1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
13 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
14 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
17 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
57 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
58 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
59 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
61 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
62 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
63 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
64 // before we forward it.
66 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
67 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
68 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
69 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
70 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
72 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
73 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
75 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
76 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
79 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
80 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
86 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
87 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
88 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
89 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
90 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
95 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
96 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
99 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
102 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
103 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
106 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
108 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
110 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
114 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
118 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
119 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
120 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
121 short_channel_id: u64,
123 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
126 struct ClaimableHTLC {
127 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
129 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
130 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
131 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
132 /// are part of the same payment.
133 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
137 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
138 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
139 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
140 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
143 session_priv: SecretKey,
144 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
145 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
146 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
151 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
152 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
154 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
155 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
160 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
161 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
163 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
171 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
172 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
173 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
174 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
175 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
176 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
177 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
178 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
179 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
181 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
183 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
184 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
185 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
186 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
187 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
189 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
190 err: msgs::LightningError,
191 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
193 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
195 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 err: LightningError {
199 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
200 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
206 shutdown_finish: None,
210 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
212 err: LightningError {
214 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
216 shutdown_finish: None,
220 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
221 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
224 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
226 err: LightningError {
228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
235 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
239 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
242 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
244 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
246 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
248 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
249 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
255 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
257 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
258 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
265 shutdown_finish: None,
270 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
271 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
272 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
273 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
274 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
276 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
277 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
278 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
279 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
280 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
281 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
282 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
284 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
288 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
289 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
290 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
291 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
292 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
293 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
294 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
295 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
296 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
297 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
298 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
299 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
300 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
302 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
303 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
304 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
305 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
308 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
309 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
311 latest_features: InitFeatures,
314 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
315 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
317 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
318 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
319 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
320 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
321 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
322 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
323 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
324 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
326 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
327 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
328 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
329 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
330 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
331 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
332 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
333 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
334 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
336 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
337 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
339 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
340 /// to individual Channels.
342 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
343 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
344 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
345 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
347 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
348 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
349 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
350 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
351 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
352 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
353 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
355 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
356 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
357 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
358 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
361 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
362 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
363 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
364 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
365 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
367 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
368 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
369 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
370 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
371 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
372 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
373 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
374 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
375 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
376 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
379 default_configuration: UserConfig,
380 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
386 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
388 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
389 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
390 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
393 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
395 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
396 our_network_key: SecretKey,
398 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
399 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
400 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
402 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
403 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
404 /// are currently open with that peer.
405 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
406 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
408 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
410 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
411 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
412 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
413 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
414 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
421 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
422 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
423 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
424 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
425 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
427 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
428 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
429 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
430 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
431 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
432 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
433 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
435 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
436 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
437 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
438 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
439 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
440 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
443 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
445 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
446 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
449 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
451 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
452 pub struct ChannelDetails {
453 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
454 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
455 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
456 /// lifetime of the channel.
457 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
458 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
459 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
460 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
461 /// The node_id of our counterparty
462 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
463 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
464 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
465 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
466 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
467 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
468 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
469 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
471 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
472 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
473 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
474 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
475 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
476 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
477 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
478 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
479 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
480 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
481 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
482 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
483 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
487 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
488 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
491 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
492 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
493 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
494 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
495 ParameterError(APIError),
496 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
497 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
498 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
501 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
503 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
504 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
505 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
506 /// paths than the ones selected).
507 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
508 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
509 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
510 /// in over-/re-payment.
512 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
513 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
514 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
516 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
517 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
518 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
519 /// with the latest update_id.
520 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
523 macro_rules! handle_error {
524 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
527 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
528 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
530 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
531 // entering the macro.
532 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
535 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
537 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
538 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
539 if let Some(update) = update_option {
540 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
546 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
547 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
549 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
550 node_id: $their_node_id,
551 action: err.action.clone()
555 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
556 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
559 // Return error in case higher-API need one
566 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
567 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
570 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
571 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
573 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
574 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
575 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
576 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
577 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
579 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
581 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
586 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
587 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
590 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
593 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
594 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
595 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
596 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
597 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
601 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
602 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
603 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
604 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
605 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
607 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
608 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
614 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
615 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
616 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
618 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
620 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
621 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
622 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
623 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
624 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
626 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
627 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
628 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
629 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
630 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
631 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
632 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
633 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
634 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
635 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
638 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
639 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
640 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
641 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
643 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
644 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
646 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
647 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
649 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
650 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
651 if !$resend_commitment {
652 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
655 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
657 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
658 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
664 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
665 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
666 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
668 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
669 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
673 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
674 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
675 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
676 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
677 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
680 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
685 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
686 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
687 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
688 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
692 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
694 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
695 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
697 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
699 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
701 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
702 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
704 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
705 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
706 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
707 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
708 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
710 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
714 default_configuration: config.clone(),
715 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
716 fee_estimator: fee_est,
720 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
721 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
724 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
725 by_id: HashMap::new(),
726 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
727 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
728 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
729 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
731 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
733 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
735 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
737 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
738 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
746 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
748 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
749 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
750 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
751 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
753 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
754 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
756 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
757 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
758 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
759 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
763 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
764 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
765 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
767 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
768 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
771 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
774 panic!("RNG is bad???");
777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
779 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
780 node_id: their_network_key,
786 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
787 let mut res = Vec::new();
789 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
790 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
791 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
792 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
793 res.push(ChannelDetails {
794 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
795 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
796 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
797 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
798 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
799 inbound_capacity_msat,
800 outbound_capacity_msat,
801 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
802 is_live: channel.is_live(),
806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
807 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
808 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
809 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
815 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
816 /// more information.
817 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
818 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
821 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
822 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
824 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
825 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
826 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
827 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
828 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
829 // really wanted anyway.
830 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
833 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
834 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
835 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
837 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
838 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
839 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
841 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
842 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
843 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
844 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
846 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
847 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
848 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
851 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
852 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
853 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
855 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
856 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
861 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
864 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
865 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
870 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
871 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
881 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
882 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
884 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
885 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
887 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
888 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
889 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
890 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
891 // ignore the result here.
892 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
896 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
897 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
898 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
899 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
902 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
903 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
904 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
905 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
906 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
913 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
914 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
915 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
916 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
923 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
924 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
925 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
926 for chan in self.list_channels() {
927 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
931 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
932 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
933 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
935 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
936 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
937 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
938 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
939 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
940 failure_code: $err_code,
941 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
946 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
947 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
950 let shared_secret = {
951 let mut arr = [0; 32];
952 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
955 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
957 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
958 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
959 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
960 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
961 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
962 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
963 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
964 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
967 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
968 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
969 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
970 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
971 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
974 let mut channel_state = None;
975 macro_rules! return_err {
976 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
978 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
979 if channel_state.is_none() {
980 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
982 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
983 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
984 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
985 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
986 })), channel_state.unwrap());
991 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
992 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
993 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
994 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
996 let error_code = match err {
997 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
998 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
999 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1000 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1001 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1003 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1006 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1007 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1008 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1015 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1018 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1019 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1020 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1021 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1022 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1023 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1024 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1025 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1026 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1027 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1028 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1029 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1033 // final_expiry_too_soon
1034 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1035 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1036 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1037 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1038 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1039 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1041 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1042 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1043 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1045 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1046 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1047 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1050 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1051 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1052 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1053 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1056 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1057 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1058 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1059 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1061 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1062 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1064 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1066 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1067 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1068 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1069 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1072 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1073 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1074 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1076 // Check two things:
1077 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1078 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1079 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1081 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1083 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1084 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1085 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1087 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1089 let blinding_factor = {
1090 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1091 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1092 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1093 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1096 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1098 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1100 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1103 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1104 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1107 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1108 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1109 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1111 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1115 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1116 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1117 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1118 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1120 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1121 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1122 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1123 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1127 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1128 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1129 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1130 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1131 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1132 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1133 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1134 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1135 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1136 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1138 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1140 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1141 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1143 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1144 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1145 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1146 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1147 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1148 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1149 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1151 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1152 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1154 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1155 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1156 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1158 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1159 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1161 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1162 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1163 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1164 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1165 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1167 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1168 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1170 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1171 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1172 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1173 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1179 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1180 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1181 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1182 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1184 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1185 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1187 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1188 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1189 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1191 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1193 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1198 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1201 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1202 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1203 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1204 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1205 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1209 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1211 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1212 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1213 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1214 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1215 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1216 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1217 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1218 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1219 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1220 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1221 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1224 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1225 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1227 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1233 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1234 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1235 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1236 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1238 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1239 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1240 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1241 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1242 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1244 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1246 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1248 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1249 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1250 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1251 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1252 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1255 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1256 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1258 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1259 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1261 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1262 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1264 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1266 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1267 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1268 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1270 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1271 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1272 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1273 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1274 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1275 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1276 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1277 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1278 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1282 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1283 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1284 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1285 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1286 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1287 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1295 } else { unreachable!(); }
1299 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1300 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1302 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1307 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1309 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1310 /// fields for more info.
1312 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1313 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1314 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1315 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1316 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1317 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1319 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1321 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1322 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1323 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1325 /// In general, a path may raise:
1326 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1327 /// node public key) is specified.
1328 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1329 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1331 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1332 /// relevant updates.
1334 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1335 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1336 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1338 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1339 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1340 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1341 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1343 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1344 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1345 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1346 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1347 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1348 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1350 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1351 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1352 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1353 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1354 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1356 let mut total_value = 0;
1357 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1358 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1359 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1360 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1361 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1362 continue 'path_check;
1364 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1365 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1366 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1367 continue 'path_check;
1370 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1371 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1373 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1374 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1377 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1378 let mut results = Vec::new();
1379 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1380 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1382 let mut has_ok = false;
1383 let mut has_err = false;
1384 for res in results.iter() {
1385 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1386 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1387 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1388 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1395 if has_err && has_ok {
1396 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1398 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1404 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1406 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1407 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1409 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1411 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1412 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1413 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1414 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1417 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1419 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1420 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1421 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1422 } else { unreachable!(); })
1427 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1428 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1431 Err(_) => { return; }
1435 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1436 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1437 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1440 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1441 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1442 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1450 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1451 if !chan.should_announce() {
1452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1456 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1458 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1460 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1461 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1463 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1464 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1465 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1466 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1467 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1472 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1473 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1474 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1476 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1479 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1480 // smaller than 500:
1481 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1483 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1484 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1485 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1487 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1488 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1490 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1491 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1492 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1493 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1495 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1496 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1497 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1499 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1500 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1503 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1504 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1505 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1506 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1507 rgb, alias, addresses,
1508 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1509 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1511 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1513 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1514 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1515 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1516 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1517 contents: announcement
1522 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1524 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1525 /// Will likely generate further events.
1526 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1527 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1529 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1530 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1531 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1533 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1534 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1536 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1537 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1538 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1539 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1541 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1542 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1543 match forward_info {
1544 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1545 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1546 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1547 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1548 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1550 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1551 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1554 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1555 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1556 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1557 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1558 // problem, not ours.
1565 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1566 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1567 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1568 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1569 match forward_info {
1570 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1571 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1573 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1575 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1576 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1577 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1578 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1580 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1582 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1585 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1587 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1588 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1589 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1595 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1597 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1598 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1599 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1600 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1601 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1602 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1603 // this channel currently :/.
1609 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1610 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1612 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1613 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1614 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1616 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1617 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1619 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1621 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1622 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1623 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1626 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1628 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1629 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1630 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1631 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1632 // messages when we can.
1633 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1634 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1635 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1642 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1643 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1646 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1647 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1648 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1649 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1650 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1651 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1653 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1655 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1656 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1657 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1659 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1661 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1663 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1667 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1668 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1671 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1672 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1673 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1674 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1675 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1676 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1677 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1679 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1687 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1688 match forward_info {
1689 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1690 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1691 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1692 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1693 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1694 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1695 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1698 let mut total_value = 0;
1699 let payment_secret_opt =
1700 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1701 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1702 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1703 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1705 value: amt_to_forward,
1706 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1707 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1709 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1710 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1711 total_value += htlc.value;
1712 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1713 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1715 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1717 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1718 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1719 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1720 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1721 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1722 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1726 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1727 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1728 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1729 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1731 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1734 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1735 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1736 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1737 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1742 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1743 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1744 payment_secret: None,
1745 amt: amt_to_forward,
1749 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1750 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1752 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1753 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1761 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1762 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1765 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1766 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1769 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1770 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1771 events.append(&mut new_events);
1774 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1775 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1776 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1778 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1779 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1780 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1781 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1782 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1783 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1784 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1785 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1786 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1791 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1793 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1794 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1799 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1800 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1801 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1802 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1803 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1804 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1805 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1807 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1808 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1809 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1810 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1811 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1812 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1813 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1814 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1817 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1818 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1824 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1825 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1826 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1827 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1828 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1829 /// still-available channels.
1830 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1831 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1832 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1833 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1836 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1837 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1838 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1839 match &onion_error {
1840 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1842 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1844 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1845 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1846 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1847 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1848 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1849 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1850 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1855 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1856 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1857 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1858 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1860 error_code: onion_error_code,
1862 error_data: onion_error_data
1866 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1872 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1873 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1874 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1875 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1877 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1878 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1879 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1880 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1881 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1882 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1884 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1886 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1892 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1893 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1894 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1895 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1896 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1897 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1899 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1901 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1905 let mut forward_event = None;
1906 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1907 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1909 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1911 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1914 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1917 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1918 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1919 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1920 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1921 time_forwardable: time
1928 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1929 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1930 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1932 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1933 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1934 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1935 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1936 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1937 /// motivated attackers.
1939 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1940 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1942 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1943 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1944 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1946 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1948 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1949 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1950 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1951 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1953 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
1954 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
1955 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
1956 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
1958 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
1959 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
1960 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
1961 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
1962 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
1965 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1966 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1967 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
1969 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1973 for htlc in sources.iter() {
1974 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
1975 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
1980 let mut errs = Vec::new();
1981 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
1982 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1983 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1984 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
1985 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1986 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1987 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1989 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1990 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
1991 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1993 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
1995 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
1996 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
1997 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
1998 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
1999 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2000 } else { errs.push(e); }
2002 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2004 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2006 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2011 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2012 // which were generated.
2013 channel_state.take();
2015 for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2016 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2017 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2024 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2025 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2026 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2027 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2028 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2034 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2035 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2036 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2037 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2038 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2039 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2040 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2041 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2043 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2047 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2048 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2049 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2050 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2051 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2052 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2053 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2054 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2063 // TODO: Do something with e?
2064 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2065 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2066 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2067 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2068 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2069 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2070 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2074 } else { unreachable!(); }
2077 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2079 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2080 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2081 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2082 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2086 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2087 if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2090 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2091 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2092 // why it's missing.
2095 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2097 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2098 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2099 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2105 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2106 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2107 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2110 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2111 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2114 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2115 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2117 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2118 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2119 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2120 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2122 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2123 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
2124 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2125 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2126 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2127 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2128 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2129 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2130 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2131 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2133 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2134 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2135 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2136 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2139 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2140 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2141 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2142 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2143 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2147 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2151 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2152 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2153 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2155 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2157 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2158 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2159 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2160 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2165 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2166 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2167 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2168 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2169 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2174 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2178 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2183 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2184 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2185 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2186 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2189 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2191 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2194 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2196 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2197 msg: announcement_sigs,
2200 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2204 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2206 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2207 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2209 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2211 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2212 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2216 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2217 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2221 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2222 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2223 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2224 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2225 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2227 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2228 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2229 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2230 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2232 entry.insert(channel);
2238 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2239 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2240 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2241 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2242 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2244 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2245 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2247 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2248 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2253 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2254 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2255 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2256 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2257 output_script: output_script,
2258 user_channel_id: user_id,
2263 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2264 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2265 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2266 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2267 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2269 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2270 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2272 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2277 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2278 // lock before add_monitor
2279 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_update) {
2281 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2282 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2283 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2284 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2285 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2288 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2289 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2290 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2291 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2292 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2293 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2297 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2298 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2299 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2305 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2314 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2315 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2316 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2317 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2318 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2319 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2320 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2323 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2324 Ok(update) => update,
2325 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2327 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2328 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2330 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2335 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2336 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2337 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2338 user_channel_id: user_id,
2343 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2344 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2345 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2348 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2351 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2352 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2354 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2355 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2356 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2357 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2358 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2359 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2360 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2361 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2362 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2364 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2365 msg: announcement_sigs,
2370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2374 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2375 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2376 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2377 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2379 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2381 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2384 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2385 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2387 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2391 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2392 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2393 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2397 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2398 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2399 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2401 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2402 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2407 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2408 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2410 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2411 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2412 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2413 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2421 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2422 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2423 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2424 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2425 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2427 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2430 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2431 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2432 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2433 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2438 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2439 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2440 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2441 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2442 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2443 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2444 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2446 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2447 } else { (tx, None) }
2449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2452 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2453 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2454 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2456 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2457 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2458 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2459 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2467 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2468 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2469 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2470 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2472 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2473 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2474 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2475 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2477 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2478 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2480 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2482 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2486 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2487 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2488 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2489 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2490 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2491 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2492 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2493 match pending_forward_info {
2494 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2495 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2496 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2497 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2498 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2499 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2500 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2504 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2505 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2506 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2507 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2508 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2509 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2510 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2511 // no problem just calling this
2512 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2513 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2515 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2516 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2517 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2520 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2522 _ => pending_forward_info
2525 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2532 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2533 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2535 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2536 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2538 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2539 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2541 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2546 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2550 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2551 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2552 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2553 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2555 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2556 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2558 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2565 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2566 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2570 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2571 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2573 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2574 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2575 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2577 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2584 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2585 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2586 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2587 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2589 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2592 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2593 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2594 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2595 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2596 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2597 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2598 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2603 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2604 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2605 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2607 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2608 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2609 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2611 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2613 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2614 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2615 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2616 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2617 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2618 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2620 commitment_signed: msg,
2624 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2625 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2626 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2637 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2638 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2639 let mut forward_event = None;
2640 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2641 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2642 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2643 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2645 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2646 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2647 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2648 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2651 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2654 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2659 match forward_event {
2661 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2662 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2663 time_forwardable: time
2671 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2672 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2673 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2674 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2677 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2680 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2681 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2682 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2683 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2684 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2685 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2686 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2688 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2691 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2693 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2697 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2699 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2703 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2708 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2709 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2711 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2716 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2717 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2718 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2719 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2721 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2722 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2724 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2731 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2732 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2733 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2735 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2737 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2740 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2744 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2745 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2746 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2748 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2749 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2751 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2752 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2753 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2754 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2756 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2757 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2760 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2761 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2767 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2770 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2771 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2772 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2773 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2774 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2775 contents: announcement,
2777 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2785 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2786 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2787 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2789 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2791 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2792 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2794 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2795 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2796 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2797 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2798 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2799 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2800 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2801 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2802 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2804 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2805 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2807 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2808 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2811 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2813 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2817 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2818 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2819 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2820 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2825 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2826 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2828 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2834 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2838 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2843 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2844 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2845 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2855 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2856 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2857 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2858 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2860 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2861 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2863 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2864 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2865 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2867 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2870 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2873 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2874 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2876 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2877 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2879 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2880 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2881 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2883 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2886 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2887 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2888 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2889 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2890 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2891 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2892 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2893 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2903 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2904 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2905 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2910 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2911 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
2912 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2913 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2914 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2917 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2918 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2919 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2920 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2922 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2923 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2924 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2926 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2928 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2934 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2935 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2936 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2941 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2942 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
2943 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2944 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2945 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2948 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2949 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2950 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2951 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2953 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2954 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2955 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2956 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2957 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2959 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2960 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2965 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2966 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2967 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2972 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
2973 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2974 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
2975 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2976 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2977 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2980 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2981 let header_hash = block.bitcoin_hash();
2982 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
2983 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2984 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2985 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
2987 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2988 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2989 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2990 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2991 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2992 let res = channel.block_connected(block, height);
2993 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
2994 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
2995 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2996 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2997 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3001 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3002 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3003 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3004 msg: funding_locked,
3006 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3008 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3009 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3010 msg: announcement_sigs,
3013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3015 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3017 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3018 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3019 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3020 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3024 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3025 for tx in block.txdata.iter() {
3026 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3027 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3029 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3030 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3032 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3033 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3034 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3035 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3036 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3037 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3046 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height, &self.logger) {
3047 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3048 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3050 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
3051 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
3052 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
3053 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
3054 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3055 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3064 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3065 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3066 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3067 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3068 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3069 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3070 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3071 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3072 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3073 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3074 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3075 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3080 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3083 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3084 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3087 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3090 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3091 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3093 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3094 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3095 // having an explicit local time source.
3096 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3097 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3098 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3099 if old_serial >= block.header.time as usize { break; }
3100 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, block.header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3106 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3107 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3108 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3109 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3111 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3113 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3114 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3115 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3116 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3117 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3118 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3120 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3121 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3132 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3133 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3135 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3136 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
3140 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3141 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3142 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3143 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3144 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3145 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3148 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3149 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3150 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3153 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3154 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3155 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3158 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3159 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3160 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3163 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3164 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3165 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3168 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3169 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3170 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3173 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3174 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3175 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3178 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3179 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3180 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3183 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3184 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3188 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3189 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3190 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3193 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3194 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3198 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3199 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3200 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3203 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3204 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3205 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3208 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3209 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3210 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3213 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3214 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3215 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3218 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3219 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3220 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3223 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3224 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3225 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3228 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3229 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3230 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3231 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3232 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3234 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3236 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3237 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3238 if no_connection_possible {
3239 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3240 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3241 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3242 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3243 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3245 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3246 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3257 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3258 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3259 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3260 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3261 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3262 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3263 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3264 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3266 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3267 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3268 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3272 no_channels_remain = false;
3278 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3283 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3286 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3291 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3292 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3293 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3294 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3295 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3299 if no_channels_remain {
3300 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3303 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3304 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3306 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3307 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3308 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3313 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3314 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3316 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3319 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3320 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3322 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3323 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3327 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3332 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3333 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3334 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3335 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3336 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3337 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3338 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3339 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3340 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3344 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3345 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3346 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3352 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3355 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3356 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3358 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3359 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3360 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3361 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3365 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3370 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3371 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3373 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3374 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3375 match &self.routing {
3376 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3378 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3379 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3381 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3383 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3384 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3387 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3388 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3389 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3390 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3395 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3396 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3397 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3398 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3399 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3400 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3401 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3403 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3404 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3405 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3407 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3409 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3410 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3411 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3412 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3417 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3418 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3420 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3422 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3424 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3426 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3433 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3434 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3435 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3436 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3437 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3438 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3443 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3444 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3446 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3448 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3450 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3452 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3459 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3460 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3461 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3462 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3463 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3464 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3469 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3472 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3475 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3482 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3483 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3485 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3487 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3489 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3491 path.write(writer)?;
3492 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3493 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3500 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3501 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3502 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3503 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3504 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3505 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3506 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3507 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3509 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3514 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3515 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3517 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3521 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3523 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3524 data.write(writer)?;
3531 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3532 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3533 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3534 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3535 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3536 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3537 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3539 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3544 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3545 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3547 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3549 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3550 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3551 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3553 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3555 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3556 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3563 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3564 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3565 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3566 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3567 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3568 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3569 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3571 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3572 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3573 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3575 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3580 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3581 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3582 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3583 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3587 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3588 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3590 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3591 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3593 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3594 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3595 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3597 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3598 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3599 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3600 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3601 unfunded_channels += 1;
3604 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3605 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3606 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3607 channel.write(writer)?;
3611 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3612 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3613 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3614 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3615 for forward in pending_forwards {
3616 forward.write(writer)?;
3620 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3621 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3622 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3623 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3624 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3625 htlc.write(writer)?;
3629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3630 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3631 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3632 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3633 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3634 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3637 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3638 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3639 for event in events.iter() {
3640 event.write(writer)?;
3643 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3649 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3651 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3653 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3654 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3655 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3656 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3657 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3658 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3659 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3660 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3661 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3662 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3663 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3664 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3665 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3666 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3667 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3668 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3672 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3673 /// deserialization.
3674 pub keys_manager: K,
3676 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3678 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3679 pub fee_estimator: F,
3680 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3682 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3683 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3684 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3687 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3688 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3689 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3690 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3691 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3692 /// deserialization.
3694 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3695 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3696 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3698 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3699 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3701 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3702 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3703 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3704 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3706 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3708 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3711 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3712 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3713 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3714 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3715 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3716 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3717 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3721 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3722 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3723 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3727 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3728 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3729 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3730 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3731 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3732 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3735 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3736 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3737 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3738 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3739 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3742 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3743 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3744 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3746 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3748 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3749 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3750 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3751 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3752 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3753 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3754 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3755 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3758 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3759 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3760 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3761 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3762 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3763 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3764 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3765 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3767 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3768 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3769 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3770 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3771 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3772 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3773 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3774 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3776 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3777 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3779 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3782 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3786 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3787 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3788 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3792 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3793 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3794 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3795 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3796 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3797 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3798 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3799 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3800 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3802 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3805 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3806 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3807 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3808 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3809 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3810 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3811 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3812 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3814 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3817 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3818 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3819 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3820 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3821 let peer_state = PeerState {
3822 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3824 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3827 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3828 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3829 for _ in 0..event_count {
3830 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3831 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3836 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3838 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3840 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3841 monitor: args.monitor,
3842 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3844 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3845 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3846 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3848 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3853 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3855 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3857 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3859 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3861 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3862 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3863 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3864 logger: args.logger,
3865 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3868 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3869 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3872 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3873 //connection or two.
3875 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))