1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
56 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
57 use util::errors::APIError;
62 use core::cell::RefCell;
64 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
65 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
66 use core::time::Duration;
69 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
70 use std::time::Instant;
73 use alloc::string::ToString;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
75 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
76 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
77 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
78 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
79 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
80 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
82 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
83 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
84 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
85 use util::logger::Logger;
87 use core::convert::TryInto;
90 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
91 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
93 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
94 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
95 // retrieve said payment type bits.
96 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
98 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
99 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
102 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
103 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
104 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
105 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
106 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
107 /// registered with LDK.
108 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
109 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
110 /// registered with LDK.
111 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
115 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
116 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
117 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
132 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
134 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
135 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
136 unknown => Err(unknown),
141 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
142 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
144 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
146 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
147 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
148 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
150 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
151 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
152 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
153 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
155 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
156 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
157 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
160 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
161 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
163 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
164 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
165 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
166 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
168 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
169 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
171 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
174 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
175 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
179 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
180 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
181 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
183 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
185 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
186 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
187 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
188 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
189 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
190 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
192 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
193 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
194 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
199 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
200 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
201 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
202 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
204 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
205 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
206 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
208 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
211 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
213 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
214 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
217 /// The metadata is constructed as:
218 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
219 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
221 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
222 /// match what was constructed.
224 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
225 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
226 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
227 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
229 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
230 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
231 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
234 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
235 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
236 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
238 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
240 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
241 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
243 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
244 where L::Target: Logger
246 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
248 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
249 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
250 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
251 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
252 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
253 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
254 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
256 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
258 let mut payment_preimage = None;
259 match payment_type_res {
260 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
261 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
262 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
263 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
264 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
265 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
269 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
270 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
271 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
272 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
273 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
278 Err(unknown_bits) => {
279 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
284 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
285 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
289 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
290 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
297 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
298 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
300 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
301 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
302 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
303 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
304 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
307 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
308 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
310 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
314 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
315 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
316 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
317 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
319 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
320 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
321 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
322 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
325 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
328 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
330 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
331 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
332 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
333 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
334 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
335 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
336 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
338 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
342 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
344 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
345 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
346 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
348 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
349 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
350 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
351 // before we forward it.
353 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
354 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
355 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
356 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
357 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
359 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
360 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
362 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
363 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
366 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
367 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
370 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
371 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
375 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
376 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
377 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
378 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
379 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
380 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
381 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
384 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
385 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
386 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
387 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
390 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
391 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
392 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
393 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
394 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
397 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
399 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
401 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
402 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
403 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
405 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
407 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
411 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
415 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
416 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
417 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
418 short_channel_id: u64,
420 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
422 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
423 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
428 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
429 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
430 /// are part of the same payment.
431 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
432 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
433 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
436 struct ClaimableHTLC {
437 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
440 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
443 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
444 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
445 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
446 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
448 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
449 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
454 impl Readable for PaymentId {
455 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
456 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
460 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
461 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
462 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
463 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
464 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
467 session_priv: SecretKey,
468 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
469 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
470 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
471 payment_id: PaymentId,
472 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
473 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
476 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
477 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
478 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
480 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
482 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
484 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
487 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
488 payment_id.hash(hasher);
489 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
490 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
491 payment_params.hash(hasher);
498 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
499 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
501 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
502 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
503 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
504 payment_secret: None,
505 payment_params: None,
510 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
511 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
513 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
521 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
522 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
524 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
529 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
531 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
532 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
533 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
534 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
535 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
537 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
538 err: msgs::LightningError,
539 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
540 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
542 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
544 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
546 err: LightningError {
548 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
549 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
556 shutdown_finish: None,
560 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
562 err: LightningError {
564 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
567 shutdown_finish: None,
571 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
572 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
575 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
577 err: LightningError {
579 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
580 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
586 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
587 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
591 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
594 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
596 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
597 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
601 log_level: Level::Warn,
604 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
606 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
608 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
610 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
611 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
617 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
628 shutdown_finish: None,
633 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
634 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
635 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
636 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
637 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
639 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
640 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
641 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
642 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
643 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
644 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
645 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
647 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
651 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
652 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
653 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
654 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
655 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
656 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
657 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
658 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
659 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
660 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
661 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
662 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
664 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
665 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
666 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
667 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
670 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
671 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
672 /// quite some time lag.
673 enum BackgroundEvent {
674 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
675 /// commitment transaction.
676 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
679 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
680 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
682 latest_features: InitFeatures,
685 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
686 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
688 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
691 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
692 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
693 struct PendingInboundPayment {
694 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
695 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
696 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
697 /// this payment being removed.
699 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
700 user_payment_id: u64,
701 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
702 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
703 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
706 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
707 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
708 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
710 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
713 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
714 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
715 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
716 pending_amt_msat: u64,
717 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
718 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
719 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
721 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
722 starting_block_height: u32,
724 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
725 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
726 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
728 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
729 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
731 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
732 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
733 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
734 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
735 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
737 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
739 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
740 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
744 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
745 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
747 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
751 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
753 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
757 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
759 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
763 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
765 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
770 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
772 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
773 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
774 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
775 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
779 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
780 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
781 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
783 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
784 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
785 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
788 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
789 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
792 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
793 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
794 let our_payment_hash;
795 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
796 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
797 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
799 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
800 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
801 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
805 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
809 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
810 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
811 let remove_res = match self {
812 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
813 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
815 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
816 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
820 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
821 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
822 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
823 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
824 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
825 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
832 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
833 let insert_res = match self {
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
835 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
836 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
838 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
839 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
842 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
843 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
844 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
845 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
846 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
853 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
855 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
856 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
857 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
858 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
865 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
866 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
867 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
868 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
869 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
870 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
871 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
872 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
874 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
875 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
876 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
877 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
878 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
879 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
880 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
881 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
882 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
884 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
885 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
887 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
888 /// to individual Channels.
890 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
891 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
892 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
893 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
895 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
896 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
897 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
898 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
899 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
900 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
901 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
903 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
904 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
905 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
906 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
909 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
910 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
911 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
912 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
913 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
915 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
916 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
917 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
918 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
919 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
920 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
921 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
922 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
923 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
924 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
927 default_configuration: UserConfig,
928 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
934 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
936 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
937 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
939 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
940 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
941 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
942 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
944 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
945 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
946 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
947 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
948 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
949 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
951 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
952 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
953 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
954 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
955 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
956 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
957 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
958 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
960 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
962 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
963 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
965 our_network_key: SecretKey,
966 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
968 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
970 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
971 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
972 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
974 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
975 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
976 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
977 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
979 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
980 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
981 /// are currently open with that peer.
982 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
983 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
986 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
987 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
989 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
990 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
991 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
992 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
993 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
994 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
995 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
996 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
997 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
999 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1006 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1008 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1009 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1010 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1011 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1012 pub struct ChainParameters {
1013 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1014 pub network: Network,
1016 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1018 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1019 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1022 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1028 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1029 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1030 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1031 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1032 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1033 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1035 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1036 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1037 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1038 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1039 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1041 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1042 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1045 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1046 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1047 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1050 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1051 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1053 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1054 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1055 should_persist: persist_check,
1056 _read_guard: read_guard,
1061 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1062 fn drop(&mut self) {
1063 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1064 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1069 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1070 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1072 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1074 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1075 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1076 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1077 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1078 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1080 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1081 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1083 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1085 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1086 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1087 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1088 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1089 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1090 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1091 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1093 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1094 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1096 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1097 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1098 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1099 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1101 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1102 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1103 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1104 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1105 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1106 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1109 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1111 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1112 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1115 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1117 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1118 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1119 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1121 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1122 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1123 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1124 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1125 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1126 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1127 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1128 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1129 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1130 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1131 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1134 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1135 /// to better separate parameters.
1136 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1137 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1138 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1139 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1140 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1141 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1142 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1143 pub features: InitFeatures,
1144 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1145 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1146 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1148 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1150 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1151 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1152 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1153 /// payments to us through this channel.
1154 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1157 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1158 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1159 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1160 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1161 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1162 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1163 /// lifetime of the channel.
1164 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1165 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1166 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1167 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1168 /// our counterparty already.
1170 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1171 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1172 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1173 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1174 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1175 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1176 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1177 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1178 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1179 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1180 /// this value on chain.
1182 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1184 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1186 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1187 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1188 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1189 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1190 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1191 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1192 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1194 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1195 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1196 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1197 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1199 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1200 pub balance_msat: u64,
1201 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1202 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1203 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1204 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1206 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1208 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1209 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1210 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1211 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1212 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1213 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1214 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1215 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1216 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1218 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1219 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1220 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1221 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1222 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1223 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1224 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1225 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1226 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1228 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1230 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1231 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1232 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1233 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1234 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1235 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1236 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1237 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1238 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1240 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1241 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1242 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1243 pub is_outbound: bool,
1244 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1245 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1246 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1247 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1248 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1250 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1251 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1252 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1253 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1255 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1256 pub is_usable: bool,
1257 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1258 pub is_public: bool,
1261 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1262 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1263 /// states for more.
1264 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1265 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1266 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1267 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1268 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1269 ParameterError(APIError),
1270 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1271 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1272 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1273 /// payment in full.
1275 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1277 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1278 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1279 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1280 /// paths than the ones selected).
1281 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1282 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1283 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1284 /// in over-/re-payment.
1286 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1287 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1288 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1290 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1291 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1292 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1293 /// with the latest update_id.
1295 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1296 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1297 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1298 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1299 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1300 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1301 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1302 payment_id: PaymentId,
1306 macro_rules! handle_error {
1307 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1310 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1311 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1313 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1314 // entering the macro.
1315 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1316 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1319 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1321 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1322 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1323 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1324 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1328 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1329 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1330 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1331 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1336 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1337 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1339 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1340 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1341 action: err.action.clone()
1345 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1346 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1349 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1356 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1357 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1358 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1360 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1361 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1363 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1364 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1366 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1367 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1368 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1369 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1371 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1372 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1373 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1375 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1376 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1377 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1378 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1380 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1381 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1382 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1388 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1389 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1393 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1395 $entry.remove_entry();
1403 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1404 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1408 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1410 $entry.remove_entry();
1418 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1419 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1421 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1422 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1423 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1430 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1431 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1432 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1434 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1436 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1437 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1438 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1439 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1441 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1442 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1443 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1444 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1445 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1446 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1447 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1448 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1449 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1450 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1451 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1454 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1455 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1456 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1457 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1458 match $action_type {
1459 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1460 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1462 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1463 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1465 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1466 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1467 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1468 if !$resend_commitment {
1469 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1472 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1474 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1475 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1479 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1480 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1482 $entry.remove_entry();
1486 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1487 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1491 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1492 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1493 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1495 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1496 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1500 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1501 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1502 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1503 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1504 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1507 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1512 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1513 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1514 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1515 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1516 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1517 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1519 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1520 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1522 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1523 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1524 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1525 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1528 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1529 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1530 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1531 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1532 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1533 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1534 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1535 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1536 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1537 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1538 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1539 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1542 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1543 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1544 // before it should be allowed to.
1545 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1546 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1547 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1550 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1552 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1553 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1554 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1559 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1560 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1561 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1562 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1563 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1564 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1565 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1566 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1567 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1568 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1569 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1570 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1571 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1572 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1573 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1574 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1575 let mut order = $order;
1577 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1579 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1583 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1584 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1585 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1586 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1591 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1592 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1593 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1594 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1595 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1600 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1604 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1609 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1610 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1611 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1616 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1617 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1618 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1619 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1620 assert!(res.is_ok());
1623 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1627 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1628 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1629 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1631 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1633 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1634 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1639 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1640 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1641 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1642 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1643 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1646 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1648 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1649 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1651 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1653 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1655 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1656 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1657 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1658 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1659 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1660 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1661 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1662 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1664 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1665 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1666 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1670 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1672 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1673 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1674 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1675 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1676 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1677 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1679 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1680 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1682 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1683 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1686 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1688 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1689 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1691 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1693 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1694 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1695 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1696 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1704 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1705 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1706 &self.default_configuration
1709 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1711 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1712 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1713 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1714 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1715 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1718 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1719 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1721 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1722 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1723 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1725 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1726 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1727 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1728 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1729 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1730 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1732 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1733 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1734 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1735 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1736 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1737 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1742 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1743 Some(peer_state) => {
1744 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1745 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1746 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1747 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1748 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1750 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1753 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1756 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1757 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1759 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1760 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1761 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1763 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1764 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1766 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1771 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1772 node_id: their_network_key,
1775 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1778 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1779 let mut res = Vec::new();
1781 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1782 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1783 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1784 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1785 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1786 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1787 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1788 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1789 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1790 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1791 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1792 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1793 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1794 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1796 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1797 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1798 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1799 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1801 inbound_capacity_msat,
1802 outbound_capacity_msat,
1803 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1804 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1805 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1806 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1807 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1808 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1809 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1814 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1815 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1816 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1822 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1823 /// more information.
1824 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1825 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1828 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1829 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1831 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1832 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1834 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1835 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1836 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1837 // really wanted anyway.
1838 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1841 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1842 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1843 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1844 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1845 Some(transaction) => {
1846 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1850 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1851 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1852 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1853 reason: closure_reason
1857 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1860 let counterparty_node_id;
1861 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1862 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1864 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1865 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1867 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1869 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1870 Some(peer_state) => {
1871 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1872 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1873 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1875 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1877 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1879 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1880 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1881 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1882 let (result, is_permanent) =
1883 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1885 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1892 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1896 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1897 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1898 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1903 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1911 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1915 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1919 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1920 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1921 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1923 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1924 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1926 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1927 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1928 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1929 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1931 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1933 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1934 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1935 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1936 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1937 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1940 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1941 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1942 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1944 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1945 /// the channel being closed or not:
1946 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1947 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1948 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1949 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1950 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1951 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1952 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1954 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1956 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1957 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1958 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1959 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1960 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1964 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1965 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1966 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1967 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1968 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1970 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1971 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1972 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1973 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1974 // ignore the result here.
1975 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1979 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1980 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1981 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1983 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1984 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1985 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1986 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1987 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1988 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1991 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1992 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1994 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1995 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1996 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1999 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2001 chan.remove_entry().1
2003 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2006 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2007 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2008 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2009 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2015 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2018 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2019 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2020 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2022 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2023 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2024 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2025 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2026 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2027 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2028 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2038 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2039 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2040 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2041 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2042 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2046 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2047 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2048 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2050 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2051 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2052 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2053 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2054 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2055 failure_code: $err_code,
2056 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2061 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2062 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2065 let shared_secret = {
2066 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2067 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2071 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2072 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2073 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2074 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2075 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2076 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2077 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2078 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2081 let mut channel_state = None;
2082 macro_rules! return_err {
2083 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2085 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2086 if channel_state.is_none() {
2087 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2089 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2090 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2091 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2092 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2093 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2098 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2100 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2101 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2103 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2104 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2108 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2109 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2111 // final_expiry_too_soon
2112 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2113 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2114 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2115 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2116 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2117 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2118 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2120 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2121 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2122 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2124 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2125 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2126 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2129 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2130 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2131 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2132 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2133 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2134 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2135 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2136 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2138 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2140 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2141 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2142 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2143 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2144 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2145 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2146 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2147 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2148 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2151 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2153 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2156 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2161 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2162 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2163 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2164 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2166 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2168 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2169 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2170 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2171 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2174 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2175 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2177 let blinding_factor = {
2178 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2179 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2180 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2181 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2184 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2186 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2188 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2191 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2192 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2195 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2196 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2197 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2198 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2199 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2203 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2204 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2205 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2208 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2209 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2210 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2211 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2216 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2217 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2218 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2219 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2220 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2221 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2222 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2223 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2224 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2225 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2226 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2228 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2231 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2233 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2234 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2235 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2236 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2237 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2240 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2241 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2242 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2243 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2244 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2245 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2246 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2248 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2249 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2251 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2252 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2253 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2254 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2255 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2257 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2258 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2260 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2261 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2262 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2263 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2264 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2265 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2267 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2268 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2270 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2271 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2272 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2273 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2274 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2275 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2276 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2277 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2278 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2279 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2285 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2286 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2287 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2288 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2290 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2291 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2293 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2294 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2295 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2297 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2299 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2304 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2307 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2308 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2309 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2311 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2312 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2313 if !chan.should_announce() {
2314 return Err(LightningError {
2315 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2316 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2320 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2323 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2324 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2325 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2326 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2327 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2328 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2330 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2331 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2335 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2337 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2338 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2340 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2341 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2342 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2343 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2344 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2345 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2346 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2347 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2350 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2351 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2353 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2359 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2360 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2362 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2363 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2364 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2366 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2367 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2368 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2369 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2370 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2372 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2374 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2376 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2377 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2379 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2380 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2381 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2382 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2383 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2384 err: "Payment already completed"
2389 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2390 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2391 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2394 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2396 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2397 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2398 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2399 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2400 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2401 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2402 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2403 total_msat: total_value,
2405 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2409 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2410 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2412 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2413 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2415 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2416 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2418 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2419 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2421 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2422 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2424 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2425 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2426 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2427 channel_state, chan)
2429 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2430 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2431 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2432 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2433 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2434 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2435 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2436 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2437 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2438 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2440 insert_outbound_payment!();
2442 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2444 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2445 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2446 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2447 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2448 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2449 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2455 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2457 } else { unreachable!(); }
2461 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2462 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2464 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2469 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2471 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2472 /// fields for more info.
2474 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2475 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2476 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2477 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2478 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2479 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2481 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2483 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2484 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2485 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2487 /// In general, a path may raise:
2488 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2489 /// node public key) is specified.
2490 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2491 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2493 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2494 /// relevant updates.
2496 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2497 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2498 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2500 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2501 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2502 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2503 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2505 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2506 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2507 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2508 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2509 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2512 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2513 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2514 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2516 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2517 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2518 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2519 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2520 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2522 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2523 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2525 let mut total_value = 0;
2526 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2527 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2528 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2529 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2530 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2531 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2532 continue 'path_check;
2534 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2535 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2536 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2537 continue 'path_check;
2540 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2541 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2543 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2544 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2546 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2547 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2548 total_value = amt_msat;
2551 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2552 let mut results = Vec::new();
2553 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2554 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2556 let mut has_ok = false;
2557 let mut has_err = false;
2558 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2559 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2560 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2561 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2562 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2563 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2564 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2568 } else if res.is_err() {
2569 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2570 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2573 if has_err && has_ok {
2574 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2577 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2578 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2579 Some(RouteParameters {
2580 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2581 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2582 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2588 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2589 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2590 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2591 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2597 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2599 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2600 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2601 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2602 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2603 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2605 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2606 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2607 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2608 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2609 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2610 if path.len() == 0 {
2611 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2612 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2617 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2618 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2619 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2621 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2622 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2624 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2625 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2626 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2627 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2630 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2632 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2633 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2634 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2637 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2638 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2639 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2642 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2643 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2644 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2649 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2650 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2654 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2657 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2659 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2660 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2661 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2662 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2664 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2665 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2666 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2668 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2669 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2670 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2671 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2672 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2674 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2675 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2676 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2677 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2678 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2680 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2688 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2689 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2690 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2691 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2692 /// never reach the recipient.
2694 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2696 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2697 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2699 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2701 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2702 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2703 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2705 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2707 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2708 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2709 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2714 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2715 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2716 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2717 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2719 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2721 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2723 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2724 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2725 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2726 } else { unreachable!(); })
2729 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2731 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2732 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2735 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2736 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2741 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2742 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2743 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2746 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2748 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2758 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2759 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2760 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2764 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2766 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2767 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2769 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2770 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2772 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2773 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2774 /// keys per-channel).
2776 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2777 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2778 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2780 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2781 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2782 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2784 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2785 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2786 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2789 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2790 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2791 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2792 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2796 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2797 let mut output_index = None;
2798 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2799 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2800 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2801 if output_index.is_some() {
2802 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2803 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2806 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2807 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2808 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2811 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2814 if output_index.is_none() {
2815 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2816 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2819 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2824 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2825 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2826 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2828 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2831 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2832 // smaller than 500:
2833 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2835 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2836 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2837 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2838 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2839 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2840 /// our network addresses.
2842 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2843 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2845 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2846 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2847 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2848 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2850 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2852 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2853 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2856 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2857 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2860 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2861 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2862 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2864 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2865 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2866 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2867 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2868 rgb, alias, addresses,
2869 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2870 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2872 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2873 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2875 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2876 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2878 let mut announced_chans = false;
2879 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2880 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2881 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2883 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2888 announced_chans = true;
2890 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2891 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2892 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2896 if announced_chans {
2897 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2898 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2899 signature: node_announce_sig,
2900 contents: announcement
2906 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2908 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2909 /// Will likely generate further events.
2910 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2913 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2914 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2915 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2917 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2918 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2920 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2921 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2922 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2923 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2925 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2926 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2927 match forward_info {
2928 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2929 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2930 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2931 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2932 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2933 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2934 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2936 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2937 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2940 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2941 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2942 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2943 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2944 // problem, not ours.
2951 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2952 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2953 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2954 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2955 match forward_info {
2956 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2957 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2959 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2960 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2962 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2963 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2964 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2965 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2966 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2968 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2970 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2971 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2973 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2975 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2976 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2977 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2983 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2985 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2986 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2987 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2988 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2989 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2990 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2991 // this channel currently :/.
2997 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2998 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3000 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3002 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3004 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3007 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3009 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3010 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3011 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3014 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3016 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3017 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3018 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3019 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3020 // messages when we can.
3021 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3022 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3023 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3030 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3031 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3034 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3035 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3036 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3037 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3038 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3039 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3041 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3042 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3043 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3044 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3045 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3047 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3048 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3050 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3052 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3056 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3057 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3060 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3061 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3063 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3064 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3065 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3066 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3067 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3068 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3070 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3078 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3079 match forward_info {
3080 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3081 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3082 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3083 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3084 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3085 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3086 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3087 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3089 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3092 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3093 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3094 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3095 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3096 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3097 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3099 value: amt_to_forward,
3104 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3106 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3107 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3108 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3110 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3111 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3112 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3113 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3114 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3116 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3121 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3122 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3123 let mut total_value = 0;
3124 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3125 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3126 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3127 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3128 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3130 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3134 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3135 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3136 total_value += htlc.value;
3137 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3138 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3139 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3141 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3142 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3144 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3146 _ => unreachable!(),
3149 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3150 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3151 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3152 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3155 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3156 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3158 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3159 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3160 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3164 payment_received_generated = true;
3166 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3167 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3170 payment_received_generated
3174 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3175 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3176 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3177 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3178 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3179 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3180 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3181 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3183 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3184 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3185 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3186 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3188 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3192 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3193 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3194 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3196 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3197 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3199 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3200 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3202 amt: amt_to_forward,
3203 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3208 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3214 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3216 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3220 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3223 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3225 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3226 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3228 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3229 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3231 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3232 if payment_received_generated {
3233 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3239 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3240 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3248 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3249 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3252 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3253 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3256 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3257 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3258 events.append(&mut new_events);
3261 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3263 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3264 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3266 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3267 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3268 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3269 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3270 if background_events.is_empty() {
3274 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3276 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3277 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3278 // monitor updating completing.
3279 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3286 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3287 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3288 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3289 self.process_background_events();
3292 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3293 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3294 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3295 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3297 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3298 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3300 if !chan.is_live() {
3301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3302 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3303 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3306 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3308 let mut retain_channel = true;
3309 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3312 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3313 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3317 let ret_err = match res {
3318 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3319 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3320 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3321 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3324 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3325 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3326 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3327 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3328 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3329 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3330 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3331 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3341 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3345 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3346 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3347 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3348 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3349 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3350 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3351 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3353 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3355 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3357 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3358 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3359 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3360 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3361 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3362 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3363 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3365 handle_errors.push(err);
3375 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3377 /// This currently includes:
3378 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3379 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3380 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3383 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3384 /// estimate fetches.
3385 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3386 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3387 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3388 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3390 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3392 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3394 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3395 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3396 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3397 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3398 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3399 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3400 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3401 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3403 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3405 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3407 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3408 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3409 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3410 if needs_close { return false; }
3413 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3414 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3415 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3416 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3417 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3418 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3419 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3424 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3425 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3427 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3428 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3433 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3434 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3443 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3444 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3450 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3451 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3452 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3453 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3454 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3455 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3458 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3459 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3460 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3461 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3462 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3463 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3464 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3465 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3467 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3468 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3474 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3475 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3476 // be surfaced to the user.
3477 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3478 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3480 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3481 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3482 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3484 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3485 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3487 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3492 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3494 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3496 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3497 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3498 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3499 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3500 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3501 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3502 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3503 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3504 Some(RouteParameters {
3505 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3506 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3507 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3510 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3511 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3512 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3514 rejected_by_dest: false,
3515 network_update: None,
3516 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3518 short_channel_id: None,
3525 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3526 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3528 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3541 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3542 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3543 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3544 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3545 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3546 /// still-available channels.
3547 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3548 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3549 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3550 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3553 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3554 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3555 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3557 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3558 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3559 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3560 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3561 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3562 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3563 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3564 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3568 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3572 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3573 all_paths_failed = true;
3574 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3575 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3577 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3586 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3587 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3588 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3589 Some(RouteParameters {
3590 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3591 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3592 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3597 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3598 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3600 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3602 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3603 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3604 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3605 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3606 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3607 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3608 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3609 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3616 error_code: onion_error_code,
3618 error_data: onion_error_data
3621 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3627 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3628 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3629 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3630 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3632 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3633 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3634 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3635 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3636 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3637 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3638 network_update: None,
3641 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3644 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3646 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3650 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3651 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3652 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3654 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3655 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3656 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3658 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3659 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3661 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3663 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3667 let mut forward_event = None;
3668 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3669 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3671 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3673 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3676 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3679 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3680 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3681 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3682 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3683 time_forwardable: time
3690 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3691 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3693 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3694 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3695 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3696 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3698 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3699 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3701 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3702 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3703 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3704 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3705 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3706 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3710 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3711 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3712 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3713 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3715 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3716 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3717 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3718 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3720 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3721 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3722 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3723 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3724 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3726 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3727 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3728 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3734 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3735 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3736 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3738 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3739 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3740 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3741 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3742 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3743 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3744 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3746 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3747 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3748 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3749 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3750 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3751 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3752 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3753 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3755 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3756 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3757 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3758 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3759 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3760 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3762 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3767 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3768 // which were generated.
3769 channel_state.take();
3771 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3772 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3773 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3780 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3781 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3782 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3783 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3784 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3786 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3790 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3791 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3792 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3793 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3794 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3795 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3796 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3797 payment_preimage, e);
3798 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3799 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3800 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3801 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3804 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3805 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3806 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3808 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3809 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3810 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3811 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3812 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3813 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3819 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3821 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3824 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3825 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3826 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3827 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3828 payment_preimage, e);
3830 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3831 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3833 chan.remove_entry();
3835 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3838 } else { unreachable!(); }
3841 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3842 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3843 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3844 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3845 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3846 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3847 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3848 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3849 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3850 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3851 pending_events.push(
3852 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3854 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3859 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3867 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3869 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3870 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3871 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3872 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3873 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3874 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3875 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3876 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3877 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3878 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3879 pending_events.push(
3880 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3881 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3887 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3891 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3892 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3893 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3895 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3896 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3897 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3898 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3899 pending_events.push(
3900 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3908 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3913 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3916 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3917 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3918 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3919 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3920 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3921 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3922 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3925 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3926 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3927 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3928 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3929 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3932 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3933 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3934 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3935 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3936 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3937 payment_preimage, e);
3939 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3940 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3941 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3942 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3945 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3946 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3947 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3948 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3952 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3953 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3954 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3957 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3958 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3960 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3968 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3969 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3970 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3973 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3976 let chan_restoration_res;
3977 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3978 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3980 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3984 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3988 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
3989 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
3990 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3991 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
3992 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
3993 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
3995 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3996 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3997 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4000 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4001 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4002 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4004 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4006 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4007 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4008 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4009 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4013 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4016 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4018 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4019 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4022 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4023 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4024 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4026 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4027 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4029 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4030 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4031 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4035 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4041 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4042 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4046 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4050 let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4051 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4052 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4053 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4054 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4055 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4058 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4059 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4060 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4061 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4064 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4065 pending_events.push(
4066 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4067 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4068 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4069 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4070 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4075 entry.insert(channel);
4081 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4082 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4083 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4084 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4085 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4087 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4088 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4090 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4091 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4093 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4096 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4097 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4098 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4099 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4101 user_channel_id: user_id,
4106 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4107 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4108 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4109 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4110 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4111 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4112 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4113 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4116 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4121 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4122 // lock before watch_channel
4123 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4125 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4126 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4127 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4128 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4129 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4130 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4131 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4132 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4133 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4134 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4137 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4138 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4139 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4140 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4141 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4142 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4146 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4147 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4148 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4149 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4153 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4154 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4163 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4165 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4166 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4167 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4170 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4173 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4174 Ok(update) => update,
4175 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4177 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4178 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4179 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4180 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4181 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4182 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4183 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4184 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4194 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4195 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4199 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4200 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4201 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4202 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4204 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4207 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4208 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4209 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4212 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4213 msg: announcement_sigs,
4215 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4216 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4217 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4218 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4219 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4220 // announcement_signatures.
4221 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4222 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4223 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4224 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4233 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4234 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4235 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4236 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4241 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4245 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4246 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4247 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4248 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4251 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4252 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4254 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4255 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4256 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4257 let (result, is_permanent) =
4258 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4260 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4266 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4267 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4268 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4278 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4279 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4282 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4286 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4287 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4288 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4292 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4295 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4296 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4297 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4298 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4303 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4304 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4305 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4306 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4307 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4308 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4309 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4311 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4312 } else { (tx, None) }
4314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4317 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4318 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4319 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4321 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4322 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4323 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4324 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4328 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4333 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4334 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4335 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4336 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4338 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4339 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4340 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4341 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4343 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4344 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4348 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4352 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4353 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4354 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4355 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4356 match pending_forward_info {
4357 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4358 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4359 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4360 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4361 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4362 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4363 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4364 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4368 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4369 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4370 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4371 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4372 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4373 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4374 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4375 // no problem just calling this
4376 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4377 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4380 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4382 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4383 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4384 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4387 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4389 _ => pending_forward_info
4392 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4399 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4400 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4401 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4402 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4403 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4405 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4406 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4408 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4413 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4417 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4418 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4419 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4420 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4422 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4423 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4425 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4432 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4433 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4434 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4435 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4437 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4440 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4441 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4442 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4444 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4451 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4452 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4453 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4454 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4456 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4459 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4460 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4461 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4462 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4463 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4464 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4465 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4470 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4471 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4473 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4474 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4475 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4477 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4479 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4480 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4481 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4482 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4483 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4484 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4486 commitment_signed: msg,
4492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4497 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4498 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4499 let mut forward_event = None;
4500 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4501 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4502 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4503 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4505 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4506 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4507 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4508 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4509 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4512 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4513 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4516 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4517 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4522 match forward_event {
4524 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4525 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4526 time_forwardable: time
4534 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4535 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4537 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4538 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4539 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4541 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4542 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4544 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4545 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4546 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4547 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4548 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4549 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4550 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4551 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4552 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4553 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4554 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4556 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4557 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4558 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4559 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4560 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4562 } else { unreachable!(); }
4565 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4566 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4567 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4571 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4572 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4573 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4574 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4575 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4580 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4582 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4583 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4585 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4586 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4588 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4589 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4596 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4597 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4599 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4601 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4604 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4611 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4612 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4613 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4615 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4617 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4620 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4621 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4624 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4625 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4626 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4627 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4628 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4629 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4637 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4638 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4639 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4640 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4641 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4642 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4644 // It's not a local channel
4645 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4650 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4651 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4652 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4653 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4654 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4655 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4657 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4659 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4660 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4661 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4662 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4664 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4667 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4669 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4672 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4673 let chan_restoration_res;
4674 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4675 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4676 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4678 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4680 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4683 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4684 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4685 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4686 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4687 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4688 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4689 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4690 let mut channel_update = None;
4691 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4693 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4696 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4697 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4698 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4699 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4700 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4701 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4702 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4705 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4706 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4707 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4708 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4709 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4712 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4717 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4718 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4720 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4721 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4726 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4727 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4728 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4729 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4730 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4731 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4732 match monitor_event {
4733 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4734 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4736 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4738 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4739 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4742 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4743 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4744 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4745 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4746 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4747 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4748 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4749 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4750 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4751 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4753 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4754 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4755 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4759 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4760 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4762 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4764 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4765 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4766 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4767 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4768 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4773 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4774 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4779 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4780 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4783 has_pending_monitor_events
4786 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4787 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4788 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4789 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4790 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4791 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4794 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4795 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4796 /// update was applied.
4798 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4799 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4800 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4801 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4802 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4803 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4804 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4805 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4807 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4808 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4809 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4810 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4811 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4813 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4814 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4815 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4816 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4817 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4819 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4820 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4821 has_monitor_update = true;
4822 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4823 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4824 if close_channel { return false; }
4826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4827 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4828 updates: commitment_update,
4835 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4836 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4837 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4844 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4845 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4846 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4849 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4850 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4856 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4857 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4858 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4859 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4860 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4861 let mut has_update = false;
4863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4864 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4865 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4866 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4867 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4869 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4870 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4871 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4872 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4874 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4875 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4878 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4879 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4880 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4881 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4882 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4885 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4891 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4893 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4894 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4900 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4901 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4908 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4909 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4915 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4916 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4918 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4919 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4920 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4921 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4922 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4923 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4924 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4925 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4926 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4927 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4928 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4929 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4930 assert!(should_broadcast);
4931 } else { unreachable!(); }
4932 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4934 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4938 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4939 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4941 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4945 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4948 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4949 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4951 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4952 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4953 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4954 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4955 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4956 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4957 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4958 // never fail a payment too early.
4959 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4961 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4969 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4972 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4973 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
4975 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4976 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4977 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4979 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4981 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
4982 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
4986 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
4987 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
4989 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
4991 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4992 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4993 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4994 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4995 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
4996 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
4999 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5000 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5003 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5005 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5007 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5008 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5009 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5010 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5011 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5014 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5015 /// stored external to LDK.
5017 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5018 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5019 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5021 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5022 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5025 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5026 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5027 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5028 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5030 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5031 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5032 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5033 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5034 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5036 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5037 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5038 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5039 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5040 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5042 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5044 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5045 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5047 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5048 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5052 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5053 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5055 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5057 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5058 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5059 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5060 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5063 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5064 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5067 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5069 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5071 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5072 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5075 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5076 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5078 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5079 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5080 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5083 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5084 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5085 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5086 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5087 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5092 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5093 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5097 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5098 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5102 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5103 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5104 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5105 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5106 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5109 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5110 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5111 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5112 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5114 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5115 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5116 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5117 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5120 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5121 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5123 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5124 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5127 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5128 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5129 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5131 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5132 events.replace(pending_events);
5141 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5143 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5145 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5149 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5151 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5152 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5154 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5155 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5156 /// restarting from an old state.
5157 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5158 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5159 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5161 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5162 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5163 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5164 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5167 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5168 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5169 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5172 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5173 handler.handle_event(&event);
5181 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5183 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5185 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5189 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5191 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5192 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5193 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5194 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5195 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5198 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5199 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5200 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5203 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5205 let new_height = height - 1;
5207 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5208 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5209 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5210 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5211 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5212 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5215 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5219 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5221 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5223 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5224 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5227 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5228 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5229 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5230 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5232 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5233 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5236 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5237 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5240 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5241 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5242 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5243 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5245 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5246 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5250 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5252 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5254 macro_rules! max_time {
5255 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5257 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5258 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5259 // having an explicit local time source.
5260 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5261 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5262 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5263 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5264 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5270 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5271 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5272 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5273 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5274 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5277 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5278 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5279 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5280 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5281 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5282 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5283 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5284 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5285 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5293 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5294 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5295 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5296 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5297 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5298 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5304 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5306 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5307 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5308 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5309 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5310 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5311 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5316 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5318 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5319 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5320 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5321 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5324 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5325 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5327 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5328 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5329 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5330 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5331 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5333 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5334 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5336 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5337 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5338 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5339 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5340 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5341 let res = f(channel);
5342 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5343 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5344 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5345 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5346 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5350 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5351 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5352 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5353 msg: funding_locked,
5355 if channel.is_usable() {
5356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5357 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5358 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5359 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5364 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5366 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5368 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5369 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5370 msg: announcement_sigs,
5372 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5373 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5374 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5376 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5377 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5378 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5383 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5384 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5385 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5387 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5388 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5389 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5390 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5391 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5395 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5396 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5397 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5398 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5400 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5401 data: reason_message,
5409 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5410 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5411 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5412 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5413 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5414 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5415 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5416 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5417 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5418 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5419 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5420 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5421 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5426 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5431 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5433 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5434 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5438 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5439 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5440 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5443 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5444 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5445 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5446 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5449 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5450 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5452 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5453 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5456 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5457 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5458 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5459 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5460 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5464 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5465 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5466 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5467 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5471 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5472 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5473 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5475 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5479 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5481 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5484 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5489 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5494 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5499 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5501 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5504 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5509 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5514 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5516 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5519 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5524 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5526 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5529 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5531 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5534 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5536 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5539 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5541 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5544 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5546 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5549 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5551 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5554 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5555 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5556 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5559 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5564 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5566 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5569 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5571 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5572 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5574 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5575 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5576 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5577 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5578 if no_connection_possible {
5579 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5580 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5581 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5582 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5583 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5585 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5586 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5587 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5591 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5598 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5599 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5600 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5601 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5602 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5603 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5604 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5606 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5609 no_channels_remain = false;
5615 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5623 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5628 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5629 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5630 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5632 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5639 if no_channels_remain {
5640 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5643 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5644 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5648 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5649 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5654 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5655 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5657 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5658 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5662 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5669 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5670 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5671 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5672 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5673 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5674 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5675 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5679 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5680 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5681 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5687 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5690 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5693 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5694 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5695 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5696 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5697 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5701 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5702 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5707 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5708 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5709 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5710 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5711 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5712 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5715 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5718 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5724 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5725 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5730 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5731 let result = *guard;
5739 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5740 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5741 let current_time = Instant::now();
5743 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5744 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5749 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5750 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5751 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5752 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5753 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5755 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5756 let result = *guard;
5757 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5761 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5762 None => return result,
5768 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5770 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5771 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5772 *persistence_lock = true;
5773 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5778 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5779 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5781 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5782 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5783 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5784 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5787 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5788 (2, node_id, required),
5789 (4, features, required),
5790 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5791 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5794 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5795 (2, channel_id, required),
5796 (4, counterparty, required),
5797 (6, funding_txo, option),
5798 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5799 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5800 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5801 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5802 (16, balance_msat, required),
5803 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5804 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5805 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5806 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5807 (26, is_outbound, required),
5808 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5809 (30, is_usable, required),
5810 (32, is_public, required),
5813 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5815 (0, onion_packet, required),
5816 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5819 (0, payment_data, required),
5820 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5822 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5823 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5824 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5828 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5829 (0, routing, required),
5830 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5831 (4, payment_hash, required),
5832 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5833 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5837 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5838 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5840 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5842 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5843 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5844 reason.write(writer)?;
5846 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5847 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5850 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5851 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5852 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5853 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5860 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5861 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5862 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5865 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5866 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5867 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5868 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5872 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5873 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5874 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5875 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5876 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5879 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5880 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5881 // messages contained in the variants.
5882 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5883 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5884 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5886 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5887 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5888 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5889 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5890 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5893 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5894 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5895 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5896 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5897 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5899 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5904 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5909 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5910 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5911 (2, outpoint, required),
5912 (4, htlc_id, required),
5913 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5916 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5917 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5918 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5919 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5922 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5923 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5924 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5929 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5930 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5931 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5937 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5938 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5939 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5941 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5942 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5943 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5947 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5948 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5949 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5951 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5953 if payment_data.is_some() {
5954 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5956 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5959 if payment_data.is_none() {
5960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5962 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5966 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5974 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5975 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5976 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5979 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5980 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5981 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5982 let mut payment_id = None;
5983 let mut payment_secret = None;
5984 let mut payment_params = None;
5985 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5986 (0, session_priv, required),
5987 (1, payment_id, option),
5988 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5989 (3, payment_secret, option),
5990 (4, path, vec_type),
5991 (5, payment_params, option),
5993 if payment_id.is_none() {
5994 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5996 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5998 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5999 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6000 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6001 path: path.unwrap(),
6002 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6007 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6008 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6013 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6014 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6016 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6018 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6019 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6020 (0, session_priv, required),
6021 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6022 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6023 (3, payment_secret, option),
6024 (4, path, vec_type),
6025 (5, payment_params, option),
6028 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6030 field.write(writer)?;
6037 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6038 (0, LightningError) => {
6042 (0, failure_code, required),
6043 (2, data, vec_type),
6047 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6049 (0, forward_info, required),
6050 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6051 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6052 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6055 (0, htlc_id, required),
6056 (2, err_packet, required),
6060 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6061 (0, payment_secret, required),
6062 (2, expiry_time, required),
6063 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6064 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6065 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6068 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6070 (0, session_privs, required),
6073 (0, session_privs, required),
6074 (1, payment_hash, option),
6077 (0, session_privs, required),
6078 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6079 (2, payment_hash, required),
6080 (4, payment_secret, option),
6081 (6, total_msat, required),
6082 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6083 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6086 (0, session_privs, required),
6087 (2, payment_hash, required),
6091 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6092 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6094 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6098 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6099 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6101 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6103 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6105 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6106 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6107 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6110 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6111 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6112 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6113 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6114 unfunded_channels += 1;
6117 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6118 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6119 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6120 channel.write(writer)?;
6124 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6125 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6126 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6127 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6128 for forward in pending_forwards {
6129 forward.write(writer)?;
6133 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6134 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6135 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6136 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6137 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6138 htlc.write(writer)?;
6142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6143 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6144 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6145 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6146 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6147 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6150 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6151 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6152 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6153 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6154 for event in events.iter() {
6155 event.write(writer)?;
6158 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6159 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6160 for event in background_events.iter() {
6162 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6164 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6165 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6170 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6171 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6173 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6174 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6175 hash.write(writer)?;
6176 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6179 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6180 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6181 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6182 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6183 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6186 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6187 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6189 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6190 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6191 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6192 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6195 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6196 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6200 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6201 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6202 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6204 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6205 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6206 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6211 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6212 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6213 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6214 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required)
6221 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6223 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6225 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6226 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6227 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6228 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6229 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6230 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6231 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6232 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6233 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6234 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6235 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6236 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6237 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6239 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6240 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6242 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6243 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6245 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6246 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6247 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6248 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6249 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6250 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6252 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6253 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6254 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6256 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6257 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6260 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6261 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6263 pub keys_manager: K,
6265 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6267 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6268 pub fee_estimator: F,
6269 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6271 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6272 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6273 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6274 pub chain_monitor: M,
6276 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6277 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6278 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6279 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6280 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6281 /// deserialization.
6283 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6284 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6285 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6287 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6288 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6290 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6291 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6292 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6293 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6295 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6298 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6299 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6302 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6303 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6304 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6305 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6306 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6307 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6310 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6311 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6312 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6313 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6314 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6316 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6317 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6322 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6323 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6324 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6325 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6326 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6327 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6328 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6329 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6332 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6333 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6334 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6338 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6339 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6340 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6341 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6342 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6343 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6346 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6347 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6349 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6350 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6351 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6355 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6357 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6358 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6359 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6360 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6361 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6362 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6363 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6364 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6365 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6366 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6367 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6368 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6369 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6370 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6371 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6372 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6373 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6374 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6375 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6376 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6377 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6378 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6379 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6380 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6381 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6382 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6383 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6384 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6385 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6386 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6387 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6388 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6389 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6390 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6391 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6392 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6393 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6396 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6397 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6398 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6400 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6403 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6404 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6405 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6406 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6407 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6408 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6412 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6413 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6414 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6415 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6419 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6420 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6421 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6422 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6423 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6426 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6427 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6429 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6432 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6433 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6434 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6435 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6436 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6437 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6438 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6439 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6441 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6444 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6445 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6446 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6447 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6448 let peer_state = PeerState {
6449 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6451 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6454 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6455 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6456 for _ in 0..event_count {
6457 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6458 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6462 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6463 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6464 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6465 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6466 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6467 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6468 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6469 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6473 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6475 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6476 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6477 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6478 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6482 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6487 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6488 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6489 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6493 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6495 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6496 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6497 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6499 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6501 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6502 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6506 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6507 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6508 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6509 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6510 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6511 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6512 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6513 (5, received_network_pubkey, option)
6516 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6517 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6518 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6519 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6520 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6521 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6523 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6525 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6526 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6527 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6528 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6529 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6530 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6531 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6533 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6534 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6535 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6536 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6537 if path.is_empty() {
6538 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6539 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6541 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6542 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6543 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6544 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6546 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6547 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6548 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6551 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6552 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6553 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6554 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6556 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6557 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6558 total_msat: path_amt,
6559 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6561 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6562 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6571 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6572 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6574 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6575 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6578 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6580 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6582 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6583 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6584 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6585 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6586 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6590 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6591 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6592 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6594 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6595 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6596 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6598 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6600 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6605 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6607 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6608 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6609 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6615 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6616 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6618 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6620 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6621 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6622 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6623 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6625 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6626 logger: args.logger,
6627 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6630 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6631 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6634 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6635 //connection or two.
6637 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6643 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6644 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6645 use core::time::Duration;
6646 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6647 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6648 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6649 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6650 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6651 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6653 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6654 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6655 use util::errors::APIError;
6656 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6657 use util::test_utils;
6659 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6661 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6662 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6664 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6667 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6668 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6670 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6671 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6672 thread::spawn(move || {
6674 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6675 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6676 *persistence_lock = true;
6679 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6685 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6686 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6688 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6691 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6696 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6698 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6701 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6708 fn test_notify_limits() {
6709 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6710 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6713 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6714 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6716 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6717 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6718 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6719 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6720 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6722 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6724 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6725 // to connect messages with new values
6726 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6727 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6728 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6729 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6731 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6732 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6733 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6734 // ... but the last node should not.
6735 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6736 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6737 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6738 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6740 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6741 // about the channel.
6742 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6743 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6744 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6746 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6748 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6749 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6750 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6751 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6752 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6753 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6755 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6756 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6757 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6759 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6760 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6761 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6762 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6763 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6764 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6766 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6767 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6768 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6769 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6770 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6771 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6772 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6773 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6775 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6776 // the channel info has updated.
6777 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6778 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6779 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6780 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6781 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6782 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6786 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6787 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6789 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6790 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6791 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6792 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6793 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6795 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6796 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6797 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6798 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6799 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6800 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6801 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6805 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6807 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6808 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6810 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6811 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6812 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6813 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6814 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6816 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6817 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6818 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6820 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6821 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6822 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6823 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6824 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6825 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6826 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6827 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6828 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6830 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6831 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6833 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6835 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6837 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6838 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6839 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6840 // lightning messages manually.
6841 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6843 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6844 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6845 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6847 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6848 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6850 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6851 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6853 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6854 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6855 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6857 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6858 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6859 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6861 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6863 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6865 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6866 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6869 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6870 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6871 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6874 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6875 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6876 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6877 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6882 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6883 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6884 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6885 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6890 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6891 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6892 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6893 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6900 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6901 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6902 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6903 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6904 // fails as expected.
6905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6909 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6910 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6912 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6913 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6914 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6916 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6917 let route_params = RouteParameters {
6918 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6919 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6920 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6922 let route = find_route(
6923 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6924 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6926 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6928 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6929 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6930 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6931 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6932 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6934 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6936 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6938 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6939 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6940 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6941 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6942 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6943 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6944 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6946 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6948 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6949 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6951 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6952 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6953 let route = find_route(
6954 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6955 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6957 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6959 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6961 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6962 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6963 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6965 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6966 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6967 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6969 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6970 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6971 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6972 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6975 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6976 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6979 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6980 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6981 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6982 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6983 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6984 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6985 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6986 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6987 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6989 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6994 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6995 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6996 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7002 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7003 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7004 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7005 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7007 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7008 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7009 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7010 final_value_msat: 10000,
7011 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7013 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7014 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7015 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7016 let route = find_route(
7017 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7018 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7021 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7022 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7023 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7026 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7027 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7028 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7029 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7030 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7031 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7032 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7034 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7038 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7039 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7043 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7045 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7046 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7047 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7048 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7050 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7051 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7052 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7053 final_value_msat: 10000,
7054 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7056 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7057 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7058 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7059 let route = find_route(
7060 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7061 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7064 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7065 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7066 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7067 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7070 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7071 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7072 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7073 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7074 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7075 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7076 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7078 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7082 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7086 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7088 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7089 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7090 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7091 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7093 // Marshall an MPP route.
7094 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7095 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7096 route.paths.push(path);
7097 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7098 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7099 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7100 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7101 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7102 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7104 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7105 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7106 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7107 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7112 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7113 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7119 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7120 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7122 total_msat: 100_000,
7125 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7126 // payment verification fails as expected.
7127 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7128 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7129 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7130 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7132 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7136 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7137 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7141 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7144 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7145 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7146 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7147 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7148 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7149 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7150 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7151 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7152 use util::test_utils;
7153 use util::config::UserConfig;
7154 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7156 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7157 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7158 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7160 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7164 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7165 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7166 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7167 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7168 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7169 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7170 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7175 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7176 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7179 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7180 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7181 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7183 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7184 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7186 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7187 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7189 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7190 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7192 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7193 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7194 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7195 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7196 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7198 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7200 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7202 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7203 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7204 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7205 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7206 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7208 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7210 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7212 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7213 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7214 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7215 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7216 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7219 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7220 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7221 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7223 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7224 } else { panic!(); }
7226 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7227 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7229 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7232 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7235 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7236 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7238 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7239 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7240 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7241 match msg_events[0] {
7242 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7243 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7244 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7248 match msg_events[1] {
7249 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7253 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7255 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7256 macro_rules! send_payment {
7257 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7258 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7259 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7260 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7261 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7262 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7263 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7265 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7266 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7268 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7269 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7271 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7272 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7273 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7274 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7275 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7276 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7277 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7278 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7281 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7282 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7284 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7286 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7287 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7288 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7290 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7293 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7294 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7295 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7296 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7298 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7303 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7304 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);