1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use alloc::string::ToString;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
79 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
80 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
81 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
82 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
85 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
86 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
128 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
130 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
131 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
132 unknown => Err(unknown),
137 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
138 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
140 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
142 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
143 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
144 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
146 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
147 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
148 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
149 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
151 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
152 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
153 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
156 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
157 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
159 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
160 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
161 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
162 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
164 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
165 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
167 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
170 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
171 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
175 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
176 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
177 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
179 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
181 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
182 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
183 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
184 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
185 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
186 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
188 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
189 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
190 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
195 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
196 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
197 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
198 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
200 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
201 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
202 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
204 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
207 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
209 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
210 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
213 /// The metadata is constructed as:
214 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
215 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
217 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
218 /// match what was constructed.
220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
221 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
222 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
223 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
225 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
226 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
227 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
230 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
231 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
232 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
234 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
236 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
237 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
238 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
239 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
240 where L::Target: Logger
242 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
244 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
245 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
246 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
247 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
248 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
249 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
250 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
252 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
254 let mut payment_preimage = None;
255 match payment_type_res {
256 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
257 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
258 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
259 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
260 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
261 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
265 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
266 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
267 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
268 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
269 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
274 Err(unknown_bits) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
280 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
285 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
293 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
294 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
296 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
297 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
298 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
299 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
300 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
303 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
304 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
306 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
310 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
311 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
312 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
313 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
315 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
316 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
317 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
318 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
321 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
324 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
326 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
327 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
328 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
329 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
330 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
331 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
332 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
334 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
337 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
338 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
340 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
341 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
343 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
345 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
346 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
348 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
350 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
351 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
353 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
363 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
365 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
366 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
367 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
369 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
370 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
371 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
372 // before we forward it.
374 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
375 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
376 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
377 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
378 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
380 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
381 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
383 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
384 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
387 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
388 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
391 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
396 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
397 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
399 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
402 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
405 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
406 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
407 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
408 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
411 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
412 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
413 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
414 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
415 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
418 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
422 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
423 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
424 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
426 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
428 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
432 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
439 short_channel_id: u64,
441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
443 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
444 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
449 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
450 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
451 /// are part of the same payment.
452 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
453 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
454 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
457 struct ClaimableHTLC {
458 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
461 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
464 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
465 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
466 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
467 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
469 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
470 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
475 impl Readable for PaymentId {
476 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
477 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
481 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
482 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
483 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
484 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
485 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
488 session_priv: SecretKey,
489 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
490 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
491 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
492 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
494 payee: Option<Payee>,
497 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
498 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
499 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
501 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
503 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
505 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
508 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
509 payment_id.hash(hasher);
510 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
511 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
519 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
520 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
522 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
523 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
524 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
525 payment_secret: None,
531 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
532 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
534 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
542 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
543 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
545 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
550 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
552 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
553 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
554 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
555 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
556 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
558 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
559 err: msgs::LightningError,
560 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
561 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
563 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
565 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
567 err: LightningError {
569 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
570 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
577 shutdown_finish: None,
581 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
583 err: LightningError {
585 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
588 shutdown_finish: None,
592 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
593 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
596 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
598 err: LightningError {
600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
601 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
607 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
608 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
612 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
615 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
619 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
621 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
623 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
625 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
626 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
632 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
643 shutdown_finish: None,
648 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
649 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
650 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
651 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
652 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
654 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
655 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
656 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
657 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
658 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
659 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
660 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
662 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
666 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
667 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
668 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
669 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
670 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
671 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
672 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
673 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
674 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
675 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
676 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
677 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
679 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
680 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
681 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
682 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
685 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
686 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
687 /// quite some time lag.
688 enum BackgroundEvent {
689 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
690 /// commitment transaction.
691 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
694 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
695 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
697 latest_features: InitFeatures,
700 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
701 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
703 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
706 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
707 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
708 struct PendingInboundPayment {
709 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
710 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
711 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
712 /// this payment being removed.
714 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
715 user_payment_id: u64,
716 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
717 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
718 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
721 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
722 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
723 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
725 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
728 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
729 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
730 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
731 pending_amt_msat: u64,
732 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
733 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
734 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
736 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
737 starting_block_height: u32,
739 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
740 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
741 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
743 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
744 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
746 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
747 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
748 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
749 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
750 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
752 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
754 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
755 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
759 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
760 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
762 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
766 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
768 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
772 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
774 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
778 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
780 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
785 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
787 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
788 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
789 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
790 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
794 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
795 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
796 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
797 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
798 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
799 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
800 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
803 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
804 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
807 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
808 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
809 let our_payment_hash;
810 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
811 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
812 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
815 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
816 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
820 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
824 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
825 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
826 let remove_res = match self {
827 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
828 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
829 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
830 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
831 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
835 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
836 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
837 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
838 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
839 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
840 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
847 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
848 let insert_res = match self {
849 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
850 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
851 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
853 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
854 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
857 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
858 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
859 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
860 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
861 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
868 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
870 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
871 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
872 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
873 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
880 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
881 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
882 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
883 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
884 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
885 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
886 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
887 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
889 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
890 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
891 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
892 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
893 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
894 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
895 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
896 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
897 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
899 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
900 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
902 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
903 /// to individual Channels.
905 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
906 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
907 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
908 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
910 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
911 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
912 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
913 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
914 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
915 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
916 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
918 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
919 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
920 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
921 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
924 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
925 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
926 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
927 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
928 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
930 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
931 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
932 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
933 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
934 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
935 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
936 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
937 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
938 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
939 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
942 default_configuration: UserConfig,
943 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
949 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
951 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
952 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
954 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
955 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
956 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
957 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
959 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
960 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
961 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
962 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
963 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
964 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
966 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
967 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
968 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
969 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
970 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
971 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
972 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
973 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
975 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
977 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
978 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
980 our_network_key: SecretKey,
981 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
983 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
985 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
986 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
987 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
989 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
990 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
991 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
992 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
994 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
995 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
996 /// are currently open with that peer.
997 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
998 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1001 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1002 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1004 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1005 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1006 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1007 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1008 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1009 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1010 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1011 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1012 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1014 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1021 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1023 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1024 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1025 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1026 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1027 pub struct ChainParameters {
1028 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1029 pub network: Network,
1031 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1033 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1034 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1037 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1043 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1044 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1045 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1046 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1047 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1048 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1050 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1051 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1052 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1053 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1054 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1056 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1057 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1060 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1061 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1062 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1065 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1066 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1068 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1069 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1070 should_persist: persist_check,
1071 _read_guard: read_guard,
1076 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1077 fn drop(&mut self) {
1078 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1079 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1084 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1085 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1087 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1089 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1090 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1091 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1092 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1093 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1095 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1096 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1098 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1100 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1101 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1102 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1103 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1104 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1105 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1106 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1108 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1109 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1111 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1112 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1113 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1114 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1116 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1117 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1118 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1119 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1120 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1121 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1124 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1126 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1127 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1130 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1132 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1133 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1134 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1136 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1138 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1139 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1140 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1141 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1142 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1143 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1144 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1145 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1146 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1149 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1150 /// to better separate parameters.
1151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1152 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1153 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1154 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1155 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1156 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1157 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1158 pub features: InitFeatures,
1159 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1160 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1161 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1163 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1165 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1166 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1167 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1168 /// payments to us through this channel.
1169 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1172 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1173 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1174 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1175 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1176 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1177 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1178 /// lifetime of the channel.
1179 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1180 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1181 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1182 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1183 /// our counterparty already.
1185 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1186 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1187 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1188 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1189 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1190 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1191 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1192 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1193 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1194 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1195 /// this value on chain.
1197 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1199 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1201 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1202 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1203 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1204 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1205 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1206 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1207 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1209 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1210 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1211 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1212 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1214 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1215 pub balance_msat: u64,
1216 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1217 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1218 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1219 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1221 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1223 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1224 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1225 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1226 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1227 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1228 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1229 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1230 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1231 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1233 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1234 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1235 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1236 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1237 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1238 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1239 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1240 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1241 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1243 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1245 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1246 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1248 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1249 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1250 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1251 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1252 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1253 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1255 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1256 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1257 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1258 pub is_outbound: bool,
1259 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1260 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1261 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1262 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1263 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1265 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1266 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1267 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1268 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1270 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1271 pub is_usable: bool,
1272 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1273 pub is_public: bool,
1276 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1277 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1278 /// states for more.
1279 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1280 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1281 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1282 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1283 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1284 ParameterError(APIError),
1285 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1286 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1287 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1288 /// payment in full.
1290 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1292 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1293 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1294 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1295 /// paths than the ones selected).
1296 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1297 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1298 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1299 /// in over-/re-payment.
1301 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1302 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1303 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1305 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1306 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1307 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1308 /// with the latest update_id.
1310 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1311 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1312 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1313 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1314 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1315 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1316 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1317 payment_id: PaymentId,
1321 macro_rules! handle_error {
1322 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1325 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1328 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1329 // entering the macro.
1330 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1331 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1334 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1336 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1337 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1338 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1339 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1343 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1344 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1345 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1346 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1351 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1352 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1354 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1355 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1356 action: err.action.clone()
1360 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1361 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1364 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1371 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1372 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1373 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1375 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1376 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1378 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1380 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1381 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1383 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1384 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1385 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1386 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1388 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1389 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1390 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1392 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1393 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1394 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1395 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1397 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1398 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1399 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1405 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1406 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1410 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1412 $entry.remove_entry();
1420 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1421 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1425 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1427 $entry.remove_entry();
1435 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1436 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1438 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1439 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1440 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1447 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1448 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1449 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1451 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1453 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1454 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1455 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1456 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1458 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1459 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1460 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1461 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1462 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1463 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1464 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1465 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1466 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1467 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1468 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1471 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1472 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1473 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1474 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1475 match $action_type {
1476 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1477 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1479 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1480 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1482 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1483 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1484 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1485 if !$resend_commitment {
1486 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1489 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1491 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1492 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1496 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1497 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1499 $entry.remove_entry();
1503 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1504 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1508 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1510 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1512 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1513 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1517 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1518 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1520 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1521 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1524 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1529 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1530 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1531 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1532 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1533 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1534 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1536 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1537 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1539 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1540 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1541 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1542 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1545 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1546 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1547 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1548 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1549 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1550 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1551 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1552 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1553 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1554 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1555 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1556 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1559 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1560 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1561 // before it should be allowed to.
1562 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1563 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1564 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1567 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1568 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1569 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1570 msg: announcement_sigs,
1573 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1576 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1577 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1578 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1579 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1580 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1581 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1582 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1583 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1584 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1585 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1586 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1587 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1588 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1589 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1590 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1591 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1592 let mut order = $order;
1594 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1596 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1600 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1601 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1602 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1603 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1608 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1609 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1610 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1611 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1612 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1617 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1621 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1626 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1627 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1628 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1633 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1634 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1635 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1636 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1637 assert!(res.is_ok());
1640 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1644 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1645 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1646 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1648 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1650 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1651 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1656 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1657 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1658 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1659 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1660 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1663 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1665 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1666 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1668 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1670 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1672 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1673 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1674 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1675 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1676 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1677 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1678 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1679 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1681 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1682 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1683 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1687 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1689 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1690 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1691 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1692 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1693 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1694 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1696 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1697 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1699 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1700 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1703 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1705 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1706 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1708 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1710 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1711 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1712 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1713 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1721 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1722 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1723 &self.default_configuration
1726 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1728 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1729 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1730 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1731 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1732 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1735 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1736 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1738 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1739 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1740 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1742 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1743 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1744 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1745 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1746 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1747 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1749 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1750 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1751 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1752 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1753 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1754 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1759 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1760 Some(peer_state) => {
1761 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1762 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1763 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1764 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1765 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1767 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1770 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1773 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1774 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1776 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1777 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1780 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1781 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1783 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1788 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1789 node_id: their_network_key,
1792 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1795 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1796 let mut res = Vec::new();
1798 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1799 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1800 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1801 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1802 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1803 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1804 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1805 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1806 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1807 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1808 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1809 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1810 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1811 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1813 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1814 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1815 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1816 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1818 inbound_capacity_msat,
1819 outbound_capacity_msat,
1820 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1821 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1822 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1823 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1824 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1825 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1826 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1831 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1832 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1833 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1839 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1840 /// more information.
1841 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1842 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1845 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1846 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1848 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1849 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1851 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1852 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1853 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1854 // really wanted anyway.
1855 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1858 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1859 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1860 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1861 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1862 Some(transaction) => {
1863 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1867 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1868 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1869 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1870 reason: closure_reason
1874 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1877 let counterparty_node_id;
1878 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1879 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1880 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1884 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1886 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1887 Some(peer_state) => {
1888 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1889 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1890 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1892 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1894 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1896 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1897 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1898 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1899 let (result, is_permanent) =
1900 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1902 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1909 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1913 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1914 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1915 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1916 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1920 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1928 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1932 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1936 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1937 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1938 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1940 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1941 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1943 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1944 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1945 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1946 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1948 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1950 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1951 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1952 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1953 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1954 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1957 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1958 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1959 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1961 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1962 /// the channel being closed or not:
1963 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1964 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1965 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1966 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1967 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1968 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1969 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1971 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1973 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1974 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1975 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1976 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1977 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1981 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1982 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1983 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1984 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1987 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1988 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1989 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1990 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1991 // ignore the result here.
1992 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1996 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1997 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1998 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2002 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2003 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2004 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2005 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2008 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2009 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2011 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2012 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2013 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2016 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2018 chan.remove_entry().1
2020 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2023 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2024 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2025 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2026 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2027 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2032 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2035 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2036 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2037 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2039 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2040 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2041 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2042 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2043 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2044 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2045 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2055 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2056 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2057 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2058 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2059 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2063 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2064 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2065 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2067 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2068 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2069 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2070 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2071 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2072 failure_code: $err_code,
2073 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2078 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2079 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2082 let shared_secret = {
2083 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2084 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2087 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2089 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2090 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2091 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2092 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2093 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2094 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2095 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2096 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2099 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2100 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2101 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2102 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2103 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2106 let mut channel_state = None;
2107 macro_rules! return_err {
2108 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2110 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2111 if channel_state.is_none() {
2112 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2114 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2115 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2116 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2117 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2118 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2123 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2124 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2125 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2126 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2128 let error_code = match err {
2129 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2130 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2131 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2132 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2133 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2135 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2138 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2139 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2140 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2147 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2150 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2151 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2152 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2153 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2154 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2155 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2156 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2157 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2158 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2159 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2160 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2161 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2165 // final_expiry_too_soon
2166 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2167 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2168 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2169 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2170 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2171 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2172 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2174 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2175 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2176 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2178 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2179 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2180 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2183 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2184 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2185 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2186 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2187 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2188 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2189 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2190 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2192 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2194 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2195 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2196 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2197 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2198 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2199 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2200 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2201 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2202 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2205 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2207 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2210 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2215 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2216 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2217 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2218 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2220 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2222 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2223 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2224 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2225 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2228 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2229 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2230 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2232 // Check two things:
2233 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2234 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2235 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2237 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2239 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2240 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2241 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2243 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2245 let blinding_factor = {
2246 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2247 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2248 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2249 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2252 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2254 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2256 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2259 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2260 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2263 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2264 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2265 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2266 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2267 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2271 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2272 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2273 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2276 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2277 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2278 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2279 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2283 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2284 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2285 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2286 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2287 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2288 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2289 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2290 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2291 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2292 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2293 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2295 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2298 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2300 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2301 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2302 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2303 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2304 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2307 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2308 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2309 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2310 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2311 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2312 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2313 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2315 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2316 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2318 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2319 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2320 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2321 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2322 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2324 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2325 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2327 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2328 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2329 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2330 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2331 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2332 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2334 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2335 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2337 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2338 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2339 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2340 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2341 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2342 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2343 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2344 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2345 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2346 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2352 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2353 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2354 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2355 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2357 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2358 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2360 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2361 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2362 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2364 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2366 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2371 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2374 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2375 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2376 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2378 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2379 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2380 if !chan.should_announce() {
2381 return Err(LightningError {
2382 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2387 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2390 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2391 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2392 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2393 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2394 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2395 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2397 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2398 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2402 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2404 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2405 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2407 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2408 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2409 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2410 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2411 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2412 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2413 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2414 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2417 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2418 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2420 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2426 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2427 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2429 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2430 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2431 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2433 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2434 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2435 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2436 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2437 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2439 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2443 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2444 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2446 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2447 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2448 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2449 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2450 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2451 err: "Payment already completed"
2456 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2457 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2458 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2461 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2463 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2464 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2465 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2466 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2467 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2468 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2469 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2470 total_msat: total_value,
2472 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2476 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2477 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2479 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2480 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2482 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2483 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2485 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2486 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2488 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2489 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2491 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2492 payee: payee.clone(),
2493 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2494 channel_state, chan)
2496 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2497 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2498 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2499 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2500 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2501 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2502 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2503 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2504 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2505 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2507 insert_outbound_payment!();
2509 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2511 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2512 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2513 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2514 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2515 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2516 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2522 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2524 } else { unreachable!(); }
2528 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2529 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2531 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2536 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2538 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2539 /// fields for more info.
2541 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2542 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2543 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2544 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2545 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2546 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2548 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2550 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2551 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2552 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2554 /// In general, a path may raise:
2555 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2556 /// node public key) is specified.
2557 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2558 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2560 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2561 /// relevant updates.
2563 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2564 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2565 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2567 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2568 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2569 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2570 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2572 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2573 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2574 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2575 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2576 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2579 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2580 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2581 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2583 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2584 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2585 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2586 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2587 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2589 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2590 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2592 let mut total_value = 0;
2593 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2594 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2595 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2596 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2597 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2598 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2599 continue 'path_check;
2601 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2602 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2603 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2604 continue 'path_check;
2607 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2608 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2610 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2611 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2613 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2614 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2615 total_value = amt_msat;
2618 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2619 let mut results = Vec::new();
2620 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2621 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2623 let mut has_ok = false;
2624 let mut has_err = false;
2625 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2626 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2627 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2628 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2629 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2630 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2631 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2635 } else if res.is_err() {
2636 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2637 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2640 if has_err && has_ok {
2641 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2644 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2645 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2646 Some(RouteParameters {
2647 payee: payee.clone(),
2648 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2649 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2655 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2656 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2657 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2658 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2664 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2666 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2667 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2668 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2669 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2670 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2672 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2673 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2674 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2675 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2676 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2677 if path.len() == 0 {
2678 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2679 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2684 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2685 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2686 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2688 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2689 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2691 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2692 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2693 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2694 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2697 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2699 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2700 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2701 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2704 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2705 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2706 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2709 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2710 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2711 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2716 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2717 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2721 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2724 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2726 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2727 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2728 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2729 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2731 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2732 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2733 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2735 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2736 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2737 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2738 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2741 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2742 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2743 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2744 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2745 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2747 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2755 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2756 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2757 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2758 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2759 /// never reach the recipient.
2761 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2763 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2764 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2766 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2768 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2769 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2770 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2772 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2774 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2775 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2776 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2781 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2782 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2783 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2784 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2786 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2788 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2790 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2791 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2792 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2793 } else { unreachable!(); })
2796 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2798 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2799 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2802 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2803 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2808 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2810 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2813 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2815 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2817 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2825 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2826 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2827 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2831 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2833 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2834 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2836 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2837 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2839 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2840 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2841 /// keys per-channel).
2843 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2844 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2845 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2847 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2848 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2849 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2851 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2852 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2853 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2856 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2857 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2858 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2859 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2863 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2864 let mut output_index = None;
2865 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2866 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2867 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2868 if output_index.is_some() {
2869 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2870 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2873 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2874 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2875 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2878 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2881 if output_index.is_none() {
2882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2883 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2886 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2890 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2891 if !chan.should_announce() {
2892 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2896 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2898 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2900 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2901 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2903 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2904 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2905 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2906 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2907 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2912 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2913 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2914 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2916 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2919 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2920 // smaller than 500:
2921 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2923 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2924 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2925 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2926 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2927 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2928 /// our network addresses.
2930 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2931 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2933 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2934 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2935 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2936 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2938 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2940 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2941 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2944 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2945 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2948 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2949 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2950 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2952 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2953 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2954 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2955 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2956 rgb, alias, addresses,
2957 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2958 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2960 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2961 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2963 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2964 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2966 let mut announced_chans = false;
2967 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2968 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2969 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2971 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2976 announced_chans = true;
2978 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2979 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2980 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2984 if announced_chans {
2985 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2986 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2987 signature: node_announce_sig,
2988 contents: announcement
2994 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2996 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2997 /// Will likely generate further events.
2998 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3001 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3002 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3003 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3008 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3009 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3010 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3011 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3013 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
3014 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3015 match forward_info {
3016 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
3017 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3018 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3019 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3020 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3021 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3022 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3024 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
3025 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
3028 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3029 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3030 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3031 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3032 // problem, not ours.
3039 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3040 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3041 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3042 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3043 match forward_info {
3044 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3045 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3047 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3048 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3050 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3051 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3052 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3053 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3054 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3056 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3058 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3059 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3061 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3063 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3064 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3065 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3071 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3073 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3074 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3075 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3076 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3077 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3078 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3079 // this channel currently :/.
3085 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3086 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3088 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3090 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3092 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3093 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3095 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3097 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3098 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3099 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3102 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3104 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3105 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3106 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3107 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3108 // messages when we can.
3109 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3110 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3111 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3118 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3119 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3122 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3123 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3124 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3125 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3126 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3127 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3129 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3131 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3132 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3133 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3135 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3136 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3138 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3140 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3144 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3145 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3148 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3149 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3150 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3151 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3152 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3153 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3154 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3155 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3156 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3158 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3166 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3167 match forward_info {
3168 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3169 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3170 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3171 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3172 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3173 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3174 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3175 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3177 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3180 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3182 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3183 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3184 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3187 value: amt_to_forward,
3192 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3194 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3195 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3196 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3198 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3199 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3200 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3201 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3204 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3209 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3210 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3211 let mut total_value = 0;
3212 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3213 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3214 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3215 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3216 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3218 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3222 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3223 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3224 total_value += htlc.value;
3225 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3226 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3227 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3229 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3230 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3232 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3234 _ => unreachable!(),
3237 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3239 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3240 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3243 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3244 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3246 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3247 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3248 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3252 payment_received_generated = true;
3254 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3255 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3258 payment_received_generated
3262 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3263 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3264 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3265 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3266 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3267 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3268 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3269 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3271 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3272 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3273 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3274 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3276 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3280 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3281 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3282 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3284 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3285 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3286 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3287 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3288 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3290 amt: amt_to_forward,
3291 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3295 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3296 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3304 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3307 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3308 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3311 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3313 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3314 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3316 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3317 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3319 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3320 if payment_received_generated {
3321 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3327 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3328 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3336 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3337 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3340 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3341 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3344 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3345 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3346 events.append(&mut new_events);
3349 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3351 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3352 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3354 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3355 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3356 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3357 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3358 if background_events.is_empty() {
3362 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3364 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3365 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3366 // monitor updating completing.
3367 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3374 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3375 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3376 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3377 self.process_background_events();
3380 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3381 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3382 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3383 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3385 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3386 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3388 if !chan.is_live() {
3389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3390 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3391 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3394 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3396 let mut retain_channel = true;
3397 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3400 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3401 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3405 let ret_err = match res {
3406 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3407 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3408 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3409 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3413 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3414 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3415 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3416 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3417 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3418 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3419 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3429 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3433 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3434 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3435 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3436 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3437 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3438 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3439 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3441 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3443 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3445 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3446 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3447 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3448 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3449 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3450 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3451 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3453 handle_errors.push(err);
3463 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3465 /// This currently includes:
3466 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3467 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3468 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3471 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3472 /// estimate fetches.
3473 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3474 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3475 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3476 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3478 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3480 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3482 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3483 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3484 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3485 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3486 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3487 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3488 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3489 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3491 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3493 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3495 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3496 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3497 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3498 if needs_close { return false; }
3501 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3502 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3503 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3504 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3505 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3506 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3507 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3508 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3512 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3513 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3515 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3516 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3517 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3521 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3522 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3531 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3532 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3538 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3539 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3540 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3541 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3542 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3543 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3546 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3547 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3548 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3549 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3550 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3551 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3552 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3553 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3555 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3556 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3562 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3563 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3564 // be surfaced to the user.
3565 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3566 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3568 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3569 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3570 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3572 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3573 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3575 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3580 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3581 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3582 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3584 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3585 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3586 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3587 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3588 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3589 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3590 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3591 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3592 Some(RouteParameters {
3594 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3595 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3598 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3599 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3600 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3602 rejected_by_dest: false,
3603 network_update: None,
3604 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3606 short_channel_id: None,
3613 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3614 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3616 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3622 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3629 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3630 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3631 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3632 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3633 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3634 /// still-available channels.
3635 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3636 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3637 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3638 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3641 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3642 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3643 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3645 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3646 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3647 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3648 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3649 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3650 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3651 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3652 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3653 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3656 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3660 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3661 all_paths_failed = true;
3662 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3663 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3665 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3674 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3675 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3676 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3677 Some(RouteParameters {
3678 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3679 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3680 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3683 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3685 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3686 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3688 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3690 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3691 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3692 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3693 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3694 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3695 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3696 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3697 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3704 error_code: onion_error_code,
3706 error_data: onion_error_data
3709 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3715 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3716 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3717 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3718 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3720 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3721 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3722 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3723 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3724 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3725 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3726 network_update: None,
3729 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3732 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3734 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3738 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3739 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3740 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3742 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3743 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3744 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3746 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3747 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3749 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3751 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3755 let mut forward_event = None;
3756 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3757 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3759 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3761 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3764 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3767 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3768 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3769 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3770 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3771 time_forwardable: time
3778 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3779 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3781 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3782 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3783 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3784 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3786 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3787 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3789 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3790 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3791 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3792 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3793 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3794 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3796 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3798 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3799 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3800 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3801 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3803 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3804 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3805 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3806 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3808 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3809 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3810 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3811 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3812 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3814 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3815 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3816 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3822 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3823 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3824 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3826 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3827 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3828 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3829 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3830 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3831 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3832 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3834 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3835 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3836 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3837 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3838 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3839 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3840 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3841 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3843 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3844 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3845 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3846 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3847 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3848 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3850 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3855 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3856 // which were generated.
3857 channel_state.take();
3859 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3860 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3861 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3868 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3869 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3870 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3871 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3872 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3874 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3878 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3879 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3880 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3881 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3882 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3883 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3884 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3885 payment_preimage, e);
3886 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3887 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3888 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3889 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3892 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3893 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3894 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3896 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3897 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3898 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3899 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3900 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3901 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3907 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3909 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3912 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3913 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3914 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3915 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3916 payment_preimage, e);
3918 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3919 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3921 chan.remove_entry();
3923 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3926 } else { unreachable!(); }
3929 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3930 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3931 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3932 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3933 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3934 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3935 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3936 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3937 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3938 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3939 pending_events.push(
3940 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3942 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3947 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3955 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3957 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3958 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3959 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3960 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3961 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3962 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3963 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3964 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3965 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3966 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3967 pending_events.push(
3968 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3969 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3975 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3979 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3980 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3981 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3983 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3984 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3985 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3986 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3987 pending_events.push(
3988 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3996 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4004 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4005 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4006 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4007 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4008 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4009 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4010 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4013 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4014 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4015 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4016 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4017 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4020 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4021 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4022 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4023 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4024 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4025 payment_preimage, e);
4027 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4028 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4029 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4030 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4033 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4034 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4035 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4036 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4040 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4041 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4042 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4045 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4046 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4048 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4056 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4057 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4058 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4061 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4064 let chan_restoration_res;
4065 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4066 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4067 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4068 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4069 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4072 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4076 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
4077 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
4078 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4079 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
4080 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
4081 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
4082 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4083 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4084 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4087 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
4088 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4089 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4091 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4093 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4094 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4095 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4096 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4100 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4101 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4102 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4105 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4109 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4110 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4111 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4112 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4113 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4114 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4117 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4118 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4119 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4121 entry.insert(channel);
4127 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4128 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4129 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4130 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4131 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4133 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4134 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4136 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4137 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4142 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4143 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4144 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4145 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4147 user_channel_id: user_id,
4152 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4153 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4154 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4155 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4157 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4158 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4159 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4162 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4167 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4168 // lock before watch_channel
4169 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4171 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4172 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4173 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4174 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4175 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4176 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4177 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4178 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4179 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4180 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4183 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4184 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4185 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4186 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4187 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4188 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4192 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4193 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4194 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4195 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4199 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4200 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4209 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4211 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4212 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4213 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4214 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4215 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4216 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4217 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4219 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4220 Ok(update) => update,
4221 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4223 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4224 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4225 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4226 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4227 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4228 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4229 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4230 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4240 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4241 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4245 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4246 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4247 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4248 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4249 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4250 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4251 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4253 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4254 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
4255 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4256 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
4257 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
4258 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
4259 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
4260 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
4261 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
4262 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
4263 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
4264 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
4265 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4266 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4267 msg: announcement_sigs,
4269 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4270 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4271 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4272 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4281 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4282 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4283 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4284 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4285 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4287 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4289 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4290 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4293 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4294 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4295 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4296 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4299 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4300 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4302 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4303 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4304 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4305 let (result, is_permanent) =
4306 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4308 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4314 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4315 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4316 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4323 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4326 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4330 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4334 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4335 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4336 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4337 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4338 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4340 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4343 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4344 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4345 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4346 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4351 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4352 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4353 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4354 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4355 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4356 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4357 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4359 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4360 } else { (tx, None) }
4362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4365 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4366 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4367 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4369 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4370 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4371 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4376 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4381 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4382 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4383 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4384 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4386 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4387 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4388 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4389 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4391 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4392 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4394 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4396 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4397 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4400 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4401 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4402 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4403 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4404 match pending_forward_info {
4405 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4406 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4407 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4408 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4409 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4410 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4411 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4412 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4416 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4417 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4418 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4419 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4420 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4421 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4422 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4423 // no problem just calling this
4424 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4425 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4428 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4430 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4431 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4432 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4435 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4437 _ => pending_forward_info
4440 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4447 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4448 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4449 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4450 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4451 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4453 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4456 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4461 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4465 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4466 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4467 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4468 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4470 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4471 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4473 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4480 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4481 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4482 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4483 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4485 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4488 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4489 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4490 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4492 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4495 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4499 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4500 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4501 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4502 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4504 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4505 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4507 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4508 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4509 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4510 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4511 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4512 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4513 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4518 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4519 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4521 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4522 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4523 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4525 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4526 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4527 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4528 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4529 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4530 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4531 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4532 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4534 commitment_signed: msg,
4540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4545 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4546 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4547 let mut forward_event = None;
4548 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4549 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4550 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4551 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4553 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4554 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4555 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4556 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4557 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4560 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4561 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4564 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4565 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4570 match forward_event {
4572 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4573 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4574 time_forwardable: time
4582 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4583 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4585 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4586 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4587 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4589 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4590 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4592 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4593 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4594 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4595 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4596 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4597 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4598 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4599 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4600 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4601 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4602 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4604 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4605 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4606 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4607 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4608 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4610 } else { unreachable!(); }
4613 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4614 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4615 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4619 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4620 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4621 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4622 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4623 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4628 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4630 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4631 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4633 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4636 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4637 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4644 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4645 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4646 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4649 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4652 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4659 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4660 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4661 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4663 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4665 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4666 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4668 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4669 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4673 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4674 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4675 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4676 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4684 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4685 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4686 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4687 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4688 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4689 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4691 // It's not a local channel
4692 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4697 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4698 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4699 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4700 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4701 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4702 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4706 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4707 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4708 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4709 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4711 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4716 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4719 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4720 let chan_restoration_res;
4721 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4722 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4723 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4725 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4727 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4728 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4730 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4731 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4732 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4733 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4734 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4735 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4736 let mut channel_update = None;
4737 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4738 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4739 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4742 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4743 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4744 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4745 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4746 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4747 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4748 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4751 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4752 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4753 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4754 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4756 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4761 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4762 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4764 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4765 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4770 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4771 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4772 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4773 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4774 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4775 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4776 match monitor_event {
4777 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4778 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4779 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4780 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4782 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4783 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4786 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4787 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4788 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4789 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4790 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4791 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4792 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4793 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4794 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4795 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4797 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4798 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4803 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4804 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4806 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4808 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4809 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4810 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4811 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4812 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4817 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4818 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4823 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4824 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4827 has_pending_monitor_events
4830 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4831 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4832 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4833 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4834 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4835 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4838 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4839 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4840 /// update was applied.
4842 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4843 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4844 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4845 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4846 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4847 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4848 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4849 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4851 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4852 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4853 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4854 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4855 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4857 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4858 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4859 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4860 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4861 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4863 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4864 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4865 has_monitor_update = true;
4866 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4867 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4868 if close_channel { return false; }
4870 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4871 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4872 updates: commitment_update,
4879 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4880 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4881 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4888 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4889 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4890 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4893 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4894 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4900 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4901 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4902 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4903 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4904 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4905 let mut has_update = false;
4907 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4908 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4909 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4910 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4911 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4913 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4914 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4915 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4916 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4919 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4922 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4923 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4924 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4925 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4926 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4929 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4930 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4935 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4937 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4938 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4944 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4945 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4952 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4953 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4959 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4960 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4962 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4963 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4964 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4965 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4966 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4967 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4968 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4969 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4970 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4971 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4972 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4973 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4974 assert!(should_broadcast);
4975 } else { unreachable!(); }
4976 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4978 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4982 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4983 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4985 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4989 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4992 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4993 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4995 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4996 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4997 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4998 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4999 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5000 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5001 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5002 // never fail a payment too early.
5003 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5005 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5013 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5016 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5017 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5019 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5020 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5021 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5023 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5025 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5026 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5030 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5031 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5033 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5035 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5036 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5037 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5038 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5039 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5040 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5043 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5044 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5047 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5049 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5051 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5052 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5053 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5054 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5055 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5058 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5059 /// stored external to LDK.
5061 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5062 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5063 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5065 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5066 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5069 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5070 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5071 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5072 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5074 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5075 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5076 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5077 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5078 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5080 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5081 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5082 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5083 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5084 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5086 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5088 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5089 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5091 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5092 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5096 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5097 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5099 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5101 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5102 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5103 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5104 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5107 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5108 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5111 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5113 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5115 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5116 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5119 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5120 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5122 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5123 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5124 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5127 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5128 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5129 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5130 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5131 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5136 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5137 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5141 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5142 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5146 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5147 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5148 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5149 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5150 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5153 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5154 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5155 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5156 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5158 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5159 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5160 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5161 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5164 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5165 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5167 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5168 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5171 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5172 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5173 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5175 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5176 events.replace(pending_events);
5185 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5187 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5188 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5189 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5190 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5193 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5195 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5196 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5198 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5199 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5200 /// restarting from an old state.
5201 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5202 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5203 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5205 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5206 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5207 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5208 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5211 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5212 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5213 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5216 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5217 handler.handle_event(&event);
5225 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5227 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5228 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5229 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5230 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5233 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5235 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5236 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5237 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5238 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5239 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5242 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5243 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5244 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5247 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5249 let new_height = height - 1;
5251 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5252 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5253 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5254 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5255 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5256 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5259 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
5263 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5265 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5266 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5267 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5271 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5272 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5273 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5274 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5276 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5277 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5280 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
5283 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5284 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5285 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5286 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5288 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5289 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5293 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5295 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
5297 macro_rules! max_time {
5298 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5300 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5301 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5302 // having an explicit local time source.
5303 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5304 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5305 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5306 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5307 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5313 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5314 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5315 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5316 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5317 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5320 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5321 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5322 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5323 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5324 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5325 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5326 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5327 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5328 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5336 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5337 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5338 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5339 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5340 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5341 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5347 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5349 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5350 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5351 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5352 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5353 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5354 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5359 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5361 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5362 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5363 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5367 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5368 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5370 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5371 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5372 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5373 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5374 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5376 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5377 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5379 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5381 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5382 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5383 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5384 let res = f(channel);
5385 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5386 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5387 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5388 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5389 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5393 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5394 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5395 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5396 msg: funding_locked,
5398 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5401 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5402 msg: announcement_sigs,
5404 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5406 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5407 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5408 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5413 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5415 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5416 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5417 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5419 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5420 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5421 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5422 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5427 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5428 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5430 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5432 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5433 data: reason_message,
5441 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5442 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5443 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5444 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5445 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5446 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5447 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5448 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5449 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5450 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5451 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5452 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5453 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5458 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5463 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5465 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5470 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5471 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5472 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5475 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5476 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5477 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5478 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5481 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5482 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5484 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5485 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5488 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5489 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5490 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5491 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5492 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5496 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5497 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5498 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5499 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5503 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5504 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5505 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5506 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5507 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5508 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5511 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5513 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5516 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5518 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5521 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5523 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5526 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5528 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5531 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5536 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5541 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5546 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5551 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5556 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5561 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5563 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5566 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5568 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5571 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5573 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5576 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5578 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5581 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5583 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5586 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5587 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5588 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5591 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5596 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5598 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5601 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5603 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5604 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5606 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5608 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5609 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5610 if no_connection_possible {
5611 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5612 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5613 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5614 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5615 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5617 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5618 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5623 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5630 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5631 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5632 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5633 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5634 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5635 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5636 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5638 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5641 no_channels_remain = false;
5647 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5655 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5660 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5661 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5662 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5664 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5671 if no_channels_remain {
5672 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5675 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5676 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5680 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5681 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5686 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5687 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5689 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5690 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5694 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5699 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5700 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5701 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5702 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5703 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5704 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5705 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5706 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5707 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5712 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5713 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5719 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5722 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5725 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5726 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5727 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5728 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5729 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5733 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5734 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5739 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5740 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5741 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5742 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5743 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5744 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5747 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5750 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5756 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5757 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5762 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5763 let result = *guard;
5771 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5772 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5773 let current_time = Instant::now();
5775 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5776 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5781 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5782 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5783 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5784 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5785 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5787 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5788 let result = *guard;
5789 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5793 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5794 None => return result,
5800 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5802 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5803 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5804 *persistence_lock = true;
5805 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5810 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5811 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5813 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5815 (0, onion_packet, required),
5816 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5819 (0, payment_data, required),
5820 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5822 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5823 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5824 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5828 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5829 (0, routing, required),
5830 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5831 (4, payment_hash, required),
5832 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5833 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5837 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5838 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5840 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5842 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5843 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5844 reason.write(writer)?;
5846 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5847 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5850 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5851 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5852 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5853 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5860 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5861 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5862 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5865 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5866 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5867 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5868 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5872 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5873 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5874 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5875 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5876 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5879 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5880 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5881 // messages contained in the variants.
5882 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5883 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5884 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5886 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5887 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5888 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5889 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5890 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5893 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5894 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5895 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5896 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5897 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5899 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5904 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5909 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5910 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5911 (2, outpoint, required),
5912 (4, htlc_id, required),
5913 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5916 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5917 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5918 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5919 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5922 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5923 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5924 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5929 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5930 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5931 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5937 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5938 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5939 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5941 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5942 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5943 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5947 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5948 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5949 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5951 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5953 if payment_data.is_some() {
5954 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5956 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5959 if payment_data.is_none() {
5960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5962 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5966 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5974 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5975 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5976 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5979 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5980 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5981 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5982 let mut payment_id = None;
5983 let mut payment_secret = None;
5984 let mut payee = None;
5985 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5986 (0, session_priv, required),
5987 (1, payment_id, option),
5988 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5989 (3, payment_secret, option),
5990 (4, path, vec_type),
5993 if payment_id.is_none() {
5994 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5996 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5998 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5999 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6000 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6001 path: path.unwrap(),
6002 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6007 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6008 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6013 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6014 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6016 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
6018 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6019 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6020 (0, session_priv, required),
6021 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6022 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6023 (3, payment_secret, option),
6024 (4, path, vec_type),
6028 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6030 field.write(writer)?;
6037 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6038 (0, LightningError) => {
6042 (0, failure_code, required),
6043 (2, data, vec_type),
6047 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6049 (0, forward_info, required),
6050 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6051 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6052 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6055 (0, htlc_id, required),
6056 (2, err_packet, required),
6060 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6061 (0, payment_secret, required),
6062 (2, expiry_time, required),
6063 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6064 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6065 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6068 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6070 (0, session_privs, required),
6073 (0, session_privs, required),
6074 (1, payment_hash, option),
6077 (0, session_privs, required),
6078 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6079 (2, payment_hash, required),
6080 (4, payment_secret, option),
6081 (6, total_msat, required),
6082 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6083 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6086 (0, session_privs, required),
6087 (2, payment_hash, required),
6091 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6092 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6094 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6098 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6099 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6101 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6103 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6105 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6106 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6107 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6110 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6111 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6112 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6113 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6114 unfunded_channels += 1;
6117 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6118 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6119 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6120 channel.write(writer)?;
6124 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6125 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6126 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6127 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6128 for forward in pending_forwards {
6129 forward.write(writer)?;
6133 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6134 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6135 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6136 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6137 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6138 htlc.write(writer)?;
6142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6143 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6144 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6145 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6146 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6147 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6150 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6151 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6152 for event in events.iter() {
6153 event.write(writer)?;
6156 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6157 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6158 for event in background_events.iter() {
6160 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6162 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6163 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6168 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6169 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6171 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6172 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6173 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6174 hash.write(writer)?;
6175 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6178 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6179 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6180 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6181 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6182 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6183 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6186 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6187 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6189 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6190 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6191 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6192 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6195 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6196 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6200 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6201 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6202 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6204 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6205 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6206 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6211 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6212 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6213 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6220 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6222 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6224 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6225 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6226 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6227 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6228 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6229 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6230 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6231 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6232 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6233 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6234 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6235 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6236 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6238 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6239 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6241 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6242 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6244 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6245 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6246 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6247 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6248 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6249 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6251 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6252 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6253 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6254 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6255 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6256 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6259 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6260 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6262 pub keys_manager: K,
6264 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6266 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6267 pub fee_estimator: F,
6268 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6270 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6271 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6272 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6273 pub chain_monitor: M,
6275 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6276 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6277 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6278 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6279 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6280 /// deserialization.
6282 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6283 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6284 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6286 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6287 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6289 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6290 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6291 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6292 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6294 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6297 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6298 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6301 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6302 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6303 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6304 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6305 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6306 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6309 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6310 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6311 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6312 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6313 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6315 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6316 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6321 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6322 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6323 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6324 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6325 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6326 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6327 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6328 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6331 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6332 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6333 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6337 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6338 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6339 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6340 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6341 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6342 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6345 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6346 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6348 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6350 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6354 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6355 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6356 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6357 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6358 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6359 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6360 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6361 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6362 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6363 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6364 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6365 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6366 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6367 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6368 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6369 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6370 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6371 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6372 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6373 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6374 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6375 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6376 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6377 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6378 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6379 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6380 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6381 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6382 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6383 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6384 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6385 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6386 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6387 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6388 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6389 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6390 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6391 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6392 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6395 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6396 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6397 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6399 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6402 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6403 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6404 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6405 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6406 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6411 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6412 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6413 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6414 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6418 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6419 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6420 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6421 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6422 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6423 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6425 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6426 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6428 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6431 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6433 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6434 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6436 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6437 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6438 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6440 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6443 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6444 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6445 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6446 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let peer_state = PeerState {
6448 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6450 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6453 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6455 for _ in 0..event_count {
6456 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6457 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6461 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6462 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6463 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6464 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6465 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6466 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6467 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6468 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6472 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6474 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6475 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6476 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6477 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6481 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6486 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6487 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6488 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6492 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6494 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6495 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6496 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6497 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6498 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6500 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6501 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6505 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6506 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6507 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6508 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6509 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6510 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6512 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6513 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6514 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6515 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6516 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6517 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6519 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6521 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6522 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6523 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6524 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6525 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6526 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6527 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6529 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6530 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6531 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6532 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6533 if path.is_empty() {
6534 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6537 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6538 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6539 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6540 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6542 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6543 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6544 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6547 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6548 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6549 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6550 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6552 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6553 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6554 total_msat: path_amt,
6555 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6557 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6558 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6567 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6568 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6570 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6571 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6574 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6575 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6576 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6578 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6579 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6580 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6582 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6584 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6589 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6591 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6592 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6593 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6595 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6596 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6599 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6600 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6602 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6604 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6605 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6606 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6607 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6609 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6610 logger: args.logger,
6611 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6614 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6615 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6618 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6619 //connection or two.
6621 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6627 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6628 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6629 use core::time::Duration;
6630 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6631 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6632 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6633 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6634 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6635 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6637 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6638 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6639 use util::errors::APIError;
6640 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6641 use util::test_utils;
6643 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6645 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6646 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6648 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6651 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6652 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6654 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6655 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6656 thread::spawn(move || {
6658 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6659 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6660 *persistence_lock = true;
6663 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6669 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6670 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6672 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6675 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6680 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6682 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6685 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6692 fn test_notify_limits() {
6693 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6694 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6695 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6696 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6698 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6700 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6701 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6702 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6703 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6704 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6706 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6708 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6709 // to connect messages with new values
6710 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6711 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6712 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6713 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6715 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6716 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6717 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6718 // ... but the last node should not.
6719 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6720 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6721 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6722 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6724 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6725 // about the channel.
6726 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6727 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6728 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6730 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6732 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6733 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6734 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6736 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6737 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6739 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6740 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6741 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6743 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6744 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6745 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6746 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6747 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6748 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6750 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6751 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6752 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6753 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6754 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6755 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6756 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6757 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6759 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6760 // the channel info has updated.
6761 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6762 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6763 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6764 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6765 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6766 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6770 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6771 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6777 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6779 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6780 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6781 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6782 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6783 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6784 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6785 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6787 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6788 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6789 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6791 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6792 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6794 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6796 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6797 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6798 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6800 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6801 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6802 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6804 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6805 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6806 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6807 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6808 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6809 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6810 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6811 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6812 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6814 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6815 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6819 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6821 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6822 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6823 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6824 // lightning messages manually.
6825 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6827 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6828 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6829 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6831 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6832 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6834 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6835 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6837 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6838 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6839 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6841 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6842 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6843 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6845 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6847 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6849 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6850 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6853 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6854 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6855 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6858 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6859 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6860 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6861 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6866 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6867 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6868 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6869 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6871 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6874 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6875 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6876 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6877 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6884 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6885 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6886 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6887 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6888 // fails as expected.
6889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6893 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6894 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6896 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6897 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6898 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6900 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6901 let params = RouteParameters {
6902 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6903 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6904 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6906 let route = find_route(
6907 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6908 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6910 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6912 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6914 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6915 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6916 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6918 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6919 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6920 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6922 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6924 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6925 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6926 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6927 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6928 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6929 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6930 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6932 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6933 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6935 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6936 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6937 let route = find_route(
6938 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6939 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6941 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6943 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6944 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6945 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6946 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6947 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6949 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6950 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6951 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6953 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6955 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6956 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6957 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6963 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6964 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6965 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6966 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6967 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6968 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6969 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6970 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6971 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6973 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6978 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6979 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6980 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6981 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6982 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6983 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6984 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6986 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6987 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6988 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6989 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6991 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6992 let params = RouteParameters {
6993 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6994 final_value_msat: 10000,
6995 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6997 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6998 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6999 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7000 let route = find_route(
7001 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7002 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7005 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7006 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7007 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7010 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7011 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7012 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7013 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7014 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7016 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7018 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7022 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7023 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7027 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7029 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7030 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7031 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7032 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7034 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7035 let params = RouteParameters {
7036 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7037 final_value_msat: 10000,
7038 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7040 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7041 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7042 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7043 let route = find_route(
7044 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7045 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7048 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7049 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7050 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7051 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7054 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7056 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7057 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7058 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7059 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7060 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7062 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7066 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7067 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7070 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7072 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7073 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7074 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7075 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7077 // Marshall an MPP route.
7078 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7079 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7080 route.paths.push(path);
7081 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7082 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7083 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7084 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7085 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7086 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7088 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7089 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7090 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7091 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7096 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7097 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7098 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7099 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7100 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7101 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7103 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7104 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7106 total_msat: 100_000,
7109 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7110 // payment verification fails as expected.
7111 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7112 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7113 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7114 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7116 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7120 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7121 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7125 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7128 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7129 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7130 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7131 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7132 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7133 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7134 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7135 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
7136 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7137 use util::test_utils;
7138 use util::config::UserConfig;
7139 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7141 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7142 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7143 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7145 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7149 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7150 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7151 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7152 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7153 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7154 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7155 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7160 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7161 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7164 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7165 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7166 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7168 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7169 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7171 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7172 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7174 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7175 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7177 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7178 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7179 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7180 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7181 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7183 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7185 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7187 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7188 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7189 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7190 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7191 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7193 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7195 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7197 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7198 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7199 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7200 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7201 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7204 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7205 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7206 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7208 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7209 } else { panic!(); }
7211 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7212 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7214 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7217 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7220 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7221 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7223 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7224 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7225 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7226 match msg_events[0] {
7227 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7228 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7229 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7233 match msg_events[1] {
7234 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7238 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7240 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7241 macro_rules! send_payment {
7242 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7243 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7244 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7245 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7246 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7247 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
7248 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7250 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7251 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7253 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7254 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7256 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7257 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7258 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7259 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7260 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7261 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7262 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7263 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7265 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7266 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7267 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7269 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7270 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7271 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7272 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7273 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7275 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7278 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7279 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7280 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7281 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7283 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7288 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7289 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);