1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1186 // |__`per_peer_state`
1188 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1190 // |__`claimable_payments`
1192 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1196 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1198 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1200 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1204 // |__`pending_events`
1206 // |__`pending_background_events`
1208 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1219 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1220 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1221 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1227 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1229 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1231 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1234 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1235 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1236 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1237 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1239 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1240 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1242 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1243 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1244 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1245 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1246 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1247 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1248 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1249 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1251 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1256 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1258 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1259 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1260 /// and via the classic SCID.
1262 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1263 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1265 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1269 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1270 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1271 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1276 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1278 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1279 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1280 /// and via the classic SCID.
1282 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1283 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1288 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1289 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1291 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1294 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1295 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1296 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1297 /// active channel list on load.
1299 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1300 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1302 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1304 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1305 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1306 /// the handling of the events.
1308 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1309 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1312 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1313 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1314 /// would break backwards compatability.
1315 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1316 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1317 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1323 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1325 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1327 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1328 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1329 /// confirmation depth.
1331 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1333 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1337 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1339 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1341 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1343 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1345 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1346 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1347 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1349 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1350 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1352 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1353 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1354 /// keeping additional state.
1355 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1357 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1358 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1359 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1360 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1362 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1363 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1365 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1366 /// are currently open with that peer.
1368 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1369 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1372 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1374 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1375 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1376 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1377 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1378 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1380 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1381 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1382 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1383 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1384 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1386 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1387 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1390 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1391 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1393 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1395 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1396 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1398 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1399 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1400 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1401 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1402 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1404 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1406 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1408 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1409 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1410 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1411 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1412 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1413 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1414 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1415 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1416 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1417 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1418 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1420 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1421 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1422 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1424 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1426 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1427 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1429 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1433 signer_provider: SP,
1438 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1440 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1441 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1442 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1444 pub struct ChainParameters {
1445 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1446 pub network: Network,
1448 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1450 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1451 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1454 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1458 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1459 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1462 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1463 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1464 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1465 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1466 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1467 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1469 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1470 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1471 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1472 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1473 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1474 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1476 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1477 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1480 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1481 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1482 /// events to handle.
1484 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1485 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1487 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1488 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1491 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1492 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1493 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1494 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1496 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1497 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1498 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1499 should_persist: move || {
1500 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1501 // processing and return that.
1502 let notify = persist_check();
1503 match (notify, force_notify) {
1504 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1505 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1506 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1507 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1508 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1511 _read_guard: read_guard,
1515 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1516 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1517 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1518 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1519 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1520 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1522 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1523 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1524 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1525 should_persist: persist_check,
1526 _read_guard: read_guard,
1531 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1532 fn drop(&mut self) {
1533 match (self.should_persist)() {
1534 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1535 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1536 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1538 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1539 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1540 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1545 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1546 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1548 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1550 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1551 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1552 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1553 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1554 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1556 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1557 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1559 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1561 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1562 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1563 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1564 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1565 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1566 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1567 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1568 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1569 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1570 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1571 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1572 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1573 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1575 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1576 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1578 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1579 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1580 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1581 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1583 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1584 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1585 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1586 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1587 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1588 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1590 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1592 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1593 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1595 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1597 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1598 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1600 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1601 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1602 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1604 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1605 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1606 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1608 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1609 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1610 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1611 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1613 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1614 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1615 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1617 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1618 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1619 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1621 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1624 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1625 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1626 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1627 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1628 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1629 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1630 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1631 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1634 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1635 /// to better separate parameters.
1636 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1637 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1638 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1639 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1640 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1641 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1642 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1643 pub features: InitFeatures,
1644 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1645 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1646 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1648 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1650 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1651 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1652 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1653 /// payments to us through this channel.
1654 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1655 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1656 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1657 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1658 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1659 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1660 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1663 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1664 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1665 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1666 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1667 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1668 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1669 /// lifetime of the channel.
1670 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1671 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1672 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1673 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1674 /// our counterparty already.
1675 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1676 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1678 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1679 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1680 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1681 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1683 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1684 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1686 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1687 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1689 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1690 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1691 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1692 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1693 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1694 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1695 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1696 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1697 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1700 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1702 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1703 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1704 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1705 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1706 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1707 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1708 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1710 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1711 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1713 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1714 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1715 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1716 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1717 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1718 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1719 /// this value on chain.
1721 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1723 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1725 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1726 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1727 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1728 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1729 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1730 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1731 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1733 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1735 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1736 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1737 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1738 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1740 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1741 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1742 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1743 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1744 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1746 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1747 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1748 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1749 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1751 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1752 pub balance_msat: u64,
1753 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1754 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1755 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1756 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1758 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1760 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1761 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1762 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1763 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1764 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1765 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1766 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1767 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1769 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1770 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1771 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1772 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1773 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1774 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1775 /// route which is valid.
1776 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1777 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1778 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1779 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1780 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1781 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1783 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1784 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1785 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1786 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1787 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1788 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1789 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1790 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1791 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1793 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1795 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1796 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1797 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1798 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1799 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1801 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1802 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1803 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1804 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1805 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1806 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1807 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1809 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1810 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1811 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1812 pub is_outbound: bool,
1813 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1814 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1815 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1816 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1817 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1819 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1820 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1821 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1822 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1823 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1824 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1825 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1827 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1828 pub is_usable: bool,
1829 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1830 pub is_public: bool,
1831 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1832 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1833 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1834 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1835 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1836 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1838 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1839 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1840 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1842 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1843 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1844 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1846 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1847 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1850 impl ChannelDetails {
1851 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1852 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1853 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1855 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1856 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1857 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1858 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1861 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1862 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1863 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1865 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1866 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1867 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1868 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1871 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1872 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1873 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1877 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1879 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1880 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1881 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1883 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1884 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1885 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1886 features: latest_features,
1887 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1888 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1889 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1890 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1891 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1892 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1893 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1894 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1895 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1896 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1898 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1899 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1900 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1901 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1902 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1903 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1904 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1905 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1906 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1907 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1908 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1909 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1910 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1911 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1912 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1913 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1914 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1915 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1916 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1917 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1918 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1919 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1920 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1921 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1922 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1923 config: Some(context.config()),
1924 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1925 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1926 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1931 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1932 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1933 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1934 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1935 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1936 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1937 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1938 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1939 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1941 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1943 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1944 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1946 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1947 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1948 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1949 /// to drop the channel.
1953 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1954 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1955 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1956 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1957 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1959 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1960 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1961 payment_id: PaymentId,
1963 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1965 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1966 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1967 payment_id: PaymentId,
1968 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1970 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1971 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1972 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1975 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1976 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1977 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1979 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1980 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1981 payment_id: PaymentId,
1982 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1983 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1984 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1986 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1987 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1988 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1990 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1991 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1992 payment_id: PaymentId,
1993 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1994 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1998 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2000 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2002 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2003 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2004 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2005 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2007 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2008 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2009 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2012 macro_rules! handle_error {
2013 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2014 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2015 // entering the macro.
2016 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2017 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2021 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2022 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2024 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2025 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2026 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2027 let logger = WithContext::from(
2028 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2030 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2032 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2033 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2034 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2039 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2042 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2044 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2045 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2046 action: err.action.clone()
2050 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2051 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2052 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2053 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2058 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2065 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2066 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2067 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2068 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2070 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2071 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2072 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2074 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2075 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2076 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2077 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2078 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2080 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2081 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2083 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2087 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2088 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2089 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2091 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2092 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2094 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2095 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2097 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2098 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2099 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2100 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2101 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2102 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2104 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2110 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2112 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2113 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2115 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2116 match $channel_phase {
2117 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2120 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2121 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2124 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2126 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2127 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2128 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2130 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2132 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2138 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2139 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2143 let key = *$entry.key();
2144 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2146 $entry.remove_entry();
2154 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2155 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2159 let key = *$entry.key();
2160 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2162 $entry.remove_entry();
2170 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2171 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2173 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2174 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2180 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2181 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2182 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2183 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2184 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2186 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2187 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2188 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2189 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2190 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2191 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2192 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2193 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2194 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2195 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2200 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2201 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2202 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2203 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2204 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2205 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2206 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2207 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2208 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2209 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2211 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2216 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2217 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2218 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2219 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2220 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2221 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2222 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2223 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2224 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2226 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2231 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2232 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2233 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2234 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2235 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2236 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2237 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2238 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2239 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2240 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2241 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2242 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2244 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2245 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2246 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2252 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2253 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2255 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2256 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2257 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2258 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2259 updates.announcement_sigs);
2260 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2261 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2264 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2265 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2266 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2267 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2269 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2270 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2271 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2272 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2273 let mut batch_completed = false;
2274 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2275 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2276 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2277 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2279 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2280 channel_state.2 = true;
2282 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2284 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2286 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2289 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2290 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2291 if batch_completed {
2292 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2293 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2294 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2295 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2296 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2297 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2298 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2299 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2300 chan.set_batch_ready();
2301 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2302 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2306 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2307 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2308 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2313 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2315 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2316 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2318 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2319 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2321 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2322 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2323 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2324 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2329 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2330 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2331 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2332 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2334 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2335 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2336 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2337 panic!("{}", err_str);
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2340 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2341 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2350 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2351 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2352 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2354 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2355 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2356 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2357 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2358 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2359 // filter for uniqueness here.
2360 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2361 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2362 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2363 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2365 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2366 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2368 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2369 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2370 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2376 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2377 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2378 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2379 while !processed_all_events {
2380 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2387 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2388 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2389 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2392 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2393 result = $self.process_background_events();
2395 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2396 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2397 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2398 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2402 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2403 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2404 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2405 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2408 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2410 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2411 $event_to_handle = event;
2413 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2414 post_event_actions.push(action);
2419 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2420 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2421 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2422 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2423 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2424 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2427 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2428 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2429 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2430 processed_all_events = false;
2434 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2435 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2436 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2438 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2439 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2440 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2446 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2448 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2450 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2452 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2457 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2459 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2461 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2462 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2464 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2466 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2467 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2468 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2471 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2472 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2473 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2475 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2476 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2477 current_timestamp: u32,
2479 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2480 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2481 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2482 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2484 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2485 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2486 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2491 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2493 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2494 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2495 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2496 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2497 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2498 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2499 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2500 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2501 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2503 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2506 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2507 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2509 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2511 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2513 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2515 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2516 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2517 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2518 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2519 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2520 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2521 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2522 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2524 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2534 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2535 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2536 &self.default_configuration
2539 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2540 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2541 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2544 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2545 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2547 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2549 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2553 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2558 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2560 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2561 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2562 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2563 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2564 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2566 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2567 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2569 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2570 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2571 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2573 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2574 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2575 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2577 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2578 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2580 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2581 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2582 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2583 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2584 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2585 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2587 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2588 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2589 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2590 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2591 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2596 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2597 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2602 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2606 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2607 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2613 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2614 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2615 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2616 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2617 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2618 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2622 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2627 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2629 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2635 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2641 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2642 node_id: their_network_key,
2645 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2648 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2649 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2650 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2651 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2652 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2653 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2654 // the same channel.
2655 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2659 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2662 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2663 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2664 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2665 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2669 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2670 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2671 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2679 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2680 /// more information.
2681 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2682 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2683 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2684 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2685 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2686 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2687 // the same channel.
2688 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2692 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2695 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2696 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2697 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2705 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2706 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2708 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2709 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2711 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2712 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2713 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2714 // really wanted anyway.
2715 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2718 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2719 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2720 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2726 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2727 let context_to_details = |context| {
2728 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2730 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2732 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2733 .map(context_to_details)
2739 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2740 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2742 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2743 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2744 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2746 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2747 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2748 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2749 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2750 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2751 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2753 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2754 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2755 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2757 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2758 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2759 payment_id: *payment_id,
2760 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2761 total_msat: *total_msat,
2764 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2765 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2767 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2768 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2770 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2775 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2778 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2779 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2792 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2793 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2794 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2795 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2796 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2797 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2799 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2800 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2801 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2803 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2807 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2808 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2810 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2811 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2812 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2813 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2816 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2817 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2821 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2823 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2824 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2831 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2832 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2833 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2837 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2838 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2844 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2845 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2846 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2848 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2849 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2851 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2852 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2853 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2854 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2856 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2858 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2859 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2860 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2863 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2864 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2865 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2866 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2867 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2868 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2871 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2872 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2873 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2875 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2876 /// the channel being closed or not:
2877 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2878 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2879 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2880 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2881 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2882 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2883 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2885 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2886 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2887 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2888 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2890 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2892 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2893 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2894 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2897 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2898 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2899 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2900 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2904 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2905 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2906 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2907 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2908 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2911 let logger = WithContext::from(
2912 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2915 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2916 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2917 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2918 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2919 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2923 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2924 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2925 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2926 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2927 // ignore the result here.
2928 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2930 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2931 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2932 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2933 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2935 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2936 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2937 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2938 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2939 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2940 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2941 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2944 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2947 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2948 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2954 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2955 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2956 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2957 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2958 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2959 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2960 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2963 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2964 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2965 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2969 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2970 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2974 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2975 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2976 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2977 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2980 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2981 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2982 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2983 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2984 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2986 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2988 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2989 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2990 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2991 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2992 mem::drop(peer_state);
2993 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2995 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2996 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2997 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2999 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3000 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3001 // Unfunded channel has no update
3002 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3004 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3005 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3006 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3007 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3008 // Unfunded channel has no update
3009 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3012 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3013 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3014 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3015 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3017 (None, *peer_node_id)
3019 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3022 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3023 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3024 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3026 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3027 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3028 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3029 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3030 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3036 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3039 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3041 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3042 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3044 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3045 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3047 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3050 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3061 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3062 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3063 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3065 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3066 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3067 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3070 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3071 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3072 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3074 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3075 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3076 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3077 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3078 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3081 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3082 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3083 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3084 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3085 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3089 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3090 /// local transaction(s).
3091 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3092 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3093 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3097 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3098 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3099 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3100 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3101 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3102 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3103 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3104 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3106 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3107 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3108 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3109 // we don't have the channel here.
3110 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3114 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3115 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3116 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3117 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3118 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3119 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3120 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3121 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3122 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3123 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3124 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3126 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3129 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3130 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3131 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3133 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3134 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3135 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3141 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3142 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3143 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3144 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3146 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3147 None => return None,
3148 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3151 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3152 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3155 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3157 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3158 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3161 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3165 fn can_forward_htlc(
3166 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3167 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3168 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3169 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3172 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3174 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3175 // intercept forward.
3176 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3177 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3178 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3180 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3185 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3186 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3187 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3189 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3190 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3192 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3198 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3199 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3200 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3201 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3202 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3203 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3204 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3205 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3206 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3207 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3209 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3210 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3212 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3213 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3214 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3216 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3217 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3218 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3219 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3220 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3221 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3222 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3224 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3228 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3229 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3231 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3232 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3233 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3234 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3235 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3236 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3237 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3241 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3242 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3244 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3246 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3247 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3248 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3249 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3250 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3254 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3255 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3257 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3259 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3260 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3263 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3264 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3265 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3266 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3269 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3270 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3271 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3272 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3273 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3274 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3275 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3279 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3282 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3283 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3284 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3285 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3286 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3287 macro_rules! return_err {
3288 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3290 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3291 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3292 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3293 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3294 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3295 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3296 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3297 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3298 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3302 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3303 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3304 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3305 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3306 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3312 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3314 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3315 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3316 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3317 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3320 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3321 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3322 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3323 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3324 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3326 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3329 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3330 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3331 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3332 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3333 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3339 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3340 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3341 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3343 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3344 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3345 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3347 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3348 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3349 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3350 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3351 return Err(LightningError {
3352 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3353 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3356 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3357 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3359 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3360 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3361 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3364 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3365 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3366 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3367 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3369 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3370 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3371 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3373 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3374 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3375 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3376 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3377 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3378 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3379 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3383 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3386 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3387 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3388 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3389 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3391 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3392 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3393 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3394 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3395 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3398 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3399 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3401 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3402 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3403 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3404 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3405 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3406 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3407 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3408 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3410 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3411 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3412 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3414 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3416 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3423 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3424 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3425 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3426 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3431 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3432 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3433 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3436 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3437 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3438 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3439 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3441 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3442 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3443 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3445 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3446 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3450 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3451 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3453 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3454 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3455 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3457 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3460 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3462 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3463 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3466 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3467 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3468 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3469 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3470 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3471 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3472 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3473 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3474 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3476 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3477 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3478 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3479 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3481 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3482 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3484 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3485 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3486 Some(monitor_update) => {
3487 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3489 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3490 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3491 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3492 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3493 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3494 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3495 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3503 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3506 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3507 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3508 // `channel_by_id` map.
3509 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3514 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3515 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3517 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3522 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3524 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3525 /// fields for more info.
3527 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3528 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3530 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3532 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3533 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3534 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3535 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3536 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3538 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3539 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3540 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3541 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3542 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3544 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3545 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3546 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3547 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3549 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3551 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3552 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3553 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3555 /// In general, a path may raise:
3556 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3557 /// node public key) is specified.
3558 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3559 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3560 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3561 /// relevant updates.
3563 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3564 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3565 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3567 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3568 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3569 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3570 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3571 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3572 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3573 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3574 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments
3577 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3578 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3579 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3582 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3583 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3584 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments
3588 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3589 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3590 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3591 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3595 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3596 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3598 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3599 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3600 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3604 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3605 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3610 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3611 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3614 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3617 self.pending_outbound_payments
3618 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3619 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3620 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3621 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3622 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3626 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3627 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3628 /// retries are exhausted.
3630 /// # Event Generation
3632 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3633 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3635 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3636 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3637 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3639 /// # Requested Invoices
3641 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3642 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3643 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3644 /// once the invoice has been received.
3646 /// # Restart Behavior
3648 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3649 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3650 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3652 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3653 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3655 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3658 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3659 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3660 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3661 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3662 /// never reach the recipient.
3664 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3665 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3667 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3668 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3670 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3671 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3672 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3674 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3675 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3676 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3679 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3680 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3682 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3685 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3686 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3687 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3689 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3690 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3691 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3692 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3695 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3696 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3697 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3698 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3701 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3702 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3703 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3706 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3709 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3710 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3713 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3714 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3716 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3717 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3718 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3719 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3720 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3721 let payment_params =
3722 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3724 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3726 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3729 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3730 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3732 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3733 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3734 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3735 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3737 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3738 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3739 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3740 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3741 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3742 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3743 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3744 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3745 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3746 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3748 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3749 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3750 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3751 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3755 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3757 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3758 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3761 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3763 let mut res = Vec::new();
3765 for mut path in route.paths {
3766 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3767 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3768 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3769 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3770 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3773 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3776 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3777 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3779 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3781 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3782 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3787 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3790 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3795 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3796 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3797 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3799 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3800 let used_liquidity =
3801 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3803 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3804 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3806 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3809 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3814 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3815 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3816 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3823 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3824 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3825 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3826 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3827 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3828 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3831 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3836 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3837 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3838 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3840 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3841 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3842 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3843 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3844 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3845 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3846 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3847 } else { unreachable!(); });
3849 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3850 Err((chan, err)) => {
3851 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3852 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3853 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3854 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3855 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3861 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3862 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3864 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3865 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3868 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3869 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3870 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3874 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3876 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3880 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3882 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3885 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3886 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3890 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3891 funding_txo, o.get()
3893 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3894 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3895 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3896 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3897 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3898 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3901 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3908 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3909 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3910 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3914 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3916 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3917 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3919 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3920 /// across the p2p network.
3922 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3923 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3925 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3926 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3927 /// keys per-channel).
3929 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3930 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3931 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3933 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3934 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3935 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3937 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3938 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3939 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3940 /// for more details.
3942 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3943 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3944 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3945 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3948 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3950 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3951 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3953 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3954 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3955 /// signature for each channel.
3957 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3958 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3960 let mut result = Ok(());
3962 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3963 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3964 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3965 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3966 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3971 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3972 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3973 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3977 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3978 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3979 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3980 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3981 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3982 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3983 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3984 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3986 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3987 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3992 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3993 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3994 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3995 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3999 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4000 match states.entry(txid) {
4001 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4002 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4003 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4007 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4010 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4011 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4012 temporary_channel_id,
4013 counterparty_node_id,
4014 funding_transaction.clone(),
4017 let mut output_index = None;
4018 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4019 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4020 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4021 if output_index.is_some() {
4022 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4023 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4026 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4029 if output_index.is_none() {
4030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4031 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4034 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4035 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4036 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4037 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4038 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4039 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4045 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4046 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4047 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4048 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4049 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4050 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4051 .into_iter().flatten()
4052 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4054 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4055 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4057 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4060 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4061 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4062 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4063 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4065 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4066 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4067 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4071 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4072 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4073 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4079 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4081 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4082 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4083 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4084 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4086 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4087 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4089 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4090 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4092 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4094 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4095 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4096 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4097 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4098 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4099 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4100 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4101 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4102 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4103 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4104 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4105 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4106 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4112 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4113 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4116 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4117 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4118 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4119 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4123 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4124 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4125 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4126 config.apply(config_update);
4127 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4131 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4132 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4133 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4135 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4142 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4143 debug_assert!(false);
4144 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4146 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4147 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4154 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4156 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4157 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4158 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4159 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4161 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4162 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4164 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4165 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4167 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4169 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4170 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4171 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4172 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4173 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4174 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4175 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4176 pub fn update_channel_config(
4177 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4178 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4179 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4182 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4183 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4185 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4186 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4188 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4189 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4190 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4191 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4192 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4194 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4195 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4196 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4199 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4202 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4203 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4204 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4205 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4206 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4207 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4210 let next_hop_scid = {
4211 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4212 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4213 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4216 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4217 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4218 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4219 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4220 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4223 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4225 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4226 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4227 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4230 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4231 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4232 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4233 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4234 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4241 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4242 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4243 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4246 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4247 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4248 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4249 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4252 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4254 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4255 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4256 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4257 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4258 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4261 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4262 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4263 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4264 payment.prev_channel_id,
4265 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4266 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4268 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4272 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4273 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4275 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4278 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4279 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4282 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4283 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4284 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4287 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4288 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4289 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4290 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4291 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4292 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4293 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4294 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4295 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4296 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4299 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4300 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4301 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4302 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4307 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4309 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4310 /// Will likely generate further events.
4311 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4312 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4314 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4315 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4316 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4318 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4319 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4321 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4322 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4323 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4324 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4326 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4327 match forward_info {
4328 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4329 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4330 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4331 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4332 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4335 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4336 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4337 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4338 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4340 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4341 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4342 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4343 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4344 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4345 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4346 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4347 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4348 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4351 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4352 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4354 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4357 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4358 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4364 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4365 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4367 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4371 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4372 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4374 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4378 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4379 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4380 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4381 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4382 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4383 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4384 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4387 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4388 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4389 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4390 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4391 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4393 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4395 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4396 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4400 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4401 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4402 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4403 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4404 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4405 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4407 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4408 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4414 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4417 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4420 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4421 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4422 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4423 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4424 // problem, not ours.
4430 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4431 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4432 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4434 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4438 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4440 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4441 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4442 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4447 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4448 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4449 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4450 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4451 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4452 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4453 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4454 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4455 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4456 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4457 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4460 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4461 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4462 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4463 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4464 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4465 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4466 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4467 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4468 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4469 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4470 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4472 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4473 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4474 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4475 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4476 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4477 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4480 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4481 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4482 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4485 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4486 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4488 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4490 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4491 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4492 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4493 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4499 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4500 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4502 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4503 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4504 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4506 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4507 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4508 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4509 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4511 Some((res, htlc_id))
4514 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4515 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4516 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4517 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4519 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4521 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4522 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4523 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4529 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4533 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4534 match forward_info {
4535 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4536 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4537 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4538 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4539 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4542 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4543 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4544 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4545 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4546 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4548 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4549 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4550 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4551 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4552 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4554 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4555 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4556 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4558 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4559 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4563 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4564 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4567 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4570 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4571 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4572 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4573 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4574 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4575 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4576 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4577 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4578 phantom_shared_secret,
4581 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4582 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4583 // if routing nodes overpay
4584 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4585 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4587 total_value_received: None,
4588 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4591 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4594 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4596 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4597 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4598 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4599 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4600 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4601 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4603 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4604 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4605 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4606 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4607 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4608 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4609 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4610 phantom_shared_secret,
4613 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4614 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4616 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4619 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4620 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4621 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4622 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4623 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4626 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4627 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4628 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4629 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4630 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4631 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4633 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4634 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4635 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4637 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4638 .entry(payment_hash)
4639 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4640 .or_insert_with(|| {
4641 committed_to_claimable = true;
4643 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4646 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4647 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4648 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4649 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4651 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4653 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4655 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4656 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4657 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4660 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4662 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4663 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4664 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4665 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4666 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4667 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4668 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4670 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4671 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4673 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4675 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4676 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4677 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4678 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4679 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4682 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4683 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4684 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4685 committed_to_claimable = true;
4687 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4688 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4689 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4690 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4691 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4692 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4693 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4694 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4695 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4699 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4700 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4701 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4702 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4703 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4705 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4707 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4708 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4710 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4711 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4712 committed_to_claimable = true;
4715 payment_claimable_generated
4719 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4720 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4721 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4722 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4723 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4724 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4725 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4726 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4728 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4729 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4730 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4731 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4732 Ok(result) => result,
4734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4735 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4738 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4739 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4740 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4741 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4742 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4743 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4746 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4747 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4748 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4750 check_total_value!(purpose);
4752 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4753 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4754 check_total_value!(purpose);
4758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4759 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4760 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4761 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4763 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4764 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4766 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4767 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4768 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4769 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4770 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4772 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4773 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4774 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4776 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4777 if payment_claimable_generated {
4778 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4784 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4785 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4793 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4794 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4795 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4796 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4798 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4799 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4801 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4803 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4804 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4805 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4807 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4809 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4810 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4811 events.append(&mut new_events);
4814 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4816 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4817 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4818 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4820 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4822 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4823 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4824 if background_events.is_empty() {
4825 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4828 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4830 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4831 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4832 // monitor updating completing.
4833 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4835 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4836 let mut updated_chan = false;
4838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4839 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4840 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4842 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4844 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4845 updated_chan = true;
4846 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4847 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4849 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4857 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4858 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4861 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4863 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4864 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4865 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4866 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4867 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4869 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4870 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4871 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4872 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4873 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4879 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4882 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4883 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4884 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4885 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4886 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4889 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4890 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4892 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4894 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4895 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4896 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4898 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4899 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4900 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4901 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4903 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4904 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4906 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4907 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4911 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4912 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4913 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4914 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4915 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4916 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4917 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4919 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4920 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4923 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4926 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4927 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4929 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4934 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4935 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4943 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4945 /// This currently includes:
4946 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4947 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4948 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4950 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4951 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4952 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4953 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4954 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4955 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4956 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4957 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4959 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4960 /// estimate fetches.
4962 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4963 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4964 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4965 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4966 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4968 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4969 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4971 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4972 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4973 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4974 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4976 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4977 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4978 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4979 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4980 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4981 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4983 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4984 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4985 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4987 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4988 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4989 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4990 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4991 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4992 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4993 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4994 channel_id: *chan_id,
4995 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5007 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5008 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5009 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5010 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5011 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5012 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5014 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5015 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5020 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5021 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5023 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5024 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5025 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5026 if needs_close { return false; }
5029 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5030 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5031 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5032 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5033 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5034 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5035 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5036 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5038 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5039 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5040 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5041 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5045 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5047 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5050 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5052 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5053 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5054 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5055 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5059 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5061 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5067 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5069 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5070 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5071 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5072 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5073 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5074 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5075 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5076 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5077 channel_id: *chan_id,
5078 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5086 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5087 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5088 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5090 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5091 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5092 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5094 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5095 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5096 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5097 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5099 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5100 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5101 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5102 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5107 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5108 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5109 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5110 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5111 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5112 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5113 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5114 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5115 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5121 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5123 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5124 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5129 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5130 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5131 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5132 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5133 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5134 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5135 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5136 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5137 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5138 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5139 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5141 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5142 // have no channels to the peer.
5143 let remove_entry = {
5144 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5145 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5148 entry.remove_entry();
5151 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5156 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5157 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5158 // This should be unreachable
5159 debug_assert!(false);
5162 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5163 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5164 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5165 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5166 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5167 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5168 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5171 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5172 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5173 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5175 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5176 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5183 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5184 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5185 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5186 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5187 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5190 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5191 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5194 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5195 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5198 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5199 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5200 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5201 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5202 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5203 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5204 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5207 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5208 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5211 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5212 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5213 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5214 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5215 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5222 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5223 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5224 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5226 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5227 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5228 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5229 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5231 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5232 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5233 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5234 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5235 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5236 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5239 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5240 /// reason for the failure.
5242 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5243 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5246 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5247 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5248 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5249 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5250 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5251 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5252 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5257 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5258 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5259 match failure_code {
5260 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5261 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5262 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5263 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5264 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5265 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5267 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5268 let fail_data = match data {
5269 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5272 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5277 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5278 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5280 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5282 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5283 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5284 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5285 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5286 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5287 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5288 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5290 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5292 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5293 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5295 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5300 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5301 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5302 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5303 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5304 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5305 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5306 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5307 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5308 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5309 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5311 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5312 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5313 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5314 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5316 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5317 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5318 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5319 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5320 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5324 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5325 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5326 // be surfaced to the user.
5327 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5328 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5329 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5331 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5332 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5333 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5336 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5338 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5339 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5341 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5342 debug_assert!(false);
5343 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5348 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5351 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5352 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5353 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5354 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5358 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5359 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5360 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5361 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5362 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5363 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5364 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5365 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5366 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5367 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5370 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5371 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5372 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5375 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5376 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5377 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5379 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5380 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5381 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5382 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5383 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5385 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5386 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5387 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5390 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5391 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5392 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5394 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5395 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5396 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5397 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5398 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5400 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5402 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5403 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5405 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5406 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5410 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5411 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5413 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5417 let mut push_forward_ev = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5418 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5419 push_forward_ev &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5420 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5422 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5424 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5425 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5428 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5429 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5430 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5431 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5432 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5433 failed_next_destination: destination,
5439 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5440 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5442 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5443 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5444 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5445 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5447 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5448 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5449 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5450 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5452 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5453 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5454 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5456 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5457 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5458 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5459 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5460 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5461 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5462 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5463 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5464 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5467 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5468 /// even type numbers.
5472 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5473 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5475 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5476 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5477 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5480 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5481 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5486 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5487 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5488 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5489 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5490 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5491 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5492 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5493 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5498 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5499 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5500 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5501 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5502 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5504 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5505 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5506 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5510 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5511 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5512 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5513 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5514 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5515 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5516 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5517 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5518 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5519 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5520 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5529 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5531 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5532 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5533 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5534 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5535 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5536 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5537 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5538 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5539 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5541 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5542 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5543 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5544 debug_assert!(false);
5548 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5550 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5551 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5552 debug_assert!(false);
5556 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5557 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5559 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5560 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5561 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5562 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5565 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5566 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5567 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5568 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5572 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5573 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5574 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5575 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5576 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5577 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5578 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5581 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5582 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5583 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5584 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5585 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5586 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5591 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5592 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5593 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5594 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5595 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5596 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5597 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5599 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5602 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5603 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5604 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5605 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5609 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5610 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5611 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5612 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5614 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5615 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5616 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5617 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5619 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5620 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5621 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5622 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5626 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5627 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5628 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5632 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5633 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5634 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5637 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5638 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5639 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5640 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5641 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5642 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5643 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5644 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5647 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5648 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5649 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5651 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5654 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5655 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5657 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5658 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5659 // monitor update as a background event.
5660 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5661 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5662 counterparty_node_id,
5663 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5664 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5665 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5669 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5670 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5675 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5677 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5679 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5680 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5681 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5682 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5683 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5685 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5687 debug_assert!(false,
5688 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5691 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5692 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5693 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5694 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5695 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5697 let mut found_blocker = false;
5698 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5699 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5700 // which case we need to only remove the one
5701 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5702 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5703 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5704 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5706 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5709 debug_assert!(false);
5718 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5719 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5720 counterparty_node_id: None,
5721 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5724 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5728 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5729 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5730 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5731 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5732 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5733 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5734 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5735 // again on restart.
5736 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5737 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5738 payment_preimage, update_res);
5741 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5742 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5744 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5745 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5746 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5747 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5748 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5749 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5750 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5751 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5752 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5753 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5756 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5757 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5758 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5759 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5760 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5761 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5765 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5766 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5769 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5770 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5771 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5772 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5775 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5776 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5777 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5778 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5779 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5781 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5782 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5783 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5785 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5786 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5789 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5790 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5791 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5792 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5793 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5794 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5795 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5796 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5797 let chan_to_release =
5798 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5799 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5801 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5802 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5803 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5804 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5809 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5810 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5811 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5812 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5813 // in the background.
5814 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5815 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5816 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5817 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5819 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5820 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5821 funding_txo, update, ..
5823 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5824 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5825 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5826 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5828 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5834 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5835 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5836 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5838 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5839 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5841 monitor_update.updates[0],
5842 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5847 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5848 // immediately once we get going.
5849 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5852 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5854 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5857 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5858 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5859 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5860 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5861 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5862 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5863 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5867 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5868 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5869 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5872 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5873 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5874 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5875 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5876 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5877 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5878 prev_user_channel_id,
5879 next_user_channel_id,
5880 total_fee_earned_msat,
5882 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5883 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5885 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5889 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5890 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5891 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5897 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5898 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5899 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5902 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5903 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5904 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5905 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5907 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5909 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5910 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5911 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5913 payment_purpose: purpose,
5916 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5918 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5922 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5924 sender_intended_total_msat,
5928 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5929 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5931 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5932 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5933 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5936 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5937 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5939 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5940 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5941 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5942 downstream_channel_id,
5943 Some(blocking_action),
5950 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5951 /// update completion.
5952 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5953 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5954 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5955 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
5956 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5957 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5958 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
5959 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5960 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5961 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5962 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5963 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5964 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
5965 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5966 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5967 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5969 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5970 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
5972 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5973 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5974 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5975 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5977 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
5978 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
5979 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
5982 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5983 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5985 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5987 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5992 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5993 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5995 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6000 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6001 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6002 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6003 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6004 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6009 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6013 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6019 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6020 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6021 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6025 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6026 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6027 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6030 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6033 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6034 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6036 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6037 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6039 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6040 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6041 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6042 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6043 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6048 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6049 let mut peer_state_lock;
6050 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6051 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6052 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6053 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6055 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6058 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6059 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6060 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6061 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6062 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6065 let remaining_in_flight =
6066 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6067 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6070 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6071 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6072 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6073 remaining_in_flight);
6074 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6077 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6080 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6082 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6083 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6086 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6087 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6088 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6090 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6091 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6092 /// used to accept such channels.
6094 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6095 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6096 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6097 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6100 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6101 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6103 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6104 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6105 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6107 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6108 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6110 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6111 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6113 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6114 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6116 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6117 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6118 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6119 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6122 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6124 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6127 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6128 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6130 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6132 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6133 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6135 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6139 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6141 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6142 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6143 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6145 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6146 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6147 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6148 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6149 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6150 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6151 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6154 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6155 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6157 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6163 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6164 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6165 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6166 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6168 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6172 Ok(mut channel) => {
6174 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6175 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6176 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6177 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6178 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6179 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6180 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6183 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6184 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6185 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6187 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6189 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6190 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6191 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6192 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6193 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6194 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6195 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6196 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6199 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6200 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6201 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6203 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6207 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6208 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6209 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6211 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6212 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6213 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6216 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6223 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6224 /// or 0-conf channels.
6226 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6227 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6228 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6229 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6230 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6231 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6233 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6234 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6235 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6236 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6237 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6238 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6239 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6243 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6246 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6247 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6249 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6250 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6252 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6253 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6254 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6255 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6256 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6258 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6261 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6262 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6263 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6266 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6267 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6268 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6269 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6270 // included in the unfunded count.
6271 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6272 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6273 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6276 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6277 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6280 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6281 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6282 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6283 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6288 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6291 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6292 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6293 // likely to be lost on restart!
6294 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6295 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6296 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6299 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6301 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6304 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6305 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6306 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6307 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6308 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6310 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6311 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6313 debug_assert!(false);
6314 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6315 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6316 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6318 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6319 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6321 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6322 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6323 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6324 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6325 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6326 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6329 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6330 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6333 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6334 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6335 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6336 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6337 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6340 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6341 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6343 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6344 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6345 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6348 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6349 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6350 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6351 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6353 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6355 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6356 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6357 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6358 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6359 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6360 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6363 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6364 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6365 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6370 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6371 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6372 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6373 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6374 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6375 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6376 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6379 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6384 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6385 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6387 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6388 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6390 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6392 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6393 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6396 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6397 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6399 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6400 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6401 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6403 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6407 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6408 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6409 // likely to be lost on restart!
6410 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6412 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6414 debug_assert!(false);
6415 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6419 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6421 match phase.get_mut() {
6422 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6423 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6424 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6434 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6435 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6436 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6437 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6438 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6440 user_channel_id: user_id,
6445 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6446 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6449 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6451 debug_assert!(false);
6452 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6455 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6456 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6457 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6458 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6459 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6460 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6461 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6463 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6464 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6465 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6466 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6467 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6468 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6469 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6470 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6471 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6475 Some(mut phase) => {
6476 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6477 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6478 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6480 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6483 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6485 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6486 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6487 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6488 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6489 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6490 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6492 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6493 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6494 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6497 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6499 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6502 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6503 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6505 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6508 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6509 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6510 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6511 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6513 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6514 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6515 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6516 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6517 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6518 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6519 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6524 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6525 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6526 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6528 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6532 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6533 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6534 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6542 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6543 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6545 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6547 debug_assert!(false);
6548 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6551 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6552 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6553 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6555 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6556 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6557 let logger = WithContext::from(
6559 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6560 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6563 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6565 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6566 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6567 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6568 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6569 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6570 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6571 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6572 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6573 } else { unreachable!(); }
6576 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6577 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6578 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6579 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6580 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6581 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6582 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6586 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6587 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6588 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6589 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6590 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6591 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6595 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6602 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6603 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6604 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6606 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6608 debug_assert!(false);
6609 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6613 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6615 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6616 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6617 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6618 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6619 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6620 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6621 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6622 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6623 msg: announcement_sigs,
6625 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6626 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6627 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6628 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6629 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6630 // announcement_signatures.
6631 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6632 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6633 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6634 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6641 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6642 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6647 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6648 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6652 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6657 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6658 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6659 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6661 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6662 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6664 debug_assert!(false);
6665 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6667 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6668 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6669 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6670 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6672 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6673 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6674 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6675 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6677 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6680 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6681 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6682 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6683 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6685 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6686 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6687 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6688 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6689 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6690 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6694 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6695 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6696 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6697 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6700 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6701 let context = phase.context_mut();
6702 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6703 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6704 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6705 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6707 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6708 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6709 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6710 let context = phase.context_mut();
6711 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6712 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6713 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6717 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6720 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6721 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6722 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6723 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6725 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6726 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6732 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6733 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6734 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6736 debug_assert!(false);
6737 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6739 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6742 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6744 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6745 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6746 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6747 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6749 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6754 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6755 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6756 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6757 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6758 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6759 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6760 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6762 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6763 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6769 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6770 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6771 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6772 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6774 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6775 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6776 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6777 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6778 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6783 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6784 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6785 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6790 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6791 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6792 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6793 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6795 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6796 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6797 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6798 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6800 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6801 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6803 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6805 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6807 debug_assert!(false);
6808 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6812 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6814 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6815 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6816 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6817 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6818 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6819 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6821 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6823 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6824 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6825 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6826 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6827 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
6828 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6829 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6830 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6831 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6832 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6833 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6834 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6838 match pending_forward_info {
6839 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6840 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6842 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6843 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6844 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6845 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6846 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6848 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6849 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6850 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6851 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6852 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6855 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
6861 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
6863 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6864 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6872 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6874 let next_user_channel_id;
6875 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6877 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6879 debug_assert!(false);
6880 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6882 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6884 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6886 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6887 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6888 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6889 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6891 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6893 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6894 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6895 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6897 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6898 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6899 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6900 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6901 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6902 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6903 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6904 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6907 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6908 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6914 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6915 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6916 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
6922 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6923 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6924 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6926 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6928 debug_assert!(false);
6929 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6933 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6935 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6936 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6938 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6939 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6947 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6948 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6949 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6951 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6953 debug_assert!(false);
6954 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6958 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6959 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6960 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6961 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6962 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6964 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6965 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6967 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6968 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6976 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6978 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6980 debug_assert!(false);
6981 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6983 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6985 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6987 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6988 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6989 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6990 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6991 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6992 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6993 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6997 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6998 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7005 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7006 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7007 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7008 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7009 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7010 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7014 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7018 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7019 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7020 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7021 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7022 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7023 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7024 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7025 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7026 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7027 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7028 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7030 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7031 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7033 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7034 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7035 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7036 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7038 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7039 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7042 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7043 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7045 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7046 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7047 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7049 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7050 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7051 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7052 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7053 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7056 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7057 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7059 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7060 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7061 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7062 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7063 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7064 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7065 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7066 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7067 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7068 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7069 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7070 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7073 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7074 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7075 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7080 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7081 // payments are being processed.
7082 if forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty {
7083 push_forward_event = true;
7085 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7086 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7093 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7094 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7097 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7098 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7099 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7101 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7105 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7106 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7107 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7108 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7109 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7111 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7112 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7113 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7114 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7115 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7116 // real by taking more time.
7117 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7118 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7119 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7124 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7125 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7126 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7127 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7128 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7129 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7130 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7132 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7133 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7134 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7135 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7136 channel_funding_outpoint,
7138 counterparty_node_id,
7143 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7144 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7145 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7147 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7148 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7149 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7150 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7152 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7153 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7154 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7160 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7161 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7163 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7165 debug_assert!(false);
7166 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7167 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7168 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7169 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7171 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7172 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7173 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7174 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7175 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7176 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7177 *counterparty_node_id)
7179 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7180 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7181 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7182 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7183 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7184 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7185 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7189 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7190 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7196 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7200 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7201 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7202 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7204 debug_assert!(false);
7205 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7209 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7210 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7211 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7212 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7213 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7215 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7216 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7224 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7225 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7226 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7228 debug_assert!(false);
7229 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7233 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7235 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7236 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7237 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7240 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7241 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7242 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7243 msg, &self.default_configuration
7244 ), chan_phase_entry),
7245 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7246 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7247 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7250 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7251 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7254 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7259 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7260 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7261 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7262 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7264 // It's not a local channel
7265 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7269 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7270 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7271 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7273 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7275 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7277 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7278 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7279 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7280 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7281 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7282 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7283 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7285 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7287 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7288 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7289 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7290 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7292 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7293 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7294 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7295 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7298 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7302 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7303 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7308 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7311 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7312 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7317 debug_assert!(false);
7318 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7319 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7323 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7324 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7325 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7326 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7328 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7329 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7330 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7331 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7332 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7333 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7334 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7335 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7336 let mut channel_update = None;
7337 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7338 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7339 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7342 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7343 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7344 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7345 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7346 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7347 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7348 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7353 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7354 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7355 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7356 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7357 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7358 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7359 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7364 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7365 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7369 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7371 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7372 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7373 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7374 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7375 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7376 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7378 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7379 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7380 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7381 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7382 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7383 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7384 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7385 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7386 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7387 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7388 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7389 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7390 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7391 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7392 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7393 next_funding_txid: None,
7396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7397 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7398 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7404 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7405 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7407 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7410 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7411 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7412 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7414 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7415 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7416 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7417 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7418 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7419 match monitor_event {
7420 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7421 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7422 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7423 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7424 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7425 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7426 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7428 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7429 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7430 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7431 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7434 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7435 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7436 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7438 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7439 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7440 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7441 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7444 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7446 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7449 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7450 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7451 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7452 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7455 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7457 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7458 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7459 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7463 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7464 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7465 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7466 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7474 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7475 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7481 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7482 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7485 has_pending_monitor_events
7488 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7489 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7490 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7492 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7493 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7494 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7497 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7498 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7499 /// update was applied.
7500 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7501 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7502 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7504 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7505 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7506 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7507 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7510 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7513 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7514 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7515 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7517 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7518 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7519 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7520 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7521 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7522 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7524 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7525 has_monitor_update = true;
7527 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7528 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7529 continue 'peer_loop;
7538 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7539 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7540 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7546 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7547 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7549 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7550 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7552 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7553 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7554 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7557 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7558 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7560 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7561 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7562 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7563 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7568 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7569 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7574 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7575 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7578 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7579 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7586 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7591 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7592 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7595 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7596 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7600 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7603 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7604 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7610 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7611 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7612 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7613 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7614 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7615 let mut has_update = false;
7616 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7618 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7620 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7623 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7624 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7626 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7627 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7628 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7629 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7630 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7632 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7633 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7636 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7637 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7638 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7640 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7641 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7642 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7643 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7644 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7649 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7650 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7651 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7657 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7658 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7663 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7669 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7670 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7673 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7674 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7680 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7681 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7683 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7684 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7685 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7686 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7687 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7688 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7689 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7690 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7691 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7692 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7693 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7694 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7695 assert!(should_broadcast);
7696 } else { unreachable!(); }
7697 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7698 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7699 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7702 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7707 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7708 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7709 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7710 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7714 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7715 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7716 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7717 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7718 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7720 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7724 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7729 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7731 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7733 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7734 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7735 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7736 &$self, description: String
7737 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7738 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7739 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7740 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7741 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7743 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7744 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7745 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7747 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7754 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7755 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7756 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7760 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7761 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7763 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7764 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7765 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7768 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7769 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7770 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7772 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7773 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7777 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7778 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7779 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7780 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7781 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7783 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7787 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7788 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7793 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7794 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7795 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7797 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7799 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7800 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7801 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7802 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7803 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7804 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7805 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7806 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7807 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7808 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7809 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7810 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7812 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7813 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7814 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7816 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7817 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7820 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7822 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7823 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7824 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7825 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7827 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7833 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7835 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7837 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7838 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7839 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7844 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7845 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7846 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7847 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7850 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7852 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7854 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7855 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7856 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7858 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7859 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7860 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7861 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7862 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7863 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7864 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7866 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7867 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7871 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7872 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7875 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7876 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7877 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7881 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7882 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7883 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7884 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7888 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7889 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7890 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7895 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7896 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7897 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7898 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7901 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7902 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7903 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7904 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7905 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7906 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7907 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7908 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7909 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7910 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7911 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7912 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7913 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7914 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7915 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7917 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7918 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7920 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7922 let builder = match quantity {
7924 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7926 let builder = match amount_msats {
7928 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7930 let builder = match payer_note {
7932 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7934 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7935 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7939 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7940 self.pending_outbound_payments
7941 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7942 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7944 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7946 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7947 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7948 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7949 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7950 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7953 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7955 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7956 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7957 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7958 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7959 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7960 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7961 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7962 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7963 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7965 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7972 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7975 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7976 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7977 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7981 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7982 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7983 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7984 /// received and no retries will be made.
7989 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7990 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7993 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7994 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7995 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7996 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7997 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7999 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8000 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8002 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8003 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8008 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8009 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8010 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8011 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8013 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8014 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8015 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8017 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8018 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8019 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8021 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8022 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8023 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8025 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8026 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8027 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8028 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8030 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8031 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8032 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8033 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8034 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8037 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8039 for path in refund.paths() {
8040 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8041 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8042 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8043 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8045 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8051 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8055 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8058 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8059 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8061 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8062 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8063 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8064 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8066 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8068 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8069 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8073 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8074 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8076 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8078 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8079 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8081 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8082 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8083 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8084 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8085 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8086 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8087 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8088 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8089 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8090 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8091 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8094 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8095 /// stored external to LDK.
8097 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8098 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8099 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8101 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8102 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8105 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8106 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8107 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8108 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8110 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8111 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8112 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8113 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8114 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8116 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8117 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8118 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8119 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8120 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8122 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8123 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8125 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8126 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8130 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8131 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8133 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8135 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8136 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8138 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8139 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8140 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8141 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8142 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8143 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8144 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8147 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8148 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8150 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8151 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8152 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8155 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8157 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8158 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8159 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8160 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8162 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8164 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8165 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8166 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8169 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8170 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8173 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8174 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8175 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8176 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8177 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8178 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8180 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8181 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8182 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8183 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8184 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8186 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8188 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8191 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8192 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8196 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8197 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8199 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8200 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8201 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8202 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8204 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8205 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8206 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8207 Some(_) => continue,
8208 None => return scid_candidate
8213 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8215 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8216 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8218 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8219 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8220 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8224 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8225 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8226 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8228 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8229 /// times to get a unique scid.
8230 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8231 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8232 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8234 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8235 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8236 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8237 return scid_candidate
8241 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8242 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8243 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8244 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8247 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8248 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8249 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8250 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8251 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8253 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8254 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8255 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8264 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8265 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8266 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8267 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8268 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8272 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8273 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8274 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8275 events.push_back((event, None));
8279 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8280 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8281 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8285 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8286 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8290 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8291 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8294 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8295 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8296 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8297 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8298 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8299 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8300 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8302 let logger = WithContext::from(
8303 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8306 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8307 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8308 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8309 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8310 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8311 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8312 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8313 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8315 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8319 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8320 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8321 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8322 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8323 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8324 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8329 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8331 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8332 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8333 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8334 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8336 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8337 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8338 if further_update_exists {
8339 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8344 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8351 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8352 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8358 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8359 for action in actions {
8361 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8362 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8364 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8370 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8371 /// using the given event handler.
8373 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8374 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8378 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8382 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8384 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8385 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8386 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8387 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8388 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8389 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8393 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8394 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8395 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8396 /// is always placed next to each other.
8398 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8399 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8400 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8401 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8403 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8404 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8405 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8406 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8407 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8408 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8409 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8411 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8412 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8413 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8414 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8417 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8418 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8420 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8421 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8424 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8426 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8429 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8430 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8434 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8435 events.replace(pending_events);
8444 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8446 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8447 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8448 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8449 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8450 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8451 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8455 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8457 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8458 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8459 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8461 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8465 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8467 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8468 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8469 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8470 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8471 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8472 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8476 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8478 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8479 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8480 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8481 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8482 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8485 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8486 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8489 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8490 let _persistence_guard =
8491 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8492 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8493 let new_height = height - 1;
8495 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8496 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8497 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8498 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8499 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8500 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8503 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8507 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8509 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8510 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8511 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8512 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8513 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8514 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8518 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8519 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8520 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8521 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8523 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8524 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8526 let _persistence_guard =
8527 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8528 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8529 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8530 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8532 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8533 if height < last_best_block_height {
8534 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8535 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8539 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8540 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8541 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8542 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8544 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8545 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8547 let _persistence_guard =
8548 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8549 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8550 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8552 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8554 macro_rules! max_time {
8555 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8557 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8558 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8559 // having an explicit local time source.
8560 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8561 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8562 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8563 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8564 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8570 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8571 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8572 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8573 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8577 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8578 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8579 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8580 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8581 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8582 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8583 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8584 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8585 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8586 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8587 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8594 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8595 let _persistence_guard =
8596 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8597 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8598 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8599 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8600 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8601 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8602 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8603 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8608 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8610 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8611 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8612 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8613 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8614 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8615 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8619 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8620 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8622 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8623 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8624 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8625 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8626 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8628 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8629 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8632 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8635 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8636 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8638 // Retain unfunded channels.
8639 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8640 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8641 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8642 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8643 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8644 let res = f(channel);
8645 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8646 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8647 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8648 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8649 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8651 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8652 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8653 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8654 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8655 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8656 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8657 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8658 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8663 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8668 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8669 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8672 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8673 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8675 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8676 msg: announcement_sigs,
8678 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8679 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8682 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8683 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8684 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8689 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8690 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8691 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8692 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8693 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8694 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8695 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8696 // is always consistent.
8697 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8698 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8699 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8700 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8701 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8704 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8705 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8706 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8707 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8708 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8709 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8710 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8715 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8716 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8717 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8718 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8719 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8720 data: reason_message,
8733 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8734 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8735 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8736 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8737 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8738 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8739 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8740 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8741 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8742 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8744 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8745 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8746 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8750 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8753 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8754 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8755 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8756 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8757 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8758 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8759 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8761 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8762 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8763 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8764 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8767 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8768 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8769 _ => unreachable!(),
8771 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8772 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8773 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8774 let logger = WithContext::from(
8775 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8777 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8783 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8785 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8790 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8791 /// may have events that need processing.
8793 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8794 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8796 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8797 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8798 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8799 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8802 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8803 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8804 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8807 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8808 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8809 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8812 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8813 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8814 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8815 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8818 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8819 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8820 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8821 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8824 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8825 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8827 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8828 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8829 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8830 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8831 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8834 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8835 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8836 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8837 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8840 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8841 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8842 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8843 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8846 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8847 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8848 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8849 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8852 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8853 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8854 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8855 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8859 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8860 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8862 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8863 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8864 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8865 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8866 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8867 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8871 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8872 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8873 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8874 // change to the contents.
8875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8876 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8877 let persist = match &res {
8878 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8879 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8880 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8882 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8884 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8889 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8890 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8891 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8892 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8895 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8896 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8897 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8898 // change to the contents.
8899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8900 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8901 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8905 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8906 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8907 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8908 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8911 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8913 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8916 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8918 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8921 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8922 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8923 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8924 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8925 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8927 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8928 let persist = match &res {
8929 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8930 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8932 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8937 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8938 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8939 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8940 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8943 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8944 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8945 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8946 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8949 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8950 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8951 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8952 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8955 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8956 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8957 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8958 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8961 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8966 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8968 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8971 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8972 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8973 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8974 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8976 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8977 let persist = match &res {
8978 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8979 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8980 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8982 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8987 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8989 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8992 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8993 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8994 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8995 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8997 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8998 let persist = match &res {
8999 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9000 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9001 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9003 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9008 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9009 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9010 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9011 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9013 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9014 let persist = match &res {
9015 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9016 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9017 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9019 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9024 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9026 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9029 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9031 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9034 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9035 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9036 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9037 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9039 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9040 let persist = match &res {
9041 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9042 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9043 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9045 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9050 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9052 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9055 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9056 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9057 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9060 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9065 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9067 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9068 let persist = match &res {
9069 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9070 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9071 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9073 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9078 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9080 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9081 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9082 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9085 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9086 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9087 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9089 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9092 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9093 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9094 let context = match phase {
9095 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9096 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9097 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9098 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9103 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9104 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9105 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9108 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9109 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9112 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9113 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9116 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9121 // Clean up for removal.
9122 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9123 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9126 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9127 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9128 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9129 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9131 // V1 Channel Establishment
9132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9134 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9136 // V2 Channel Establishment
9137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9138 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9139 // Common Channel Establishment
9140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9143 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9145 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9146 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9147 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9148 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9149 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9150 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9151 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9152 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9153 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9154 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9155 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9156 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9157 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9158 // Channel Operations
9159 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9161 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9162 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9164 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9166 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9167 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9168 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9169 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9170 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9171 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9172 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9173 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9174 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9177 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9178 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9179 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9180 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9183 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9185 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9187 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9188 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9192 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9193 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9194 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9195 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9199 let mut res = Ok(());
9201 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9202 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9203 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9204 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9205 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9206 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9207 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9210 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9211 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9213 if inbound_peer_limited {
9215 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9217 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9218 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9219 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9220 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9221 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9222 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9223 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9224 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9229 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9230 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9232 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9233 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9234 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9235 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9238 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9241 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9242 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9247 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9250 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9251 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9252 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9253 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9255 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9257 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9258 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9259 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9260 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9261 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9265 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9266 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9267 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9268 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9272 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9273 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9274 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9275 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9276 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9277 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9281 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9282 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9283 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9284 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9285 debug_assert!(false);
9288 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9289 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9290 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9291 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9292 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9293 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9294 debug_assert!(false);
9300 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9301 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9306 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9307 match &msg.data as &str {
9308 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9309 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9311 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9312 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9313 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9314 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9315 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9316 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9317 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9318 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9319 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9321 || -> NotifyOption {
9322 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9323 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9324 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9325 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9326 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9327 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9328 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9329 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9333 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9334 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9336 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9337 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9338 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9340 log_level: Level::Trace,
9343 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9344 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9345 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9347 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9356 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9358 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9359 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9360 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9361 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9362 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9365 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9366 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9367 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9368 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9370 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9371 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9372 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9376 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9377 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9378 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9379 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9380 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9381 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9382 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9383 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9384 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9385 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9386 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9392 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9393 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9394 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9395 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9396 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9402 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9403 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9404 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9408 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9409 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9413 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9414 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9417 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9418 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9421 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9422 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9425 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9426 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9427 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9428 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9431 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9432 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9433 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9434 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9437 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9438 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9439 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9440 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9443 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9444 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9445 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9446 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9449 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9450 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9451 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9452 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9455 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9456 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9457 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9458 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9461 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9462 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9463 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9464 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9467 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9468 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9469 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9470 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9473 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9474 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9475 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9476 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9480 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9481 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9483 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9484 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9485 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9486 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9487 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9488 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9492 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9493 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9494 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9497 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9498 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9501 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9502 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9504 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9505 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9507 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9508 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9512 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9513 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9514 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9516 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9518 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9519 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9523 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9524 amount_msats, payment_secret
9526 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9528 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9529 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9533 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9534 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9535 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9538 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9539 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9540 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9541 payment_paths, payment_hash
9543 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9544 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9545 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9547 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9548 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9549 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9550 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9551 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9554 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9555 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9556 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9557 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9558 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9560 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9561 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9562 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9563 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9564 .and_then(|invoice| {
9566 let mut invoice = invoice;
9567 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9568 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9570 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9571 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9572 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9574 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9575 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9580 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9581 Err(error) => Some(error),
9585 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9586 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9588 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9590 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9591 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9594 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9596 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9603 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9610 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9611 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9615 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9616 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9617 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9618 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9619 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9623 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9624 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9626 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9627 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9628 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9629 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9630 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9633 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9634 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9635 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9636 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9639 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9640 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9641 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9642 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9645 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9646 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9647 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9648 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9651 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9652 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9653 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9654 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9655 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9656 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9657 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9658 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9659 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9660 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9661 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9662 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9663 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9664 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9665 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9666 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9667 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9668 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9669 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9670 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9671 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9676 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9677 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9679 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9680 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9681 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9682 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9685 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9686 (2, node_id, required),
9687 (4, features, required),
9688 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9689 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9690 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9691 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9694 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9695 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9696 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9697 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9698 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9699 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9700 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9701 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9702 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9703 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9704 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9705 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9706 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9707 (7, self.config, option),
9708 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9709 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9710 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9711 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9712 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9713 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9714 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9715 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9716 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9717 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9718 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9719 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9720 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9721 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9722 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9723 (32, self.is_public, required),
9724 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9725 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9726 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9727 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9728 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9729 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9730 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9736 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9737 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9738 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9739 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9740 (2, channel_id, required),
9741 (3, channel_type, option),
9742 (4, counterparty, required),
9743 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9744 (6, funding_txo, option),
9745 (7, config, option),
9746 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9747 (9, confirmations, option),
9748 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9749 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9750 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9751 (16, balance_msat, required),
9752 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9753 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9754 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9755 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9756 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9757 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9758 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9759 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9760 (26, is_outbound, required),
9761 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9762 (30, is_usable, required),
9763 (32, is_public, required),
9764 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9765 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9766 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9767 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9768 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9769 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9770 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9773 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9774 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9775 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9776 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9777 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9781 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9783 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9784 outbound_scid_alias,
9788 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9789 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9791 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9792 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9793 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9794 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9795 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9796 confirmations_required,
9798 force_close_spend_delay,
9799 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9800 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9801 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9802 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9803 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9804 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9805 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9806 channel_shutdown_state,
9807 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9808 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9813 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9814 (2, channels, required_vec),
9815 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9816 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9819 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9820 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9821 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9824 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9826 (0, onion_packet, required),
9827 (1, blinded, option),
9828 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9831 (0, payment_data, required),
9832 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9833 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9834 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9835 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9836 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9838 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9839 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9840 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9841 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9842 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9843 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9844 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9848 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9849 (0, routing, required),
9850 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9851 (4, payment_hash, required),
9852 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9853 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9854 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9855 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9859 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9862 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9864 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9865 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9866 reason.write(writer)?;
9868 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9869 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9872 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9873 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9874 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9875 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9882 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9883 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9884 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9887 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9888 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9889 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9890 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9894 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9895 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9896 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9897 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9898 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9901 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9902 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9903 // messages contained in the variants.
9904 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9905 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9906 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9908 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9909 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9910 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9911 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9912 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9915 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9916 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9917 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9918 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9919 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9921 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9926 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9931 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9932 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9933 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9936 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9937 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9938 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9939 (2, outpoint, required),
9940 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9941 (4, htlc_id, required),
9942 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9943 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9944 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9945 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9946 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9949 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9950 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9951 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9952 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9953 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9955 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9956 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9957 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9958 (2, self.value, required),
9959 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9960 (4, payment_data, option),
9961 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9962 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9963 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9964 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9970 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9971 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9972 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9973 (0, prev_hop, required),
9974 (1, total_msat, option),
9975 (2, value_ser, required),
9976 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9977 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9978 (5, total_value_received, option),
9979 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9980 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9981 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9983 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9984 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9985 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9987 if payment_data.is_some() {
9988 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9990 if total_msat.is_none() {
9991 total_msat = Some(value);
9993 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9996 if total_msat.is_none() {
9997 if payment_data.is_none() {
9998 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10000 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10002 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10006 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10009 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10010 total_value_received,
10011 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10013 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10014 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10019 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10020 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10021 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10024 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10025 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10026 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10027 let mut payment_id = None;
10028 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10029 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10030 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10031 (0, session_priv, required),
10032 (1, payment_id, option),
10033 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10034 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10035 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10036 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10038 if payment_id.is_none() {
10039 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10041 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10043 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10044 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10045 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10047 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10048 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10049 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10050 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10054 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10055 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10056 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10058 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10061 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10062 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10067 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10068 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10070 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10071 0u8.write(writer)?;
10072 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10073 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10074 (0, session_priv, required),
10075 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10076 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10077 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10078 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10079 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10080 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10083 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10084 1u8.write(writer)?;
10085 field.write(writer)?;
10092 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10093 (0, forward_info, required),
10094 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10095 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10096 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10097 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10098 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10099 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10100 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10103 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10105 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10107 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10111 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10112 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10113 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10114 (0, htlc_id, required),
10115 (2, err_packet, required),
10118 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10119 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10120 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10121 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10122 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10123 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10124 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10125 (0, htlc_id, required),
10126 (1, failure_code, required),
10127 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10128 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10136 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10137 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10138 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10140 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10142 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10143 (0, htlc_id, required),
10144 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10145 (2, err_packet, required),
10146 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10148 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10149 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10150 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10152 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10156 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10157 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10161 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10166 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10167 (0, payment_secret, required),
10168 (2, expiry_time, required),
10169 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10170 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10171 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10174 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10176 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10177 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10178 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10179 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10180 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10181 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10185 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10186 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10188 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10190 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10192 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10193 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10194 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10197 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10200 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10201 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10202 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10203 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10204 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10205 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10208 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10209 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10213 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10215 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10216 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10217 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10218 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10219 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10220 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10223 channel.write(writer)?;
10229 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10230 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10231 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10232 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10233 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10234 for forward in pending_forwards {
10235 forward.write(writer)?;
10240 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10241 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10242 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10243 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10248 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10249 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10250 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10252 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10253 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10254 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10255 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10256 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10257 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10258 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10259 htlc.write(writer)?;
10261 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10262 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10265 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10266 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10267 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10268 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10269 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10270 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10271 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10274 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10275 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10276 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10277 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10278 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10280 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10281 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10282 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10283 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10284 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10285 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10286 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10291 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10292 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10293 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10294 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10295 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10296 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10297 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10298 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10299 0u64.write(writer)?;
10301 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10302 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10303 event.write(writer)?;
10307 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10308 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10309 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10310 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10311 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10312 0u64.write(writer)?;
10314 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10315 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10316 // likely to be identical.
10317 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10318 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10320 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10321 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10322 hash.write(writer)?;
10323 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10326 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10327 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10328 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10329 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10330 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10333 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10334 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10336 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10337 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10338 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10339 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10342 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10343 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10344 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10345 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10349 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10350 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10351 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10353 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10354 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10355 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10361 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10362 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10363 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10364 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10367 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10368 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10369 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10370 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10371 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10374 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10375 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10376 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10377 if !updates.is_empty() {
10378 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10379 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10384 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10385 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10386 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10387 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10388 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10389 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10390 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10391 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10392 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10393 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10394 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10395 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10396 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10397 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10404 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10406 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10407 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10410 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10411 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10412 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10413 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10414 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10415 // check that the event is sane here.
10416 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10417 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10418 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10419 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10425 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10426 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10427 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10428 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10429 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10430 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10433 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10434 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10435 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10436 events.push_back((ev, action));
10437 } else if action.is_some() {
10438 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10445 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10446 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10447 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10448 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10449 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10450 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10453 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10455 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10457 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10458 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10459 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10460 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10461 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10462 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10463 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10464 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10465 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10466 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10467 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10468 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10469 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10471 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10472 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10474 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10475 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10477 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10478 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10479 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10480 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10481 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10482 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10484 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10485 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10487 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10488 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10489 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10490 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10491 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10492 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10496 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10497 pub entropy_source: ES,
10499 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10500 pub node_signer: NS,
10502 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10503 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10505 pub signer_provider: SP,
10507 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10509 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10510 pub fee_estimator: F,
10511 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10513 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10514 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10515 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10516 pub chain_monitor: M,
10518 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10519 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10520 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10521 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10522 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10523 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10525 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10527 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10528 /// deserialization.
10530 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10531 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10532 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10534 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10535 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10537 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10538 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10539 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10540 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10542 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10545 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10546 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10549 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10550 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10552 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10553 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10554 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10555 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10556 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10557 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10561 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10562 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10563 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10564 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10565 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10567 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10568 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10569 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10575 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10576 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10577 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10578 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10580 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10581 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10582 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10583 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10584 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10585 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10589 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10590 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10591 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10595 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10596 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10598 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10599 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10600 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10601 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10602 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10603 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10607 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10608 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10610 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10611 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10612 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10614 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10616 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10617 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10618 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10619 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10620 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10621 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10622 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10623 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10624 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10625 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10626 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10628 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10629 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10630 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10631 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10632 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10633 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10634 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10635 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10636 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10637 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10638 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10639 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10640 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10641 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10642 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10644 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10645 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10646 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10648 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10649 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10650 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10652 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10653 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10654 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10656 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10657 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10658 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10660 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10661 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10662 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10665 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10666 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10667 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10668 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10669 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10670 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10671 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10672 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10674 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10675 let mut found_htlc = false;
10676 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10677 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10680 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10681 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10682 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10683 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10684 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10685 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10686 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10688 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10689 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10690 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10694 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10695 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10696 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10697 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10698 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10700 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10701 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10703 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10705 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10706 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10709 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10710 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10711 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10715 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10716 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10717 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10718 // safely discard the channel.
10719 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10720 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10721 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10722 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10723 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10724 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10725 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10726 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10729 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10730 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10731 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10732 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10733 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10738 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10739 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10740 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10741 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10742 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10744 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10745 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10746 counterparty_node_id: None,
10747 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10748 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10750 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10754 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10755 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10756 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10757 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10758 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10759 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10760 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10761 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10762 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10764 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10767 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10768 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10769 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10770 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10771 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10772 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10773 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10774 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10776 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10779 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10782 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10783 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10784 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10785 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10786 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10787 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10788 is_connected: false,
10792 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10793 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10794 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10795 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10796 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10797 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10798 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10799 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10802 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10803 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10804 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10805 for _ in 0..event_count {
10806 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10807 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10812 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10813 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10814 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10816 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10817 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10818 // on-startup monitor updates.
10819 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10820 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10822 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10826 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10827 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10829 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10830 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10831 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10832 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10833 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10837 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10838 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10839 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10840 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10841 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10842 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10843 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10845 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10846 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10850 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10851 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10852 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10853 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10854 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10855 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10856 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10857 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10858 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10859 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10860 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10861 let mut events_override = None;
10862 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10863 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
10864 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10865 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10866 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10867 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10868 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10869 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10870 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10871 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10872 (8, events_override, option),
10873 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10874 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10875 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10876 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10877 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
10879 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
10880 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10881 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10884 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10885 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10888 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10889 pending_events_read = events;
10892 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10893 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10896 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10897 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10898 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10899 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10900 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10901 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10903 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10905 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10906 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10907 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10910 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10911 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10912 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10913 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10914 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10916 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10917 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10918 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10920 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10921 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10922 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10923 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10924 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10926 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10927 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10928 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10929 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10930 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10931 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10932 pending_background_events.push(
10933 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10934 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10935 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10936 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10937 update: update.clone(),
10940 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10941 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10942 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10943 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10944 pending_background_events.push(
10945 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10946 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10947 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10950 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10951 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10952 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10954 max_in_flight_update_id
10958 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10961 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10962 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10963 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10965 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10967 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10968 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10969 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10970 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10971 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10972 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10973 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10974 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10975 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10978 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10979 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10980 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10981 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10982 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10983 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10984 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10985 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10986 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10987 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10988 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10991 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10992 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10993 debug_assert!(false);
10994 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10999 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11000 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11001 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11002 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11003 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11004 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11005 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11006 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11007 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11008 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11010 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11011 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11012 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11014 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11015 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11016 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11017 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11018 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11019 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11020 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11021 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11026 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11027 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11029 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11030 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11031 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11032 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11035 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11036 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11037 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11038 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11039 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11040 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11041 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11043 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11044 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11045 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11046 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11047 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11048 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11049 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11050 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11051 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11054 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11055 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11056 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11057 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11059 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11060 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11061 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11064 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11065 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11066 retry_strategy: None,
11067 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11068 payment_params: None,
11069 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11070 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11071 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11072 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11073 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11074 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11075 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11076 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11077 total_msat: path_amt,
11078 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11079 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11081 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11082 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11087 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11088 match htlc_source {
11089 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11090 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11091 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11092 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11094 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11095 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11096 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11097 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11098 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11099 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11100 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11101 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11102 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11104 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11105 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11109 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11111 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11112 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11113 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11114 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11115 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11116 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11121 !forwards.is_empty()
11123 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11124 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11125 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11126 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11127 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11128 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11129 intercepted_id != ev_id
11136 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11137 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11138 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11139 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11140 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11141 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11142 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11143 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11144 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11145 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11146 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11148 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11149 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11150 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11151 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11153 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11154 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11155 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11162 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11163 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11165 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11167 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11168 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11169 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11170 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11171 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11172 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11173 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11174 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11175 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11176 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11179 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11180 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11181 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11182 // channel still live case here.
11186 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11187 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11192 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11193 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11194 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11195 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11196 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11197 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11198 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11199 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11203 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11204 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11206 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11207 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11208 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11209 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11211 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11212 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11213 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11215 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11216 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11218 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11219 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11221 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11224 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11225 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11226 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11228 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11232 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11233 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11234 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11235 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11236 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11238 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11239 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11240 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11241 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11242 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11243 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11244 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11245 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11247 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11248 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11252 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11254 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11256 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11257 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11259 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11260 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11265 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11266 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11268 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11270 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11272 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11273 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11274 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11275 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11279 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11280 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11283 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11284 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11285 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11286 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11287 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11289 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11290 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11291 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11293 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11294 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11295 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11296 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11297 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11300 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11301 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11302 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11303 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11304 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11309 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11310 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11311 debug_assert!(false);
11312 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11317 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11319 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11320 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11321 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11322 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11323 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11324 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11325 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11326 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11327 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11328 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11329 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11331 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11332 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11334 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11335 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11336 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11337 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11339 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11340 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11341 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11342 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11344 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11345 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11346 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11347 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11349 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11350 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11351 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11354 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11355 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11356 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11359 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11360 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11363 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11366 purpose: payment.purpose,
11367 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11368 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11369 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11375 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11376 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11377 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11378 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11379 for action in actions.iter() {
11380 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11381 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11382 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11384 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11386 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11387 blocked_channel_id);
11388 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11389 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11390 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11392 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11393 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11394 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11395 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11399 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11400 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11404 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11406 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11411 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11413 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11414 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11415 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11416 router: args.router,
11418 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11420 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11421 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11422 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11423 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11425 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11426 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
11427 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11428 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11429 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11430 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11431 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11433 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11435 our_network_pubkey,
11438 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11440 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11442 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11443 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11444 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11445 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11446 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11448 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11449 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11451 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11453 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11455 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11456 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11457 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11459 logger: args.logger,
11460 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11463 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11464 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11465 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11466 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11467 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11470 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11471 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11472 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11473 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11474 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11475 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11476 downstream_channel_id, None
11480 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11481 //connection or two.
11483 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11489 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11490 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11491 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11492 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11493 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11494 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11495 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11496 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11497 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11498 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11499 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11500 use crate::prelude::*;
11501 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11502 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11503 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11504 use crate::util::test_utils;
11505 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11506 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11509 fn test_notify_limits() {
11510 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11511 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11515 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11517 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11518 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11519 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11520 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11521 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11523 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11525 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11526 // to connect messages with new values
11527 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11528 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11529 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11530 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11531 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11532 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11534 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11535 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11537 // ... but the last node should not.
11538 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11539 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11540 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11541 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11543 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11544 // about the channel.
11545 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11546 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11547 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11549 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11551 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11552 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11553 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11554 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11555 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11556 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11558 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11560 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11562 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11563 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11564 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11565 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11566 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11567 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11569 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11570 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11571 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11572 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11573 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11574 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11575 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11576 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11578 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11579 // the channel info has updated.
11580 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11581 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11582 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11583 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11584 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11585 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11589 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11590 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11598 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11599 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11600 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11601 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11603 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11604 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11605 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11606 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11607 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11608 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11609 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11610 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11612 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11614 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11616 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11617 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11618 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11620 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11622 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11623 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11624 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11626 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11627 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11628 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11630 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11631 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11632 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11633 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11634 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11635 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11636 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11637 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11638 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11640 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11641 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11642 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11644 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11646 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11648 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11649 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11650 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11651 // lightning messages manually.
11652 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11653 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11656 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11657 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11658 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11659 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11661 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11662 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11664 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11665 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11667 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11668 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11669 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11671 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11672 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11673 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11675 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11677 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11679 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11680 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11683 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11684 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11685 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11688 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11689 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11690 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11691 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11696 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11697 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11698 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11699 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11706 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11707 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11708 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11711 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11712 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11713 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11714 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11715 // fails as expected.
11716 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11717 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11718 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11719 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11720 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11721 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11724 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11725 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11726 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11727 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11728 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11729 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11730 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11732 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11733 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11734 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11736 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11737 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11738 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11739 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11740 let route = find_route(
11741 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11742 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11744 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11745 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11747 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11749 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11750 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11751 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11753 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11754 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11755 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11757 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11759 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11760 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11761 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11762 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11763 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11764 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11765 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11766 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11767 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11769 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11770 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11772 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11773 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11774 let route = find_route(
11775 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11776 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11778 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11779 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11781 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11782 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11783 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11784 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11785 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11787 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11788 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11789 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11790 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11792 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11793 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11794 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11795 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11796 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11798 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11799 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11800 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11802 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11803 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11804 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11805 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11806 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11807 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11808 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11809 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11810 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11812 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11813 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11815 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11816 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11817 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11818 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11820 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11821 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11822 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11823 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11824 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11826 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11827 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11828 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11831 let route = find_route(
11832 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11833 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11835 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11836 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11837 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11839 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11841 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11842 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11843 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11845 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11846 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11847 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11849 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11850 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11851 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11852 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11853 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11854 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11855 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11856 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11857 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11859 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11860 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11864 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11865 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11866 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11869 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11870 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11872 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11873 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11875 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11876 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11877 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11878 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11879 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11880 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11881 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11882 let route = find_route(
11883 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11884 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11887 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11888 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11889 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11890 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11891 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11892 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11895 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11896 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11897 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11898 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11899 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11900 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11901 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11903 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11907 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11908 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11909 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11910 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11911 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11915 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11917 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11918 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11920 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11921 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11922 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11923 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11924 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11925 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11926 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11927 let route = find_route(
11928 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11929 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11932 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11933 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11934 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11935 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11936 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11937 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11938 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11939 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11942 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11943 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11944 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11945 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11946 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11947 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11948 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11950 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11954 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11955 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11956 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11957 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11958 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11960 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11961 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11962 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11963 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11965 // Marshall an MPP route.
11966 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11967 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11968 route.paths.push(path);
11969 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11970 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11971 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11972 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11973 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11974 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11976 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11977 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11979 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11980 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11982 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11987 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11991 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11993 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11995 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11996 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11998 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11999 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12001 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12004 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12005 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12006 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12007 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12008 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12009 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12012 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12015 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12016 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12021 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12022 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12026 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12028 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12029 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12031 total_msat: 100_000,
12034 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12035 // payment verification fails as expected.
12036 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12037 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12038 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12039 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12041 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12045 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12046 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12050 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12051 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12052 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12053 // the channel is successfully closed.
12054 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12059 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12060 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12062 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12063 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12065 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12066 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12068 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12069 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12070 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12071 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12074 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12076 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12077 // as it has the funding transaction.
12078 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12079 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12080 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12083 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12085 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12087 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12089 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12090 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12091 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12093 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12096 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12097 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12098 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12099 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12100 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12103 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12104 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12106 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12107 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12108 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12109 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12111 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12112 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12113 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12114 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12116 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12117 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12119 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12120 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12121 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12122 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12123 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12124 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12125 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12129 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12130 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12131 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12132 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12133 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12134 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12135 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12138 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12140 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12141 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12142 // closing transaction).
12143 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12144 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12145 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12147 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12148 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12149 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12150 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12151 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12154 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12156 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12158 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12159 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12160 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12162 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12164 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12165 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12168 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12169 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12170 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12173 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12174 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12175 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12178 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12179 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12180 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12183 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12184 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12185 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12188 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12190 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12191 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12193 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12194 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12196 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12197 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12202 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12203 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12204 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12205 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12206 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12207 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12208 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12212 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12213 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12214 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12216 // Test the API functions.
12217 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12219 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12221 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12223 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12225 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12227 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12229 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12233 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12234 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12235 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12236 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12237 // the given `channel_id`.
12238 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12239 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12240 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12241 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12243 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12246 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12248 // Test the API functions.
12249 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12251 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12253 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12255 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12257 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12259 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12263 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12264 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12265 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12266 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12268 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12270 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12272 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12273 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12275 let mut funding_tx = None;
12276 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12277 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12278 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12281 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12282 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12283 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12284 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12285 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12287 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12289 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12291 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12293 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12295 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12297 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12300 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12301 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12302 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12303 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12304 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12305 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12307 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12308 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12310 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12311 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12312 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12313 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12314 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12315 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12316 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12319 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12320 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12321 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12322 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12323 }, true).unwrap_err();
12325 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12326 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12327 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12328 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12329 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12330 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12331 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12333 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12334 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12336 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12337 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12338 }, true).unwrap_err();
12340 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12341 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12342 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12343 }, false).unwrap();
12344 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12346 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12347 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12349 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12350 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12351 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12352 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12353 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12355 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12356 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12357 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12359 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12360 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12361 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12363 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12364 // "protected" and can connect again.
12365 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12366 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12367 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12369 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12371 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12373 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12374 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12378 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12379 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12383 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12385 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12387 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12388 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12390 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12391 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12392 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12393 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12396 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12398 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12399 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12400 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12402 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12403 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12404 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12406 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12407 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12408 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12409 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12413 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12414 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12415 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12418 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12419 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12421 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12423 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12425 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12426 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12428 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12429 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12430 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12431 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12432 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12433 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12436 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12437 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12439 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12440 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12444 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12445 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12448 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12449 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12450 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12451 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12452 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12454 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12455 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12457 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12458 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12459 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12460 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12466 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12467 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12469 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12470 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12471 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12473 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12474 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12478 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12482 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12483 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12484 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12485 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12486 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12487 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12488 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12489 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12490 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12491 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12492 payment_metadata: None,
12493 keysend_preimage: None,
12494 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12495 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12497 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12499 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12500 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12501 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12502 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12503 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12504 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12505 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12507 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12508 } else { panic!(); }
12510 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12511 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12512 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12513 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12514 payment_metadata: None,
12515 keysend_preimage: None,
12516 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12517 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12519 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12521 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12522 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12523 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12524 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12528 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12529 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12530 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12531 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12532 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12534 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12535 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12536 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12537 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12538 payment_metadata: None,
12539 keysend_preimage: None,
12540 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12541 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12543 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12544 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12545 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12547 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12548 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12549 // is not satisfied.
12550 assert!(result.is_ok());
12554 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12555 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12556 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12557 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12558 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12560 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12561 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12566 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12567 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12569 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12570 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12572 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12573 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12574 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12575 match &msg_events[0] {
12576 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12577 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12579 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12580 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12581 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12587 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12588 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12590 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12591 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12594 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12598 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12599 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12600 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12601 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12604 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12605 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12606 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12608 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12610 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12611 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12612 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12614 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12615 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12617 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12618 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12623 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12624 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12626 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12627 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12629 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12630 // not have generated any events.
12631 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12635 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12636 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12637 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12638 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12639 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12641 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12642 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12644 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12645 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12646 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12648 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12649 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12650 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12651 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12654 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12655 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12658 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12659 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12662 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12663 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12664 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12665 ..Default::default()
12667 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12668 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12671 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12672 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12675 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12676 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12677 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12678 ..Default::default()
12680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12681 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12682 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12683 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12685 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12686 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12689 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12690 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12691 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12692 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12693 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12696 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12697 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12698 ..Default::default()
12700 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12703 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12704 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12705 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12710 fn test_payment_display() {
12711 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12712 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12713 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12714 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12715 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12716 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12720 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12721 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12722 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12723 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12724 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12725 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12727 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12728 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12729 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12730 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12731 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12732 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12733 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12734 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12736 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12737 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12738 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12741 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12742 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12744 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12745 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12747 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12748 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12749 }, false).unwrap();
12750 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12751 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12752 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12754 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12756 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12757 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12758 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12759 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12760 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12761 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12762 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12763 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12764 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12765 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12766 } else { panic!() };
12767 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12768 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12769 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12770 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12772 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12774 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12775 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12776 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12781 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12782 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12783 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12784 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12787 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12788 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12789 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12791 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12792 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12794 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12795 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12798 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12799 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12800 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12802 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12806 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12807 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12808 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12810 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12815 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12816 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12817 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12818 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12820 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12821 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12822 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12824 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12826 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12827 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12828 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12829 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12831 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12832 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12834 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12840 use crate::chain::Listen;
12841 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12842 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12843 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12844 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12845 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12846 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12847 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12848 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12849 use crate::util::test_utils;
12850 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12852 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12853 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12854 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12855 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12857 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12859 use criterion::Criterion;
12861 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12862 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12863 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12864 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12865 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12866 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12867 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12869 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12870 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12872 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12873 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12875 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12877 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12880 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12881 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12884 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12885 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12886 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12888 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12889 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12891 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12892 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12893 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12894 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12895 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12897 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12898 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12899 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12901 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12902 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12903 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12904 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12906 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12907 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12908 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12910 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12911 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12912 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12913 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12914 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12916 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12917 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12918 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12920 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12921 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12923 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12924 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12925 }, false).unwrap();
12926 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12927 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12928 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12931 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12932 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12933 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12935 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12936 } else { panic!(); }
12938 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12939 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12940 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12941 match events_b[0] {
12942 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12943 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12948 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12949 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12950 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12951 match events_a[0] {
12952 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12953 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12958 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12960 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12961 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12962 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12964 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12965 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12966 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12967 match msg_events[0] {
12968 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12969 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12970 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12974 match msg_events[1] {
12975 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12979 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12980 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12981 match events_a[0] {
12982 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12983 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12988 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12989 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12990 match events_b[0] {
12991 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12992 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12997 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12998 macro_rules! send_payment {
12999 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13000 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13001 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13002 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13003 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13004 payment_count += 1;
13005 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13006 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13008 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13009 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13010 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13011 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13012 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13013 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13014 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13015 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13016 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13017 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13018 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13021 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13022 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13023 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13025 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13026 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13027 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13028 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13029 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13031 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13034 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13035 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13036 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13037 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13039 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13043 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13044 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13045 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);