1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
236 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
237 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
238 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
239 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
240 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
243 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
245 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
246 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
247 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
250 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
254 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
255 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
256 (0, short_channel_id, required),
257 (2, htlc_id, required),
259 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
260 (0, session_priv, required),
265 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
266 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
267 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
268 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
269 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
272 session_priv: SecretKey,
273 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
274 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
275 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
276 payment_id: PaymentId,
277 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
282 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
284 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
286 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
288 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
291 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
292 payment_id.hash(hasher);
293 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
294 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
299 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
302 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
303 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
305 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
306 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
307 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
308 payment_secret: None,
313 struct ReceiveError {
319 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
320 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
322 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
324 pub enum FailureCode {
325 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
326 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
327 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
328 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
329 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
330 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
331 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
332 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
333 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
334 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
335 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
338 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
340 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
341 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
342 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
343 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
344 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
346 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
347 err: msgs::LightningError,
348 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
349 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
351 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
353 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
355 err: LightningError {
357 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
358 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
365 shutdown_finish: None,
369 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
370 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
373 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
375 err: LightningError {
377 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
378 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
385 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
389 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
392 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
394 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
395 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
399 log_level: Level::Warn,
402 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
404 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
406 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
408 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
409 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
417 shutdown_finish: None,
422 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
423 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
424 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
425 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
426 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
428 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
429 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
430 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
431 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
432 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
433 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
434 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
436 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
440 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
441 struct ClaimingPayment {
443 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
444 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
446 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
447 (0, amount_msat, required),
448 (2, payment_purpose, required),
449 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
452 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
453 struct ClaimablePayments {
454 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
455 /// failed/claimed by the user.
457 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
458 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
460 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
461 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
462 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
464 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
465 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
466 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
467 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
470 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
471 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
472 /// quite some time lag.
473 enum BackgroundEvent {
474 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
475 /// commitment transaction.
476 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
480 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
481 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
482 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
483 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
484 /// event can be generated.
485 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
486 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
487 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
490 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
491 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
492 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
495 /// State we hold per-peer.
496 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
497 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
499 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
500 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
502 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
503 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
504 latest_features: InitFeatures,
505 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
506 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
507 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
508 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
509 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
511 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
512 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
513 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
514 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
516 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
517 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
518 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
519 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
520 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
521 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
522 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
523 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
524 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
525 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
529 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
530 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
531 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
532 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
533 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
534 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
537 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
541 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
542 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
544 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
547 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
548 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
549 struct PendingInboundPayment {
550 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
551 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
552 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
553 /// this payment being removed.
555 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
556 user_payment_id: u64,
557 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
558 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
559 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
562 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
563 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
564 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
565 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
566 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
567 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
568 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
570 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
571 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
579 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
581 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
586 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
587 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
588 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
589 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
590 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
591 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
592 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
593 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
595 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
596 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
598 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
599 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
601 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
602 /// to individual Channels.
604 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
605 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
606 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
607 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
609 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
610 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
611 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
612 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
613 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
614 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
615 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
617 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
618 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
619 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
620 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
623 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
624 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
625 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
626 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
627 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
629 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
630 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
631 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
632 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
634 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
635 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
636 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
638 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
639 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
640 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
641 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
642 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
645 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
646 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
647 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
648 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
649 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
653 // `total_consistency_lock`
655 // |__`forward_htlcs`
657 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
659 // |__`per_peer_state`
661 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
663 // | |__`claimable_payments`
665 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
671 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
673 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
677 // | |__`pending_events`
679 // | |__`pending_background_events`
681 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
683 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
684 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
685 ES::Target: EntropySource,
686 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
687 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
688 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
692 default_configuration: UserConfig,
693 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
694 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
700 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
702 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
704 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
705 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
707 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
708 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
709 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
710 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
712 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
713 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
715 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
716 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
717 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
718 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
719 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
720 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
721 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
722 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
724 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
726 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
727 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
729 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
731 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
732 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
733 /// and via the classic SCID.
735 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
736 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
738 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
740 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
742 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
743 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
744 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
746 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
747 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
749 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
750 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
752 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
753 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
755 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
756 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
757 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
758 /// active channel list on load.
760 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
763 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
765 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
766 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
767 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
769 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
770 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
771 /// the handling of the events.
773 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
774 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
777 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
778 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
779 /// would break backwards compatability.
780 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
781 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
782 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
784 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
785 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
787 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
789 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
790 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
791 /// confirmation depth.
793 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
794 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
795 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
797 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
799 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
801 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
803 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
805 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
807 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
808 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
809 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
811 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
812 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
814 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
815 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
816 /// keeping additional state.
817 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
819 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
820 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
821 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
822 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
824 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
825 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
827 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
828 /// are currently open with that peer.
830 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
831 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
834 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
836 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
837 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
838 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
839 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
840 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
842 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
843 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
844 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
845 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
846 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
847 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
848 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
849 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
850 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
851 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
852 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
854 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
863 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
865 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
866 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
867 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
868 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
869 pub struct ChainParameters {
870 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
871 pub network: Network,
873 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
875 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
876 pub best_block: BestBlock,
879 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
885 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
886 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
887 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
888 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
889 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
890 /// updates are ready for persistence).
892 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
893 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
894 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
895 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
896 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
898 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
899 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
902 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
903 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
904 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
907 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
908 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
910 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
911 persistence_notifier: notifier,
912 should_persist: persist_check,
913 _read_guard: read_guard,
918 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
920 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
921 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
926 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
927 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
929 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
931 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
932 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
933 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
934 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
935 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
937 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
938 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
940 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
942 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
943 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
944 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
945 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
946 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
947 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
948 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
949 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
950 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
951 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
952 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
953 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
954 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
956 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
957 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
959 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
960 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
961 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
962 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
964 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
965 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
966 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
967 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
968 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
969 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
972 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
974 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
975 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
978 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
980 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
981 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
983 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
984 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
985 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
986 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
988 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
989 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
990 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
991 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
993 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
994 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
995 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
997 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
998 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
999 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1001 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1002 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1003 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1004 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1005 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1006 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1007 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1008 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1009 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1010 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1011 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1014 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1015 /// to better separate parameters.
1016 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1017 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1018 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1019 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1020 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1021 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1022 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1023 pub features: InitFeatures,
1024 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1025 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1026 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1028 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1030 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1031 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1032 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1033 /// payments to us through this channel.
1034 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1035 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1036 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1037 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1038 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1039 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1040 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1043 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1044 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1045 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1046 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1047 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1048 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1049 /// lifetime of the channel.
1050 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1051 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1052 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1053 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1054 /// our counterparty already.
1056 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1057 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1058 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1059 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1061 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1062 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1063 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1064 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1066 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1067 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1069 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1070 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1072 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1073 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1074 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1075 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1076 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1077 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1078 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1079 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1080 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1083 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1085 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1086 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1087 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1088 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1089 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1090 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1091 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1093 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1094 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1096 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1097 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1098 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1099 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1100 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1101 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1102 /// this value on chain.
1104 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1106 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1108 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1109 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1110 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1111 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1113 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1114 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1115 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1116 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1118 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1119 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1120 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1121 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1123 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1124 pub balance_msat: u64,
1125 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1126 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1127 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1128 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1130 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1132 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1133 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1134 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1135 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1136 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1137 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1138 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1139 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1141 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1142 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1143 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1144 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1145 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1146 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1147 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1149 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1150 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1151 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1152 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1153 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1154 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1155 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1156 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1157 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1159 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1161 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1162 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1163 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1164 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1165 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1167 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1168 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1169 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1170 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1171 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1172 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1173 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1175 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1176 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1177 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1178 pub is_outbound: bool,
1179 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1180 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1181 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1182 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1183 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1185 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1186 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1187 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1188 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1190 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1191 pub is_usable: bool,
1192 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1193 pub is_public: bool,
1194 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1195 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1196 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1197 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1198 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1199 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1201 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1202 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1205 impl ChannelDetails {
1206 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1207 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1208 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1210 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1211 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1212 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1213 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1216 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1217 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1218 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1220 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1221 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1222 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1223 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1226 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1227 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1229 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1230 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1231 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1233 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1234 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1235 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1236 features: latest_features,
1237 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1238 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1239 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1240 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1241 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1242 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1243 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1244 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1245 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1246 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1248 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1249 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1250 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1251 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1252 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1253 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1254 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1255 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1256 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1257 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1258 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1259 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1260 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1261 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1262 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1263 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1264 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1265 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1266 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1267 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1268 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1269 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1270 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1271 config: Some(channel.config()),
1276 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1277 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1278 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1279 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1280 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1282 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1284 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1285 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1286 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1289 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1290 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1291 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1293 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1294 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1295 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1297 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1298 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1299 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1301 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1302 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1306 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1308 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1310 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1311 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1312 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1313 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1315 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1316 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1317 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1320 macro_rules! handle_error {
1321 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1324 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1325 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1326 // entering the macro.
1327 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1328 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1330 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1332 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1333 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1334 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1335 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1339 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1340 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1341 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1342 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1347 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1348 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1350 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1351 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1352 action: err.action.clone()
1356 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1357 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1358 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1359 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1364 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1371 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1372 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1373 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1374 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1375 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1376 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1378 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1379 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1380 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1381 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1382 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1384 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1385 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1387 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1391 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1392 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1393 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1395 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1396 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1398 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1399 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1401 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1402 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1403 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1404 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1405 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1406 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1412 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1413 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1417 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1419 $entry.remove_entry();
1427 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1428 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1432 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1434 $entry.remove_entry();
1442 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1443 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1445 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1446 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1452 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1453 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1454 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1455 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1456 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1458 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1459 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1460 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1461 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1462 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1463 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1464 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1465 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1466 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1467 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1472 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1473 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1474 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1476 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1477 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1478 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1479 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1480 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1481 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1484 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1489 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1490 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1491 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1492 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1493 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1494 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1495 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1496 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1497 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1498 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1499 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1501 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1502 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1503 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1509 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1510 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1512 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1513 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1514 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1515 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1516 updates.announcement_sigs);
1517 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1518 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1521 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1522 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1523 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1525 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1527 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1528 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1530 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1531 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1532 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1533 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1538 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1539 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1540 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1541 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1542 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1544 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1545 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1546 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1549 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1550 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1551 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1552 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1553 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1554 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1555 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1556 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1560 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1561 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1562 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1563 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1564 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1566 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1572 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1573 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1577 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1579 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1581 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1582 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1583 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1588 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1590 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1591 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1593 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1595 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1596 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1597 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1598 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1599 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1600 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1601 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1602 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1604 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1605 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1606 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1611 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1613 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1614 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1615 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1616 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1617 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1618 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1619 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1620 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1622 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1625 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1626 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1628 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1630 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1632 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1634 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1635 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1636 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1637 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1647 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1648 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1649 &self.default_configuration
1652 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1653 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1654 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1657 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1658 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1660 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1662 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1666 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1671 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1673 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1674 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1675 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1676 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1677 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1679 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1680 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1682 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1683 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1684 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1686 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1687 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1688 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1689 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1690 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1691 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1693 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1694 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1695 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1696 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1697 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1698 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1702 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1703 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1707 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1708 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1710 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1712 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1713 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1714 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1715 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1716 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1717 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1721 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1726 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1728 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1732 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1734 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1741 node_id: their_network_key,
1744 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1747 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1748 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1749 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1750 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1751 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1752 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1753 // the same channel.
1754 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1756 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1758 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1759 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1761 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1762 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1763 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1771 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1772 /// more information.
1773 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1774 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1777 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1778 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1780 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1781 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1783 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1784 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1785 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1786 // really wanted anyway.
1787 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1790 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1791 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1792 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1793 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1795 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1796 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1798 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1799 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1802 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1808 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1809 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1811 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1812 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1813 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1815 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1816 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1817 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1818 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1819 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1820 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1821 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1822 total_msat: *total_msat,
1825 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1826 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1828 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1829 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1831 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1836 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1837 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1838 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1839 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1840 Some(transaction) => {
1841 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1845 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1846 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1847 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1848 reason: closure_reason
1852 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1855 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1856 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1859 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1860 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1862 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1864 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1866 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1867 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1868 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1869 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1870 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1872 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1873 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1874 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1876 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1880 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1881 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1882 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1883 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1884 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1887 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1888 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1889 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1890 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1894 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1902 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1903 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1904 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1905 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1908 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1912 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1913 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1914 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1916 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1917 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1919 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1920 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1921 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1922 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1924 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1926 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1927 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1928 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1929 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1930 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1933 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1934 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1935 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1937 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1938 /// the channel being closed or not:
1939 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1940 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1941 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1942 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1943 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1944 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1945 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1947 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1949 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1950 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1951 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1952 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1953 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1957 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1958 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1959 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1960 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1961 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1962 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1963 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1964 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1966 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1967 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1968 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1969 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1970 // ignore the result here.
1971 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1975 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1976 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1977 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1978 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1979 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1980 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1981 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1983 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1985 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1986 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1987 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1989 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1991 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1993 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1996 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1997 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1998 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1999 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2000 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2005 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2008 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2010 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2011 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2013 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2014 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2016 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2017 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2018 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2019 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2030 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2031 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2032 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2034 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2035 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2036 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2039 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2040 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2041 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2043 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2044 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2045 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2046 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2047 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2050 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2051 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2052 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2053 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2054 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2058 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2059 /// local transaction(s).
2060 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2061 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2062 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2066 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2067 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2069 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2070 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2071 return Err(ReceiveError {
2072 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2074 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2077 // final_expiry_too_soon
2078 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2079 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2081 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2082 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2083 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2084 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2085 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2086 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2087 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2088 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2091 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2094 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2095 return Err(ReceiveError {
2097 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2098 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2102 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2103 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2104 return Err(ReceiveError {
2105 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2106 err_data: Vec::new(),
2107 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2111 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2112 return Err(ReceiveError {
2113 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2114 err_data: Vec::new(),
2115 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2117 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2118 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2120 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2121 phantom_shared_secret,
2123 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2124 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2125 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2126 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2127 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2128 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2129 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2130 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2131 return Err(ReceiveError {
2132 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2133 err_data: Vec::new(),
2134 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2138 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2140 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2143 return Err(ReceiveError {
2144 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2145 err_data: Vec::new(),
2146 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2151 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2154 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2155 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2156 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2157 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2161 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2162 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2163 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2165 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2166 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2167 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2168 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2169 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2170 failure_code: $err_code,
2176 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2177 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2180 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2181 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2182 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2184 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2185 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2186 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2187 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2188 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2189 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2190 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2191 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2193 macro_rules! return_err {
2194 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2196 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2197 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2198 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2199 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2200 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2201 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2207 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2209 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2210 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2212 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2213 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2217 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2218 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2220 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2222 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2223 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2224 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2225 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2226 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2228 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2231 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2232 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2233 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2235 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2236 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2237 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2240 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2241 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2242 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2243 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2247 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2248 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2249 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2252 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2253 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2254 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2255 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2256 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2261 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2262 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2263 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2264 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2265 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2266 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2267 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2268 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2269 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2270 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2271 // phantom or an intercept.
2272 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2273 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2274 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2278 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2281 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2283 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2285 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2286 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2287 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2291 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2293 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2294 // have no consistency guarantees.
2295 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2299 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2300 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2301 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2302 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2303 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2305 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2306 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2307 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2308 // we don't have the channel here.
2309 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2311 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2313 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2314 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2315 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2316 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2317 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2318 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2319 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2321 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2322 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2324 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2325 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2329 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2330 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2331 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2332 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2334 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2341 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2342 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2343 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2344 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2345 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2346 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2348 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2349 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2351 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2352 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2353 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2354 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2355 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2356 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2357 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2358 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2359 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2360 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2366 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2367 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2368 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2369 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2371 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2372 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2374 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2375 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2376 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2378 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2379 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2380 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2381 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2382 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2383 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2384 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2388 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2393 pending_forward_info
2396 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2397 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2398 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2400 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2401 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2402 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2403 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2404 if !chan.should_announce() {
2405 return Err(LightningError {
2406 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2407 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2410 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2411 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2414 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2417 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2418 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2419 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2420 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2422 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2423 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2424 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2425 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2427 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2428 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2432 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2434 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2436 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2438 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2439 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2441 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2442 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2443 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2444 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2445 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2446 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2447 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2448 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2450 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2451 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2452 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2454 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2456 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2463 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2464 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2465 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2468 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2469 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2470 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2473 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2474 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2476 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2477 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2478 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2479 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2480 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2482 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2484 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2485 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2486 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2487 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2491 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2492 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2495 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2496 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2497 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2499 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2500 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2501 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2503 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2504 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2506 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2507 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2508 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2509 Some(monitor_update) => {
2510 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2511 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2512 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2515 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2516 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2517 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2518 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2519 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2520 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2521 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2522 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2528 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2529 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2530 // `channel_by_id` map.
2531 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2532 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2537 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2538 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2540 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2545 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2547 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2548 /// fields for more info.
2550 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2551 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2553 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2555 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2556 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2557 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2558 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2559 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2561 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2562 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2563 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2564 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2565 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2567 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2568 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2569 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2570 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2572 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2574 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2575 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2576 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2578 /// In general, a path may raise:
2579 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2580 /// node public key) is specified.
2581 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2582 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2584 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2585 /// relevant updates.
2587 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2588 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2589 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2591 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2593 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2594 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2595 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2596 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2597 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2599 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2600 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2601 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2603 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2604 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2605 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2606 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2607 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2608 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2610 self.pending_outbound_payments
2611 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2612 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2613 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2616 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2617 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2618 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2619 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2621 self.pending_outbound_payments
2622 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2623 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2624 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2625 &self.pending_events,
2626 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2627 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2631 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2632 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2634 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2635 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2636 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2640 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2641 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2642 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2646 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2647 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2648 /// retries are exhausted.
2650 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2651 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2653 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2654 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2655 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2657 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2658 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2660 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2661 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2662 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2664 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2667 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2668 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2669 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2670 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2671 /// never reach the recipient.
2673 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2674 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2676 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2677 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2679 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2681 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2682 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2683 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2684 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2685 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2686 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2688 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2689 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2692 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2693 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2695 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2698 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2699 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2700 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2702 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2703 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2704 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2705 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2706 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2707 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2710 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2711 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2712 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2713 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2714 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2716 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2717 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2718 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2721 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2724 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2725 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2728 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2729 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2730 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2731 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2732 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2733 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2734 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2735 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2737 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2738 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2741 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2743 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2745 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2746 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2747 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2748 } else { unreachable!(); })
2751 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2754 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2755 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2758 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2759 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2764 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2765 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2768 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2770 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2773 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2774 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2775 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2784 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2785 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2786 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2790 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2792 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2793 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2795 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2796 /// across the p2p network.
2798 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2799 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2801 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2802 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2803 /// keys per-channel).
2805 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2806 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2807 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2809 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2810 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2811 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2813 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2814 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2815 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2816 /// for more details.
2818 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2819 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2820 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2821 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2823 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2824 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2825 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2826 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2831 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2832 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2833 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2834 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2835 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2836 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2837 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2841 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2842 let mut output_index = None;
2843 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2844 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2845 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2846 if output_index.is_some() {
2847 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2848 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2851 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2852 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2853 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2856 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2859 if output_index.is_none() {
2860 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2861 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2864 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2868 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2870 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2871 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2872 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2873 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2875 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2876 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2878 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2879 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2881 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2883 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2884 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2885 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2886 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2887 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2888 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2889 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2890 pub fn update_channel_config(
2891 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2892 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2893 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2894 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2895 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2900 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2903 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2904 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2905 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2906 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2907 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2908 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2909 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2910 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2914 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2915 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2916 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2919 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2921 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2922 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2923 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2931 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2932 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2934 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2935 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2937 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2938 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2939 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2940 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2941 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2943 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2944 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2946 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2949 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2950 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2951 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2952 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2953 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2956 let next_hop_scid = {
2957 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2959 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2962 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2964 if !chan.is_usable() {
2965 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2966 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2969 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2971 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2972 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2977 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2978 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2979 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2982 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2983 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2984 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2986 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2988 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2989 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2992 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2993 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2994 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2995 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2996 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2998 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3002 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3003 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3005 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3008 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3009 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3012 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3013 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3014 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3017 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3018 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3019 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3020 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3021 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3022 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3023 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3026 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3027 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3029 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3034 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3036 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3037 /// Will likely generate further events.
3038 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3041 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3042 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3043 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3045 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3046 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3048 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3049 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3050 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3052 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3053 match forward_info {
3054 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3055 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3056 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3057 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3058 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3061 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3062 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3063 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3065 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3066 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3067 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3068 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3069 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3070 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3073 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3074 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3076 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3079 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3080 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3086 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3087 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3089 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3093 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3094 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3096 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3100 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3101 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3102 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3103 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3104 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3106 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3107 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3108 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3109 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3110 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3112 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3114 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3115 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3119 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3120 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3121 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3122 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3128 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3131 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3134 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3135 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3136 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3137 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3138 // problem, not ours.
3144 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3145 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3147 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3152 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3153 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3154 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3159 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3161 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3165 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3166 match forward_info {
3167 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3168 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3169 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3170 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3171 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3175 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3176 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3177 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3178 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3179 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3180 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3181 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3183 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3184 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3185 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3187 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3188 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3190 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3192 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3193 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3194 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3195 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3200 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3201 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3203 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3205 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3206 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3208 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3211 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3213 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3214 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3215 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3224 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3225 match forward_info {
3226 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3227 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3228 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3229 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3232 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3233 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3234 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3235 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3237 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3238 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3240 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3243 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3244 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3246 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3247 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3248 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3249 phantom_shared_secret,
3251 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3253 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3258 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3259 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3260 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3261 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3262 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3264 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3265 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3266 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3267 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3268 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3269 phantom_shared_secret,
3271 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3272 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3276 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3277 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3278 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3279 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3280 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3283 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3284 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3285 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3287 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3288 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3289 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3292 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3293 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3294 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3297 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3298 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3299 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3300 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3302 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3306 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3307 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3308 total_value += htlc.value;
3309 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3310 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3311 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3313 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3314 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3316 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3318 _ => unreachable!(),
3321 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3323 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3324 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3325 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3326 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3327 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3328 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3329 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3332 amount_msat: total_value,
3333 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3334 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3336 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3338 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3339 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3341 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3343 payment_claimable_generated
3347 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3348 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3349 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3350 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3351 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3352 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3353 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3354 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3356 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3357 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3358 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3359 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3360 Ok(result) => result,
3362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3363 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3367 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3368 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3369 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3371 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3372 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3376 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3378 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3379 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3380 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3381 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3384 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3386 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3387 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3388 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3389 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3390 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3392 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3394 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3395 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3400 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3407 if payment_data.is_none() {
3408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3409 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3412 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3413 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3415 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3416 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3418 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3419 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3421 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3422 if payment_claimable_generated {
3423 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3429 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3430 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3438 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3439 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3440 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3441 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3442 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3443 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3445 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3446 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3448 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3450 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3451 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3452 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3454 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3456 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3457 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3458 events.append(&mut new_events);
3461 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3463 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3464 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3466 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3467 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3468 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3469 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3470 if background_events.is_empty() {
3474 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3476 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3477 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3478 // monitor updating completing.
3479 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3486 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3487 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3488 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3489 self.process_background_events();
3492 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3493 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3494 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3495 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3496 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3497 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3498 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3500 if !chan.is_live() {
3501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3502 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3503 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3505 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3506 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3508 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3509 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3513 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3514 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3515 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3516 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3517 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3518 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3519 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3521 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3524 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3527 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3528 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3529 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3537 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3539 /// This currently includes:
3540 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3541 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3542 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3544 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3545 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3546 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3548 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3549 /// estimate fetches.
3550 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3551 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3552 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3553 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3555 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3557 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3558 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3559 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3561 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3562 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3565 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3566 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3567 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3568 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3569 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3571 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3572 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3573 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3574 if needs_close { return false; }
3577 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3578 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3579 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3580 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3581 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3582 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3583 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3584 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3588 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3589 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3591 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3592 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3593 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3597 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3598 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3603 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3607 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3608 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3613 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3614 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3615 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3616 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3617 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3618 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3619 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3620 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3621 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3622 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3623 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3625 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3626 // have no channels to the peer.
3627 let remove_entry = {
3628 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3629 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3632 entry.remove_entry();
3635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3640 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3641 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3642 // This should be unreachable
3643 debug_assert!(false);
3646 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3647 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3648 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3649 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3651 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3652 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3653 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3655 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3662 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3663 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3664 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3665 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3666 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3669 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3670 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3673 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3675 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3676 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3677 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3678 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3679 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3686 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3687 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3688 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3690 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3691 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3692 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3693 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3695 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3696 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3697 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3698 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3699 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3700 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3703 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3704 /// reason for the failure.
3706 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3707 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3710 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3711 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3712 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3713 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3714 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3715 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3716 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3721 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3722 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3723 match failure_code {
3724 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3725 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3726 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3727 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3728 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3729 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3734 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3735 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3737 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3739 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3740 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3741 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3742 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3743 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3744 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3745 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3747 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3749 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3750 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3752 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3757 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3758 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3759 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3760 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3761 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3762 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3763 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3764 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3765 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3766 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3768 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3769 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3770 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3771 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3773 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3774 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3775 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3776 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3777 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3781 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3782 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3783 // be surfaced to the user.
3784 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3785 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3786 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3788 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3789 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3790 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3792 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3793 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3795 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3799 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3802 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3803 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3804 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3805 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3809 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3810 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3811 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3812 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3813 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3814 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3815 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3816 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3817 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3820 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3821 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3822 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3825 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3826 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3827 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3829 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3830 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3831 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3832 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3833 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3835 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3837 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3839 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3840 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3841 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3842 push_forward_ev = true;
3844 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3846 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3849 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3852 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3853 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3854 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3855 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3856 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3857 failed_next_destination: destination,
3863 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3864 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3866 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3867 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3868 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3870 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3871 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3872 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3873 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3875 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3876 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3877 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3878 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3879 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3880 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3881 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3886 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3887 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3888 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3889 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3890 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3891 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3892 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3893 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3898 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3899 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3900 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3902 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3903 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3904 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3905 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3910 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3912 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3913 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3914 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3915 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3916 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3918 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3919 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3921 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3922 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3923 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3924 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3925 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3927 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3928 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3929 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3930 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3931 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3932 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3933 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3934 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3941 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3942 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3950 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3955 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3956 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3957 debug_assert!(false);
3962 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3963 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3964 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3965 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3966 if sources.len() != 1 {
3967 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3968 debug_assert!(false);
3974 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3976 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3977 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3978 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3979 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3982 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3983 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3984 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3985 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3989 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3990 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3991 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3992 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3994 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3995 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3996 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3997 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3998 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4003 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4004 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4005 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4006 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4007 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4008 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4009 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4011 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4014 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4015 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4016 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4017 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4021 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4022 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4023 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4024 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4027 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4028 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4029 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4033 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4034 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4035 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4039 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4042 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4043 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4044 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4046 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4047 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4048 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4049 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4050 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4052 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4053 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4054 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4055 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4056 if let Err(e) = res {
4057 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4058 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4059 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4060 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4061 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4067 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4068 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4069 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4073 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4074 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4075 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4076 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4077 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4078 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4079 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4080 // again on restart.
4081 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4082 payment_preimage, update_res);
4084 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4085 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4086 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4087 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4088 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4089 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4093 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4094 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4097 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4099 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4100 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4102 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4103 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4104 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4105 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4106 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4107 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4108 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4111 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4112 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4114 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4116 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4122 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4123 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4124 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4130 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4131 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4132 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4135 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4136 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4138 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4139 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4140 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4141 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4142 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4146 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4147 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4153 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4154 /// update completion.
4155 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4156 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4157 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4158 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4159 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4160 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4162 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4163 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4164 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4165 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4166 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4167 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4169 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4171 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4172 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4173 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4174 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4177 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4178 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4180 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4181 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4182 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4187 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4189 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4190 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4191 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4192 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4197 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4198 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4199 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4200 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4201 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4206 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4210 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4216 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4217 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4218 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4224 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4225 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4227 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4228 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4230 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4231 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4232 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4233 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4234 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4239 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4240 let mut peer_state_lock;
4241 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4242 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4243 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4246 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4251 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4252 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4253 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4256 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4259 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4261 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4262 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4265 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4266 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4267 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4269 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4270 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4271 /// used to accept such channels.
4273 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4274 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4275 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4276 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4279 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4280 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4282 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4283 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4284 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4286 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4287 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4289 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4290 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4292 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4293 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4295 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4296 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4297 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4298 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4301 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4304 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4306 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4307 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4308 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4309 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4310 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4311 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4313 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4314 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4317 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4318 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4319 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4320 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4322 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4325 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4326 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4327 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4329 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4330 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4331 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4332 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4333 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4334 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4339 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4340 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4341 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4345 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4346 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4347 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4351 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4357 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4358 /// or 0-conf channels.
4360 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4361 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4362 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4363 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4364 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4365 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4367 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4368 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4369 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4370 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4371 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4372 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4373 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4377 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4380 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4381 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4383 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4384 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4385 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4386 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4388 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4391 num_unfunded_channels
4394 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4395 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4399 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4403 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4404 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4405 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4406 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4408 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4409 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4410 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4411 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4414 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4416 debug_assert!(false);
4417 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4419 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4420 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4422 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4423 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4424 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4425 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4426 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4427 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4430 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4431 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4434 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4435 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4437 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4438 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4441 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4442 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4443 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4446 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4451 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4453 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4457 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4458 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4459 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4461 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4462 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4463 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4466 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4467 pending_events.push(
4468 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4469 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4470 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4471 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4472 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4473 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4478 entry.insert(channel);
4484 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4485 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4486 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4487 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4489 debug_assert!(false);
4490 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4492 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4493 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4494 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4495 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4496 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4497 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4502 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4503 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4504 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4505 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4506 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4508 user_channel_id: user_id,
4513 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4514 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4516 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4517 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4519 debug_assert!(false);
4520 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4525 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4526 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4528 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4533 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4535 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4537 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4538 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4539 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4541 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4542 funding_msg.channel_id))
4544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4545 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4549 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4550 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4551 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4552 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4553 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4554 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4555 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4559 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4561 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4562 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4563 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4565 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4566 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4567 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4568 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4569 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4570 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4571 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4572 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4580 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4581 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4585 debug_assert!(false);
4586 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4590 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4591 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4593 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4594 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4595 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4596 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4597 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4598 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4599 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4600 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4601 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4602 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4607 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4611 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4613 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4615 debug_assert!(false);
4616 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4618 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4619 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4620 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4622 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4623 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4624 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4626 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4627 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4628 msg: announcement_sigs,
4630 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4631 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4632 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4633 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4634 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4635 // announcement_signatures.
4636 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4637 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4638 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4639 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4645 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4653 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4654 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4655 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4656 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4657 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4659 debug_assert!(false);
4660 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4664 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4667 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4668 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4669 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4670 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4673 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4674 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4675 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4676 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4678 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4679 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4680 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4681 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4682 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4683 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4688 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4689 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4690 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4691 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4692 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4699 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4700 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4701 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4702 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4708 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4710 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4712 debug_assert!(false);
4713 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4715 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4718 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4720 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4721 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4722 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4723 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4728 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4729 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4730 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4731 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4732 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4733 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4734 } else { (tx, None) }
4736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4739 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4740 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4741 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4743 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4744 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4747 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4751 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4756 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4757 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4758 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4759 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4761 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4762 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4763 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4764 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4766 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4770 debug_assert!(false);
4771 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4778 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4779 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4780 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4781 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4782 match pending_forward_info {
4783 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4784 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4785 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4786 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4788 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4789 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4790 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4791 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4792 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4795 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4797 _ => pending_forward_info
4800 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4807 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4808 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4810 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4812 debug_assert!(false);
4813 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4817 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4819 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4824 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4828 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4832 debug_assert!(false);
4833 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4835 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4837 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4839 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4846 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4848 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4850 debug_assert!(false);
4851 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4855 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4857 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4858 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4859 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4861 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4868 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4870 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4872 debug_assert!(false);
4873 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4877 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4879 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4880 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4881 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4882 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4883 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4884 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4891 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4892 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4893 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4894 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4895 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4896 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4897 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4898 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4899 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4900 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4901 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4903 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4904 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4906 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4907 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4908 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4910 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4911 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4914 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4915 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4917 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4918 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4919 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4921 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4922 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4923 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4924 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4925 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4928 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4929 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4932 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4933 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4934 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4935 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4936 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4937 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4938 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4941 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4942 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4943 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4948 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4949 // payments are being processed.
4950 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4951 push_forward_event = true;
4953 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4954 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4961 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4962 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4965 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4966 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4967 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4969 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4973 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4974 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4975 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4976 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4977 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4979 if !forward_ev_exists {
4980 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4982 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
4987 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4988 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4990 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4992 debug_assert!(false);
4993 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4994 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
4995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4996 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4998 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4999 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5000 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5001 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5002 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5003 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5004 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5009 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5013 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5015 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5017 debug_assert!(false);
5018 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5024 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5031 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5033 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5035 debug_assert!(false);
5036 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5040 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5041 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5042 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5047 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5048 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5049 msg, &self.default_configuration
5051 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5052 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5053 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5056 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5061 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5062 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5063 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5064 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5066 // It's not a local channel
5067 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5071 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5072 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5073 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5077 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5079 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5080 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5081 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5082 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5083 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5084 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5086 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5088 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5089 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5090 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5091 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5093 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5094 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5099 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5102 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5104 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5105 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5107 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5109 debug_assert!(false);
5110 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5112 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5113 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5114 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5116 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5117 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5118 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5119 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5120 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5121 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5122 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5123 let mut channel_update = None;
5124 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5125 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5126 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5129 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5130 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5131 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5132 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5133 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5134 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5135 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5140 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5141 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5142 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5143 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5144 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5145 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5153 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5154 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5157 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5158 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5163 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5164 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5165 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5167 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5168 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5169 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5170 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5171 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5172 match monitor_event {
5173 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5174 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5176 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5178 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5179 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5180 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5181 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5184 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5185 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5186 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5187 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5189 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5190 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5191 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5192 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5195 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5196 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5197 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5198 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5200 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5201 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5202 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5203 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5204 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5205 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5209 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5210 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5212 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5214 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5215 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5216 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5217 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5218 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5225 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5226 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5232 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5233 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5236 has_pending_monitor_events
5239 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5240 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5241 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5243 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5244 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5245 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5246 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5248 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5253 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5254 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5255 /// update was applied.
5256 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5257 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5258 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5259 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5261 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5262 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5263 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5264 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5266 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5267 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5270 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5271 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5272 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5273 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5274 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5275 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5276 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5277 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5279 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5280 has_monitor_update = true;
5282 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5283 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5284 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5285 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5286 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5287 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5288 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5290 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5292 continue 'peer_loop;
5301 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5302 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5303 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5306 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5307 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5313 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5314 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5315 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5316 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5317 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5318 let mut has_update = false;
5320 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5322 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5323 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5325 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5326 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5327 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5328 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5329 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5331 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5332 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5335 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5336 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5337 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5338 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5339 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5344 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5346 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5347 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5348 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5354 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5355 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5363 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5364 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5370 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5371 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5373 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5374 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5375 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5376 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5377 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5378 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5379 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5380 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5381 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5382 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5383 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5384 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5385 assert!(should_broadcast);
5386 } else { unreachable!(); }
5387 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5389 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5393 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5394 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5396 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5397 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5400 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5403 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5404 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5406 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5407 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5408 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5409 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5410 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5411 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5412 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5413 // never fail a payment too early.
5414 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5416 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5424 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5427 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5428 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5430 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5431 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5432 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5433 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5435 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5437 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5438 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5442 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5443 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5445 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5447 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5448 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5450 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5451 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5452 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5453 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5454 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5455 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5456 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5457 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5458 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5459 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5460 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5463 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5464 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5466 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5469 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5471 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5473 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5474 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5475 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5476 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5477 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5480 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5481 /// stored external to LDK.
5483 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5484 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5485 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5487 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5488 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5491 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5492 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5493 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5494 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5496 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5497 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5498 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5499 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5500 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5502 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5503 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5504 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5505 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5506 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5508 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5509 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5511 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5512 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5516 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5517 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5519 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5521 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5522 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5524 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5525 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5526 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5527 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5528 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5529 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5530 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5533 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5534 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5536 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5539 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5541 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5543 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5544 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5547 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5548 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5550 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5551 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5552 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5555 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5556 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5558 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5559 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5560 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5561 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5563 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5564 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5565 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5566 Some(_) => continue,
5567 None => return scid_candidate
5572 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5574 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5575 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5577 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5578 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5579 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5583 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5584 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5585 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5587 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5588 /// times to get a unique scid.
5589 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5590 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5591 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5593 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5594 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5595 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5596 return scid_candidate
5600 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5601 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5602 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5603 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5606 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5609 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5610 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5611 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5612 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5621 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5622 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5623 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5624 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5625 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5629 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5630 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5631 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5636 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5637 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5638 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5642 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5643 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5647 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5648 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5651 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5652 /// using the given event handler.
5654 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5655 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5658 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5659 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5660 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5662 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5664 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5665 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5666 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5667 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5670 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5671 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5672 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5675 for event in pending_events {
5676 handler(event).await;
5679 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5680 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5685 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5687 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5689 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5690 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5691 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5696 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5697 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5698 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5699 /// is always placed next to each other.
5701 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5702 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5703 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5704 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5706 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5707 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5708 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5709 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5710 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5711 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5712 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5714 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5715 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5716 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5717 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5720 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5721 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5723 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5724 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5727 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5729 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5732 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5733 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5737 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5738 events.replace(pending_events);
5747 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5749 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5750 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5751 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5752 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5753 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5754 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5758 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5760 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5761 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5762 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5763 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5764 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5766 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5767 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5768 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5769 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5772 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5773 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5774 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5777 for event in pending_events {
5778 handler.handle_event(event);
5786 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5788 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5789 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5790 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5791 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5792 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5793 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5797 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5799 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5800 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5801 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5802 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5803 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5806 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5807 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5810 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5811 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5812 let new_height = height - 1;
5814 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5815 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5816 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5817 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5818 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5819 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5822 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5826 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5828 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5829 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5830 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5831 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5832 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5833 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5837 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5838 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5839 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5840 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5842 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5843 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5846 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5847 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5849 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5850 if height < last_best_block_height {
5851 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5852 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5856 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5857 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5858 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5859 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5861 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5862 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5866 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5868 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5870 macro_rules! max_time {
5871 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5873 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5874 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5875 // having an explicit local time source.
5876 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5877 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5878 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5879 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5880 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5886 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5887 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5888 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5889 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5893 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5894 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5895 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5898 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5899 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5900 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5907 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5909 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5910 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5911 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5912 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5913 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5914 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5919 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5921 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5922 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5923 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5924 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5925 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5930 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5931 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5933 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5934 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5935 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5936 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5937 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5939 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5940 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5943 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5946 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5947 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5948 let res = f(channel);
5949 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5950 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5951 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5952 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5953 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5955 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5956 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5957 if channel.is_usable() {
5958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5959 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5961 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5970 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5972 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5973 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5974 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5975 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5976 msg: announcement_sigs,
5978 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5979 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5980 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5982 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5983 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5984 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5989 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5990 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5991 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5992 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5993 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5994 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5995 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5996 // is always consistent.
5997 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5998 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5999 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6000 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6001 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6004 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6005 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6006 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6007 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6008 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6009 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6010 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6014 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6015 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6017 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6018 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6019 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6020 data: reason_message,
6030 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6031 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6032 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6033 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6034 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6035 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6036 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6037 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6038 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6039 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6041 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6042 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6043 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6047 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6050 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6051 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6052 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6053 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6054 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6055 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6056 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6057 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6058 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6061 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6062 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6063 _ => unreachable!(),
6065 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6066 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6067 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6074 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6076 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6077 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6081 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6082 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6083 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6084 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6086 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6088 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6089 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6090 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6091 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6092 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6093 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6096 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6097 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6098 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6100 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6101 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6102 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6103 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6106 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6107 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6108 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6109 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6110 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6113 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6114 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6115 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6118 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6119 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6120 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6121 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6124 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6125 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6126 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6127 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6130 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6131 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6133 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6134 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6135 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6136 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6137 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6140 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6141 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6142 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6143 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6146 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6147 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6148 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6149 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6152 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6153 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6154 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6155 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6159 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6160 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6162 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6163 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6164 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6165 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6166 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6171 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6176 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6181 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6186 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6191 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6196 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6206 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6247 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6248 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6251 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6256 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6264 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6266 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6267 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6268 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6271 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6272 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6273 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6274 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6275 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6276 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6281 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6283 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6292 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6295 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6296 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6297 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6299 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6306 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6307 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6308 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6309 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6312 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6314 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6316 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6317 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6321 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6322 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6323 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6327 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6329 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6330 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6331 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6332 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6333 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6334 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6337 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6338 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6340 if inbound_peer_limited {
6343 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6344 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6345 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6346 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6347 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6352 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6353 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6355 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6356 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6357 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6358 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6363 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6364 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6369 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6372 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6375 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6376 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6377 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6378 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6379 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6380 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6381 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6385 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6386 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6387 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6392 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6393 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6394 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6395 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6396 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6405 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6409 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6412 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6413 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6415 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6416 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6419 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6421 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6422 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6423 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6427 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6428 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6429 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6430 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6433 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6434 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6435 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6436 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6444 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6445 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6449 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6450 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6453 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6454 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6458 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6459 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6460 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6461 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6464 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6465 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6467 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6468 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6469 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6470 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6471 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6474 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6475 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6476 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6477 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6480 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6481 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6482 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6483 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6486 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6487 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6488 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6489 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6490 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6491 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6492 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6493 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6494 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6495 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6496 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6497 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6498 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6499 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6500 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6501 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6502 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6503 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6505 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6506 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6507 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6513 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6514 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6516 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6517 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6518 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6519 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6522 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6523 (2, node_id, required),
6524 (4, features, required),
6525 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6526 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6527 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6528 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6531 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6532 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6533 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6534 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6535 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6536 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6537 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6538 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6539 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6540 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6541 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6542 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6543 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6544 (7, self.config, option),
6545 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6546 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6547 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6548 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6549 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6550 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6551 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6552 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6553 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6554 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6555 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6556 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6557 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6558 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6559 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6560 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6561 (32, self.is_public, required),
6562 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6563 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6564 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6570 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6571 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6572 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6573 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6574 (2, channel_id, required),
6575 (3, channel_type, option),
6576 (4, counterparty, required),
6577 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6578 (6, funding_txo, option),
6579 (7, config, option),
6580 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6581 (9, confirmations, option),
6582 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6583 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6584 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6585 (16, balance_msat, required),
6586 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6587 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6588 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6589 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6590 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6591 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6592 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6593 (26, is_outbound, required),
6594 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6595 (30, is_usable, required),
6596 (32, is_public, required),
6597 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6598 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6599 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6602 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6603 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6604 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6605 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6606 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6610 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6612 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6613 outbound_scid_alias,
6617 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6618 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6620 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6621 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6622 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6623 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6624 confirmations_required,
6626 force_close_spend_delay,
6627 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6628 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6629 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6630 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6631 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6632 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6637 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6638 (2, channels, vec_type),
6639 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6640 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6643 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6645 (0, onion_packet, required),
6646 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6649 (0, payment_data, required),
6650 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6651 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6653 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6654 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6655 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6659 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6660 (0, routing, required),
6661 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6662 (4, payment_hash, required),
6663 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6664 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6665 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6669 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6670 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6672 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6674 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6675 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6676 reason.write(writer)?;
6678 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6679 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6682 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6683 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6684 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6685 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6692 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6693 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6694 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6697 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6698 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6699 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6700 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6704 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6705 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6706 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6707 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6708 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6711 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6712 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6713 // messages contained in the variants.
6714 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6715 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6716 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6718 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6719 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6720 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6721 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6722 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6725 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6727 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6728 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6729 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6731 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6736 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6741 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6742 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6743 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6744 (2, outpoint, required),
6745 (4, htlc_id, required),
6746 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6749 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6750 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6751 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6752 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6753 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6755 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6756 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6757 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6758 (2, self.value, required),
6759 (4, payment_data, option),
6760 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6761 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6767 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6768 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6769 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6771 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6772 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6773 let mut total_msat = None;
6774 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6775 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6776 (0, prev_hop, required),
6777 (1, total_msat, option),
6778 (2, value, required),
6779 (4, payment_data, option),
6780 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6781 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6783 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6785 if payment_data.is_some() {
6786 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6788 if total_msat.is_none() {
6789 total_msat = Some(value);
6791 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6794 if total_msat.is_none() {
6795 if payment_data.is_none() {
6796 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6798 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6800 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6804 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6807 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6814 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6815 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6816 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6820 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6821 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6822 let mut payment_id = None;
6823 let mut payment_secret = None;
6824 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6825 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6826 (0, session_priv, required),
6827 (1, payment_id, option),
6828 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6829 (3, payment_secret, option),
6830 (4, path, vec_type),
6831 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6833 if payment_id.is_none() {
6834 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6836 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6838 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6839 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6841 let path = path.unwrap();
6842 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6843 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6844 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6847 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6848 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6849 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6851 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6855 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6856 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6861 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6862 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6864 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6866 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6867 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6868 (0, session_priv, required),
6869 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6870 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6871 (3, payment_secret, option),
6872 (4, *path, vec_type),
6873 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6876 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6878 field.write(writer)?;
6885 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6886 (0, forward_info, required),
6887 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6888 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6889 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6890 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6893 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6895 (0, htlc_id, required),
6896 (2, err_packet, required),
6901 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6902 (0, payment_secret, required),
6903 (2, expiry_time, required),
6904 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6905 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6906 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6909 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6911 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6912 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6913 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6914 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6915 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6916 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6920 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6921 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6923 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6925 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6927 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6928 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6929 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6932 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6935 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6936 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6937 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6940 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6941 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6943 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6944 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6945 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6946 unfunded_channels += 1;
6951 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6953 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6956 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6957 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6958 channel.write(writer)?;
6965 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6966 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6967 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6968 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6969 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6970 for forward in pending_forwards {
6971 forward.write(writer)?;
6976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6978 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6979 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6980 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6982 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6983 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6984 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6985 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6986 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6987 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6988 htlc.write(writer)?;
6990 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6993 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
6994 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
6995 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6996 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
6997 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
6998 // per_peer_state lock at all.
6999 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7002 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7003 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7004 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7005 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7006 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7008 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7009 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7010 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7011 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7012 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7013 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7014 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7019 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7020 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7021 for event in events.iter() {
7022 event.write(writer)?;
7025 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7026 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7027 for event in background_events.iter() {
7029 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7031 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7032 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7037 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7038 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7039 // likely to be identical.
7040 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7041 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7043 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7044 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7045 hash.write(writer)?;
7046 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7049 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7050 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7051 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7052 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7053 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7056 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7057 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7059 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7060 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7061 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7062 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7065 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7066 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7070 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7071 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7072 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7074 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7075 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7076 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7082 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7083 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7084 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7085 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7088 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7089 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7090 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7091 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7092 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7095 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7096 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7097 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7098 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7099 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7100 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7101 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7102 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7103 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7104 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7111 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7113 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7115 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7116 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7117 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7118 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7119 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7120 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7121 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7122 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7123 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7124 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7125 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7126 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7127 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7129 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7130 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7132 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7133 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7135 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7136 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7137 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7138 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7139 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7140 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7142 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7143 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7145 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7147 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7148 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7149 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7150 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7154 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7155 pub entropy_source: ES,
7157 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7158 pub node_signer: NS,
7160 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7161 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7163 pub signer_provider: SP,
7165 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7167 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7168 pub fee_estimator: F,
7169 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7171 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7172 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7173 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7174 pub chain_monitor: M,
7176 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7177 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7178 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7179 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7180 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7181 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7183 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7185 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7186 /// deserialization.
7188 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7189 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7190 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7192 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7193 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7195 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7196 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7197 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7198 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7200 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7203 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7204 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7207 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7208 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7219 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7220 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7221 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7222 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7223 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7225 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7226 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7231 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7232 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7233 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7234 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7236 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7237 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7238 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7239 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7240 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7241 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7245 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7246 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7247 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7251 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7252 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7254 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7256 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7257 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7258 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7259 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7263 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7264 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7266 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7267 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7270 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7272 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7273 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7274 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7275 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7276 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7277 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7278 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7279 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7280 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7282 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7283 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7284 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7285 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7286 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7287 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7288 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7289 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7290 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7291 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7292 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7293 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7294 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7295 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7296 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7298 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7299 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7300 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7301 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7302 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7303 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7304 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7305 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7306 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7307 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7308 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7309 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7310 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7311 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7312 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7313 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7315 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7316 let mut found_htlc = false;
7317 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7318 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7321 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7322 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7323 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7324 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7325 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7326 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7327 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7328 log_info!(args.logger,
7329 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7330 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7331 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7335 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7336 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7337 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7339 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7340 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7342 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7344 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7345 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7348 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7349 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7350 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7354 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7355 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7356 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7357 // safely discard the channel.
7358 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7359 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7360 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7361 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7362 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7365 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7366 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7367 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7368 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7369 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7374 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7375 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7376 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7377 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7381 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7382 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7383 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7384 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7385 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7387 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7388 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7389 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7391 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7394 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7395 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7396 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7397 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7398 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7400 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7401 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7403 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7406 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7407 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7408 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7409 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7410 let peer_state = PeerState {
7411 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7412 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7413 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7414 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7415 is_connected: false,
7417 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7420 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7421 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7422 for _ in 0..event_count {
7423 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7424 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7429 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7431 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7432 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7433 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7434 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7438 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7439 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7443 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7444 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7445 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7449 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7451 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7452 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7453 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7455 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7457 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7462 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7463 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7464 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7465 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7466 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7467 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7468 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7469 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7470 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7471 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7472 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7473 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7474 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7475 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7476 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7477 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7478 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7479 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7480 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7481 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7483 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7484 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7487 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7488 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7491 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7492 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7495 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7496 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7497 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7498 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7499 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7500 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7502 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7504 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7505 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7506 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7510 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7511 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7512 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7513 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7514 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7515 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7516 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7518 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7519 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7520 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7521 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7522 if path.is_empty() {
7523 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7527 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7528 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7529 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7530 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7532 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7533 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7534 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7537 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7538 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7539 retry_strategy: None,
7540 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7541 payment_params: None,
7542 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7543 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7545 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7546 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7547 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7548 total_msat: path_amt,
7549 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7551 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7552 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7557 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7559 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7560 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7561 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7562 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7564 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7565 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7566 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7567 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7568 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7569 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7570 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7571 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7572 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7573 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7574 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7579 !forwards.is_empty()
7581 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7582 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7583 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7584 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7585 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7586 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7587 intercepted_id != ev_id
7594 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7595 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7596 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7597 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7598 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7599 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7600 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7601 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7602 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7603 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7604 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7605 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7606 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7615 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7616 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7617 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7618 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7619 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7620 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7621 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7622 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7626 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7627 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7629 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7630 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7631 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7632 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7634 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7635 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7638 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7639 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7640 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7641 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7642 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7644 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7645 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7646 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7647 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7648 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7649 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7650 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7651 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7653 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7654 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7658 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7660 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7662 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7663 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7665 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7669 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7670 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7672 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7674 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7676 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7677 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7678 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7679 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7683 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7684 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7685 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7687 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7688 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7689 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7691 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7692 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7693 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7695 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7696 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7697 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7698 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7699 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7700 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7702 if chan.is_usable() {
7703 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7704 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7705 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7706 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7707 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7713 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7715 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7716 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7717 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7718 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7719 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7720 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7721 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7722 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7723 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7724 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7725 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7727 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7728 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7730 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7731 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7732 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7733 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7735 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7736 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7737 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7738 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7740 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7741 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7742 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7743 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7745 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7746 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7747 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7748 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7750 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7751 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7754 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7755 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7758 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7761 purpose: payment_purpose,
7762 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7768 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7769 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7770 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7772 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7773 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7777 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7779 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7780 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7781 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7782 router: args.router,
7784 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7786 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7787 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7788 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7789 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7791 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7792 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7793 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7794 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7795 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7796 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7798 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7803 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7805 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7807 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7808 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7809 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7810 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7812 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7813 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7814 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7816 logger: args.logger,
7817 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7820 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7821 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7822 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7823 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7824 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7827 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7828 //connection or two.
7830 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7836 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7837 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7838 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7839 use core::time::Duration;
7840 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7841 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7842 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7843 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7844 use crate::ln::msgs;
7845 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7846 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7847 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7848 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7849 use crate::util::test_utils;
7850 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7851 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7854 fn test_notify_limits() {
7855 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7856 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7860 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7862 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7863 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7864 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7865 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7866 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7868 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7870 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7871 // to connect messages with new values
7872 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7873 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7874 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7875 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7876 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7877 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7879 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7880 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7881 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7882 // ... but the last node should not.
7883 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7884 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7885 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7886 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7888 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7889 // about the channel.
7890 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7891 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7892 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7894 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7896 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7897 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7898 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7899 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7900 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7901 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7903 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7904 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7905 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7907 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7908 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7909 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7910 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7911 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7912 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7914 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7915 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7916 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7917 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7918 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7919 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7920 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7921 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7923 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7924 // the channel info has updated.
7925 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7926 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7927 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7928 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7929 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7930 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7934 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7935 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7941 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7943 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7944 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7945 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7946 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7948 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7949 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7950 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7951 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7952 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7953 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7955 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7957 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7959 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7960 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7962 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7964 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7965 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7966 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7968 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7969 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7970 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7972 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7973 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7974 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7975 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7976 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7977 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7978 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7979 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7980 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7982 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7983 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7985 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7986 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7987 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7989 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7990 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7991 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7992 // lightning messages manually.
7993 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7994 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7997 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7998 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7999 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8001 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8002 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8004 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8005 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8007 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8009 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8011 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8012 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8013 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8015 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8017 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8019 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8020 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8023 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8024 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8025 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8028 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8029 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8030 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8031 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8036 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8037 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8038 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8039 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8044 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8045 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8046 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8047 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8054 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8055 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8056 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8057 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8058 // fails as expected.
8059 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8060 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8061 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8062 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8063 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8064 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8065 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8067 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8068 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8069 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8071 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8072 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8073 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8074 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8076 let route = find_route(
8077 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8078 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8080 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8082 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8084 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8085 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8086 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8088 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8089 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8090 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8092 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8094 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8095 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8096 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8097 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8098 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8099 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8102 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8104 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8105 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8107 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8108 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8109 let route = find_route(
8110 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8111 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8113 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8115 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8117 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8118 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8119 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8121 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8122 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8123 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8127 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8128 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8131 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8135 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8136 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8137 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8138 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8139 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8140 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8141 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8142 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8143 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8145 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8146 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8150 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8151 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8152 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8155 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8156 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8158 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8159 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8161 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8162 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8163 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8164 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8166 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8167 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8168 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8169 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8170 let route = find_route(
8171 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8172 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8175 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8176 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8177 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8178 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8181 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8182 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8183 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8184 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8185 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8186 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8187 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8189 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8193 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8194 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8198 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8200 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8201 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8203 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8204 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8205 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8206 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8208 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8209 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8210 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8211 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8212 let route = find_route(
8213 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8214 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8217 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8218 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8219 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8220 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8221 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8224 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8225 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8226 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8227 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8228 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8229 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8230 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8232 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8236 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8240 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8242 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8243 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8244 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8245 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8247 // Marshall an MPP route.
8248 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8249 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8250 route.paths.push(path);
8251 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8252 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8253 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8254 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8255 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8256 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8258 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8259 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8260 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8261 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8266 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8270 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8272 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8274 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8275 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8277 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8278 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8283 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8284 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8285 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8286 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8287 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8288 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8291 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8294 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8295 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8300 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8301 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8305 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8307 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8308 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8310 total_msat: 100_000,
8313 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8314 // payment verification fails as expected.
8315 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8316 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8317 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8318 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8320 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8324 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8325 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8329 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8330 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8331 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8332 // the channel is successfully closed.
8333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8336 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8338 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8339 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8340 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8341 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8342 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8344 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8345 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8347 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8348 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8349 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8350 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8353 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8355 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8356 // as it has the funding transaction.
8357 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8358 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8359 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8362 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8364 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8366 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8368 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8369 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8370 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8374 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8375 // as it has the funding transaction.
8376 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8377 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8378 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8381 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8382 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8384 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8385 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8386 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8388 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8389 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8390 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8391 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8393 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8394 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8396 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8397 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8398 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8399 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8400 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8401 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8402 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8406 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8407 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8408 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8409 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8410 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8411 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8412 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8415 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8417 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8418 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8419 // closing transaction).
8420 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8421 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8422 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8424 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8425 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8426 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8427 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8428 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8431 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8433 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8435 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8436 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8437 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8439 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8441 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8442 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8445 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8446 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8447 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8450 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8451 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8452 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8455 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8457 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8458 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8460 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8461 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8463 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8464 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8469 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8470 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8471 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8472 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8473 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8474 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8475 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8479 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8480 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8481 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8483 // Test the API functions.
8484 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8486 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8488 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8490 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8492 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8494 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8496 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8500 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8501 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8502 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8505 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8507 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8509 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8510 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8512 let mut funding_tx = None;
8513 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8514 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8515 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8518 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8519 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8520 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8521 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8522 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8524 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8526 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8528 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8531 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8534 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8535 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8536 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8537 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8538 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8540 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8541 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8543 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8544 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8545 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8546 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8547 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8548 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8549 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8551 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8552 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8553 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8554 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8556 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8557 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8558 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8559 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8560 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8561 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8562 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8564 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8565 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8566 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8567 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8569 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8570 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8571 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8572 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8574 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8575 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8577 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8578 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8579 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8580 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8581 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8583 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8584 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8585 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8587 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8588 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8589 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8591 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8592 // "protected" and can connect again.
8593 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8594 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8595 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8596 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8598 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8600 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8601 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8605 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8606 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8607 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8610 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8612 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8614 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8615 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8617 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8619 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8620 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8623 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8625 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8626 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8627 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8629 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8630 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8631 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8633 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8634 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8635 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8636 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8640 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8641 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8642 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8645 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8646 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8648 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8650 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8652 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8653 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8655 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8656 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8657 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8658 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8659 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8660 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8662 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8665 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8666 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8670 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8671 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8674 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8675 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8676 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8677 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8678 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8679 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8680 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8682 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8683 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8684 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8685 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8689 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8691 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8692 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8694 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8695 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8696 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8698 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8699 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8703 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8708 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8709 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8710 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8711 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8714 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8715 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8716 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8717 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8718 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8720 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8721 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8722 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8724 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8725 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8727 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8728 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8733 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8734 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8736 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8737 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8743 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8745 use crate::chain::Listen;
8746 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8747 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8748 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8749 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8750 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8751 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8752 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8753 use crate::util::test_utils;
8754 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8755 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8757 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8758 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8759 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8761 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8765 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8766 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8767 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8768 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8769 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8770 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8771 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8772 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8777 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8778 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8781 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8782 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8783 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8785 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8787 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8788 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8789 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8790 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8791 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8793 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8794 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8796 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8797 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8798 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8799 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8801 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8803 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8805 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8806 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8807 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8808 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8809 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8811 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8813 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8815 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8816 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8817 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8818 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8819 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8822 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8823 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8824 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8826 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8827 } else { panic!(); }
8829 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8830 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8832 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8835 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8838 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8839 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8841 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8842 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8843 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8844 match msg_events[0] {
8845 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8846 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8847 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8851 match msg_events[1] {
8852 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8856 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8857 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8859 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8860 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8865 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8866 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8868 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8869 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8871 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8874 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8876 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8877 macro_rules! send_payment {
8878 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8879 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8880 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8881 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8882 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8883 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8884 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8885 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8886 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8887 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8889 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8890 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8892 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8893 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8895 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8896 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8897 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8898 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8899 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8900 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8901 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8902 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8905 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8906 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8907 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8909 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8910 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8911 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8912 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8913 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8915 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8918 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8919 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8920 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8921 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8923 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8928 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8929 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);