1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
297 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
299 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
304 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
306 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
307 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
308 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
309 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
310 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
312 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
313 err: msgs::LightningError,
314 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
315 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
317 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
319 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
321 err: LightningError {
323 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
324 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
331 shutdown_finish: None,
335 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
337 err: LightningError {
339 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
347 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
350 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
352 err: LightningError {
354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
355 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
361 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
362 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
366 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
369 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
372 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
376 log_level: Level::Warn,
379 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
383 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
385 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
386 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
399 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
400 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
401 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
402 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
403 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
405 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
406 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
407 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
408 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
409 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
410 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
411 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
413 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
417 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
418 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
419 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
420 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
421 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
422 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
425 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
426 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
427 /// quite some time lag.
428 enum BackgroundEvent {
429 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
430 /// commitment transaction.
431 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
434 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
435 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
437 latest_features: InitFeatures,
440 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
441 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
443 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
446 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
447 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
448 struct PendingInboundPayment {
449 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
450 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
451 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
452 /// this payment being removed.
454 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
455 user_payment_id: u64,
456 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
457 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
458 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
461 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
462 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
463 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
468 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
470 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
471 pending_amt_msat: u64,
472 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
473 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
476 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
477 starting_block_height: u32,
479 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
480 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
481 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
483 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
484 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
485 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
507 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
513 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
520 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
529 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
530 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
531 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
538 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
539 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
542 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
543 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
544 let our_payment_hash;
545 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
551 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
555 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
559 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
560 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
561 let remove_res = match self {
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
566 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
570 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
571 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
572 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
573 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
574 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
575 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
582 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
583 let insert_res = match self {
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
586 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
592 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
593 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
594 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
595 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
596 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
603 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
605 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
606 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
607 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
608 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
615 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
616 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
617 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
618 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
619 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
620 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
621 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
623 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
624 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
626 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
627 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
628 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
629 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
630 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
631 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
632 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
633 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
635 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
636 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
638 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
639 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
641 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
642 /// to individual Channels.
644 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
645 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
646 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
647 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
649 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
650 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
651 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
652 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
653 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
654 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
655 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
657 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
658 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
659 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
660 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
663 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
664 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
665 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
666 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
667 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
669 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
670 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
671 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
672 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
673 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
676 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
677 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
678 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
679 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
680 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
684 // `total_consistency_lock`
686 // |__`forward_htlcs`
688 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
690 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
692 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
694 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
696 // | |__`channel_state`
700 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
702 // | |__`per_peer_state`
704 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
708 // | |__`pending_events`
710 // | |__`pending_background_events`
712 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
713 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
715 K::Target: KeysInterface,
716 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
719 default_configuration: UserConfig,
720 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
721 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
725 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
727 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
729 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
730 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
732 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
733 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
734 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
735 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
736 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
738 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
739 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
740 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
741 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
743 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
744 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
746 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
747 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
748 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
749 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
750 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
751 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
752 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
753 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
755 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
757 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
758 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
760 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
762 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
763 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
764 /// and via the classic SCID.
766 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
767 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
769 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
771 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
773 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
774 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
775 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
777 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
778 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
780 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
781 /// failed/claimed by the user.
783 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
784 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
786 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
787 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
789 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
790 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
791 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
792 /// active channel list on load.
794 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
795 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
797 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
799 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
800 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
801 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
803 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
804 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
805 /// the handling of the events.
808 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
809 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
810 /// would break backwards compatability.
811 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
812 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
813 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
815 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
816 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
818 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
820 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
821 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
822 /// confirmation depth.
824 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
825 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
826 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
828 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
830 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
832 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
834 our_network_key: SecretKey,
835 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
837 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
839 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
840 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
841 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
843 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
844 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
846 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
847 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
848 /// keeping additional state.
849 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
851 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
852 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
853 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
854 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
856 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
857 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
858 /// are currently open with that peer.
859 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
860 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
863 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
864 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
866 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
867 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
868 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
869 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
870 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
871 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
872 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
873 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
874 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
875 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
876 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
878 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
885 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
887 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
888 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
889 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
890 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
891 pub struct ChainParameters {
892 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
893 pub network: Network,
895 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
897 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
898 pub best_block: BestBlock,
901 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
907 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
908 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
909 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
910 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
911 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
912 /// updates are ready for persistence).
914 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
915 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
916 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
917 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
918 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
920 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
921 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
924 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
925 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
926 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
929 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
930 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
932 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
933 persistence_notifier: notifier,
934 should_persist: persist_check,
935 _read_guard: read_guard,
940 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
942 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
943 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
948 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
949 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
951 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
953 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
954 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
955 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
956 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
957 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
959 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
960 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
962 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
964 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
965 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
966 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
967 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
968 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
969 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
970 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
971 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
972 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
973 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
974 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
975 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
976 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
978 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
979 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
981 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
982 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
983 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
984 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
986 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
987 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
988 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
989 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
990 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
991 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
994 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
996 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
997 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1000 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1002 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1003 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1005 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1006 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1007 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1008 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1010 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1011 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1012 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1013 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1014 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1015 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1016 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1017 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1018 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1019 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1020 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1023 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1024 /// to better separate parameters.
1025 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1026 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1027 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1028 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1029 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1030 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1031 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1032 pub features: InitFeatures,
1033 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1034 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1035 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1037 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1039 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1040 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1041 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1042 /// payments to us through this channel.
1043 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1044 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1045 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1046 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1047 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1048 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1049 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1052 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1053 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1054 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1055 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1056 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1057 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1058 /// lifetime of the channel.
1059 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1060 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1061 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1062 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1063 /// our counterparty already.
1065 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1066 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1067 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1068 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1070 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1071 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1072 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1073 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1075 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1076 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1078 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1079 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1081 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1082 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1083 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1084 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1085 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1086 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1087 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1088 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1089 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1092 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1094 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1095 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1096 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1097 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1098 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1099 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1100 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1102 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1103 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1105 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1106 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1107 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1108 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1109 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1110 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1111 /// this value on chain.
1113 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1115 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1117 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1118 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1119 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1120 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1122 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1123 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1124 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1125 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1127 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1128 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1129 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1130 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1132 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1133 pub balance_msat: u64,
1134 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1135 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1136 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1137 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1139 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1141 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1142 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1143 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1144 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1145 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1146 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1147 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1148 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1150 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1151 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1152 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1153 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1154 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1155 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1156 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1159 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1160 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1161 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1162 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1163 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1164 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1165 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1166 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1168 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1170 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1171 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1172 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1173 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1174 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1176 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1177 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1178 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1179 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1180 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1181 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1182 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1184 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1185 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1186 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1187 pub is_outbound: bool,
1188 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1189 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1190 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1191 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1192 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1194 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1195 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1196 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1197 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1199 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1200 pub is_usable: bool,
1201 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1202 pub is_public: bool,
1203 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1204 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1205 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1206 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1207 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1208 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1210 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1211 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1214 impl ChannelDetails {
1215 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1216 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1217 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1219 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1220 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1221 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1222 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1225 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1226 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1227 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1229 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1230 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1231 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1232 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1236 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1237 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1238 /// states for more.
1239 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1240 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1241 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1242 /// send the payment at all.
1244 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1246 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1247 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1248 /// for this payment.
1249 ParameterError(APIError),
1250 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1251 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1253 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1255 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1258 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1259 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1260 /// for this payment.
1261 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1262 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1263 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1264 /// paths than the ones selected).
1266 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1267 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1268 /// for this payment.
1269 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1270 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1271 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1272 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1274 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1276 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1277 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1278 /// in over-/re-payment.
1280 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1281 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1282 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1284 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1285 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1286 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1287 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1289 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1290 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1291 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1292 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1293 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1294 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1295 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1296 payment_id: PaymentId,
1300 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1302 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1304 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1305 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1306 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1307 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1309 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1310 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1311 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1314 macro_rules! handle_error {
1315 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1318 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1319 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1321 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1322 // entering the macro.
1323 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1324 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1327 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1329 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1330 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1331 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1332 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1336 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1337 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1338 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1339 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1344 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1345 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1347 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1348 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1349 action: err.action.clone()
1353 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1354 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1357 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1364 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1365 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1366 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1367 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1368 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1369 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1371 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1372 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1373 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1374 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1375 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1377 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1378 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1380 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1384 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1385 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1388 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1389 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1391 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1392 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1394 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1395 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1396 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1397 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1398 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1399 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1405 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1406 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1410 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1412 $entry.remove_entry();
1420 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1421 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1425 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1427 $entry.remove_entry();
1435 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1436 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1438 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1439 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1445 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1446 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1448 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1449 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1450 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1451 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1452 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1453 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1454 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1455 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1456 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1457 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1458 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1459 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1460 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1461 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1464 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1465 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1466 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1467 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1468 match $action_type {
1469 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1470 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1472 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1473 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1475 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1476 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1477 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1478 if !$resend_commitment {
1479 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1482 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1484 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1485 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1487 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1492 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1493 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1495 $entry.remove_entry();
1499 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1500 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1501 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1503 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1504 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1506 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1507 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1510 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1512 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1513 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1517 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1518 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1519 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1520 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1521 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1523 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1524 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1525 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1526 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1527 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1528 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1529 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1530 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1531 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1532 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1537 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1538 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1539 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1541 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1542 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1543 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1544 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1545 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1546 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1549 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1554 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1555 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1556 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1557 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1558 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1561 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1563 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1564 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1566 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1568 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1569 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1570 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1571 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1572 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1573 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1574 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1575 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1577 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1578 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1579 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1583 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1585 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1586 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1587 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1589 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1590 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1591 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1592 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1593 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1594 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1595 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1596 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1598 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1599 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1602 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1603 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1605 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1607 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1609 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1611 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1612 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1613 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1614 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1622 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1623 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1624 &self.default_configuration
1627 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1628 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1629 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1632 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1633 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1635 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1637 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1641 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1646 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1648 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1649 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1650 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1651 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1652 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1654 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1655 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1657 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1658 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1659 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1661 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1662 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1663 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1664 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1665 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1666 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1668 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1669 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1670 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1671 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1672 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1673 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1678 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1679 Some(peer_state) => {
1680 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1681 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1682 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1683 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1684 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1685 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1686 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1690 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1695 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1698 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1701 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1702 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1704 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1705 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1706 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1711 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1717 node_id: their_network_key,
1720 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1723 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1724 let mut res = Vec::new();
1726 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1727 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1728 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1729 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1730 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1731 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1732 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1733 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1734 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1735 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1736 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1737 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1738 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1739 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1740 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1741 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1742 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1743 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1744 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1745 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1746 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1747 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1749 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1750 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1751 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1752 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1753 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1754 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1755 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1756 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1757 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1758 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1759 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1760 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1761 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1762 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1763 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1764 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1765 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1766 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1767 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1768 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1769 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1770 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1771 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1772 config: Some(channel.config()),
1776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1777 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1778 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1779 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1785 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1786 /// more information.
1787 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1788 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1791 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1792 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1794 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1795 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1798 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1799 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1800 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1801 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1802 // really wanted anyway.
1803 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1806 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1807 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1808 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1809 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1810 Some(transaction) => {
1811 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1815 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1816 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1817 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1818 reason: closure_reason
1822 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1823 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1825 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1826 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1827 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1828 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1829 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1831 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1834 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1836 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1837 Some(peer_state) => {
1838 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1839 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1840 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1842 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1845 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1847 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1848 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1849 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1850 let (result, is_permanent) =
1851 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1853 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1858 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1859 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1863 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1864 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1865 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1866 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1870 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1878 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1879 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1880 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1883 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1887 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1888 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1889 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1891 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1892 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1894 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1895 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1896 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1897 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1899 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1901 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1902 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1903 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1904 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1905 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1908 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1909 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1910 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1912 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1913 /// the channel being closed or not:
1914 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1915 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1916 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1917 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1918 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1919 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1920 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1922 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1924 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1925 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1926 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1927 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1928 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1932 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1933 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1934 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1935 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1936 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1937 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1938 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1940 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1941 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1942 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1943 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1944 // ignore the result here.
1945 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1949 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1950 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1951 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1952 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1954 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1955 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1956 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1957 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1958 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1960 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1961 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1963 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1965 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1967 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1970 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1971 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1972 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1973 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1974 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1979 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1982 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1984 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1985 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1986 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1987 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1988 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1989 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1990 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2000 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2001 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2002 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2004 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2005 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2006 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2009 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2010 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2011 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2013 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2014 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2015 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2016 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2017 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2020 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2021 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2022 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2023 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2024 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2028 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2029 /// local transaction(s).
2030 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2031 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2032 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2036 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2037 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2039 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2040 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2041 return Err(ReceiveError {
2042 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2044 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2047 // final_expiry_too_soon
2048 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2049 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2050 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2051 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2052 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2053 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2054 return Err(ReceiveError {
2056 err_data: Vec::new(),
2057 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2060 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2061 return Err(ReceiveError {
2063 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2064 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2068 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2069 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2070 return Err(ReceiveError {
2071 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2072 err_data: Vec::new(),
2073 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2076 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2077 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2078 return Err(ReceiveError {
2079 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2080 err_data: Vec::new(),
2081 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2083 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2084 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2086 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2087 phantom_shared_secret,
2089 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2090 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2091 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2092 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2093 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2094 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2095 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2096 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2097 return Err(ReceiveError {
2098 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2099 err_data: Vec::new(),
2100 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2104 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2106 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2109 return Err(ReceiveError {
2110 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2111 err_data: Vec::new(),
2112 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2117 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2120 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2121 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2122 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2123 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2127 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2128 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2129 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2131 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2132 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2133 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2134 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2135 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2136 failure_code: $err_code,
2142 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2143 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2146 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2148 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2149 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2150 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2151 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2152 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2153 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2154 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2155 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2157 macro_rules! return_err {
2158 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2160 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2161 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2162 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2163 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2164 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2170 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2172 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2173 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2175 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2176 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2180 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2181 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2183 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2185 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2186 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2187 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2188 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2189 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2191 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2194 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2195 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2196 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2198 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2199 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2200 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2203 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2204 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2205 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2206 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2210 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2211 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2212 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2215 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2216 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2217 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2218 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2219 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2224 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2225 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2226 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2227 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2228 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2229 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2230 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2231 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2232 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2233 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2234 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2235 // phantom or an intercept.
2236 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2237 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2238 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2242 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2245 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2247 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2248 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2250 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2251 // no consistency guarantees.
2252 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2256 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2257 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2258 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2259 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2260 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2262 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2263 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2264 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2265 // we don't have the channel here.
2266 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2268 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2270 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2271 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2272 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2273 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2274 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2275 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2276 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2278 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2279 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2281 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2282 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2286 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2288 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2295 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2296 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2297 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2298 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2299 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2300 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2302 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2303 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2305 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2306 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2307 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2308 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2309 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2310 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2311 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2312 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2313 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2314 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2320 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2321 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2322 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2323 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2325 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2326 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2328 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2329 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2330 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2332 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2333 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2334 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2336 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2341 pending_forward_info
2344 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2345 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2346 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2348 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2349 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2350 if !chan.should_announce() {
2351 return Err(LightningError {
2352 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2353 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2356 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2357 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2360 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2363 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2364 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2365 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2366 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2367 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2368 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2370 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2371 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2375 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2377 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2379 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2381 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2382 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2384 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2385 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2386 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2387 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2388 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2389 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2390 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2391 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2394 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2395 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2397 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2403 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2404 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2406 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2407 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2409 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2410 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2411 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2412 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2413 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2415 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2417 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2419 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2420 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2421 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2422 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2425 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2426 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2427 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2429 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2430 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2432 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2433 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2435 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2436 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2438 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2439 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2441 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2442 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2443 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2446 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2447 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2448 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2450 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2451 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2453 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2454 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2455 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2456 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2457 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2458 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2459 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2460 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2461 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2462 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2464 _ => unreachable!(),
2467 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2468 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2469 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2470 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2471 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2472 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2473 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2474 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2483 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2484 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2485 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2486 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2491 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2492 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2494 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2499 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2501 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2502 /// fields for more info.
2504 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2505 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2506 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2507 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2510 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2511 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2512 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2513 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2514 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2516 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2517 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2519 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2520 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2521 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2523 /// In general, a path may raise:
2524 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2525 /// node public key) is specified.
2526 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2527 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2529 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2530 /// relevant updates.
2532 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2533 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2534 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2536 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2537 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2538 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2539 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2542 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2543 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2544 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2546 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2547 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2548 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2549 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2550 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2554 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2555 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2558 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2559 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2560 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2561 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2564 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2565 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2568 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2569 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2570 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2571 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2574 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2575 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2578 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2579 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2582 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2587 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2588 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2589 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2591 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2592 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2594 let mut total_value = 0;
2595 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2596 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2597 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2598 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2599 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2600 continue 'path_check;
2602 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2603 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2604 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2605 continue 'path_check;
2608 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2609 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2611 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2612 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2614 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2615 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2616 total_value = amt_msat;
2619 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2620 let mut results = Vec::new();
2621 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2622 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2623 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2626 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2627 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2628 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2629 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2632 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2633 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2634 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2635 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2637 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2638 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2642 results.push(path_res);
2644 let mut has_ok = false;
2645 let mut has_err = false;
2646 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2647 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2648 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2649 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2650 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2651 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2652 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2656 } else if res.is_err() {
2657 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2658 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2661 if has_err && has_ok {
2662 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2665 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2666 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2667 Some(RouteParameters {
2668 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2669 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2670 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2676 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2677 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2678 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2679 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2680 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2686 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2688 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2689 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2690 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2691 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2692 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2694 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2695 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2696 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2697 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2698 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2699 if path.len() == 0 {
2700 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2701 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2706 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2707 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2708 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2711 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2712 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2713 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2715 let res = match payment {
2716 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2717 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2719 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2720 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2721 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2722 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2725 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2727 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2728 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2729 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2732 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2733 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2734 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2737 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2738 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2739 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2743 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2744 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2749 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2750 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2754 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2757 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2759 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2760 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2761 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2762 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2764 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2765 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2766 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2768 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2769 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2770 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2771 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2774 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2775 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2776 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2777 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2778 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2780 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2788 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2789 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2790 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2791 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2792 /// never reach the recipient.
2794 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2795 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2797 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2798 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2800 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2802 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2803 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2804 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2806 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2808 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2809 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2811 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2812 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2817 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2818 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2819 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2820 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2821 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2823 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2826 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2827 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2831 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2832 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2834 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2835 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2840 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2842 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2843 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2844 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2847 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2848 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2849 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2850 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2851 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2852 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2855 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2856 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2857 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2858 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2859 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2861 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2863 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2865 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2866 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2867 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2868 } else { unreachable!(); })
2871 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2873 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2874 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2877 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2878 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2883 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2884 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2885 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2888 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2890 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2893 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2894 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2895 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2904 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2905 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2906 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2910 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2912 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2913 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2915 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2916 /// across the p2p network.
2918 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2919 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2921 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2922 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2923 /// keys per-channel).
2925 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2926 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2927 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2929 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2930 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2931 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2933 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2934 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2935 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2936 /// for more details.
2938 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2939 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2940 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2943 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2944 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2946 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2951 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2952 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2953 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2954 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2955 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2956 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2957 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2961 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2962 let mut output_index = None;
2963 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2964 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2965 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2966 if output_index.is_some() {
2967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2968 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2971 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2973 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2976 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2979 if output_index.is_none() {
2980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2981 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2984 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2988 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2990 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2991 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2992 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2993 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2995 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2996 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2998 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2999 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3001 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3003 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3004 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3005 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3006 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3007 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3008 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3009 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3010 pub fn update_channel_config(
3011 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3012 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3013 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3014 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3015 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3019 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3020 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3023 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3024 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3025 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3026 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3027 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3028 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3030 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3031 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3032 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3033 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3037 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3038 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3039 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3042 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3044 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3045 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3046 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3055 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3056 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3058 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3059 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3061 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3062 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3063 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3064 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3065 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3067 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3068 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3070 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3073 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3074 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3075 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3076 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3077 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3080 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3082 if !chan.is_usable() {
3083 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3084 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3087 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3089 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3090 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3094 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3095 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3096 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3099 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3100 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3101 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3103 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3105 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3106 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3109 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3110 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3111 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3112 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3113 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3115 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3119 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3120 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3122 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3125 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3126 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3127 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3129 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3130 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3131 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3134 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3135 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3136 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3137 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3138 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3139 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3140 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3143 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() };
3144 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3145 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3146 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3151 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3153 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3154 /// Will likely generate further events.
3155 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3158 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3159 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3160 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3161 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3163 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3164 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3166 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3167 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3168 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3170 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3171 match forward_info {
3172 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3173 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3174 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3175 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3176 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3179 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3180 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3181 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3183 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3184 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3185 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3186 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3187 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3188 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3191 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3192 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3194 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3197 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3198 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3204 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3205 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3207 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3211 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3212 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3214 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3218 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3219 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3220 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3221 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3222 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3224 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3225 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3226 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3227 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3228 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3230 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3232 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3233 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3237 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3238 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3239 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3240 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3246 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3249 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3252 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3253 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3254 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3255 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3256 // problem, not ours.
3262 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3263 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3265 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3269 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3270 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3271 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3273 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3277 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3278 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3279 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3280 match forward_info {
3281 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3282 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3283 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3284 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3285 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3288 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3289 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3290 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3291 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3292 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3293 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3294 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3295 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3297 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3299 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3302 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3304 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3305 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3306 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3307 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3313 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3315 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3316 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3317 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3318 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3319 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3320 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3321 // this channel currently :/.
3327 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3328 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3330 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3332 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3334 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3337 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3339 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3340 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3341 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3344 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3346 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3347 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3348 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3349 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3350 // messages when we can.
3351 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3352 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3353 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3360 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3361 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3364 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3365 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3366 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3367 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3368 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3369 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3371 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3373 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3374 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3375 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3378 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3382 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3383 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3385 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3389 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3390 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3391 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3392 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3393 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3394 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3395 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3396 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3397 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3399 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3406 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3407 match forward_info {
3408 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3409 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3410 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3411 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3414 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3415 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3416 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3417 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3419 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3420 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3422 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3425 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3426 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3427 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3428 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3429 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3430 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3431 phantom_shared_secret,
3433 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3435 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3440 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3441 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3442 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3443 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3444 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3446 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3447 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3448 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3449 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3450 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3451 phantom_shared_secret,
3453 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3454 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3458 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3459 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3460 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3461 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3462 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3465 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3466 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3467 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3469 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3470 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3471 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3474 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3475 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3476 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3477 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3478 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3480 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3484 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3485 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3486 total_value += htlc.value;
3487 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3488 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3489 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3491 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3492 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3494 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3496 _ => unreachable!(),
3499 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3501 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3502 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3503 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3504 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3505 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3506 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3507 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3510 amount_msat: total_value,
3511 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3512 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3514 payment_received_generated = true;
3516 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3517 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3519 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3521 payment_received_generated
3525 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3526 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3527 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3528 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3529 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3530 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3531 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3532 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3534 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3535 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3536 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3537 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3538 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3544 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3546 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3547 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3548 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3549 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3550 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3551 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3552 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3553 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3555 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3557 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3558 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3563 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3570 if payment_data.is_none() {
3571 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3572 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3575 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3576 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3578 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3579 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3580 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3581 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3582 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3584 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3585 if payment_received_generated {
3586 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3592 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3593 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3601 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3602 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3604 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3606 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3607 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3610 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3611 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3612 events.append(&mut new_events);
3615 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3617 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3618 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3620 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3621 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3622 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3623 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3624 if background_events.is_empty() {
3628 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3630 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3631 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3632 // monitor updating completing.
3633 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3640 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3641 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3642 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3643 self.process_background_events();
3646 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3647 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3648 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3649 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3651 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3652 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3654 if !chan.is_live() {
3655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3656 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3657 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3660 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3662 let mut retain_channel = true;
3663 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3666 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3667 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3671 let ret_err = match res {
3672 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3673 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3674 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3676 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3677 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3678 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3679 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3680 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3681 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3682 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3689 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3690 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3698 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3702 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3703 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3704 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3705 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3706 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3707 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3708 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3710 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3712 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3715 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3716 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3717 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3718 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3719 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3721 handle_errors.push(err);
3731 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3732 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3733 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3734 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3735 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3736 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3737 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3739 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3740 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3741 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3742 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3743 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3744 if no_remaining_entries {
3745 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3747 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3748 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3749 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3750 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3751 no_remaining_entries = false;
3759 if no_remaining_entries {
3760 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3761 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3763 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3770 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3772 /// This currently includes:
3773 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3774 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3775 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3777 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3778 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3780 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3781 /// estimate fetches.
3782 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3783 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3784 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3785 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3787 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3789 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3790 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3792 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3794 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3795 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3796 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3797 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3798 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3800 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3802 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3804 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3805 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3806 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3807 if needs_close { return false; }
3810 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3811 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3812 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3813 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3814 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3815 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3816 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3817 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3821 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3822 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3824 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3825 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3830 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3831 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3836 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3842 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3843 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3844 // This should be unreachable
3845 debug_assert!(false);
3848 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3849 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3850 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3851 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3853 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3854 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3855 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3857 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3864 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3865 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3866 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3869 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3870 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3873 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3879 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3880 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3881 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3883 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3884 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3885 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3886 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3888 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3889 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3890 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3891 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3892 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3895 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3896 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3897 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3898 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3899 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3900 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3901 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3902 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3903 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3904 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3909 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3910 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3912 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3914 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3915 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3916 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3917 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3918 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3919 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3920 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3922 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3924 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3925 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3927 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3932 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3933 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3934 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3935 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3936 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3937 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3938 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3939 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3940 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3941 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3943 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3944 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3945 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3946 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3948 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3949 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3950 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3951 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3952 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3956 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3957 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3958 // be surfaced to the user.
3959 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3960 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3961 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3963 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3964 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3965 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3967 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3972 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3973 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3977 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3978 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3979 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3980 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3982 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3983 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3984 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3985 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3986 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3989 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3990 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3991 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3994 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3995 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3996 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3998 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3999 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4000 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4001 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4002 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4003 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4004 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4005 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4009 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4013 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4014 all_paths_failed = true;
4015 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4016 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4018 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4024 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4027 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4028 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4029 Some(RouteParameters {
4030 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4031 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4032 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4037 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4038 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4040 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4042 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4044 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4045 if !payment_retryable {
4046 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4048 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4052 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4054 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4060 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4061 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4062 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4063 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4064 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4066 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4067 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4068 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4069 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4076 error_code: onion_error_code,
4078 error_data: onion_error_data
4082 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4088 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4089 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4090 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4091 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4093 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4094 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4095 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4096 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4098 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4099 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4101 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4103 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4106 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4107 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4108 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4109 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4110 network_update: None,
4113 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4116 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4118 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4123 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4124 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4125 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4127 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4128 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4129 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4131 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4132 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4133 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4134 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4136 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4137 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4140 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4142 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4146 let mut forward_event = None;
4147 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4148 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4149 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4151 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4152 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4153 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4156 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4159 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4160 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4161 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4162 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4163 time_forwardable: time
4166 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4167 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4168 failed_next_destination: destination
4174 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4175 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4177 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4178 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4179 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4181 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4182 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4183 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4184 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4186 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4187 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4188 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4189 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4190 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4191 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4192 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4193 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4197 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4198 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4199 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4201 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4202 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4203 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4204 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4206 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4207 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4208 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4209 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4210 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4212 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4213 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4214 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4215 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4216 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4217 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4218 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4219 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4220 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4221 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4222 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4229 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4234 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4235 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4236 debug_assert!(false);
4240 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4241 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4242 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4243 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4244 if sources.len() != 1 {
4245 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4246 debug_assert!(false);
4251 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4252 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4253 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4254 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4255 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4258 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4260 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4261 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4264 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4265 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4266 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4270 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4271 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4272 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4273 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4274 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4275 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4276 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4277 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4278 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4280 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4281 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4282 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4283 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4284 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4285 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4287 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4291 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4293 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4294 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4295 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4296 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4297 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4299 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4300 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4304 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4305 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4308 purpose: payment_purpose,
4309 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4313 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4314 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4315 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4316 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4321 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4322 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4324 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4325 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4326 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4327 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4328 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4329 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4330 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4331 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4333 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4334 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4335 payment_preimage, e);
4336 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4337 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4338 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4339 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4343 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4344 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4345 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4346 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4347 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4348 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4349 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4350 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4351 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4352 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4358 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4360 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4363 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4364 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4365 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4367 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4368 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4369 payment_preimage, e);
4372 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4373 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4375 chan.remove_entry();
4377 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4380 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4383 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4384 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4385 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4386 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4387 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4388 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4389 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4390 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4391 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4392 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4393 pending_events.push(
4394 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4396 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4406 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4408 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4409 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4410 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4411 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4412 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4413 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4414 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4415 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4416 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4417 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4418 pending_events.push(
4419 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4420 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4426 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4430 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4431 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4432 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4434 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4435 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4436 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4437 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4438 pending_events.push(
4439 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4451 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4452 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4453 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4454 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4455 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4456 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4457 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4460 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4461 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4462 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4463 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4464 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4467 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4468 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4469 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4470 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4471 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4472 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4473 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4474 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4475 // again on restart.
4476 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4477 payment_preimage, update_res);
4479 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4480 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4481 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4482 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4485 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4486 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4487 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4488 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4492 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4493 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4494 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4497 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4498 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4499 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4501 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4503 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4513 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4514 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4515 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4518 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4519 /// update completion.
4520 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4521 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4522 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4523 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4524 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4525 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4526 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4528 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4529 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4530 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4531 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4534 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4535 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4537 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4539 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4544 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4546 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4547 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4549 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4554 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4555 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4556 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4557 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4558 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4563 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4567 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4573 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4574 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4575 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4581 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4585 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4586 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4588 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4592 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4596 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4597 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4598 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4599 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4600 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4601 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4602 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4604 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4605 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4606 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4611 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4612 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4613 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4616 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4618 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4619 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4621 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4622 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4623 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4624 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4628 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4630 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4631 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4634 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4635 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4636 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4638 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4639 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4640 /// used to accept such channels.
4642 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4643 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4644 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4645 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4648 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4649 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4651 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4652 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4653 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4655 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4656 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4658 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4659 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4661 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4662 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4664 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4665 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4666 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4667 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4670 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4673 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4674 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4677 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4678 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4680 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4681 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4684 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4685 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4686 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4687 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4688 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4689 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4693 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4694 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4698 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4699 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4703 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4709 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4710 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4711 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4714 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4718 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4719 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4720 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4722 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4723 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4724 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4725 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4728 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4733 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4734 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4735 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4737 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4741 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4742 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4745 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4746 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4747 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4750 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4751 pending_events.push(
4752 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4753 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4754 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4755 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4756 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4757 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4762 entry.insert(channel);
4768 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4769 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4770 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4774 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4775 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4777 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4778 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4783 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4784 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4785 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4786 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4787 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4789 user_channel_id: user_id,
4794 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4795 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4796 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4797 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4798 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4799 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4801 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4804 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4809 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4810 // lock before watch_channel
4811 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4812 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4813 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4814 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4815 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4816 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4817 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4818 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4819 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4820 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4821 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4822 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4823 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4825 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4826 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4827 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4828 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4829 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4830 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4831 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4835 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4836 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4838 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4841 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4842 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4844 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4845 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4846 funding_msg.channel_id))
4848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4849 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4853 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4856 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4857 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4865 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4867 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4868 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4869 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4870 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4872 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4873 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4875 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4876 Ok(update) => update,
4877 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4879 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4880 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4882 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4883 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4884 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4885 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4886 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4887 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4888 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4894 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4895 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4902 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4903 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4907 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4908 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4909 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4910 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4912 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4913 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4915 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4916 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4917 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4920 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4921 msg: announcement_sigs,
4923 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4924 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4925 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4926 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4927 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4928 // announcement_signatures.
4929 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4930 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4932 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4938 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4946 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4947 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4948 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4949 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4950 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4952 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4954 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4955 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4958 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4959 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4960 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4961 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4964 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4965 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4967 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4968 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4969 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4970 let (result, is_permanent) =
4971 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4973 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4978 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4980 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4990 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4991 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4992 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4995 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4999 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5000 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5003 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5005 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5006 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5008 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5009 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5011 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5016 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5017 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5018 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5019 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5020 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5021 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5022 } else { (tx, None) }
5024 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5027 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5028 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5029 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5031 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5032 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5033 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5034 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5038 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5043 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5044 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5045 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5046 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5048 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5049 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5050 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5051 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5053 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5054 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5055 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5057 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5059 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5060 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5063 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5064 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5065 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5066 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5067 match pending_forward_info {
5068 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5069 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5070 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5071 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5073 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5075 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5076 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5077 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5080 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5082 _ => pending_forward_info
5085 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5092 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5094 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5095 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5096 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5098 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5099 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5101 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5106 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5110 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5111 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5113 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5115 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5118 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5125 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5126 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5127 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5128 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5130 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5133 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5134 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5135 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5137 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5144 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5145 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5146 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5147 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5149 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5152 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5153 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5154 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5155 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5156 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5157 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5158 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5163 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5164 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5168 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5169 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5170 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5172 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5173 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5174 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5175 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5176 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5177 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5178 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5179 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5181 commitment_signed: msg,
5187 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5192 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5193 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5194 let mut forward_event = None;
5195 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5196 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5197 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5198 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5199 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5200 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5201 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5202 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5204 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5205 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5207 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5208 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5209 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5210 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5211 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5212 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5215 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5216 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5218 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5219 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5220 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5221 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5222 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5223 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5224 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5225 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5226 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5229 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5230 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5233 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5234 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5235 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5236 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5237 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5238 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5239 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5242 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5243 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() },
5244 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5249 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5250 // payments are being processed.
5251 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5252 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5254 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5255 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5262 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5263 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
5266 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5267 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5268 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5271 match forward_event {
5273 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5274 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5275 time_forwardable: time
5283 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5284 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5286 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5287 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5288 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5289 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5290 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5291 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5293 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5294 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5295 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5296 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5297 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5298 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5299 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5300 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5301 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5302 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5303 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5304 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5306 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5307 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5308 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5309 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5310 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5311 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5313 } else { unreachable!(); }
5315 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5316 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5317 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5321 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5322 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5323 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5324 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5325 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5326 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5331 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5333 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5334 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5336 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5337 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5338 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5340 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5341 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5348 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5349 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5350 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5351 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5353 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5354 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5356 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5363 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5364 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5365 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5367 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5368 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5369 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5370 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5372 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5373 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5376 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5377 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5378 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5379 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5380 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5381 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5389 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5390 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5391 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5392 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5394 // It's not a local channel
5395 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5398 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5399 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5400 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5402 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5403 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5404 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5405 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5406 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5407 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5411 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5412 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5413 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5414 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5416 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5417 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5422 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5425 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5427 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5428 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5429 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5431 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5432 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5433 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5436 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5437 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5438 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5439 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5440 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5441 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5442 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5443 let mut channel_update = None;
5444 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5445 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5446 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5449 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5450 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5451 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5452 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5453 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5454 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5455 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5460 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5461 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5462 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5463 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5464 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5465 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5473 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5474 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5477 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5478 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5483 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5484 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5485 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5486 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5487 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5488 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5489 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5490 match monitor_event {
5491 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5492 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5493 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5494 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5496 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5497 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5498 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5501 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5502 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5503 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5504 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5505 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5506 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5507 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5508 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5509 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5510 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5511 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5515 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5516 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5518 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5520 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5521 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5522 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5523 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5524 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5529 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5530 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5536 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5537 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5540 has_pending_monitor_events
5543 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5544 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5545 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5547 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5548 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5551 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5552 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5553 /// update was applied.
5555 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5556 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5557 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5558 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5559 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5560 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5561 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5562 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5564 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5565 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5566 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5567 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5569 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5570 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5571 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5572 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5574 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5576 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5579 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5580 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5581 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5582 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5583 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5584 updates: commitment_update,
5588 has_monitor_update = true;
5589 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5590 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5591 if close_channel { return false; }
5598 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5599 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5600 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5607 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5608 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5609 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5612 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5613 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5619 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5620 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5621 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5622 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5623 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5624 let mut has_update = false;
5626 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5627 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5628 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5629 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5631 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5632 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5633 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5634 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5636 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5637 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5640 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5641 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5642 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5643 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5644 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5649 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5651 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5652 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5653 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5659 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5660 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5667 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5668 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5674 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5675 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5677 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5678 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5679 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5680 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5681 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5682 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5683 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5684 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5685 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5686 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5687 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5688 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5689 assert!(should_broadcast);
5690 } else { unreachable!(); }
5691 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5693 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5697 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5698 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5700 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5701 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5704 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5707 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5708 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5710 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5711 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5712 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5713 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5714 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5715 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5716 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5717 // never fail a payment too early.
5718 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5720 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5728 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5731 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5732 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5734 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5735 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5736 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5738 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5740 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5741 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5745 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5746 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5748 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5750 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5751 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5752 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5753 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5754 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5755 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5758 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5759 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5761 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5764 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5766 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5768 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5769 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5770 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5771 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5772 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5775 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5776 /// stored external to LDK.
5778 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5779 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5780 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5782 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5783 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5786 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5787 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5788 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5789 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5791 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5792 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5793 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5794 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5795 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5797 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5798 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5799 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5800 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5801 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5803 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5804 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5806 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5807 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5811 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5812 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5814 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5816 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5817 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5818 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5819 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5822 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5823 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5825 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5828 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5830 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5832 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5833 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5836 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5837 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5839 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5840 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5841 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5844 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5845 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5847 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5848 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5849 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5850 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5852 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5853 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5854 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5855 Some(_) => continue,
5856 None => return scid_candidate
5861 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5863 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5864 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5866 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5867 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5868 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5872 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5873 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5874 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5876 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5877 /// times to get a unique scid.
5878 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5879 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5880 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5882 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5883 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5884 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5885 return scid_candidate
5889 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5890 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5891 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5892 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5894 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5895 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5896 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5897 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5906 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5907 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5908 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5909 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5914 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5915 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5919 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5920 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5923 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5924 /// using the given event handler.
5926 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5927 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5930 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5931 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5932 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5934 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5936 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5937 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5938 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5939 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5942 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5943 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5944 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5947 for event in pending_events {
5948 handler(event).await;
5951 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5952 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5957 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5958 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5959 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5960 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5964 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5965 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5966 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5967 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5969 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5970 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5971 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5972 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5975 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5976 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5978 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5979 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5982 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5983 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5984 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5986 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5987 events.replace(pending_events);
5996 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5998 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5999 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6000 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6001 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6004 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6006 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6007 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6008 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6009 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6010 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6012 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6013 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6014 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6015 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6018 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6019 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6020 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6023 for event in pending_events {
6024 handler.handle_event(event);
6032 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6034 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6035 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6036 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6037 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6040 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6042 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6043 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6044 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6045 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6046 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6049 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6050 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6053 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6055 let new_height = height - 1;
6057 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6058 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6059 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6060 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6061 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6062 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6065 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6069 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6071 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6073 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6077 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6078 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6079 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6080 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6082 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6083 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6086 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6087 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6089 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6090 if height < last_best_block_height {
6091 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6092 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6096 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6097 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6098 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6099 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6101 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6102 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6106 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6108 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6110 macro_rules! max_time {
6111 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6113 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6114 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6115 // having an explicit local time source.
6116 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6117 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6118 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6119 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6120 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6126 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6127 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6128 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6129 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6133 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6134 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6135 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6136 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6137 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6138 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6144 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6146 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6147 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6148 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6149 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6150 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6151 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6156 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6158 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6159 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6160 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6164 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6165 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6167 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6168 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6169 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6170 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6171 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6173 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6174 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6176 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6177 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6178 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6179 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6180 let res = f(channel);
6181 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6182 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6183 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6184 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6186 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6188 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6189 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6190 if channel.is_usable() {
6191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6192 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6193 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6194 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6203 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6205 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6208 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6209 msg: announcement_sigs,
6211 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6212 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6213 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6215 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6216 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6217 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6222 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6223 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6224 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6225 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6226 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6227 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6228 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6229 // is always consistent.
6230 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6231 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6232 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6233 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6234 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6237 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6238 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6239 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6240 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6241 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6242 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6247 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6248 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6250 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6252 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6253 data: reason_message,
6262 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6263 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6264 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6265 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6266 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6267 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6268 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6269 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6270 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6271 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6272 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6273 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6274 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6275 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6279 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6282 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6283 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6284 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6285 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6286 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6287 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6288 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6289 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6290 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6293 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6294 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6295 _ => unreachable!(),
6297 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6298 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x2000 | 2, data: Vec::new() },
6299 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6306 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6308 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6309 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6313 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6314 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6315 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6316 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6318 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6320 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6321 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6322 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6323 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6324 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6325 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6328 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6329 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6330 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6332 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6333 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6334 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6335 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6338 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6339 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6340 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6341 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6342 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6345 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6346 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6347 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6350 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6351 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6352 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6353 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6357 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6358 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6359 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6360 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6361 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6362 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6365 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6367 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6370 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6372 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6375 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6380 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6382 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6385 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6387 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6390 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6392 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6395 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6397 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6400 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6402 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6405 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6407 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6410 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6415 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6417 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6420 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6422 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6425 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6430 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6432 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6435 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6437 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6440 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6441 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6442 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6445 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6450 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6452 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6455 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6457 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6458 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6460 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6462 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6463 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6464 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6465 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6466 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6467 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6468 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6469 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6470 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6473 no_channels_remain = false;
6478 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6480 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6481 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6482 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6483 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6484 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6485 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6486 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6487 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6488 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6489 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6490 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6491 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6492 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6493 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6494 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6495 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6496 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6497 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6498 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6499 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6503 if no_channels_remain {
6504 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6507 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6508 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6512 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6513 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6514 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6518 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6523 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6524 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6526 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6527 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6531 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6536 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6537 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6538 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6539 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6540 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6541 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6542 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6543 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6544 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6549 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6550 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6555 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6556 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6557 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6558 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6559 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6567 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6571 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6574 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6575 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6576 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6577 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6578 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6583 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6584 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6585 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6586 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6589 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6591 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6599 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6600 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6604 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6605 provided_node_features()
6608 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6609 provided_init_features()
6613 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6614 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6615 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6616 provided_init_features().to_context()
6619 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6620 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6622 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6623 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6624 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6625 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6626 provided_init_features().to_context()
6629 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6630 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6631 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6632 provided_init_features().to_context()
6635 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6636 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6637 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6638 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6639 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6640 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6641 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6642 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6643 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6644 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6645 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6646 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6647 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6648 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6649 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6650 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6651 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6652 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6656 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6657 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6659 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6660 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6661 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6662 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6665 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6666 (2, node_id, required),
6667 (4, features, required),
6668 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6669 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6670 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6671 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6674 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6675 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6676 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6677 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6678 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6679 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6680 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6681 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6682 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6683 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6684 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6685 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6686 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6687 (7, self.config, option),
6688 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6689 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6690 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6691 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6692 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6693 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6694 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6695 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6696 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6697 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6698 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6699 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6700 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6701 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6702 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6703 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6704 (32, self.is_public, required),
6705 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6706 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6707 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6713 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6714 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6715 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6716 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6717 (2, channel_id, required),
6718 (3, channel_type, option),
6719 (4, counterparty, required),
6720 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6721 (6, funding_txo, option),
6722 (7, config, option),
6723 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6724 (9, confirmations, option),
6725 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6726 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6727 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6728 (16, balance_msat, required),
6729 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6730 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6731 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6732 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6733 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6734 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6735 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6736 (26, is_outbound, required),
6737 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6738 (30, is_usable, required),
6739 (32, is_public, required),
6740 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6741 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6742 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6745 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6746 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6747 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6748 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6749 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6753 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6755 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6756 outbound_scid_alias,
6760 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6761 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6763 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6764 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6765 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6766 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6767 confirmations_required,
6769 force_close_spend_delay,
6770 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6771 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6772 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6773 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6774 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6775 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6780 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6781 (2, channels, vec_type),
6782 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6783 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6786 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6788 (0, onion_packet, required),
6789 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6792 (0, payment_data, required),
6793 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6794 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6796 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6797 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6798 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6802 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6803 (0, routing, required),
6804 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6805 (4, payment_hash, required),
6806 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6807 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6808 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6812 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6813 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6815 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6817 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6818 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6819 reason.write(writer)?;
6821 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6822 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6825 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6826 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6827 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6828 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6835 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6836 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6837 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6841 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6842 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6843 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6847 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6848 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6849 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6850 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6851 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6854 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6855 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6856 // messages contained in the variants.
6857 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6858 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6859 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6861 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6862 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6863 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6864 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6865 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6868 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6870 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6871 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6872 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6874 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6879 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6884 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6885 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6886 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6887 (2, outpoint, required),
6888 (4, htlc_id, required),
6889 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6892 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6894 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6895 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6896 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6898 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6899 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6900 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6901 (2, self.value, required),
6902 (4, payment_data, option),
6903 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6904 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6910 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6911 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6912 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6914 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6915 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6916 let mut total_msat = None;
6917 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6918 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6919 (0, prev_hop, required),
6920 (1, total_msat, option),
6921 (2, value, required),
6922 (4, payment_data, option),
6923 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6924 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6926 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6928 if payment_data.is_some() {
6929 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6931 if total_msat.is_none() {
6932 total_msat = Some(value);
6934 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6937 if total_msat.is_none() {
6938 if payment_data.is_none() {
6939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6941 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6943 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6947 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6950 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6957 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6958 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6959 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6962 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6963 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6964 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6965 let mut payment_id = None;
6966 let mut payment_secret = None;
6967 let mut payment_params = None;
6968 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6969 (0, session_priv, required),
6970 (1, payment_id, option),
6971 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6972 (3, payment_secret, option),
6973 (4, path, vec_type),
6974 (5, payment_params, option),
6976 if payment_id.is_none() {
6977 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6979 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6981 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6982 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6983 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6984 path: path.unwrap(),
6985 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6990 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6991 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6996 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6997 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6999 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7001 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7002 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7003 (0, session_priv, required),
7004 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7005 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7006 (3, payment_secret, option),
7007 (4, *path, vec_type),
7008 (5, payment_params, option),
7011 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7013 field.write(writer)?;
7020 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7021 (0, LightningError) => {
7025 (0, failure_code, required),
7026 (2, data, vec_type),
7030 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7031 (0, forward_info, required),
7032 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7033 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7034 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7035 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7038 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7040 (0, htlc_id, required),
7041 (2, err_packet, required),
7046 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7047 (0, payment_secret, required),
7048 (2, expiry_time, required),
7049 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7050 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7051 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7054 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7056 (0, session_privs, required),
7059 (0, session_privs, required),
7060 (1, payment_hash, option),
7061 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7064 (0, session_privs, required),
7065 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7066 (2, payment_hash, required),
7067 (4, payment_secret, option),
7068 (6, total_msat, required),
7069 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7070 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7073 (0, session_privs, required),
7074 (2, payment_hash, required),
7078 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7079 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7080 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7081 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7082 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7085 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7086 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7088 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7090 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7092 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7093 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7094 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7098 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7099 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7100 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7101 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7102 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7103 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7104 unfunded_channels += 1;
7107 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7108 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7109 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7110 channel.write(writer)?;
7116 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7117 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7118 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7119 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7120 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7121 for forward in pending_forwards {
7122 forward.write(writer)?;
7127 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7128 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7129 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7131 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7132 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7133 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7134 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7135 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7136 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7137 htlc.write(writer)?;
7139 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7143 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7144 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7145 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7146 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7147 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7150 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7151 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7152 for event in events.iter() {
7153 event.write(writer)?;
7156 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7157 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7158 for event in background_events.iter() {
7160 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7162 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7163 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7168 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7169 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7170 // likely to be identical.
7171 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7172 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7174 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7175 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7176 hash.write(writer)?;
7177 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7180 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7181 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7182 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7183 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7184 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7187 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7188 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7190 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7191 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7192 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7193 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7196 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7197 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7201 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7202 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7203 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7205 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7206 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7207 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7213 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7214 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7215 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7216 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7218 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7219 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7220 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7221 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7222 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7223 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7224 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7225 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7232 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7234 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7236 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7237 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7238 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7239 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7240 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7241 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7242 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7243 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7244 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7245 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7246 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7247 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7248 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7250 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7251 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7253 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7254 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7256 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7257 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7258 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7259 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7260 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7261 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7263 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7264 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7265 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7266 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7267 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7271 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7272 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7274 pub keys_manager: K,
7276 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7278 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7279 pub fee_estimator: F,
7280 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7282 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7283 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7284 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7285 pub chain_monitor: M,
7287 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7288 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7289 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7290 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7291 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7292 /// deserialization.
7294 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7295 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7296 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7298 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7299 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7301 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7302 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7303 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7304 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7306 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7309 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7310 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7313 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7314 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7315 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7317 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7321 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7322 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7323 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7324 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7325 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7327 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7328 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7333 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7334 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7335 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7336 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7337 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7338 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7339 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7340 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7343 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7344 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7345 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7349 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7350 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7351 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7352 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7353 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7354 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7357 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7358 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7360 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7361 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7362 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7364 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7366 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7368 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7369 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7370 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7371 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7372 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7373 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7374 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7375 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7376 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7377 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7378 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7379 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7380 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7381 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7382 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7383 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7384 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7385 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7386 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7387 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7388 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7389 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7390 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7391 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7392 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7393 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7394 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7395 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7396 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7397 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7398 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7399 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7400 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7401 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7402 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7403 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7404 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7405 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7408 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7409 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7410 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7412 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7413 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7415 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7417 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7418 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7419 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7420 // safely discard the channel.
7421 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7422 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7423 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7424 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7425 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7428 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7429 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7430 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7431 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7432 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7437 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7438 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7439 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7440 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7444 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7445 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7446 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7447 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7448 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7449 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7451 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7452 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7454 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7457 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7459 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7460 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7461 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7463 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7464 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7466 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7469 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7470 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7471 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7472 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7473 let peer_state = PeerState {
7474 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7476 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7479 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7481 for _ in 0..event_count {
7482 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7483 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7487 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7488 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7489 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7490 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7491 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7492 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7493 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7494 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7498 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7499 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7500 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7501 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7502 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7503 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7507 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7508 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7512 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7513 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7514 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7518 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7519 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7520 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7521 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7522 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7523 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7524 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7526 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7527 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7531 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7532 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7533 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7534 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7535 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7536 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7537 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7538 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7539 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7540 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7541 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7542 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7543 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7544 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7545 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7546 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7548 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7549 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7552 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7553 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7556 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7557 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7558 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7559 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7560 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7561 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7563 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7565 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7566 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7567 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7568 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7569 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7570 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7571 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7573 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7574 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7575 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7576 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7577 if path.is_empty() {
7578 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7581 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7582 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7583 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7584 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7585 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7586 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7587 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7588 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7591 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7592 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7593 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7594 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7596 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7597 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7598 total_msat: path_amt,
7599 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7601 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7602 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7611 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7612 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7614 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7615 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7616 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7617 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7619 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7620 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7623 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7624 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7625 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7626 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7627 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7629 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7630 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7631 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7632 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7633 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7634 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7635 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7636 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7638 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7639 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7643 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7645 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7647 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7648 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7650 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7654 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7655 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7657 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7658 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7661 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7663 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7665 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7666 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7667 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7668 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7669 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7673 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7674 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7675 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7676 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7678 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7679 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7680 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7682 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7683 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7684 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7685 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7686 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7687 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7689 if chan.is_usable() {
7690 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7691 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7692 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7693 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7694 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7699 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7701 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7702 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7703 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7704 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7705 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7706 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7707 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7708 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7709 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7710 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7711 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7713 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7714 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7716 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7717 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7718 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7719 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7721 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7722 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7723 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7724 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7726 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7727 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7728 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7729 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7731 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7732 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7733 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7735 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7736 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7739 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7742 purpose: payment_purpose,
7743 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7749 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7751 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7752 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7753 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7755 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7757 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7759 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7761 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7762 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7763 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7764 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7766 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7767 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7768 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7769 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7770 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7771 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7773 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7779 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7781 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7783 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7784 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7785 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7786 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7788 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7789 logger: args.logger,
7790 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7793 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7794 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7795 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7796 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7799 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7800 //connection or two.
7802 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7808 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7809 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7810 use core::time::Duration;
7811 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7812 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7813 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7814 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7815 use crate::ln::msgs;
7816 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7817 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7818 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7819 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7820 use crate::util::test_utils;
7821 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7824 fn test_notify_limits() {
7825 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7826 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7830 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7832 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7833 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7834 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7835 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7836 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7838 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7840 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7841 // to connect messages with new values
7842 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7843 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7844 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7845 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7847 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7848 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7849 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7850 // ... but the last node should not.
7851 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7852 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7853 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7854 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7856 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7857 // about the channel.
7858 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7859 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7860 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7862 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7864 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7865 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7866 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7867 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7868 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7869 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7871 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7872 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7873 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7875 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7876 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7877 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7878 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7879 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7880 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7882 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7883 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7884 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7885 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7886 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7887 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7888 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7889 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7891 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7892 // the channel info has updated.
7893 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7894 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7895 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7896 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7897 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7898 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7902 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7903 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7909 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7911 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7912 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7913 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7914 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7916 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7917 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7918 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7919 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7920 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7921 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7923 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7925 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7927 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7928 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7930 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7931 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7932 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7933 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7937 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7940 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7941 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7942 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7943 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7944 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7945 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7946 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7947 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7948 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7950 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7951 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7953 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7955 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7957 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7958 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7959 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7960 // lightning messages manually.
7961 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7962 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7965 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7966 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7967 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7969 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7970 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7972 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7973 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7975 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7976 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7977 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7979 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7980 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7981 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7983 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7987 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7988 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7991 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7992 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7993 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7996 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7997 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7998 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7999 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8004 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8005 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8006 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8007 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8012 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8013 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8014 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8015 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8022 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8023 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8024 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8025 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8026 // fails as expected.
8027 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8028 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8029 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8030 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8031 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8032 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8033 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8035 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8036 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8037 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8039 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8040 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8041 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8042 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8043 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8045 let route = find_route(
8046 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8047 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8049 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8051 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8052 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8053 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8054 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8055 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8058 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8059 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8060 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8061 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8063 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8064 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8065 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8066 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8067 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8068 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8069 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8070 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8071 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8073 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8074 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8076 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8077 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8078 let route = find_route(
8079 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8080 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8082 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8086 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8087 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8088 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8090 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8091 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8092 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8094 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8096 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8097 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8100 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8104 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8106 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8109 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8110 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8111 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8112 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8114 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8115 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8119 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8120 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8121 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8127 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8128 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8129 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8130 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8132 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8133 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8134 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8135 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8136 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8138 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8139 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8140 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8141 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8142 let route = find_route(
8143 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8144 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8147 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8148 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8149 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8150 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8154 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8155 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8156 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8157 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8159 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8161 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8165 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8166 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8167 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8170 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8172 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8173 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8174 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8175 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8177 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8178 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8179 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8180 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8181 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8183 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8184 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8185 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8186 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8187 let route = find_route(
8188 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8189 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8192 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8193 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8194 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8195 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8196 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8199 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8200 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8201 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8202 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8203 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8204 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8205 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8207 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8211 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8215 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8217 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8218 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8219 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8220 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8222 // Marshall an MPP route.
8223 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8224 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8225 route.paths.push(path);
8226 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8227 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8228 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8229 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8230 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8231 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8233 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8234 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8235 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8236 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8241 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8242 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8243 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8244 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8245 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8246 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8248 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8249 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8251 total_msat: 100_000,
8254 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8255 // payment verification fails as expected.
8256 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8257 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8258 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8259 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8261 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8265 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8266 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8270 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8271 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8272 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8273 // the channel is successfully closed.
8274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8276 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8277 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8279 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8280 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8282 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8283 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8285 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8286 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8288 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8289 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8290 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8291 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8294 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8296 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8297 // as it has the funding transaction.
8298 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8299 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8300 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8302 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8305 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8307 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8309 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8310 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8311 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8313 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8314 // as it has the funding transaction.
8315 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8316 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8317 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8320 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8321 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8323 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8324 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8325 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8327 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8328 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8329 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8330 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8332 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8333 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8335 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8336 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8337 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8338 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8339 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8340 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8341 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8343 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8344 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8345 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8346 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8347 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8348 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8349 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8352 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8354 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8355 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8356 // closing transaction).
8357 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8358 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8359 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8361 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8362 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8363 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8364 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8365 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8368 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8370 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8372 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8373 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8374 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8376 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8378 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8379 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8383 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8385 use crate::chain::Listen;
8386 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8387 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8388 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8389 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8390 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8391 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8392 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8393 use crate::util::test_utils;
8394 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8395 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8397 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8398 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8399 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8401 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8405 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8406 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8407 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8408 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8409 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8410 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8411 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8416 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8417 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8420 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8421 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8422 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8424 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8425 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8427 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8428 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8430 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8431 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8433 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8434 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8435 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8436 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8437 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8439 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8441 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8443 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8444 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8445 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8446 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8447 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8449 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8451 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8453 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8454 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8455 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8456 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8457 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8460 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8461 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8462 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8464 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8465 } else { panic!(); }
8467 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8468 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8470 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8473 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8476 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8477 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8479 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8480 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8481 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8482 match msg_events[0] {
8483 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8484 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8485 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8489 match msg_events[1] {
8490 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8494 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8495 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8497 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8498 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8503 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8504 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8506 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8507 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8512 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8514 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8515 macro_rules! send_payment {
8516 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8517 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8518 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8519 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8520 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8521 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8522 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8523 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8524 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8525 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8527 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8528 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8530 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8531 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8533 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8534 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8535 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8536 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8537 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8538 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8539 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8540 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8542 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8543 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8544 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8545 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8547 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8548 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8549 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8550 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8551 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8553 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8556 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8557 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8558 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8559 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8561 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8566 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8567 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);