1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
65 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
66 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use std::time::Duration;
69 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
70 use std::time::Instant;
71 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
160 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
169 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
170 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
173 session_priv: SecretKey,
174 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
175 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
176 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
181 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
182 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
184 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
190 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
191 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
193 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
201 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
202 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
203 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
204 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
205 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
206 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
207 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
208 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
209 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
210 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
211 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
212 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
214 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
216 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
217 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
218 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
219 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
220 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
222 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
223 err: msgs::LightningError,
224 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
226 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
228 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
230 err: LightningError {
232 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
233 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
239 shutdown_finish: None,
243 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
249 shutdown_finish: None,
253 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
254 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
257 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
259 err: LightningError {
261 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
262 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
268 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
272 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
275 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
279 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
282 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
290 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
291 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
298 shutdown_finish: None,
303 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
304 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
305 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
306 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
307 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
309 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
310 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
311 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
312 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
313 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
314 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
315 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
317 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
321 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
322 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
323 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
324 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
325 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
326 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
327 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
328 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
329 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
330 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
331 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
332 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
333 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
335 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
336 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
337 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
338 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
341 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
342 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
343 /// quite some time lag.
344 enum BackgroundEvent {
345 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
346 /// commitment transaction.
347 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
350 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
351 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
353 latest_features: InitFeatures,
356 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
357 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
359 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
361 struct PendingInboundPayment {
362 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
363 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
364 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
365 /// this payment being removed.
367 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
368 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
369 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
372 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
373 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
374 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
375 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
376 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
377 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
378 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
379 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
381 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
382 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
383 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
384 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
385 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
386 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
387 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
388 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
389 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
391 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
392 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
394 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
395 /// to individual Channels.
397 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
398 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
399 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
400 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
402 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
403 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
404 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
405 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
406 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
407 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
408 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
410 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
411 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
412 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
413 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
416 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
417 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
418 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
419 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
420 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
422 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
423 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
424 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
425 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
426 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
427 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
428 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
429 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
430 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
431 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
434 default_configuration: UserConfig,
435 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
441 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
443 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
444 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
446 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
447 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
448 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
449 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
451 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
452 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
453 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
454 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts.
455 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
456 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
458 our_network_key: SecretKey,
459 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
461 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
462 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
463 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
465 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
466 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
467 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
468 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
470 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
471 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
472 /// are currently open with that peer.
473 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
474 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
476 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
478 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
479 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
480 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
481 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
482 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
483 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
484 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
485 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
486 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
488 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
495 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
497 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
498 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
499 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
500 pub struct ChainParameters {
501 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
502 pub network: Network,
504 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
506 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
507 pub best_block: BestBlock,
510 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
511 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
512 pub struct BestBlock {
513 block_hash: BlockHash,
518 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
519 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
521 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
526 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
527 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
528 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
531 /// Returns the best block hash.
532 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
534 /// Returns the best block height.
535 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
538 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
539 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
540 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
541 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
542 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
543 /// updates are ready for persistence).
544 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
545 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
546 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
547 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
550 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
551 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
552 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
555 persistence_notifier: notifier,
556 _read_guard: read_guard,
561 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
563 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
567 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
568 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
570 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
572 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
573 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
574 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
575 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
576 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
578 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
579 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
581 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
583 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
584 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
585 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
586 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
587 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
588 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
589 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
591 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
592 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
593 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
594 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
595 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
596 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
599 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
601 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
602 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
605 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
607 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
609 pub struct ChannelDetails {
610 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
611 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
612 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
613 /// lifetime of the channel.
614 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
616 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
617 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
618 /// The node_id of our counterparty
619 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
620 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
621 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
622 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
623 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
624 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
625 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
626 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
628 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
629 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
630 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
631 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
632 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
633 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
634 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
635 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
636 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
637 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
638 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
639 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
640 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
643 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
644 /// payments to us through this channel.
645 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
648 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
649 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
651 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
652 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
653 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
654 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
655 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
656 ParameterError(APIError),
657 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
658 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
659 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
662 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
664 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
665 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
666 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
667 /// paths than the ones selected).
668 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
669 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
670 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
671 /// in over-/re-payment.
673 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
674 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
675 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
677 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
678 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
679 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
680 /// with the latest update_id.
681 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
684 macro_rules! handle_error {
685 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
688 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
689 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
692 // entering the macro.
693 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
696 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
698 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
699 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
700 if let Some(update) = update_option {
701 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
707 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
708 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
710 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
711 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
712 action: err.action.clone()
716 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
717 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
720 // Return error in case higher-API need one
727 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
728 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
731 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
732 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
734 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
735 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
736 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
737 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
738 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
740 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
742 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
747 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
748 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
751 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
752 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
754 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
755 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
756 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
757 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
758 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
760 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
762 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
763 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
764 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
765 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
766 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
768 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
775 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
776 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
777 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
779 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
781 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
782 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
783 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
784 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
785 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
787 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
788 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
789 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
790 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
791 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
792 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
793 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
794 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
795 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
796 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
799 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
800 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
801 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
802 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
804 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
805 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
807 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
808 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
810 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
811 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
812 if !$resend_commitment {
813 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
816 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
818 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
819 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
825 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
826 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
827 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
829 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
830 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
834 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
835 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
836 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
837 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
838 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
841 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
846 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
847 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
848 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
849 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
850 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
853 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
855 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
856 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
858 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
860 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
862 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
863 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
864 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
865 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
866 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
867 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
870 default_configuration: config.clone(),
871 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
872 fee_estimator: fee_est,
876 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
878 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
879 by_id: HashMap::new(),
880 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
881 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
882 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
883 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
885 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
887 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
888 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
891 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
892 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
894 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
896 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
897 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
898 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
899 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
907 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
908 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
909 &self.default_configuration
912 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
914 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
915 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
916 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
917 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
918 /// otherwise ignored.
920 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
921 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
923 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
924 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
925 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
926 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
927 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
930 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
931 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
932 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
935 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
936 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
938 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
939 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
941 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
944 panic!("RNG is bad???");
947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
949 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
950 node_id: their_network_key,
956 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
957 let mut res = Vec::new();
959 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
960 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
961 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
962 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
963 res.push(ChannelDetails {
964 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
965 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
966 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
967 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
968 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
969 inbound_capacity_msat,
970 outbound_capacity_msat,
971 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
972 is_live: channel.is_live(),
973 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
978 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
979 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
980 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
986 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
987 /// more information.
988 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
989 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
992 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
993 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
995 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
996 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
997 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
998 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
999 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1000 // really wanted anyway.
1001 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1004 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1005 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1006 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1008 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1009 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1012 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1013 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1014 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1015 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1017 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1018 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1019 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1022 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1023 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1024 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1026 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1027 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1032 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1033 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1035 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1036 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1041 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1042 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1052 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1053 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1055 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1056 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1058 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1059 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1060 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1061 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1062 // ignore the result here.
1063 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1067 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1069 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1070 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1071 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1072 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1073 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1074 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1077 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1078 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1080 chan.remove_entry().1
1082 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1085 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1086 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1087 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1088 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1089 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1094 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1097 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1098 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1099 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1101 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1102 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1103 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1104 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1105 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1106 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1107 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1117 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1118 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1119 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1120 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1121 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1125 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1126 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1127 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1129 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1130 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1131 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1132 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1133 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1134 failure_code: $err_code,
1135 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1140 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1141 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1144 let shared_secret = {
1145 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1146 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1149 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1151 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1152 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1153 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1154 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1155 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1156 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1157 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1158 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1161 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1162 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1163 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1164 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1165 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1168 let mut channel_state = None;
1169 macro_rules! return_err {
1170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1173 if channel_state.is_none() {
1174 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1176 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1177 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1178 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1179 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1180 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1185 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1186 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1187 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1188 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1190 let error_code = match err {
1191 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1192 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1193 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1194 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1195 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1197 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1200 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1201 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1202 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1209 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1212 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1213 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1214 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1215 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1216 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1217 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1218 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1219 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1220 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1221 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1222 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1223 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1227 // final_expiry_too_soon
1228 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1229 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1230 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1231 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1232 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1233 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1235 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1236 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1237 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1239 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1240 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1241 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1244 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1245 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1246 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1247 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1250 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1251 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1252 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1253 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1255 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1256 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1258 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1260 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1261 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1262 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1263 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1266 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1267 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1268 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1270 // Check two things:
1271 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1272 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1273 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1275 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1277 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1278 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1279 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1281 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1283 let blinding_factor = {
1284 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1285 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1286 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1287 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1290 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1292 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1294 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1297 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1298 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1301 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1302 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1303 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1304 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1305 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1309 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1310 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1311 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1314 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1315 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1316 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1317 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1321 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1322 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1323 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1324 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1325 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1326 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1327 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1328 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1329 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1330 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1332 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1334 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1335 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1337 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1338 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1339 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1340 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1341 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1342 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1343 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1345 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1346 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1348 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1349 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1350 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1352 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1353 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1355 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1356 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1357 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1358 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1359 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1361 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1362 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1364 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1365 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1366 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1367 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1373 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1374 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1375 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1376 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1378 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1379 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1381 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1382 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1383 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1385 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1387 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1392 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1395 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1396 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1397 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1398 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1399 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1403 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1405 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1406 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1408 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1409 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1410 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1411 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1412 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1413 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1414 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1415 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1418 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1419 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1421 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1427 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1428 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1429 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1430 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1431 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1433 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1434 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1435 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1436 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1437 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1439 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1443 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1444 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1445 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1446 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1447 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1450 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1451 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1453 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1454 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1456 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1457 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1459 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1461 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1462 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1463 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1465 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1466 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1467 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1468 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1469 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1470 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1471 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1472 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1473 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1476 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1477 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1478 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1479 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1480 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1481 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1482 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1490 } else { unreachable!(); }
1494 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1495 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1497 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1502 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1504 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1505 /// fields for more info.
1507 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1508 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1509 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1510 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1511 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1512 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1514 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1516 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1517 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1518 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1520 /// In general, a path may raise:
1521 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1522 /// node public key) is specified.
1523 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1524 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1526 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1527 /// relevant updates.
1529 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1530 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1531 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1533 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1534 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1535 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1536 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1538 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1539 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1540 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1541 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1542 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1543 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1545 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1546 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1547 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1548 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1549 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1551 let mut total_value = 0;
1552 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1553 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1554 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1555 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1556 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1557 continue 'path_check;
1559 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1560 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1561 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1562 continue 'path_check;
1565 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1566 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1568 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1569 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1572 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1573 let mut results = Vec::new();
1574 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1575 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1577 let mut has_ok = false;
1578 let mut has_err = false;
1579 for res in results.iter() {
1580 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1581 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1582 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1583 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1590 if has_err && has_ok {
1591 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1593 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1599 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1600 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1601 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1602 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1604 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1606 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1608 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1609 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1610 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1611 } else { unreachable!(); })
1614 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1616 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1617 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1620 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1621 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1626 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1627 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1628 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1631 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1633 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1643 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1644 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1645 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1649 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1651 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1652 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1654 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1656 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1657 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1658 /// keys per-channel).
1660 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1661 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1662 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1664 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1665 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1666 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1667 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1670 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1671 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1672 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1673 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1677 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1678 let mut output_index = None;
1679 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1680 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1681 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1682 if output_index.is_some() {
1683 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1684 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1687 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1688 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1689 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1692 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1695 if output_index.is_none() {
1696 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1697 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1700 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1704 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1705 if !chan.should_announce() {
1706 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1710 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1712 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1714 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1715 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1717 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1718 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1719 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1720 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1721 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1726 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1727 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1728 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1730 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1733 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1734 // smaller than 500:
1735 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1737 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1738 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1739 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1741 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1742 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1744 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1745 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1746 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1747 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1749 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1750 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1753 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1754 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1757 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1758 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1759 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1760 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1761 rgb, alias, addresses,
1762 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1763 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1765 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1767 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1768 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1769 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1770 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1771 contents: announcement
1776 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1778 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1779 /// Will likely generate further events.
1780 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1783 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1784 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1785 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1787 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1788 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1790 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1791 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1792 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1793 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1795 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1796 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1797 match forward_info {
1798 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1799 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1800 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1801 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1802 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1803 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1804 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1806 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1807 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1810 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1811 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1812 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1813 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1814 // problem, not ours.
1821 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1822 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1823 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1824 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1825 match forward_info {
1826 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1827 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1829 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1830 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1831 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1832 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1833 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1834 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1835 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1836 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1838 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1840 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1841 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1843 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1845 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1846 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1847 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1853 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1855 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1856 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1857 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1858 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1859 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1860 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1861 // this channel currently :/.
1867 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1868 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1870 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1871 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1872 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1874 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1875 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1877 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1879 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1880 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1881 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1884 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1886 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1887 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1888 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1889 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1890 // messages when we can.
1891 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1892 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1893 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1900 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1901 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1904 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1905 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1906 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1907 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1908 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1909 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1911 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1912 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1913 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1914 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1915 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1917 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1919 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1921 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1925 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1926 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1930 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1931 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1932 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1933 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1934 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1935 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1937 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1945 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1946 match forward_info {
1947 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1948 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1949 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1950 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1951 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1952 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1953 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1954 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1955 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1958 let mut total_value = 0;
1959 let payment_secret_opt =
1960 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1961 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1962 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1963 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1965 value: amt_to_forward,
1966 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1967 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1969 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1970 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1971 total_value += htlc.value;
1972 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1973 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1975 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1977 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1978 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1979 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1980 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1981 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
1983 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1984 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1985 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1986 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1987 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1989 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1992 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1993 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1995 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
2000 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2002 payment_secret: None,
2003 amt: amt_to_forward,
2007 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2008 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2010 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2011 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2019 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2020 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2023 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2024 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2027 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2028 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2029 events.append(&mut new_events);
2032 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2034 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2035 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2037 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2038 fn process_background_events(&self) {
2039 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2040 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2041 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2043 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2044 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2045 // monitor updating completing.
2046 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2052 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2053 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2054 self.process_background_events();
2057 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2058 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2059 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2061 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2063 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2064 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2066 self.process_background_events();
2068 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2069 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2070 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2071 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2072 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2073 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2078 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2080 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2081 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2086 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2087 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2088 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2089 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2090 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2091 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, _payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
2092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2094 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2095 let payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2096 let payment_secret = if let Some(secret) = payment_secrets.get(&payment_hash) {
2097 Some(secret.payment_secret)
2098 } else { return false; };
2099 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, payment_secret));
2100 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2101 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2102 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2103 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2104 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2105 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2106 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2107 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2108 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2114 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2115 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2116 // be surfaced to the user.
2117 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2118 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2120 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2121 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2122 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2124 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2125 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2127 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2132 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2133 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2134 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2136 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2137 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2138 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2140 rejected_by_dest: false,
2152 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2153 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2154 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2155 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2156 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2157 /// still-available channels.
2158 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2159 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2160 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2161 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2164 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2165 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2166 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2168 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2170 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2171 match &onion_error {
2172 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2174 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2176 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2177 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2178 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2179 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2180 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2181 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2182 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2187 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2188 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2189 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2190 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2192 error_code: onion_error_code,
2194 error_data: onion_error_data
2198 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2204 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2205 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2206 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2207 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2209 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2210 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2211 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2212 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2213 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2214 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2216 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2218 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2224 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2225 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2226 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2228 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2229 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2231 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2233 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2237 let mut forward_event = None;
2238 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2239 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2241 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2243 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2246 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2249 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2250 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2251 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2252 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2253 time_forwardable: time
2260 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2261 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2262 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2264 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2265 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2266 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2267 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2268 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2269 /// motivated attackers.
2271 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2272 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2274 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2275 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, _payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2276 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2280 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2281 let payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2282 let payment_secret = if let Some(secret) = payment_secrets.get(&payment_hash) {
2283 Some(secret.payment_secret)
2284 } else { return false; };
2285 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, payment_secret));
2286 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2287 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2289 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2290 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2291 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2292 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2294 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2295 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2296 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2297 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2298 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2301 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2302 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2303 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2305 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2309 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2310 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2311 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2316 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2317 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2318 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2319 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2320 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2321 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2322 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2323 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2324 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2325 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2326 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2328 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2330 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2331 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2332 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2333 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2334 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2335 } else { errs.push(e); }
2337 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2339 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2341 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2346 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2347 // which were generated.
2348 channel_state.take();
2350 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2351 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2352 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2359 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2360 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2361 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2362 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2363 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2369 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2370 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2371 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2372 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2373 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2374 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2375 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2376 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2378 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2382 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2383 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2384 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2385 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2386 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2387 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2388 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2389 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2398 // TODO: Do something with e?
2399 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2400 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2401 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2402 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2403 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2404 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2405 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2409 } else { unreachable!(); }
2412 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2414 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2415 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2416 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2417 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2421 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2422 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2423 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2426 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2427 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2428 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2429 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2432 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2433 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2434 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2435 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2436 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2437 payment_preimage, e);
2441 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2443 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2444 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2445 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2451 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2452 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2453 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2456 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2457 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2460 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2461 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2463 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2464 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2465 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2466 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2468 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2469 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2470 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2471 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2472 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2473 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2474 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2475 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2476 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2477 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2479 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2480 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2481 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2482 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2485 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2487 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2488 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2489 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2493 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2497 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2498 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2499 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2501 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2503 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2504 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2505 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2506 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2511 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2512 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2513 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2514 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2515 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2520 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2524 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2529 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2530 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2532 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2533 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2534 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2537 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2539 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2540 msg: announcement_sigs,
2543 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2547 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2549 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2550 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2552 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2554 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2555 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2559 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2560 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2564 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2565 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2572 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2573 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2575 entry.insert(channel);
2581 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2582 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2583 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2584 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2585 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2587 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2590 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2591 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2596 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2597 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2598 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2599 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2601 user_channel_id: user_id,
2606 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2607 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2608 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2609 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2610 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2611 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2613 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2616 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2621 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2622 // lock before watch_channel
2623 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2625 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2626 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2627 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2628 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2629 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2630 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2631 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2632 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2633 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2634 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2637 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2638 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2639 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2640 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2641 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2642 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2653 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2654 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2663 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2665 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2666 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2667 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2668 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2670 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2673 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2674 Ok(update) => update,
2675 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2677 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2678 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2685 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2689 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2691 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2692 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2694 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2695 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2697 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2698 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2699 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2700 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2701 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2702 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2703 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2704 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2705 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2706 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2707 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2708 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2709 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2710 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2711 msg: announcement_sigs,
2716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2720 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2721 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2722 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2723 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2725 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2727 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2728 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2730 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2731 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2732 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2733 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2737 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2738 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2739 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2743 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2744 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2745 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2747 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2748 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2753 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2756 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2757 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2758 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2767 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2768 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2769 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2770 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2771 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2773 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2776 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2777 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2778 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2779 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2784 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2785 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2786 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2787 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2788 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2789 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2790 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2792 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2793 } else { (tx, None) }
2795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2798 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2800 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2802 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2803 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2804 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2805 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2813 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2814 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2815 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2816 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2818 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2819 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2820 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2821 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2823 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2826 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2828 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2829 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2832 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2833 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2834 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2835 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2836 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2837 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2838 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2839 match pending_forward_info {
2840 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2841 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2842 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2843 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2844 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2845 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2846 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2850 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2851 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2852 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2853 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2854 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2855 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2856 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2857 // no problem just calling this
2858 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2859 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2861 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2862 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2863 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2866 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2868 _ => pending_forward_info
2871 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2878 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2879 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2884 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2887 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2892 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2896 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2897 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2898 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2899 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2901 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2902 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2904 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2911 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2912 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2913 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2914 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2916 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2919 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2920 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2921 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2923 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2930 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2931 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2932 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2933 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2935 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2936 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2938 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2939 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2940 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2941 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2942 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2943 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2944 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2949 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2950 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2951 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2953 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2954 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2955 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2957 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2959 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2960 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2961 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2962 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2963 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2964 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2966 commitment_signed: msg,
2970 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2971 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2972 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2983 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2984 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2985 let mut forward_event = None;
2986 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2987 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2988 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2989 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2991 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2992 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2993 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2994 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2997 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2998 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3001 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3002 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3007 match forward_event {
3009 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3010 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3011 time_forwardable: time
3019 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3020 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3022 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3023 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3024 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3026 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3027 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3029 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3030 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3031 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3032 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3033 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3034 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3035 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3036 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3038 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3040 } else { unreachable!(); }
3043 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3045 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3049 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3051 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3055 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3060 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3062 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3063 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3066 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3073 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3074 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3075 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3076 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3078 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3079 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3081 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3088 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3089 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3090 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3092 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3094 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3097 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3101 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3102 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3103 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3105 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3106 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3108 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3109 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3110 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3111 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3113 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3114 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3117 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3118 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3124 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3126 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3127 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3128 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3129 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3130 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3131 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3132 contents: announcement,
3134 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3137 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3142 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3143 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3144 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3145 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3146 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3148 // It's not a local channel
3152 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3154 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3155 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3156 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3158 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3165 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3166 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3167 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3169 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3171 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3172 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3174 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3175 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3176 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3177 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3178 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3179 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3180 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3181 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3182 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3183 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3184 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3185 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3186 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3188 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3189 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3191 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3192 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3195 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3196 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3197 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3201 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3202 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3204 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3209 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3210 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3212 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3218 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3222 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3227 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3228 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3229 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3239 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3240 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3241 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3242 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3243 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3245 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3247 let counterparty_node_id;
3248 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3249 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3250 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3254 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3255 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3256 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3258 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3259 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3261 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3262 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3264 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3265 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3266 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3268 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3271 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3272 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3273 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3274 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3275 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3276 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3277 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3278 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3288 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3289 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3290 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3294 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3295 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3296 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3298 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3299 match monitor_event {
3300 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3301 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3302 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3303 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3309 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3310 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3311 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3312 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3313 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3314 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3315 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3316 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3317 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3319 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3320 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3325 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3326 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3328 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3337 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3338 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3342 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3343 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3345 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3346 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3347 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3348 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3349 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3350 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3351 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3352 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3353 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3354 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3355 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3356 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3357 assert!(should_broadcast);
3358 } else { unreachable!(); }
3359 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3361 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3365 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3366 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3368 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3371 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3372 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3374 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3375 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
3376 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3377 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3378 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3379 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3380 // never fail a payment too early.
3381 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3383 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3391 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3394 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3395 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3397 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3399 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3400 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3401 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3402 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3405 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
3406 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3409 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3410 /// stored external to LDK.
3412 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3413 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3414 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3416 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3417 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3419 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3420 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3421 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3422 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3424 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3425 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3426 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3427 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 7,200 secs as a default validity time for
3428 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3430 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3431 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3432 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3433 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3434 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3436 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3438 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3439 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3440 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3441 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
3445 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3446 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3447 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3448 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3449 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3452 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3453 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3454 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3455 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3457 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3458 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3459 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3464 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3465 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3466 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3467 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3468 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3471 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3472 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3473 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3474 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3476 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3477 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3478 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3483 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3485 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3486 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3487 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3488 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3491 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3493 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3494 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3495 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3496 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3497 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3500 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3501 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3502 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3505 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3507 let new_height = height - 1;
3509 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3510 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3511 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3512 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3513 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3514 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3517 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3521 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3523 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3524 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3525 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3526 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3529 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3530 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3531 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3532 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3534 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3535 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3538 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3541 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3542 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3543 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3544 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3546 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3547 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3551 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3553 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3555 macro_rules! max_time {
3556 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3558 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3559 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3560 // having an explicit local time source.
3561 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3562 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3563 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3564 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3565 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3571 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3572 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3575 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3576 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3577 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3578 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3579 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3580 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3586 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3588 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3589 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3590 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3591 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3592 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3593 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3598 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3600 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3601 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3602 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3603 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3606 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3607 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3609 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3610 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3611 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3612 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3613 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3615 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3616 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3618 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3619 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3620 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3621 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3622 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3623 let res = f(channel);
3624 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3625 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3626 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3627 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3628 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3632 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3633 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3634 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3635 msg: funding_locked,
3637 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3639 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3640 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3641 msg: announcement_sigs,
3644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3646 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3648 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3649 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3650 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3652 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3653 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3654 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3655 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3661 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3662 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3669 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3670 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3671 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3672 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3673 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3674 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3675 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3676 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3677 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3678 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3679 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3680 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3681 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3686 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3691 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3693 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3694 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3698 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3699 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3700 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3702 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3703 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3704 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3705 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3708 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3709 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3711 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3712 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3715 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3716 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3717 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3718 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3719 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3724 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3725 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3726 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3727 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3728 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3729 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3732 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3734 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3737 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3739 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3742 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3744 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3747 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3749 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3752 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3754 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3757 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3759 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3762 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3764 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3767 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3769 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3772 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3774 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3777 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3779 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3782 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3783 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3784 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3787 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3789 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3792 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3794 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3797 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3799 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3802 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3804 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3807 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3809 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3812 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3814 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3817 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3819 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3820 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3821 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3825 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3826 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3827 if no_connection_possible {
3828 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3829 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3830 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3831 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3832 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3834 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3835 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3836 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3846 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3847 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3848 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3849 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3850 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3851 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3852 // reestablish logic.
3853 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3854 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3855 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3856 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3857 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3859 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3860 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3861 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3865 no_channels_remain = false;
3871 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3873 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3874 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3875 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3876 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3877 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3878 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3879 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3880 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3881 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3882 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3883 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3884 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3885 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3886 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3887 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3888 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3889 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3890 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3891 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3895 if no_channels_remain {
3896 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3899 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3900 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3902 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3903 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3904 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3909 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3910 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3915 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3916 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3918 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3919 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3923 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3930 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3931 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3932 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3933 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3934 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3935 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3936 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3940 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3941 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3942 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3948 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3951 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3954 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3955 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3956 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3957 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3958 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3962 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3963 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3968 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3969 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3970 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3971 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3972 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3973 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3976 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3979 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3985 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3986 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3987 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3988 let result = *guard;
3996 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3997 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3998 let current_time = Instant::now();
4000 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4001 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4002 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4003 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4004 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4005 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4006 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4008 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4009 let result = *guard;
4010 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4014 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4015 None => return result,
4021 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4023 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4024 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4025 *persistence_lock = true;
4026 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4031 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4032 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4034 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4035 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4036 match &self.routing {
4037 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
4039 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4040 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4042 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
4044 payment_data.write(writer)?;
4045 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4048 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
4049 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4050 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
4051 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
4056 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4057 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
4058 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
4059 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
4060 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4061 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4062 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4064 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4065 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4066 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4068 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4070 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4071 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4072 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4073 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4078 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4079 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4081 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4083 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4085 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4087 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4094 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4095 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4096 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4097 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4098 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4099 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4104 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4105 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4107 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4109 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4111 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4113 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4120 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4121 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4122 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4123 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4124 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4125 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4130 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4134 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4137 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
4144 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4147 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4149 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4151 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4153 path.write(writer)?;
4154 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4155 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4162 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4163 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4164 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4165 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4166 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4167 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4168 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4169 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4171 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4176 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4177 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4179 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4183 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4185 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4186 data.write(writer)?;
4193 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4194 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4195 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4196 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4197 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4198 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4199 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4201 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4206 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4207 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4209 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4211 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4212 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4213 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4214 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4216 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4218 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4219 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4226 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4227 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4228 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4229 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4230 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4231 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4232 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4233 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4235 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4236 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4237 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4239 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4244 impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
4251 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4252 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4253 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4254 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4255 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4259 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4261 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4262 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4264 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4266 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4267 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4268 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4271 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4272 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4273 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4274 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4275 unfunded_channels += 1;
4278 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4279 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4280 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4281 channel.write(writer)?;
4285 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4286 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4287 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4288 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4289 for forward in pending_forwards {
4290 forward.write(writer)?;
4294 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4295 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4296 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4297 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4298 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4299 htlc.write(writer)?;
4303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4304 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4305 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4306 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4307 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4308 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4311 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4312 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4313 for event in events.iter() {
4314 event.write(writer)?;
4317 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4318 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4319 for event in background_events.iter() {
4321 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4323 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4324 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4329 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4330 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4332 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4333 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4334 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4335 hash.write(writer)?;
4336 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4343 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4345 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4347 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4348 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4349 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4350 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4351 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4352 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4353 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4354 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4355 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4356 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4357 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4359 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4360 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4362 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4363 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4364 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4365 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4366 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4367 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4368 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4369 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4370 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4371 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4372 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4375 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4376 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4378 pub keys_manager: K,
4380 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4382 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4383 pub fee_estimator: F,
4384 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4386 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4387 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4388 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4389 pub chain_monitor: M,
4391 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4392 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4393 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4394 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4395 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4396 /// deserialization.
4398 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4399 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4400 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4402 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4403 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4405 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4406 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4407 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4408 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4410 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4413 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4414 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4417 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4418 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4419 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4420 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4421 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4425 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4426 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4427 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4428 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4429 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4431 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4432 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4437 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4438 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4439 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4440 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4441 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4442 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4443 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4444 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4447 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4448 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4449 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4453 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4454 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4455 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4456 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4457 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4458 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4461 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4462 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4464 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4465 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4468 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4469 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4470 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4472 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4474 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4476 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4477 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4478 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4479 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4480 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4481 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4482 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4483 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4484 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4485 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4486 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4487 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4488 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4489 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4490 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4491 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4492 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4493 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4494 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4495 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4496 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4498 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4499 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4501 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4504 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4508 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4509 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4510 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4514 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4515 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4516 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4517 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4518 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4519 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4520 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4521 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4522 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4524 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4527 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4528 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4529 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4530 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4531 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4532 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4533 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4534 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4536 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4539 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4540 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4541 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4542 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4543 let peer_state = PeerState {
4544 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4546 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4549 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4550 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4551 for _ in 0..event_count {
4552 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4553 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4558 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4559 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4560 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4561 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4562 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4563 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4567 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4568 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4570 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4571 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4572 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4573 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4574 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4578 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4579 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4581 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4583 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4584 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4585 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4587 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4589 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4594 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4596 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4598 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4599 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4602 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4603 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4605 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4607 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4608 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4609 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4610 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4612 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4613 logger: args.logger,
4614 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4617 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4618 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4621 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4622 //connection or two.
4624 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4630 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4632 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4634 use std::time::Duration;
4637 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4638 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4639 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4641 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4642 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4643 thread::spawn(move || {
4645 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4646 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4647 *persistence_lock = true;
4650 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4656 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4657 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4659 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4662 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4667 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4669 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4672 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4679 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4682 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4683 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4684 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4685 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4686 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4687 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4688 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4689 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4690 use routing::router::get_route;
4691 use util::test_utils;
4692 use util::config::UserConfig;
4693 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4695 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4696 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4697 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4699 use std::sync::Mutex;
4703 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4704 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4705 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4706 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4707 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4708 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4709 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4714 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4715 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4718 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4719 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4720 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4722 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4723 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4725 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4726 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4728 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4729 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4731 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4732 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4733 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4734 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4735 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4737 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4739 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4741 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4742 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4743 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4744 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4745 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4747 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4749 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4751 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4752 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4753 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4756 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4757 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4758 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4760 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4761 } else { panic!(); }
4763 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4764 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4766 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4769 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4772 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4773 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4775 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4776 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4778 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4780 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4781 macro_rules! send_payment {
4782 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4783 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4784 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4785 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4787 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4788 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
4790 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4791 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4793 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
4794 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4795 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4796 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4797 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4798 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4799 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4800 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4802 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4803 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
4804 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &Some(payment_secret), 10_000));
4806 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4807 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4808 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4809 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4810 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4812 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4815 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4816 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4817 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4818 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4820 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4825 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4826 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);