1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) amt_incoming: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
147 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
148 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
151 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
155 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
156 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
157 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
158 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
159 short_channel_id: u64,
161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
162 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
164 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
165 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
170 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
172 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
173 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
174 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
176 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
177 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
180 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
181 struct ClaimableHTLC {
182 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
184 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
186 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
188 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
192 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
193 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
194 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
195 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
197 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
198 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
203 impl Readable for PaymentId {
204 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
205 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
209 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
210 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
211 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
212 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
213 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
216 session_priv: SecretKey,
217 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
218 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
219 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
220 payment_id: PaymentId,
221 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
222 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
225 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
226 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
227 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
229 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
231 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
233 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
236 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
237 payment_id.hash(hasher);
238 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
239 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
240 payment_params.hash(hasher);
245 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
248 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
251 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
252 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
253 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
254 payment_secret: None,
255 payment_params: None,
260 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
261 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
263 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
271 struct ReceiveError {
277 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
278 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
280 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
285 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
287 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
288 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
289 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
290 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
291 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
293 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
294 err: msgs::LightningError,
295 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
296 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
298 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
300 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
302 err: LightningError {
304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
305 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
312 shutdown_finish: None,
316 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
318 err: LightningError {
320 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
323 shutdown_finish: None,
327 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
328 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
331 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
333 err: LightningError {
335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
343 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
347 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
350 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
353 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
357 log_level: Level::Warn,
360 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
362 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
364 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
375 shutdown_finish: None,
380 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
381 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
382 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
383 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
384 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
386 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
387 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
388 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
389 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
390 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
391 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
392 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
394 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
398 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
399 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
400 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
401 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
402 /// failed/claimed by the user.
404 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
405 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
407 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
408 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
409 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
410 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
413 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
414 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
415 /// quite some time lag.
416 enum BackgroundEvent {
417 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
418 /// commitment transaction.
419 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
422 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
423 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
425 latest_features: InitFeatures,
428 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
429 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
431 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
434 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
435 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
436 struct PendingInboundPayment {
437 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
438 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
439 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
440 /// this payment being removed.
442 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
443 user_payment_id: u64,
444 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
445 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
446 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
449 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
450 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
451 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
453 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
456 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
457 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
458 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
459 pending_amt_msat: u64,
460 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
461 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
464 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
465 starting_block_height: u32,
467 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
468 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
469 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
471 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
472 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
473 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
475 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
476 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
477 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
478 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
479 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
481 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
483 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
484 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
488 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
489 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
495 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
501 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
508 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
517 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
518 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
519 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
520 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
526 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
527 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
530 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
531 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
532 let our_payment_hash;
533 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
539 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
543 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
547 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
548 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
549 let remove_res = match self {
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
551 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
554 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
558 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
559 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
560 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
561 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
562 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
563 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
570 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
571 let insert_res = match self {
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
574 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
580 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
581 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
582 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
583 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
584 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
591 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
603 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
604 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
605 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
606 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
607 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
608 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
609 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
611 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
612 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
614 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
615 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
616 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
617 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
618 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
619 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
620 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
621 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
623 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
624 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
626 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
627 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
629 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
630 /// to individual Channels.
632 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
633 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
634 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
635 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
637 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
638 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
639 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
640 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
641 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
642 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
643 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
645 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
646 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
647 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
648 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
651 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
652 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
653 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
654 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
655 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
657 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
658 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
659 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
660 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
661 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
664 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
665 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
666 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
667 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
668 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
672 // `total_consistency_lock`
674 // |__`forward_htlcs`
676 // |__`channel_state`
680 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
682 // | |__`per_peer_state`
684 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
686 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
688 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
692 // | |__`pending_events`
694 // | |__`pending_background_events`
696 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
697 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
698 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
699 K::Target: KeysInterface,
700 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
703 default_configuration: UserConfig,
704 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
705 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
709 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
713 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
714 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
716 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
718 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
719 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
720 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
722 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
723 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
724 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
725 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
727 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
728 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
730 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
731 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
732 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
733 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
734 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
735 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
736 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
737 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
739 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
741 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
742 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
744 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
746 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
747 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
748 /// and via the classic SCID.
750 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
751 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
755 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
757 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
759 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
760 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
761 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
762 /// active channel list on load.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
767 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
769 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
770 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
771 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
773 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
774 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
775 /// the handling of the events.
778 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
779 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
780 /// would break backwards compatability.
781 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
782 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
783 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
786 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
788 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
790 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
791 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
792 /// confirmation depth.
794 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
795 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
796 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
798 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
800 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
802 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
804 our_network_key: SecretKey,
805 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
807 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
809 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
810 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
811 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
813 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
814 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
816 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
817 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
818 /// keeping additional state.
819 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
821 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
822 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
823 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
824 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
826 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
827 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
828 /// are currently open with that peer.
829 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
830 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
833 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
836 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
837 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
839 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
840 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
841 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
842 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
843 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
844 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
845 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
846 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
848 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
855 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
857 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
858 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
859 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
860 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
861 pub struct ChainParameters {
862 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
863 pub network: Network,
865 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
867 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
868 pub best_block: BestBlock,
871 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
877 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
878 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
879 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
880 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
881 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
882 /// updates are ready for persistence).
884 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
885 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
886 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
887 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
888 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
890 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
891 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
894 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
895 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
896 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
899 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
900 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
902 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
903 persistence_notifier: notifier,
904 should_persist: persist_check,
905 _read_guard: read_guard,
910 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
912 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
913 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
918 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
919 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
921 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
923 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
924 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
925 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
926 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
927 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
929 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
930 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
932 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
934 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
935 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
936 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
937 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
938 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
939 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
940 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
941 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
942 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
943 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
944 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
945 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
946 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
948 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
949 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
951 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
952 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
953 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
954 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
956 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
957 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
958 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
959 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
960 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
961 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
964 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
966 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
967 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
970 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
972 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
973 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
975 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
976 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
977 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
978 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
980 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
981 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
982 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
983 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
984 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
985 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
986 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
987 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
988 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
989 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
990 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
993 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
994 /// to better separate parameters.
995 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
996 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
997 /// The node_id of our counterparty
998 pub node_id: PublicKey,
999 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1000 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1001 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1002 pub features: InitFeatures,
1003 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1004 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1005 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1007 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1009 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1010 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1011 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1012 /// payments to us through this channel.
1013 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1014 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1015 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1016 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1017 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1018 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1019 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1022 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1025 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1026 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1027 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1028 /// lifetime of the channel.
1029 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1030 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1031 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1032 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1033 /// our counterparty already.
1035 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1036 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1037 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1038 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1040 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1041 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1042 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1043 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1045 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1046 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1048 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1049 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1051 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1052 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1053 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1054 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1055 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1056 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1057 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1058 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1059 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1062 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1064 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1065 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1066 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1067 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1068 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1069 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1070 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1072 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1073 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1075 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1076 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1078 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1079 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1080 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1081 /// this value on chain.
1083 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1085 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1087 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1088 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1089 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1090 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1091 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1092 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1093 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1095 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1096 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1097 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1098 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1100 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1101 pub balance_msat: u64,
1102 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1103 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1104 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1105 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1107 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1109 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1110 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1111 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1112 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1113 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1114 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1115 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1116 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1118 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1119 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1120 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1121 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1122 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1123 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1124 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1126 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1127 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1128 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1129 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1130 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1131 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1132 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1133 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1134 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1136 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1138 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1139 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1140 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1141 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1142 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1143 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1144 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1145 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1146 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1148 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1149 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1150 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1151 pub is_outbound: bool,
1152 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1153 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1154 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1155 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1156 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1158 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1159 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1160 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1161 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1163 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1164 pub is_usable: bool,
1165 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1166 pub is_public: bool,
1167 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1168 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1169 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1170 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1171 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1172 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1174 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1175 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1178 impl ChannelDetails {
1179 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1180 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1181 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1183 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1184 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1185 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1186 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1189 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1190 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1191 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1193 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1194 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1195 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1196 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1200 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1201 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1202 /// states for more.
1203 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1204 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1205 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1206 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1207 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1208 ParameterError(APIError),
1209 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1210 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1211 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1212 /// payment in full.
1214 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1216 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1217 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1218 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1219 /// paths than the ones selected).
1221 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] does *not* need to be called for this payment and
1222 /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work for this payment.
1223 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1224 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1225 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1226 /// in over-/re-payment.
1228 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1229 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1230 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1232 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1233 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1234 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1235 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1237 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1238 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1239 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1240 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1241 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1242 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1243 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1244 payment_id: PaymentId,
1248 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1250 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1252 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1253 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1254 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1255 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1257 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1258 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1259 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1262 macro_rules! handle_error {
1263 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1266 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1267 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1269 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1270 // entering the macro.
1271 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1272 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1275 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1277 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1278 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1279 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1280 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1284 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1285 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1286 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1287 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1292 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1293 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1295 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1296 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1297 action: err.action.clone()
1301 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1302 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1305 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1312 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1313 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1314 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1315 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1316 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1317 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1319 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1320 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1321 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1322 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1323 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1325 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1326 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1328 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1332 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1333 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1334 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1336 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1337 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1339 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1340 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1342 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1343 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1344 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1345 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1346 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1347 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1353 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1354 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1358 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1360 $entry.remove_entry();
1368 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1369 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1373 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1375 $entry.remove_entry();
1383 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1384 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1386 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1387 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1393 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1394 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1396 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1397 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1398 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1399 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1400 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1401 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1402 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1403 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1404 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1405 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1406 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1407 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1408 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1409 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1412 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1413 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1414 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1415 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1416 match $action_type {
1417 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1418 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1420 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1421 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1423 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1424 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1425 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1426 if !$resend_commitment {
1427 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1430 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1432 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1433 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1435 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1440 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1441 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1443 $entry.remove_entry();
1447 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1448 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1449 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1451 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1452 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1454 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1455 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1457 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1458 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1460 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1461 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1465 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1466 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1467 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1468 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1469 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1471 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1472 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1473 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1474 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1475 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1476 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1477 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1478 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1479 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1480 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1485 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1486 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1487 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1489 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1490 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1491 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1492 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1493 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1494 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1497 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1502 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1503 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1504 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1505 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1506 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1508 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1509 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1510 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1512 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1513 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1514 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1515 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1518 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1519 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1520 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1521 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1522 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1523 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1524 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1525 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1526 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1527 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1528 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1529 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1532 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1533 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1534 // before it should be allowed to.
1535 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1536 send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1538 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1539 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1540 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1545 emit_channel_ready_event!($self, $channel_entry.get_mut());
1547 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1548 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1549 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1550 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1551 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1552 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1553 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1554 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1555 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1556 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1557 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1558 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1559 match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1560 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
1562 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1563 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1564 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1565 let mut order = $order;
1567 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1569 break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1574 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1575 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1576 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1577 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1582 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1583 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1584 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1585 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1586 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1591 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1595 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1600 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1601 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1602 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1607 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1608 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1609 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1610 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1611 assert!(res.is_ok());
1614 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1618 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1619 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1620 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1622 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1624 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1625 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1630 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1631 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1633 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1637 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1639 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1640 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1642 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1644 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1645 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1646 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1647 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1648 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1649 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1650 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1651 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1653 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1654 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1655 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1659 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1661 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1662 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1663 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1664 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1666 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1667 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1668 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1669 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1670 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1671 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1673 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1674 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1677 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1678 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1680 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1682 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1684 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1686 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1687 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1688 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1689 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1697 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1698 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1699 &self.default_configuration
1702 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1703 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1704 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1707 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1708 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1710 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1712 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1716 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1721 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1723 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1724 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1725 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1726 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1727 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1730 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1731 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1733 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1734 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1735 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1737 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1738 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1739 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1740 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1741 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1742 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1744 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1745 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1746 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1747 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1748 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1749 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1754 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1755 Some(peer_state) => {
1756 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1757 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1758 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1759 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1760 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1761 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1762 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1766 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1771 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1774 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1777 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1778 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1780 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1781 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1782 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1785 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1787 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1792 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1793 node_id: their_network_key,
1796 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1799 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1800 let mut res = Vec::new();
1802 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1804 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1805 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1806 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1807 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1808 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1809 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1810 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1811 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1812 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1813 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1814 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1815 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1816 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1817 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1818 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1819 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1820 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1821 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1822 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1824 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1825 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1826 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1827 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1828 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1829 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1830 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1831 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1832 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1833 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1834 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1835 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1836 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1837 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1838 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1839 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1840 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1841 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1842 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1843 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1844 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1845 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1846 config: Some(channel.config()),
1850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1851 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1852 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1853 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1859 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1860 /// more information.
1861 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1862 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1865 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1866 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1868 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1869 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1872 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1873 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1874 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1875 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1876 // really wanted anyway.
1877 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1880 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1881 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1882 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1883 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1884 Some(transaction) => {
1885 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1889 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1890 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1891 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1892 reason: closure_reason
1896 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1899 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1900 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1901 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1902 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1905 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1909 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1910 Some(peer_state) => {
1911 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1912 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1913 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1915 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1917 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1919 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1920 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1921 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1922 let (result, is_permanent) =
1923 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1925 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1930 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1931 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1935 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1936 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1937 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1938 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1942 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1950 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1951 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1952 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1955 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1959 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1960 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1961 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1963 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1964 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1966 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1967 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1968 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1969 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1971 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1973 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1974 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1975 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1976 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1977 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1980 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1981 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1982 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1984 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1985 /// the channel being closed or not:
1986 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1987 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1988 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1989 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1990 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1991 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1992 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1994 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1996 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1997 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1998 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1999 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2004 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2005 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2006 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2007 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2008 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2009 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2010 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
2012 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2013 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2014 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2015 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2016 // ignore the result here.
2017 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2021 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2022 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2023 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2024 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2026 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2027 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2028 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2029 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
2030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2032 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2033 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2035 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2037 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2039 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2042 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2043 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2044 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2045 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2046 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2051 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2054 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2055 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2056 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2057 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2058 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2059 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2060 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2061 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2062 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2072 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2073 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2074 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2076 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2077 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2078 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2081 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2082 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2083 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2085 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2086 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2087 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2088 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2089 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2092 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2093 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2094 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2095 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2096 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2100 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2101 /// local transaction(s).
2102 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2103 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2104 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2108 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2109 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2111 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2112 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2113 return Err(ReceiveError {
2114 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2116 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2119 // final_expiry_too_soon
2120 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2121 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2122 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2123 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2124 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2125 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2126 return Err(ReceiveError {
2128 err_data: Vec::new(),
2129 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2132 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2133 return Err(ReceiveError {
2135 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2136 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2140 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2141 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2142 return Err(ReceiveError {
2143 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2144 err_data: Vec::new(),
2145 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2148 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2149 return Err(ReceiveError {
2150 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2151 err_data: Vec::new(),
2152 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2155 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2156 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2157 return Err(ReceiveError {
2158 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2159 err_data: Vec::new(),
2160 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2162 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2163 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2165 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2166 phantom_shared_secret,
2168 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2169 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2170 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2171 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2172 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2173 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2174 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2175 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2176 return Err(ReceiveError {
2177 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2178 err_data: Vec::new(),
2179 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2183 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2185 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2188 return Err(ReceiveError {
2189 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2190 err_data: Vec::new(),
2191 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2196 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2199 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2200 amt_incoming: Some(amt_msat),
2201 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2202 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2206 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2207 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2208 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2210 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2211 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2212 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2213 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2214 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2215 failure_code: $err_code,
2221 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2222 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2225 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2227 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2228 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2229 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2230 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2231 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2232 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2233 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2234 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2236 macro_rules! return_err {
2237 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2239 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2240 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2241 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2242 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2243 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2249 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2251 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2252 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2254 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2255 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2259 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2260 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2262 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2264 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2265 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2266 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2267 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2268 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2270 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2273 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2274 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2275 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2277 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2278 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2279 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2282 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2283 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2284 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2285 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2286 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2290 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2291 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2292 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2295 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2296 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2297 amt_incoming: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2298 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2299 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2304 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2305 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2306 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2307 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2308 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2309 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2310 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2311 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2312 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2313 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2314 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2316 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2319 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2322 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2324 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2325 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2327 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2328 // no consistency guarantees.
2329 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2333 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2334 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2335 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2336 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2337 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2339 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2340 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2341 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2342 // we don't have the channel here.
2343 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2345 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2347 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2348 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2349 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2350 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2351 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2352 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2353 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2355 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2356 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2358 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2359 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2363 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2365 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2372 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2373 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2374 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2375 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2376 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2377 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2379 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2380 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2382 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2383 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2384 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2385 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2386 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2387 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2388 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2389 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2390 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2391 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2397 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2398 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2399 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2400 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2402 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2403 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2405 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2406 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2407 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2409 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2410 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2411 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2413 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2418 pending_forward_info
2421 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2422 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2423 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2425 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2426 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2427 if !chan.should_announce() {
2428 return Err(LightningError {
2429 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2433 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2434 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2436 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2437 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2440 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2441 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2442 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2443 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2444 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2445 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2447 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2448 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2452 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2454 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2456 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2458 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2459 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2461 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2462 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2463 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2464 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2465 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2466 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2467 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2468 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2471 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2472 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2474 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2480 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2481 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2483 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2484 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2486 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2487 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2488 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2489 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2490 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2492 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2496 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2497 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2498 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2499 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2502 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2504 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2506 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2507 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2509 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2512 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2513 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2515 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2516 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2518 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2519 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2520 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2523 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2524 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2525 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2527 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2528 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2530 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2531 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2532 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2533 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2534 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2535 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2536 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2537 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2538 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2539 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2541 _ => unreachable!(),
2544 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2545 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2546 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2547 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2548 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2549 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2550 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2551 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2560 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2561 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2562 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2563 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2568 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2569 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2571 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2576 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2578 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2579 /// fields for more info.
2581 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2582 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2583 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2584 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2587 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2588 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2589 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2590 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2591 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2593 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2594 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2596 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2597 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2598 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2600 /// In general, a path may raise:
2601 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2602 /// node public key) is specified.
2603 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2604 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2606 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2607 /// relevant updates.
2609 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2610 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2611 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2613 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2614 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2615 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2616 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2619 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2620 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2621 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2623 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2624 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2625 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2626 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2627 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2631 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2632 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2635 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2636 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2637 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2638 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2641 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2642 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2644 err: "Payment already in progress"
2646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2647 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2648 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2649 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2650 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2653 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2654 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2657 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2658 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2661 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2666 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2667 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2668 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2670 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2671 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2673 let mut total_value = 0;
2674 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2675 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2676 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2677 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2678 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2679 continue 'path_check;
2681 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2682 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2683 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2684 continue 'path_check;
2687 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2688 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2690 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2691 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2693 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2694 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2695 total_value = amt_msat;
2698 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2699 let mut results = Vec::new();
2700 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2701 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2702 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2705 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2706 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2707 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2708 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2711 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2712 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2713 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2714 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2716 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2717 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2721 results.push(path_res);
2723 let mut has_ok = false;
2724 let mut has_err = false;
2725 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2726 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2727 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2728 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2729 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2730 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2731 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2735 } else if res.is_err() {
2736 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2737 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2740 if has_err && has_ok {
2741 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2744 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2745 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2746 Some(RouteParameters {
2747 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2748 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2749 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2755 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2756 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2757 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2758 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2759 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2765 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2767 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2768 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2769 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2770 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2771 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2773 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2774 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2775 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2776 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2777 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2778 if path.len() == 0 {
2779 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2780 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2785 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2786 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2787 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2790 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2791 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2792 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2794 let res = match payment {
2795 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2796 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2798 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2799 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2800 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2801 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2804 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2806 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2807 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2808 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2811 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2812 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2813 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2816 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2817 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2818 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2822 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2823 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2828 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2829 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2833 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2836 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2838 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2839 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2840 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2841 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2843 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2844 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2845 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2847 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2848 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2849 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2850 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2853 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2854 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2855 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2856 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2857 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2859 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2867 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2868 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2869 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2870 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2871 /// never reach the recipient.
2873 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2874 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2876 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2877 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2879 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2881 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2882 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2883 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2885 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2887 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2888 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2890 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2891 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2896 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2897 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2898 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2899 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2900 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2902 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2905 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2906 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2910 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2911 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2913 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2914 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2919 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2921 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2922 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2923 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2926 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2927 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2928 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2929 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2930 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2931 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2934 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2935 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2936 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2937 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2938 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2940 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2942 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2944 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2945 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2946 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2947 } else { unreachable!(); })
2950 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2952 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2953 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2956 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2957 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2962 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2964 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2967 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2969 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2972 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2973 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2974 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2983 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2984 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2985 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2989 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2991 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2992 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2994 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2995 /// across the p2p network.
2997 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2998 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3000 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3001 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3002 /// keys per-channel).
3004 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3005 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3006 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3008 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3009 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3010 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3012 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3013 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3014 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3015 /// for more details.
3017 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3018 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3019 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3022 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3023 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3024 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3025 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3030 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3031 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
3032 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
3033 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
3034 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
3035 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3036 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3040 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3041 let mut output_index = None;
3042 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3043 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3044 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3045 if output_index.is_some() {
3046 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3047 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3050 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3051 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3052 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3055 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3058 if output_index.is_none() {
3059 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3060 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3063 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3067 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3069 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3070 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3071 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3072 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3074 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3075 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3077 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3078 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3080 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3082 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3083 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3084 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3085 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3086 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3087 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3088 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3089 pub fn update_channel_config(
3090 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3091 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3092 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3093 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3094 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3099 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3102 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3103 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3104 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3105 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3106 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3107 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3109 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3110 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3111 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3112 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3116 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3117 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3118 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3121 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3122 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3123 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3124 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3125 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3134 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3136 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3137 /// Will likely generate further events.
3138 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3141 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3142 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3143 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3144 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3146 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3147 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3149 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3150 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3151 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3152 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3153 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3155 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3156 match forward_info {
3157 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3158 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3159 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3160 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward,
3161 outgoing_cltv_value, amt_incoming: _
3164 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3165 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3166 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3168 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3169 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3170 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3171 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3172 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3173 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3176 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3177 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3179 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3182 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3183 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3189 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3190 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3192 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3196 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3197 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3199 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3203 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3204 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3205 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3206 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3207 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3209 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3210 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3211 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3212 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3213 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3215 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3217 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3218 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3222 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3223 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3224 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3225 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3231 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3234 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3237 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3238 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3239 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3240 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3241 // problem, not ours.
3247 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3248 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3250 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3254 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3256 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3259 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3260 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3261 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3262 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3263 match forward_info {
3264 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3265 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint ,
3266 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3267 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value,
3268 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, amt_incoming: _,
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3272 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3273 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3274 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3275 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3276 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3277 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3278 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3280 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3282 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3285 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3287 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3288 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3289 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3290 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3296 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3298 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3299 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3300 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3301 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3302 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3303 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3304 // this channel currently :/.
3310 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3311 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3313 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3315 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3317 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3320 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3322 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3323 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3324 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3327 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3329 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3330 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3331 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3332 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3333 // messages when we can.
3334 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3335 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3336 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3343 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3344 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3347 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3348 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3349 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3350 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3351 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3352 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3354 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3356 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3357 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3358 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3361 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3365 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3366 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3368 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3372 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3373 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3374 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3375 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3376 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3377 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3378 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3379 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3380 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3382 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3389 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3390 match forward_info {
3391 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3392 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3393 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3394 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, ..
3397 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3398 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3399 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3400 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3402 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3403 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3405 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3408 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3409 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3410 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3411 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3412 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3413 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3414 phantom_shared_secret,
3416 value: amt_to_forward,
3418 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3423 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3424 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3425 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3426 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3427 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3429 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3430 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3431 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3432 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3433 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3434 phantom_shared_secret,
3436 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3437 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3442 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3443 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3444 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3446 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3447 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3448 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3451 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3452 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3453 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3454 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3456 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3460 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3461 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3462 total_value += htlc.value;
3463 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3464 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3465 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3467 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3468 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3470 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3472 _ => unreachable!(),
3475 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3477 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3478 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3479 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3480 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3481 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3484 amount_msat: total_value,
3486 payment_received_generated = true;
3488 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3489 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3491 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3493 payment_received_generated
3497 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3498 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3499 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3500 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3501 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3502 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3503 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3504 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3506 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3507 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3508 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3509 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3510 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3512 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3516 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3518 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3519 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3520 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3521 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3522 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3523 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3525 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3529 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3531 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3538 if payment_data.is_none() {
3539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3543 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3544 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3546 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3547 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3549 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3550 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3552 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3553 if payment_received_generated {
3554 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3560 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3561 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3569 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3570 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3572 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3574 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3575 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3578 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3579 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3580 events.append(&mut new_events);
3583 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3585 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3586 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3588 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3589 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3590 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3591 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3592 if background_events.is_empty() {
3596 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3598 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3599 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3600 // monitor updating completing.
3601 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3608 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3609 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3610 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3611 self.process_background_events();
3614 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3615 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3616 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3617 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3619 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3620 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3622 if !chan.is_live() {
3623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3624 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3625 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3628 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3630 let mut retain_channel = true;
3631 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3634 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3635 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3639 let ret_err = match res {
3640 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3641 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3642 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3643 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3644 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3645 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3646 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3647 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3648 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3649 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3650 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3657 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3658 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3666 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3670 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3671 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3672 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3673 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3674 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3675 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3676 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3678 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3680 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3684 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3685 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3686 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3687 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3689 handle_errors.push(err);
3699 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3700 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3701 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3702 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3703 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3704 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3705 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3707 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3708 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3709 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3710 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3711 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3712 if no_remaining_entries {
3713 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3715 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3716 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3717 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3718 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3719 no_remaining_entries = false;
3727 if no_remaining_entries {
3728 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3729 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3731 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3738 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3740 /// This currently includes:
3741 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3742 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3743 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3745 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3746 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3748 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3749 /// estimate fetches.
3750 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3751 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3752 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3753 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3755 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3757 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3758 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3760 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3761 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3762 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3763 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3764 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3765 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3766 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3768 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3770 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3772 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3773 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3774 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3775 if needs_close { return false; }
3778 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3779 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3780 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3781 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3782 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3783 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3784 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3785 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3789 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3790 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3792 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3793 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3794 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3798 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3799 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3804 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3809 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3810 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3811 // This should be unreachable
3812 debug_assert!(false);
3815 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3816 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3817 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3818 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3820 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3821 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3822 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3824 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3832 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3833 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3837 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3838 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3841 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3847 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3848 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3849 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3851 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3852 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3853 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3854 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3856 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3857 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3858 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3859 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3860 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3863 let removed_source = {
3864 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3865 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash)
3867 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3868 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3869 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3870 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3871 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3872 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3873 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3874 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3875 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3880 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3881 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3883 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3885 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3886 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3887 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3888 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3889 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3890 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3891 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3893 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3895 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3896 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3898 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3903 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3904 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3905 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3906 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3907 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3908 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3909 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3910 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3911 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3912 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3914 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3915 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3916 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3917 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3919 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3920 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3921 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3922 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3923 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3927 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3928 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3929 // be surfaced to the user.
3930 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3931 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3932 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3934 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3935 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3936 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3938 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3943 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3944 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3948 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3949 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3950 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3951 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3953 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3954 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3955 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3956 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3957 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3960 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3961 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3962 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3965 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3966 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3967 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3969 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3970 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3971 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3972 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3973 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3974 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3975 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3976 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3977 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3980 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3984 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3985 all_paths_failed = true;
3986 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3987 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3989 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3998 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3999 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4000 Some(RouteParameters {
4001 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4002 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4003 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4008 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4009 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4011 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4013 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4015 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4016 if !payment_retryable {
4017 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4019 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4023 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4025 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4031 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4032 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4033 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4034 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4035 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4037 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4038 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4039 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4040 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4047 error_code: onion_error_code,
4049 error_data: onion_error_data
4053 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4059 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4060 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4061 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4062 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4064 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4065 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4066 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4067 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4069 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4070 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4072 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4074 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4077 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4078 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4079 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4080 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4081 network_update: None,
4084 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4087 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4089 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4094 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4095 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4096 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4098 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4099 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4100 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4102 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4103 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4104 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4105 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4107 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4108 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4111 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4112 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4113 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4117 let mut forward_event = None;
4118 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4119 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4120 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4122 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4124 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4127 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4130 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4131 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4132 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4133 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4134 time_forwardable: time
4137 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4138 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4139 failed_next_destination: destination
4145 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4146 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4148 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4149 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4150 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4152 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4153 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4154 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4155 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4157 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4159 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4160 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4161 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4162 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4163 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4164 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4168 let removed_source = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4169 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4170 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4172 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4173 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4174 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4175 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4177 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4178 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4179 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4180 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4181 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4183 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4184 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4185 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4186 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4187 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4188 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4189 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4190 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4191 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4192 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4199 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4204 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4205 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4206 debug_assert!(false);
4210 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4211 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4212 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4213 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4214 if sources.len() != 1 {
4215 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4216 debug_assert!(false);
4222 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4224 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4225 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4228 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4229 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4230 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4234 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4235 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4236 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4237 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4238 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4239 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4240 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4241 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4242 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4244 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4245 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4246 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4247 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4248 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4249 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4251 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4255 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4257 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4258 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4259 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4260 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4263 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4264 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4268 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4269 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4271 purpose: payment_purpose,
4272 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4276 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4277 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4278 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4279 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4284 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4285 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4286 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4287 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4288 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4290 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4294 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4295 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4296 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4297 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4298 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4299 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4301 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4302 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4303 payment_preimage, e);
4304 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4305 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4306 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4307 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4311 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4312 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4313 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4314 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4315 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4316 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4317 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4318 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4319 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4320 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4326 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4328 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4331 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4332 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4333 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4335 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4336 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4337 payment_preimage, e);
4340 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4341 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4343 chan.remove_entry();
4345 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4348 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4351 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4352 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4353 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4354 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4355 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4356 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4357 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4358 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4359 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4360 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4361 pending_events.push(
4362 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4364 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4374 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4376 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4377 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4378 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4379 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4380 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4381 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4382 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4383 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4384 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4385 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4386 pending_events.push(
4387 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4388 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4394 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4398 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4399 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4400 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4402 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4403 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4404 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4405 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4406 pending_events.push(
4407 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4419 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4420 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4421 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4422 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4423 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4424 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4425 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4428 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4429 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4430 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4431 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4432 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4435 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4436 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4437 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4438 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4439 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4440 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4441 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4442 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4443 // again on restart.
4444 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4445 payment_preimage, update_res);
4447 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4448 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4449 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4450 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4453 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4454 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4455 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4456 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4460 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4461 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4462 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4465 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4466 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4467 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4469 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4471 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4481 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4482 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4483 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4486 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4487 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4489 let chan_restoration_res;
4490 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4491 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4492 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4493 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4494 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4495 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4497 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4501 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4502 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4503 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4504 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4505 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4506 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4507 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4509 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4510 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4511 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4516 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4517 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4518 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4521 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4523 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4524 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4525 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4526 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4527 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4531 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4533 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4534 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4537 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4538 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4539 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4541 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4542 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4543 /// used to accept such channels.
4545 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4546 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4547 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4548 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4551 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4552 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4554 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4555 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4556 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4558 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4559 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4561 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4562 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4564 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4565 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4567 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4568 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4569 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4570 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4573 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4576 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4577 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4578 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4580 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4581 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4583 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4584 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4587 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4588 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4589 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4590 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4591 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4592 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4596 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4600 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4601 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4602 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4606 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4612 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4613 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4617 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4621 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4622 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4623 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4624 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4627 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4628 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4634 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4636 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4637 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4640 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4641 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4642 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4644 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4645 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4646 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4649 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4650 pending_events.push(
4651 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4652 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4653 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4654 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4655 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4656 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4661 entry.insert(channel);
4667 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4668 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4669 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4670 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4671 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4673 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4674 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4676 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4677 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4682 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4683 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4684 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4685 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4686 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4688 user_channel_id: user_id,
4693 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4694 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4695 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4696 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4697 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4698 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4700 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4703 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4708 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4709 // lock before watch_channel
4710 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4711 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4712 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4713 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4714 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4715 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4716 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4717 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4718 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4719 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4720 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4721 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4722 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4724 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4725 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4726 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4727 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4728 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4729 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4730 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4733 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4734 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4735 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4737 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4739 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4740 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4741 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4744 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4745 funding_msg.channel_id))
4747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4748 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4751 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4752 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4755 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4756 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4764 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4766 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4767 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4771 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4774 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4775 Ok(update) => update,
4776 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4778 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4779 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4781 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4782 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4783 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4784 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4785 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4786 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4787 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4793 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4794 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4801 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4802 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4806 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4807 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4808 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4809 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4811 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4814 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4815 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4816 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4817 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4818 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4819 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4820 msg: announcement_sigs,
4822 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4823 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4824 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4825 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4826 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4827 // announcement_signatures.
4828 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4829 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4830 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4831 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4837 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4845 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4846 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4847 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4851 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4853 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4857 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4858 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4859 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4860 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4863 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4864 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4866 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4867 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4868 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4869 let (result, is_permanent) =
4870 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4872 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4877 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4878 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4879 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4889 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4890 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4891 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4894 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4898 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4899 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4900 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4902 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4904 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4905 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4907 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4908 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4910 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4915 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4916 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4917 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4918 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4919 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4920 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4921 } else { (tx, None) }
4923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4926 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4927 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4928 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4930 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4931 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4932 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4937 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4942 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4943 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4944 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4945 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4947 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4948 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4949 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4950 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4952 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4958 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4962 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4963 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4964 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4965 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4966 match pending_forward_info {
4967 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4968 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4969 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4970 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4972 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4974 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4975 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4976 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4979 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4981 _ => pending_forward_info
4984 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4991 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4993 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4997 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5000 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5005 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5009 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5010 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5011 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5012 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5014 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5015 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5017 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5024 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5025 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5029 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5032 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5033 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5034 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5036 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5043 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5044 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5045 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5046 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5048 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5051 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5052 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5053 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5054 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5055 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5056 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5057 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5062 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5063 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5067 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5068 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5069 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5071 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5073 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5074 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5075 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5076 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5077 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5078 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5080 commitment_signed: msg,
5086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5091 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5092 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5093 let mut forward_event = None;
5094 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5095 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5096 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5097 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5099 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5100 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5101 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5102 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5103 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5106 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5107 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5110 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5111 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })));
5116 match forward_event {
5118 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5119 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5120 time_forwardable: time
5128 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5129 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5132 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5133 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5135 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5136 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5138 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5139 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5140 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5141 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5142 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5143 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5144 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5145 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5146 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5147 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5148 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5149 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5151 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5152 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5153 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5154 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5155 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5156 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5158 } else { unreachable!(); }
5160 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5161 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5162 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5166 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5167 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5168 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5169 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5170 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5175 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5177 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5178 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5180 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5181 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5182 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5184 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5185 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5192 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5193 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5194 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5195 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5197 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5200 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan);
5202 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5207 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5208 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5209 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5211 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5213 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5214 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5216 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5217 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5221 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5222 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5223 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5224 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5225 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5233 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5234 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5235 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5236 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5238 // It's not a local channel
5239 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5242 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5243 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5244 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5246 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5247 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5248 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5249 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5250 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5251 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5253 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5255 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5256 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5257 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5258 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5260 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5261 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5266 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5269 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5270 let chan_restoration_res;
5271 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5272 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5273 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5275 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5277 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5280 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5281 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5282 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5283 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5284 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5285 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5286 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5287 let mut channel_update = None;
5288 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5289 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5290 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5293 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5294 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5295 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5296 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5297 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5298 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5299 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5304 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5305 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5306 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5307 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5308 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5309 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5311 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5316 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5317 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5319 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5320 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5325 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5326 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5327 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5328 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5329 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5330 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5331 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5332 match monitor_event {
5333 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5334 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5336 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5339 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5340 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5343 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5344 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5345 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5346 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5347 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5348 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5349 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5350 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5351 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5352 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5357 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5358 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5360 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5362 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5363 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5364 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5371 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5372 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5378 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5379 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5382 has_pending_monitor_events
5385 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5386 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5387 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5389 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5390 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5393 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5394 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5395 /// update was applied.
5397 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5398 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5399 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5400 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5401 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5402 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5403 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5404 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5406 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5408 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5409 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5411 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5412 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5413 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5414 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5416 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5418 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5421 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5422 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5423 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5424 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5425 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5426 updates: commitment_update,
5430 has_monitor_update = true;
5431 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5432 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5433 if close_channel { return false; }
5440 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5441 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5442 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5449 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5450 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5451 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5454 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5455 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5461 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5462 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5463 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5464 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5465 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5466 let mut has_update = false;
5468 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5469 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5470 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5471 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5473 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5474 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5475 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5476 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5479 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5482 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5483 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5484 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5485 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5491 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5493 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5494 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5495 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5501 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5502 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5509 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5510 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5516 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5517 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5519 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5520 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5521 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5522 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5523 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5524 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5525 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5526 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5527 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5528 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5529 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5530 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5531 assert!(should_broadcast);
5532 } else { unreachable!(); }
5533 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5535 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5539 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5540 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5542 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5543 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5546 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5549 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5550 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5552 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5553 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5554 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5555 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5556 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5557 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5558 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5559 // never fail a payment too early.
5560 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5562 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5570 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5573 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5574 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5576 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5577 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5578 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5580 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5582 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5583 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5587 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5588 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5590 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5592 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5593 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5594 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5595 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5596 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5597 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5600 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5601 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5603 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5606 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5608 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5610 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5611 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5612 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5613 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5614 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5617 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5618 /// stored external to LDK.
5620 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5621 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5622 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5624 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5625 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5628 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5629 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5630 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5631 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5633 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5634 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5635 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5636 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5637 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5639 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5640 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5641 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5642 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5643 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5645 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5646 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5648 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5649 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5653 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5654 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5656 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5658 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5659 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5660 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5661 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5664 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5665 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5667 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5670 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5672 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5674 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5675 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5678 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5679 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5681 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5682 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5683 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5686 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5687 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5689 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5690 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5691 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5692 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5694 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5695 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5696 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5697 Some(_) => continue,
5698 None => return scid_candidate
5703 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5705 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5706 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5708 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5709 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5710 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5714 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5715 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5716 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5717 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5718 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5723 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5724 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5728 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5729 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5733 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5734 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5735 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5736 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5737 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5740 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5741 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5742 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5743 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5745 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5746 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5747 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5748 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5751 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5752 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5754 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5758 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5759 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5760 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5762 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5763 events.replace(pending_events);
5772 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5774 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5775 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5776 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5777 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5780 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5782 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5783 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5784 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5785 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5786 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5788 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5789 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5790 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5791 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5794 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5795 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5796 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5799 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5800 handler.handle_event(&event);
5808 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5810 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5811 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5812 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5813 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5816 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5818 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5819 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5820 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5821 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5822 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5825 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5826 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5829 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5831 let new_height = height - 1;
5833 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5834 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5835 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5836 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5837 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5838 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5841 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5845 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5847 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5848 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5849 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5850 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5853 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5854 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5855 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5856 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5858 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5859 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5862 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5863 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5865 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5866 if height < last_best_block_height {
5867 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5868 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5872 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5873 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5874 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5875 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5877 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5878 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5882 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5884 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5886 macro_rules! max_time {
5887 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5889 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5890 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5891 // having an explicit local time source.
5892 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5893 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5894 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5895 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5896 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5902 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5903 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5904 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5905 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5909 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5910 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5911 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5912 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5913 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5914 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5920 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5922 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5923 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5924 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5925 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5926 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5927 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5932 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5934 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5935 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5936 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5937 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5940 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5941 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5943 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5944 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5945 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5946 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5947 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5949 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5950 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5952 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5953 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5954 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5955 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5956 let res = f(channel);
5957 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5958 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5959 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5960 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5962 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5964 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5965 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5966 if channel.is_usable() {
5967 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5968 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5970 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5979 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5981 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5982 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5983 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5984 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5985 msg: announcement_sigs,
5987 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5988 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5989 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5991 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5992 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5993 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5998 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5999 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6000 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6001 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6002 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6003 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6004 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6005 // is always consistent.
6006 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6007 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6008 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6009 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6010 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6013 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6014 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6015 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6016 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6017 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6018 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6019 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6023 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6024 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6025 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6026 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6027 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6028 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6029 data: reason_message,
6037 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6038 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6039 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6040 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6041 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6042 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6043 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6044 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6045 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6046 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6048 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6049 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6050 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6051 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6055 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6060 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6062 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6063 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6067 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6068 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6069 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
6072 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6073 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6074 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6075 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6078 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6079 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
6081 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6082 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6085 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6086 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6087 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6088 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6089 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6092 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6093 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6094 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6097 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6098 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6099 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6100 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6104 impl<M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6105 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6106 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6107 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6108 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6109 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6112 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6113 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6114 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6117 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6119 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6122 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6124 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6127 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6129 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6132 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6134 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6137 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6142 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6143 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6144 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6147 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6149 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6152 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6154 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6157 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6159 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6162 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6167 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6174 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6177 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6179 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6182 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6184 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6187 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6188 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6189 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6192 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6197 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6199 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6202 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6204 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6205 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6207 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6208 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6209 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6210 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6211 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6212 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6213 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6214 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6215 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6216 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6217 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6220 no_channels_remain = false;
6225 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6232 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6233 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6239 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6240 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6241 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6242 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6243 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6244 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6245 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6246 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6250 if no_channels_remain {
6251 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6254 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6255 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6259 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6260 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6261 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6265 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6270 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6271 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6273 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6274 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6278 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6283 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6284 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6285 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6286 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6287 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6288 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6289 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6290 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6291 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6295 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6296 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6297 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6302 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6303 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6304 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6305 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6306 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6314 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6318 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6319 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6321 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6322 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6323 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6324 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6325 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6330 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6331 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6332 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6333 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6336 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6337 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6338 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6346 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6347 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6351 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6352 provided_node_features()
6355 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6356 provided_init_features()
6360 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6361 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6362 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6363 provided_init_features().to_context()
6366 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6367 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6369 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6370 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6371 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6372 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6373 provided_init_features().to_context()
6376 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6377 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6378 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6379 provided_init_features().to_context()
6382 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6383 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6384 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6385 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6386 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6387 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6388 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6389 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6390 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6391 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6392 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6393 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6394 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6395 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6396 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6397 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6398 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6399 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6403 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6404 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6406 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6407 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6408 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6409 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6412 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6413 (2, node_id, required),
6414 (4, features, required),
6415 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6416 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6417 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6418 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6421 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6422 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6423 (2, channel_id, required),
6424 (3, channel_type, option),
6425 (4, counterparty, required),
6426 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6427 (6, funding_txo, option),
6428 (7, config, option),
6429 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6430 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6431 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6432 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6433 (16, balance_msat, required),
6434 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6435 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6436 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6437 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6438 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6439 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6440 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6441 (26, is_outbound, required),
6442 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6443 (30, is_usable, required),
6444 (32, is_public, required),
6445 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6446 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6449 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6450 (2, channels, vec_type),
6451 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6452 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6455 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6457 (0, onion_packet, required),
6458 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6461 (0, payment_data, required),
6462 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6463 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6465 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6466 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6467 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6471 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6472 (0, routing, required),
6473 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6474 (4, payment_hash, required),
6475 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6476 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6477 (9, amt_incoming, option),
6481 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6482 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6484 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6486 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6487 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6488 reason.write(writer)?;
6490 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6491 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6494 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6495 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6496 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6497 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6504 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6505 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6506 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6510 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6511 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6512 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6516 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6517 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6518 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6519 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6520 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6523 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6524 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6525 // messages contained in the variants.
6526 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6527 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6528 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6530 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6531 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6532 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6533 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6534 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6537 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6538 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6539 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6540 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6541 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6543 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6548 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6553 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6554 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6555 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6556 (2, outpoint, required),
6557 (4, htlc_id, required),
6558 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6561 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6562 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6563 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6564 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6565 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6567 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6568 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6569 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6570 (2, self.value, required),
6571 (4, payment_data, option),
6572 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6573 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6579 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6580 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6581 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6583 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6584 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6585 let mut total_msat = None;
6586 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6587 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6588 (0, prev_hop, required),
6589 (1, total_msat, option),
6590 (2, value, required),
6591 (4, payment_data, option),
6592 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6593 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6595 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6597 if payment_data.is_some() {
6598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6600 if total_msat.is_none() {
6601 total_msat = Some(value);
6603 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6606 if total_msat.is_none() {
6607 if payment_data.is_none() {
6608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6610 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6612 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6616 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6619 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6626 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6627 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6628 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6631 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6632 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6633 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6634 let mut payment_id = None;
6635 let mut payment_secret = None;
6636 let mut payment_params = None;
6637 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6638 (0, session_priv, required),
6639 (1, payment_id, option),
6640 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6641 (3, payment_secret, option),
6642 (4, path, vec_type),
6643 (5, payment_params, option),
6645 if payment_id.is_none() {
6646 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6648 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6650 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6651 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6652 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6653 path: path.unwrap(),
6654 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6659 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6660 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6665 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6666 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6668 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6670 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6671 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6672 (0, session_priv, required),
6673 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6674 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6675 (3, payment_secret, option),
6676 (4, path, vec_type),
6677 (5, payment_params, option),
6680 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6682 field.write(writer)?;
6689 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6690 (0, LightningError) => {
6694 (0, failure_code, required),
6695 (2, data, vec_type),
6699 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6700 (0, forward_info, required),
6701 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6702 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6703 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6708 (0, htlc_id, required),
6709 (2, err_packet, required),
6714 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6715 (0, payment_secret, required),
6716 (2, expiry_time, required),
6717 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6718 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6719 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6722 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6724 (0, session_privs, required),
6727 (0, session_privs, required),
6728 (1, payment_hash, option),
6729 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6732 (0, session_privs, required),
6733 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6734 (2, payment_hash, required),
6735 (4, payment_secret, option),
6736 (6, total_msat, required),
6737 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6738 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6741 (0, session_privs, required),
6742 (2, payment_hash, required),
6746 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6747 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6748 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6749 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6750 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6753 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6754 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6756 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6758 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6760 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6761 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6762 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6766 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6767 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6768 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6769 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6770 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6771 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6772 unfunded_channels += 1;
6775 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6776 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6777 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6778 channel.write(writer)?;
6784 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6785 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6786 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6787 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6788 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6789 for forward in pending_forwards {
6790 forward.write(writer)?;
6795 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6796 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6797 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6798 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6799 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6800 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6801 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6802 htlc.write(writer)?;
6804 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6807 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6808 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6809 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6810 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6811 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6812 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6815 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6816 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6817 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6818 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6819 for event in events.iter() {
6820 event.write(writer)?;
6823 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6824 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6825 for event in background_events.iter() {
6827 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6829 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6830 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6835 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6836 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6837 // likely to be identical.
6838 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6839 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6841 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6842 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6843 hash.write(writer)?;
6844 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6847 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6848 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6849 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6850 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6851 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6854 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6855 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6857 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6858 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6859 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6860 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6863 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6864 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6868 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6869 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6870 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6872 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6873 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6874 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6879 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6880 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6881 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6882 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6883 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6884 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6885 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6892 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6894 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6896 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6897 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6898 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6899 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6900 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6901 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6902 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6903 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6904 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6905 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6906 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6907 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6908 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6910 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6911 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6913 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6914 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6916 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6917 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6918 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6919 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6920 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6921 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6923 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6924 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6925 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6926 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6927 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6931 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6932 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6934 pub keys_manager: K,
6936 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6938 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6939 pub fee_estimator: F,
6940 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6942 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6943 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6944 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6945 pub chain_monitor: M,
6947 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6948 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6949 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6950 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6951 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6952 /// deserialization.
6954 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6955 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6956 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6958 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6959 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6961 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6962 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6963 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6964 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6966 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6969 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6970 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6973 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6974 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6975 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6976 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6977 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6978 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6981 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6982 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6983 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6984 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6985 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6987 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6988 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6993 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6994 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6995 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6996 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
6997 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6998 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6999 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7003 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7004 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7005 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7009 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7010 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7011 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7012 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7013 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7014 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7017 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7018 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7020 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7026 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7028 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7029 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7030 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7031 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7032 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7033 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7034 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7035 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7036 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7037 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7038 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7039 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7040 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7041 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7042 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7043 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7044 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7045 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7046 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7047 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7048 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7050 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7051 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7052 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7053 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7054 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7055 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7056 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7057 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7058 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7059 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7060 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7061 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7062 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7063 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7064 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7065 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7068 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7069 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7070 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7072 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7073 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7075 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7077 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7078 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7079 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7080 // safely discard the channel.
7081 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7082 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7083 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7084 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7085 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7088 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7089 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7090 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7091 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7092 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7093 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7097 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7098 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7099 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7100 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7104 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7105 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7106 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7107 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7108 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7109 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7111 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7112 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7114 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7117 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7118 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7119 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7120 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7121 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7122 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7123 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7124 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7126 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7129 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7130 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7131 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7132 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 let peer_state = PeerState {
7134 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7136 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7139 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7141 for _ in 0..event_count {
7142 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7143 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7147 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7148 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7149 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7150 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7151 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7152 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7153 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7154 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7158 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7160 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7161 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7162 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7163 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7167 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7168 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7172 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7173 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7174 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7178 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7180 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7181 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7182 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7184 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7186 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7191 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7192 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7193 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7194 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7195 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7196 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7197 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7198 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7199 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7200 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7201 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7202 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7203 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7204 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7206 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7207 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7210 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7211 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7214 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7215 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7216 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7217 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7218 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7219 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7221 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7223 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7224 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7225 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7226 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7227 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7228 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7229 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7231 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7232 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7233 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7234 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7235 if path.is_empty() {
7236 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7237 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7239 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7240 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7241 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7242 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7244 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7245 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7246 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7249 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7250 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7251 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7252 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7254 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7255 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7256 total_msat: path_amt,
7257 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7259 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7260 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7269 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7270 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7272 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7273 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7274 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7275 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7277 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7278 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7281 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7282 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7283 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7284 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7285 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7287 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7288 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7289 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7290 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7291 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7292 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7293 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7294 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7296 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7301 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7303 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7305 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7306 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7308 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7312 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7313 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7315 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7316 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7319 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7321 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7323 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7324 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7325 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7326 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7327 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7331 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7332 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7333 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7334 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7336 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7337 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7338 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7340 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7341 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7342 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7343 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7344 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7347 if chan.is_usable() {
7348 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7349 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7350 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7351 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7357 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7359 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7360 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7361 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7362 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7363 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7364 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7365 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7367 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7368 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7369 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7370 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7372 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7373 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7374 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7375 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7377 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7378 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7379 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7380 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7382 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7383 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7384 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7386 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7387 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7390 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7392 purpose: payment_purpose,
7393 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7399 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7401 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7402 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7403 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7405 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7407 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7410 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7412 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7413 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7414 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7416 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7417 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7418 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7419 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7420 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7422 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7428 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7430 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7432 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7433 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7434 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7435 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7437 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7438 logger: args.logger,
7439 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7442 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7443 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7444 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7445 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7448 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7449 //connection or two.
7451 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7457 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7458 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7459 use core::time::Duration;
7460 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7461 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7462 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7463 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7464 use crate::ln::msgs;
7465 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7466 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7467 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7468 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7469 use crate::util::test_utils;
7470 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7473 fn test_notify_limits() {
7474 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7475 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7479 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7481 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7482 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7483 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7484 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7485 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7487 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7489 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7490 // to connect messages with new values
7491 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7492 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7493 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7494 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7496 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7497 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7498 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7499 // ... but the last node should not.
7500 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7501 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7502 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7503 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7505 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7506 // about the channel.
7507 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7508 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7509 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7511 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7513 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7514 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7515 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7516 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7517 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7518 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7520 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7521 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7522 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7524 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7525 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7526 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7527 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7528 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7529 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7531 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7532 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7533 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7534 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7535 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7536 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7537 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7538 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7540 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7541 // the channel info has updated.
7542 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7544 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7545 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7546 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7547 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7551 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7552 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7558 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7560 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7561 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7562 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7563 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7565 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7566 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7567 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7568 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7569 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7570 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7572 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7574 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7576 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7577 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7579 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7580 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7581 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7582 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7583 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7585 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7586 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7587 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7589 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7590 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7591 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7592 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7593 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7594 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7595 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7596 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7597 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7599 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7600 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7602 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7603 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7604 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7606 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7607 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7608 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7609 // lightning messages manually.
7610 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7611 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7614 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7615 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7616 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7618 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7619 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7621 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7622 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7624 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7625 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7626 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7628 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7629 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7630 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7632 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7634 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7636 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7637 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7640 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7641 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7642 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7645 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7646 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7647 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7648 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7653 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7654 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7655 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7656 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7661 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7662 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7663 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7664 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7671 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7672 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7673 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7674 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7675 // fails as expected.
7676 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7679 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7680 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7681 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7682 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7684 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7685 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7686 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7688 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7689 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7690 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7691 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7692 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7694 let route = find_route(
7695 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7696 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7698 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7700 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7701 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7702 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7703 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7704 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7706 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7707 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7708 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7712 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7713 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7714 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7715 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7716 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7717 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7718 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7719 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7720 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7722 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7723 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7725 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7726 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7727 let route = find_route(
7728 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7729 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7731 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7733 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7735 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7736 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7737 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7739 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7740 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7741 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7743 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7744 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7745 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7746 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7749 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7750 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7751 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7753 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7754 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7755 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7756 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7757 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7758 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7759 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7760 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7761 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7763 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7764 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7768 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7769 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7770 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7774 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7776 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7777 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7778 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7779 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7781 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7782 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7783 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7784 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7785 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7787 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7788 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7789 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7790 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7791 let route = find_route(
7792 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7793 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7796 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7797 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7798 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7799 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7802 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7803 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7804 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7805 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7806 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7807 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7810 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7814 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7815 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7816 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7817 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7818 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7819 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7821 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7822 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7823 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7824 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7826 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7827 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7828 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7829 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7830 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7832 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7833 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7834 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7835 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7836 let route = find_route(
7837 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7838 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7841 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7842 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7843 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7844 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7845 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7848 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7849 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7850 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7851 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7852 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7853 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7854 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7856 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7860 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7864 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7866 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7867 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7868 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7869 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7871 // Marshall an MPP route.
7872 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7873 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7874 route.paths.push(path);
7875 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7876 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7877 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7878 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7879 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7880 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7882 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7883 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7884 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7885 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7890 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7891 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7897 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7898 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7900 total_msat: 100_000,
7903 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7904 // payment verification fails as expected.
7905 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7906 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7907 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7908 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7910 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7914 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7915 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7919 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7920 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7921 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7922 // the channel is successfully closed.
7923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7928 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7929 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7930 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7931 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7932 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7934 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7935 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7937 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7938 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7940 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7943 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7945 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7946 // as it has the funding transaction.
7947 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7948 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7949 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7951 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7954 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7956 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7958 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7959 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7960 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7962 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7963 // as it has the funding transaction.
7964 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7965 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7966 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7969 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7970 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7972 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7973 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7974 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7976 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7977 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7978 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7979 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7981 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7982 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7984 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7985 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7986 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7987 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7988 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7989 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7990 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7992 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7993 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7994 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7995 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7996 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7997 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7998 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8001 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8003 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8004 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8005 // closing transaction).
8006 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8007 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8008 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8010 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8011 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8012 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8013 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8014 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8017 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8019 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8021 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8022 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8023 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8025 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8027 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8028 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8032 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8034 use crate::chain::Listen;
8035 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8036 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8037 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8038 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8039 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8040 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8041 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8042 use crate::util::test_utils;
8043 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8044 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8046 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8047 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8048 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8050 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8054 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8055 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8056 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8057 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8058 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8059 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8060 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8065 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8066 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8069 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8070 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8071 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8073 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8074 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8076 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8077 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8079 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8080 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8082 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8083 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8084 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8085 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8086 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8088 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8090 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8092 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8093 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8094 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8095 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8096 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8098 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8100 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8102 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8103 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8104 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8105 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8106 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8109 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8110 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8111 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8113 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8114 } else { panic!(); }
8116 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8117 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8119 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8122 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8125 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8126 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8128 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8129 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8130 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8131 match msg_events[0] {
8132 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8133 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8134 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8138 match msg_events[1] {
8139 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8143 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8144 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8146 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8147 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8152 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8153 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8155 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8156 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8161 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8163 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8164 macro_rules! send_payment {
8165 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8166 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8167 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8168 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8169 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8170 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8171 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8172 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8173 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8174 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8176 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8177 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8179 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8180 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8182 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8183 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8184 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8185 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8186 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8187 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8188 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8189 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8192 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8193 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8194 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8196 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8197 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8198 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8199 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8200 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8202 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8205 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8206 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8207 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8208 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8210 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8215 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8216 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);