545 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5548 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5549 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5550 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5551 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5552 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5553 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5554 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5558 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5559 events.replace(pending_events);
5568 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5570 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5571 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5572 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5573 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5574 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5575 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5579 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5581 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5582 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5583 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5584 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5585 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5587 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5588 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5589 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5590 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5593 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5594 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5595 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5598 for event in pending_events {
5599 handler.handle_event(event);
5607 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5609 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5610 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5611 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5612 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5613 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5614 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5618 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5620 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5621 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5622 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5623 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5624 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5627 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5628 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5631 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5633 let new_height = height - 1;
5635 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5636 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5637 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5638 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5639 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5640 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5643 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5647 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5649 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5650 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5651 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5652 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5653 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5654 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5658 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5659 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5660 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5661 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5663 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5664 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5668 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5670 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5671 if height < last_best_block_height {
5672 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5673 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5677 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5678 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5679 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5680 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5682 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5683 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5687 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5689 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5691 macro_rules! max_time {
5692 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5694 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5695 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5696 // having an explicit local time source.
5697 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5698 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5699 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5700 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5701 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5707 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5708 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5709 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5710 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5714 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5715 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5716 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5717 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5718 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5719 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5720 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5721 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5728 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5730 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5731 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5732 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5733 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5734 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5735 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5740 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5742 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5744 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5745 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5746 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5747 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5751 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5752 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5754 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5755 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5756 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5757 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5758 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5760 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5761 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5764 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5767 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5768 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5769 let res = f(channel);
5770 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5771 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5772 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5773 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5774 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5776 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5777 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5778 if channel.is_usable() {
5779 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5780 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5781 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5782 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5787 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5791 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5793 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5795 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5796 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5797 msg: announcement_sigs,
5799 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5800 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5801 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5803 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5804 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5805 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5810 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5811 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5812 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5813 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5814 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5815 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5816 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5817 // is always consistent.
5818 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5819 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5820 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5821 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5822 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5825 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5826 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5827 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5828 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5829 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5830 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5831 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5835 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5836 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5837 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5838 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5839 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5840 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5841 data: reason_message,
5851 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5852 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5853 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5854 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5855 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5856 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5857 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5858 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5859 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5860 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5862 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5863 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5864 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5868 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5871 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5872 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5873 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5874 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5875 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5876 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5877 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5878 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5879 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5882 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5883 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5884 _ => unreachable!(),
5886 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5887 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5888 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5889 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5895 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5897 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5898 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5902 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5903 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5904 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5905 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5907 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5909 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5910 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5911 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5912 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5913 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5914 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5917 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5918 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5919 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5921 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5922 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5923 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5924 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5927 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5928 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5929 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5930 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5931 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5934 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5935 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5936 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5939 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5940 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5941 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5942 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5945 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5946 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5947 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
5948 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
5951 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5952 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5954 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
5955 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
5956 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
5957 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
5958 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
5961 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5962 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5963 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
5964 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
5967 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5968 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5969 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5970 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
5973 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5974 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5975 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
5976 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
5980 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
5981 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5983 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5984 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5985 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5986 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5987 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5988 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5992 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5994 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5997 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5999 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6002 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6004 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6007 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6009 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6012 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6014 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6017 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6019 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6022 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6024 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6027 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6029 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6032 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6034 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6037 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6039 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6042 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6044 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6047 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6049 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6052 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6054 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6057 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6059 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6062 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6064 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6067 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6068 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6069 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6072 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6077 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6079 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6082 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6083 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6084 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6085 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6087 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6088 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6089 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6092 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6093 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6094 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6095 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6096 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6097 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6102 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6105 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6109 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6110 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6113 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6116 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6117 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6118 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6119 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6120 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6121 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6122 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6127 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6128 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6129 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6133 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6135 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6137 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6138 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6142 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6143 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6144 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6148 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6153 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6154 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6156 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6157 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6158 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6159 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6160 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6165 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6166 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6167 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6168 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6175 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6176 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6177 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6178 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6179 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6180 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6181 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6182 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6183 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6184 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6189 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6190 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6195 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6196 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6197 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6198 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6199 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6208 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6212 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6215 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6216 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6217 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6218 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6219 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6220 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6221 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6222 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6224 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6225 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6226 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6230 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6231 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6232 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6233 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6236 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6237 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6238 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6239 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6247 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6248 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6252 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6253 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6256 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6257 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6261 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6262 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6263 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6264 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6267 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6268 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6270 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6271 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6272 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6273 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6274 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6277 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6278 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6279 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6280 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6283 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6284 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6285 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6286 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6289 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6290 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6291 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6292 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6293 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6294 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6295 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6296 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6297 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6298 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6299 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6300 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6301 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6302 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6303 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6304 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6305 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6306 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6308 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6309 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6310 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6316 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6317 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6319 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6320 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6321 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6322 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6325 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6326 (2, node_id, required),
6327 (4, features, required),
6328 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6329 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6330 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6331 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6334 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6335 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6336 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6337 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6338 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6339 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6340 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6341 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6342 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6343 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6344 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6345 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6346 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6347 (7, self.config, option),
6348 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6349 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6350 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6351 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6352 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6353 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6354 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6355 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6356 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6357 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6358 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6359 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6360 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6361 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6362 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6363 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6364 (32, self.is_public, required),
6365 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6366 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6367 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6373 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6374 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6375 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6376 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6377 (2, channel_id, required),
6378 (3, channel_type, option),
6379 (4, counterparty, required),
6380 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6381 (6, funding_txo, option),
6382 (7, config, option),
6383 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6384 (9, confirmations, option),
6385 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6386 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6387 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6388 (16, balance_msat, required),
6389 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6390 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6391 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6392 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6393 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6394 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6395 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6396 (26, is_outbound, required),
6397 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6398 (30, is_usable, required),
6399 (32, is_public, required),
6400 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6401 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6402 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6405 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6406 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6407 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6408 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6409 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6413 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6415 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6416 outbound_scid_alias,
6420 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6421 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6423 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6424 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6425 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6426 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6427 confirmations_required,
6429 force_close_spend_delay,
6430 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6431 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6432 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6433 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6434 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6435 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6440 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6441 (2, channels, vec_type),
6442 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6443 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6446 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6448 (0, onion_packet, required),
6449 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6452 (0, payment_data, required),
6453 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6454 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6456 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6457 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6458 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6462 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6463 (0, routing, required),
6464 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6465 (4, payment_hash, required),
6466 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6467 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6468 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6472 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6473 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6475 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6477 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6478 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6479 reason.write(writer)?;
6481 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6482 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6485 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6486 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6487 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6488 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6495 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6496 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6497 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6501 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6502 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6503 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6507 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6508 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6509 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6510 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6511 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6514 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6515 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6516 // messages contained in the variants.
6517 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6518 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6519 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6521 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6523 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6524 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6525 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6528 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6530 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6531 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6532 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6534 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6539 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6544 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6545 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6546 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6547 (2, outpoint, required),
6548 (4, htlc_id, required),
6549 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6552 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6553 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6554 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6555 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6556 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6558 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6559 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6560 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6561 (2, self.value, required),
6562 (4, payment_data, option),
6563 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6564 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6570 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6571 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6572 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6574 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6575 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6576 let mut total_msat = None;
6577 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6578 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6579 (0, prev_hop, required),
6580 (1, total_msat, option),
6581 (2, value, required),
6582 (4, payment_data, option),
6583 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6584 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6586 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6588 if payment_data.is_some() {
6589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6591 if total_msat.is_none() {
6592 total_msat = Some(value);
6594 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6597 if total_msat.is_none() {
6598 if payment_data.is_none() {
6599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6601 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6603 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6607 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6610 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6617 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6618 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6619 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6623 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6624 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6625 let mut payment_id = None;
6626 let mut payment_secret = None;
6627 let mut payment_params = None;
6628 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6629 (0, session_priv, required),
6630 (1, payment_id, option),
6631 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6632 (3, payment_secret, option),
6633 (4, path, vec_type),
6634 (5, payment_params, option),
6636 if payment_id.is_none() {
6637 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6639 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6641 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6642 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6643 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6644 path: path.unwrap(),
6645 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6650 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6651 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6656 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6657 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6659 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6661 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6662 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6663 (0, session_priv, required),
6664 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6665 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6666 (3, payment_secret, option),
6667 (4, *path, vec_type),
6668 (5, payment_params, option),
6671 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6673 field.write(writer)?;
6680 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6681 (0, forward_info, required),
6682 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6683 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6684 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6685 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6688 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6690 (0, htlc_id, required),
6691 (2, err_packet, required),
6696 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6697 (0, payment_secret, required),
6698 (2, expiry_time, required),
6699 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6700 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6701 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6704 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6706 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6707 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6708 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6709 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6710 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6711 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6715 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6716 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6718 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6720 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6722 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6723 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6724 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6727 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6730 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6731 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6732 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6733 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6734 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6735 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6736 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6738 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6739 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6740 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6741 unfunded_channels += 1;
6746 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6748 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6751 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6752 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6753 channel.write(writer)?;
6760 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6761 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6762 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6763 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6764 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6765 for forward in pending_forwards {
6766 forward.write(writer)?;
6771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6773 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6774 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6775 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6777 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6778 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6779 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6780 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6781 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6782 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6783 htlc.write(writer)?;
6785 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6788 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
6789 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
6790 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6791 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
6794 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6795 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
6796 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6797 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6798 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6800 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6801 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6802 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6803 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
6804 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
6805 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6806 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
6811 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6812 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6813 for event in events.iter() {
6814 event.write(writer)?;
6817 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6818 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6819 for event in background_events.iter() {
6821 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6823 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6824 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6829 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6830 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6831 // likely to be identical.
6832 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6833 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6835 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6836 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6837 hash.write(writer)?;
6838 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6841 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6842 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6843 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6844 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6845 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6848 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6849 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6851 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6852 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6853 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6854 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6857 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6858 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6862 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6863 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6864 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6866 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6867 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6868 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6874 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6875 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6876 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6877 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6880 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6881 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6882 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6883 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6884 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6887 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6888 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6889 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6890 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6891 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6892 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6893 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
6894 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6895 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6896 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6903 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6905 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6907 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6908 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6909 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6910 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6911 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6912 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6913 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6914 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6915 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6916 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6917 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6918 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6919 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6921 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6922 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6924 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6925 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6927 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6928 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6929 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6930 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6931 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6932 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6934 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6935 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6937 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6938 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6939 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6940 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6941 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6946 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
6947 pub entropy_source: ES,
6949 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
6950 pub node_signer: NS,
6952 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6953 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6955 pub signer_provider: SP,
6957 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6959 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6960 pub fee_estimator: F,
6961 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6963 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6964 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6965 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6966 pub chain_monitor: M,
6968 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6969 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6970 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6971 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6972 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6973 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
6975 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
6977 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6978 /// deserialization.
6980 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6981 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6982 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6984 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6985 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6987 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6988 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6989 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6990 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6992 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6995 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6996 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6999 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7000 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7002 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7003 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7004 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7005 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7006 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7007 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7011 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7012 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7013 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7014 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7015 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7017 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7018 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7023 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7024 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7025 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7026 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7028 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7029 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7030 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7031 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7032 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7033 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7037 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7038 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7039 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7043 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7044 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7046 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7047 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7048 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7049 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7050 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7055 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7056 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7058 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7064 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7065 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7066 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7067 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7068 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7069 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7070 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7071 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7072 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7074 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7075 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7076 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7077 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7078 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7079 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7080 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7081 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7082 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7083 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7084 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7085 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7086 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7087 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7088 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7089 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7090 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7091 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7092 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7093 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7094 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7095 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7096 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7097 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7098 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7099 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7100 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7101 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7102 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7103 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7104 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7105 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7107 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7108 let mut found_htlc = false;
7109 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7110 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7113 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7114 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7115 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7116 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7117 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7118 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7119 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7120 log_info!(args.logger,
7121 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7122 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7123 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7127 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7128 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7129 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7131 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7132 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7134 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7136 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7137 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7140 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7141 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7142 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7146 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7147 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7148 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7149 // safely discard the channel.
7150 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7151 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7152 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7153 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7154 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7157 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7158 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7159 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7160 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7161 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7162 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7166 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7167 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7168 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7169 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7173 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7174 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7175 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7176 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7177 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7180 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7181 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7183 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7186 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7187 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7188 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7189 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7190 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7192 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7193 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7195 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7198 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7199 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7200 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7201 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 let peer_state = PeerState {
7203 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7204 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7205 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7206 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7207 is_connected: false,
7209 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7212 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7214 for _ in 0..event_count {
7215 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7216 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7221 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7222 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7223 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7224 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7225 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7226 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7230 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7231 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7234 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7235 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7236 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7237 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7241 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7242 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7243 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7244 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7245 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7246 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7247 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7249 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7250 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7254 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7255 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7256 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7257 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7258 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7259 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7260 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7261 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7262 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7263 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7264 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7265 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7266 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7267 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7268 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7269 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7270 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7271 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7272 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7273 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7275 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7276 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7279 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7280 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7283 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7284 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7285 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7286 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7287 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7288 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7290 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7292 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7293 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7294 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7295 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7296 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7297 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7298 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7300 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7301 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7302 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7303 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7304 if path.is_empty() {
7305 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7306 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7308 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7309 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7310 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7311 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7313 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7314 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7315 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7318 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7319 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7320 retry_strategy: None,
7321 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7322 payment_params: None,
7323 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7324 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7326 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7327 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7328 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7329 total_msat: path_amt,
7330 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7332 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7333 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7338 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7339 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7340 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7341 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7342 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7344 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7345 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7346 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7347 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7348 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7349 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7350 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7351 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7352 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7353 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7354 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7359 !forwards.is_empty()
7361 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7362 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7363 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7364 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7365 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7366 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7367 intercepted_id != ev_id
7379 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7380 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7381 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7382 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7383 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7384 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7385 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7386 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7390 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7391 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7393 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7394 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7395 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7398 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7399 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7402 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7403 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7404 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7405 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7406 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7408 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7409 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7410 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7411 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7412 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7413 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7414 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7415 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7417 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7422 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7424 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7426 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7427 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7429 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7433 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7434 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7436 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7437 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7440 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7442 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7444 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7445 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7446 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7447 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7451 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7452 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7455 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7456 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7457 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7459 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7460 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7461 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7463 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7464 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7465 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7466 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7467 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7468 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7470 if chan.is_usable() {
7471 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7472 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7473 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7474 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7475 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7481 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7483 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7484 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7485 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7486 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7487 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7488 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7489 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7490 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7491 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7492 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7493 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7495 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7496 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7498 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7499 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7500 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7501 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7503 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7504 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7505 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7506 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7508 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7509 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7510 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7511 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7513 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7514 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7515 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7516 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7517 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7518 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7519 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7522 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7523 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7526 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7529 purpose: payment_purpose,
7530 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7536 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7537 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7538 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7540 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7541 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7545 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7547 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7548 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7549 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7550 router: args.router,
7552 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7554 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7555 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7556 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()), },
7557 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7559 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7560 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7561 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7562 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7563 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7564 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7566 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7571 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7573 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7575 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7576 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7577 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7578 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7580 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7581 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7582 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7584 logger: args.logger,
7585 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7588 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7589 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7590 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7591 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7592 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7595 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7596 //connection or two.
7598 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7604 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7605 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7606 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7607 use core::time::Duration;
7608 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7609 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7610 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7611 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7612 use crate::ln::msgs;
7613 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7614 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7615 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7616 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7617 use crate::util::test_utils;
7618 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7619 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7622 fn test_notify_limits() {
7623 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7624 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7628 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7630 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7631 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7632 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7633 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7634 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7636 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7638 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7639 // to connect messages with new values
7640 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7641 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7642 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7643 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7645 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7646 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7647 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7648 // ... but the last node should not.
7649 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7650 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7651 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7652 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7654 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7655 // about the channel.
7656 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7657 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7658 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7660 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7662 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7663 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7664 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7665 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7666 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7667 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7669 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7670 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7671 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7673 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7674 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7675 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7676 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7677 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7678 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7680 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7681 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7682 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7683 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7684 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7685 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7686 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7687 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7689 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7690 // the channel info has updated.
7691 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7692 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7693 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7694 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7695 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7696 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7700 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7701 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7707 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7709 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7710 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7711 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7712 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7714 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7715 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7716 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7717 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7718 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7719 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7723 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7725 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7726 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7728 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7730 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7731 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7734 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7735 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7736 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7738 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7739 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7740 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7741 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7742 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7743 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7744 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7745 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7746 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7748 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7749 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7751 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7752 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7753 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7755 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7756 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7757 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7758 // lightning messages manually.
7759 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7760 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7763 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7764 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7765 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7767 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7768 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7770 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7771 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7773 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7774 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7775 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7777 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7778 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7779 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7781 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7785 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7786 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7789 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7790 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7791 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7792 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7794 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7795 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7796 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7797 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7802 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7803 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7804 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7805 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7810 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7811 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7812 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7813 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7815 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7820 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7821 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7822 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7823 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7824 // fails as expected.
7825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7828 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7829 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7830 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7831 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7833 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7834 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7835 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7837 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7838 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7839 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7840 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7841 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7843 let route = find_route(
7844 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7845 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7847 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7849 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7851 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7852 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7853 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7855 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7856 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7857 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7858 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7859 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7861 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7862 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7863 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7864 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7865 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7866 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7867 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7868 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7869 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7871 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7872 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7874 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7875 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7876 let route = find_route(
7877 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7878 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7880 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7882 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7884 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7885 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7886 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7888 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7889 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7890 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7892 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7893 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7894 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7895 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7896 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7898 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7899 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7900 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7902 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7903 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7904 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7905 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7906 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7907 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7908 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7909 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7910 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7912 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7913 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7917 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7918 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7919 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7923 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7925 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7926 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7928 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7929 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7930 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
7931 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7932 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7934 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7935 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7936 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7937 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7938 let route = find_route(
7939 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7940 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7943 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7944 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7945 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7946 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7949 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7950 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7951 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7952 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7953 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7954 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7955 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7957 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7961 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7962 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7968 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7969 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7971 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7972 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7973 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
7974 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7975 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7977 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7978 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7979 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7980 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7981 let route = find_route(
7982 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7983 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7986 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7987 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7988 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7989 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7990 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7993 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7994 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7995 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7996 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7997 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7998 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7999 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8001 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8005 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8006 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8007 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8009 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8011 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8012 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8013 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8014 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8016 // Marshall an MPP route.
8017 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8018 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8019 route.paths.push(path);
8020 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8021 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8022 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8023 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8024 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8025 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8027 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8028 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8029 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8030 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8035 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8039 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8041 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8043 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8044 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8046 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8047 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8049 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8052 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8053 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8054 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8055 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8056 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8057 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8060 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8063 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8064 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8069 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8070 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8074 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8076 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8077 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8079 total_msat: 100_000,
8082 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8083 // payment verification fails as expected.
8084 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8085 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8086 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8087 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8089 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8093 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8094 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8098 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8099 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8100 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8101 // the channel is successfully closed.
8102 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8103 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8104 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8105 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8107 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8108 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8109 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8110 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8111 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8113 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8114 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8116 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8117 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8118 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8119 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8122 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8124 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8125 // as it has the funding transaction.
8126 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8127 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8128 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8130 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8133 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8135 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8137 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8138 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8139 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8141 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8142 // as it has the funding transaction.
8143 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8144 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8145 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8148 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8149 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8151 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8152 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8153 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8155 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8156 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8157 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8158 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8160 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8161 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8163 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8164 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8165 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8166 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8167 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8168 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8169 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8171 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8172 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8173 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8174 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8175 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8176 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8177 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8180 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8182 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8183 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8184 // closing transaction).
8185 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8186 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8187 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8189 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8190 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8191 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8192 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8193 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8196 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8198 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8200 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8201 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8202 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8204 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8206 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8207 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8210 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8211 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8212 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8215 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8216 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8217 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8220 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8222 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8223 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8225 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8226 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8228 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8229 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8234 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8235 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8236 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8237 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8238 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8239 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8240 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8241 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8244 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8245 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8246 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8248 // Test the API functions.
8249 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8251 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8253 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8255 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8257 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8259 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8261 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8266 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8267 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8268 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8269 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8272 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8273 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8274 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8276 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8278 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8279 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8280 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8282 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8283 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8285 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8286 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8291 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8292 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8294 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8295 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8297 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8301 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8303 use crate::chain::Listen;
8304 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8305 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8306 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8307 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8308 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8309 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8310 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8311 use crate::util::test_utils;
8312 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8313 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8315 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8316 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8317 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8319 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8323 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8324 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8325 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8326 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8327 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8328 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8329 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8330 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8335 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8336 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8339 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8340 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8341 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8343 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8344 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8346 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8347 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8348 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8349 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8350 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8352 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8353 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8355 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8356 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8357 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8358 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8360 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8362 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8364 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8365 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8366 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8367 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8368 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8370 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8372 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8374 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8375 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8376 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8377 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8378 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8381 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8382 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8383 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8385 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8386 } else { panic!(); }
8388 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8389 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8391 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8394 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8397 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8398 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8400 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8401 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8402 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8403 match msg_events[0] {
8404 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8405 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8406 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8410 match msg_events[1] {
8411 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8415 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8416 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8418 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8419 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8424 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8425 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8427 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8428 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8433 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8435 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8436 macro_rules! send_payment {
8437 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8438 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8439 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8440 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8441 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8442 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8443 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8444 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8445 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8446 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8448 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8449 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8451 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8452 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8454 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8455 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8456 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8457 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8458 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8459 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8460 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8461 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8463 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8464 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8465 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8466 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8468 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8469 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8470 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8471 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8472 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8474 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8477 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8478 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8479 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8480 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8482 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8487 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8488 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);