1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
210 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
211 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
212 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
213 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
214 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
217 session_priv: SecretKey,
218 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
219 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
220 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
221 payment_id: PaymentId,
222 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
223 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
226 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
227 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
228 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
230 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
232 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
234 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
237 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
238 payment_id.hash(hasher);
239 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
240 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
241 payment_params.hash(hasher);
246 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
249 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
250 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
252 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
253 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
254 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
255 payment_secret: None,
256 payment_params: None,
261 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
262 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
264 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
272 struct ReceiveError {
278 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
279 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
281 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
286 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
288 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
289 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
290 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
291 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
292 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
294 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
295 err: msgs::LightningError,
296 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
297 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
299 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
301 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
303 err: LightningError {
305 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
306 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
313 shutdown_finish: None,
317 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
319 err: LightningError {
321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
324 shutdown_finish: None,
328 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
329 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
332 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
344 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
348 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
351 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
353 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
354 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
358 log_level: Level::Warn,
361 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
365 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
376 shutdown_finish: None,
381 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
382 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
383 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
384 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
385 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
387 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
388 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
389 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
390 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
391 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
392 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
393 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
395 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
399 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
400 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
401 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
402 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
403 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
404 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
407 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
408 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
409 /// quite some time lag.
410 enum BackgroundEvent {
411 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
412 /// commitment transaction.
413 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
416 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
417 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
419 latest_features: InitFeatures,
422 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
423 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
425 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
428 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
429 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
430 struct PendingInboundPayment {
431 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
432 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
433 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
434 /// this payment being removed.
436 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
437 user_payment_id: u64,
438 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
439 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
440 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
443 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
444 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
445 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
447 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
450 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
451 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
452 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
453 pending_amt_msat: u64,
454 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
455 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
456 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
458 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
459 starting_block_height: u32,
461 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
462 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
463 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
466 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
467 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
469 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
470 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
471 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
472 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
473 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
475 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
477 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
482 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
483 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
485 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
489 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
495 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
502 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
504 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
506 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
507 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
511 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
512 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
513 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
516 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
520 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
521 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
524 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
525 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
526 let our_payment_hash;
527 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
533 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
537 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
541 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
542 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
543 let remove_res = match self {
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
548 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
552 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
553 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
554 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
555 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
556 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
557 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
564 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
565 let insert_res = match self {
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
567 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
568 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
574 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
575 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
576 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
577 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
578 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
585 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
597 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
598 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
599 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
600 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
601 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
602 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
603 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
605 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
606 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
608 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
609 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
610 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
611 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
612 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
613 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
614 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
615 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
617 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
618 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
620 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
621 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
623 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
624 /// to individual Channels.
626 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
627 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
628 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
629 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
631 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
632 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
633 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
634 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
635 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
636 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
637 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
639 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
640 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
641 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
642 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
645 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
646 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
647 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
648 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
649 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
651 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
652 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
653 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
654 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
655 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
658 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
659 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
660 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
661 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
662 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
666 // `total_consistency_lock`
668 // |__`forward_htlcs`
670 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
672 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
674 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
676 // | |__`channel_state`
680 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
682 // | |__`per_peer_state`
684 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
688 // | |__`pending_events`
690 // | |__`pending_background_events`
692 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
693 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
695 K::Target: KeysInterface,
696 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
699 default_configuration: UserConfig,
700 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
701 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
705 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
707 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
709 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
710 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
712 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
713 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
714 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
715 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
716 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
718 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
719 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
720 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
721 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
723 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
724 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
726 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
727 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
728 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
729 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
730 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
731 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
732 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
733 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
735 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
737 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
738 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
740 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
742 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
743 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
744 /// and via the classic SCID.
746 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
747 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
749 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
751 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
753 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
755 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
756 /// failed/claimed by the user.
758 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
759 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
764 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
765 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
766 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
767 /// active channel list on load.
769 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
770 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
772 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
774 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
775 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
776 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
778 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
779 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
780 /// the handling of the events.
783 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
784 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
785 /// would break backwards compatability.
786 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
787 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
788 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
790 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
793 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
795 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
796 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
797 /// confirmation depth.
799 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
800 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
801 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
803 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
805 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
807 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
809 our_network_key: SecretKey,
810 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
812 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
814 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
815 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
816 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
818 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
819 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
821 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
822 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
823 /// keeping additional state.
824 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
826 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
827 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
828 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
829 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
831 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
832 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
833 /// are currently open with that peer.
834 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
835 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
839 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
841 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
842 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
843 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
844 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
845 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
846 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
847 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
848 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
849 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
850 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
851 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
853 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
860 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
862 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
863 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
864 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
865 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
866 pub struct ChainParameters {
867 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
868 pub network: Network,
870 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
872 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
873 pub best_block: BestBlock,
876 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
882 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
883 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
884 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
885 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
886 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
887 /// updates are ready for persistence).
889 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
890 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
891 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
892 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
893 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
895 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
896 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
899 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
900 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
901 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
904 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
905 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
907 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
908 persistence_notifier: notifier,
909 should_persist: persist_check,
910 _read_guard: read_guard,
915 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
917 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
918 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
923 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
924 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
926 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
928 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
929 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
930 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
931 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
932 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
934 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
935 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
937 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
939 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
940 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
941 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
942 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
943 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
944 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
945 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
946 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
947 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
948 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
949 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
950 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
951 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
953 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
954 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
956 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
957 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
958 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
959 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
961 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
962 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
963 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
964 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
965 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
966 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
969 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
971 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
972 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
975 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
977 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
978 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
980 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
981 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
982 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
983 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
985 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
986 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
987 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
988 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
989 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
990 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
991 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
992 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
993 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
994 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
995 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
998 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
999 /// to better separate parameters.
1000 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1001 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1002 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1003 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1004 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1005 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1006 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1007 pub features: InitFeatures,
1008 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1009 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1010 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1012 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1014 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1015 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1016 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1017 /// payments to us through this channel.
1018 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1019 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1020 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1021 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1022 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1023 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1024 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1027 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1028 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1029 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1030 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1031 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1032 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1033 /// lifetime of the channel.
1034 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1035 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1036 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1037 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1038 /// our counterparty already.
1040 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1041 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1042 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1043 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1045 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1046 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1047 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1048 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1050 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1051 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1053 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1054 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1056 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1057 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1058 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1059 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1060 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1061 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1062 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1063 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1064 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1067 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1069 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1070 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1071 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1072 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1073 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1074 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1075 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1077 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1078 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1080 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1081 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1082 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1083 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1084 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1085 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1086 /// this value on chain.
1088 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1090 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1092 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1093 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1094 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1095 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1097 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1098 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1099 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1100 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1102 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1103 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1104 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1105 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1107 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1108 pub balance_msat: u64,
1109 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1110 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1111 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1112 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1114 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1116 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1117 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1118 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1119 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1120 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1121 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1122 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1123 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1125 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1126 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1127 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1128 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1129 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1130 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1131 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1133 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1134 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1135 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1136 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1137 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1138 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1139 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1140 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1141 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1143 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1145 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1146 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1147 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1148 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1149 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1150 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1151 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1152 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1153 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1155 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1156 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1157 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1158 pub is_outbound: bool,
1159 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1160 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1161 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1162 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1163 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1165 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1166 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1167 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1168 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1170 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1171 pub is_usable: bool,
1172 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1173 pub is_public: bool,
1174 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1175 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1176 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1177 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1178 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1179 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1181 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1182 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1185 impl ChannelDetails {
1186 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1187 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1188 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1190 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1191 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1192 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1193 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1196 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1197 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1198 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1200 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1201 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1202 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1203 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1207 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1208 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1209 /// states for more.
1210 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1211 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1212 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1213 /// send the payment at all.
1215 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1217 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1218 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1219 /// for this payment.
1220 ParameterError(APIError),
1221 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1222 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1224 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1226 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1229 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1230 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1231 /// for this payment.
1232 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1233 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1234 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1235 /// paths than the ones selected).
1237 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1238 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1239 /// for this payment.
1240 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1241 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1242 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1243 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1245 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1247 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1248 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1249 /// in over-/re-payment.
1251 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1252 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1253 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1255 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1256 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1257 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1258 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1260 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1261 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1262 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1263 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1264 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1265 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1266 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1267 payment_id: PaymentId,
1271 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1273 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1275 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1276 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1277 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1278 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1280 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1281 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1282 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1285 macro_rules! handle_error {
1286 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1289 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1290 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1292 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1293 // entering the macro.
1294 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1295 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1298 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1300 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1301 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1302 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1303 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1307 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1308 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1309 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1310 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1315 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1316 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1318 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1319 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1320 action: err.action.clone()
1324 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1325 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1328 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1335 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1336 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1337 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1338 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1339 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1340 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1342 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1343 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1344 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1345 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1346 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1348 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1349 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1351 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1355 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1356 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1357 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1359 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1360 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1362 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1363 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1365 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1366 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1367 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1368 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1369 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1370 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1376 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1377 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1381 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1383 $entry.remove_entry();
1391 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1392 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1396 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1398 $entry.remove_entry();
1406 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1407 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1409 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1410 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1416 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1417 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1419 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1420 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1421 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1422 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1423 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1424 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1425 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1426 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1427 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1428 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1429 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1430 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1431 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1432 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1435 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1436 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1437 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1438 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1439 match $action_type {
1440 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1441 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1443 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1444 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1446 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1447 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1448 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1449 if !$resend_commitment {
1450 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1453 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1455 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1456 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1458 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1463 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1464 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1466 $entry.remove_entry();
1470 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1471 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1472 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1474 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1475 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1477 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1478 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1480 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1481 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1483 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1484 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1488 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1489 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1490 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1491 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1492 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1494 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1495 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1496 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1497 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1498 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1499 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1500 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1501 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1502 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1503 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1508 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1509 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1510 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1512 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1513 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1514 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1515 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1516 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1517 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1520 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1525 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1526 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1527 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1528 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1529 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1532 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1534 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1535 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1537 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1539 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1540 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1541 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1542 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1543 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1544 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1545 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1546 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1548 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1549 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1550 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1554 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1556 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1557 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1558 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1560 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1561 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1562 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1563 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1564 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1565 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1566 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1568 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1569 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1572 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1573 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1575 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1577 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1579 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1581 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1582 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1583 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1584 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1592 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1593 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1594 &self.default_configuration
1597 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1598 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1599 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1602 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1603 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1605 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1607 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1611 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1616 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1618 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1619 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1620 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1621 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1622 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1624 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1625 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1627 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1628 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1629 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1631 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1632 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1633 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1634 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1635 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1636 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1638 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1639 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1640 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1641 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1642 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1643 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1648 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1649 Some(peer_state) => {
1650 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1651 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1652 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1653 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1654 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1655 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1656 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1660 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1665 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1668 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1671 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1672 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1674 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1675 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1676 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1679 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1681 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1684 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1687 node_id: their_network_key,
1690 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1693 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1694 let mut res = Vec::new();
1696 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1697 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1698 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1699 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1700 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1701 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1702 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1703 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1704 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1705 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1706 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1707 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1708 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1709 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1710 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1711 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1712 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1713 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1714 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1715 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1716 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1718 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1719 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1720 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1721 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1722 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1723 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1724 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1725 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1726 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1727 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1728 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1729 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1730 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1731 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1732 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1733 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1734 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1735 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1736 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1737 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1738 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1739 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1740 config: Some(channel.config()),
1744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1745 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1746 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1747 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1753 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1754 /// more information.
1755 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1756 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1759 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1760 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1762 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1763 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1766 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1767 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1768 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1769 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1770 // really wanted anyway.
1771 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1774 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1775 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1776 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1777 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1778 Some(transaction) => {
1779 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1783 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1784 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1785 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1786 reason: closure_reason
1790 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1791 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1793 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1794 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1795 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1797 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1798 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1799 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1800 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1802 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1804 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1805 Some(peer_state) => {
1806 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1807 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1808 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1810 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1813 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1815 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1816 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1817 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1818 let (result, is_permanent) =
1819 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1821 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1827 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1831 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1832 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1833 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1838 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1846 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1847 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1851 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1855 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1856 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1857 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1859 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1860 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1862 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1863 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1864 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1865 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1867 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1869 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1870 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1871 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1872 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1873 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1876 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1877 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1878 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1880 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1881 /// the channel being closed or not:
1882 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1883 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1884 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1885 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1886 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1887 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1888 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1890 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1892 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1893 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1894 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1895 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1896 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1900 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1901 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1902 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1903 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1904 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1905 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1906 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1908 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1909 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1910 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1911 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1912 // ignore the result here.
1913 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1917 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1918 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1919 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1920 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1923 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1924 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1925 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1926 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1928 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1929 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1931 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1933 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1935 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1938 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1939 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1940 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1941 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1942 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1947 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1950 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1952 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1953 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1954 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1955 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1956 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1957 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1958 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1968 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1969 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1970 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1972 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1973 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1974 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1977 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1978 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1979 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1981 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1982 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1983 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1984 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1985 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1988 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1989 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1990 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1991 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1992 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1996 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1997 /// local transaction(s).
1998 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1999 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2000 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2004 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2005 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2007 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2008 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2009 return Err(ReceiveError {
2010 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2012 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2015 // final_expiry_too_soon
2016 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2017 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2018 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2019 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2020 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2021 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2022 return Err(ReceiveError {
2024 err_data: Vec::new(),
2025 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2028 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2029 return Err(ReceiveError {
2031 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2032 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2036 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2037 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2038 return Err(ReceiveError {
2039 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2040 err_data: Vec::new(),
2041 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2044 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2045 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2046 return Err(ReceiveError {
2047 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2048 err_data: Vec::new(),
2049 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2051 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2052 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2054 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2055 phantom_shared_secret,
2057 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2058 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2059 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2060 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2061 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2062 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2063 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2064 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2065 return Err(ReceiveError {
2066 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2067 err_data: Vec::new(),
2068 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2072 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2074 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2077 return Err(ReceiveError {
2078 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2079 err_data: Vec::new(),
2080 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2085 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2088 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2089 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2090 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2091 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2095 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2096 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2097 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2099 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2100 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2101 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2102 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2103 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2104 failure_code: $err_code,
2110 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2111 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2114 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2116 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2117 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2118 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2119 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2120 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2121 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2122 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2123 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2125 macro_rules! return_err {
2126 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2128 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2129 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2130 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2131 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2132 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2138 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2140 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2141 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2143 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2144 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2148 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2149 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2151 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2153 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2154 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2155 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2156 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2157 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2159 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2162 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2163 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2164 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2166 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2167 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2168 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2171 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2172 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2173 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2174 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2178 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2179 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2180 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2183 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2184 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2185 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2186 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2187 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2192 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2193 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2194 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2195 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2196 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2197 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2198 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2199 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2200 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2201 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2202 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2204 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2207 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2210 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2212 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2213 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2215 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2216 // no consistency guarantees.
2217 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2221 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2222 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2223 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2224 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2225 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2227 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2228 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2229 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2230 // we don't have the channel here.
2231 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2233 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2235 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2236 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2237 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2238 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2239 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2240 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2241 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2243 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2244 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2246 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2247 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2251 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2253 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2260 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2261 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2262 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2263 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2264 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2265 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2267 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2268 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2270 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2271 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2272 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2273 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2274 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2275 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2276 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2277 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2278 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2279 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2285 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2286 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2287 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2288 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2290 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2291 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2293 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2294 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2295 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2297 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2298 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2299 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2301 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2306 pending_forward_info
2309 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2310 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2311 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2313 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2314 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2315 if !chan.should_announce() {
2316 return Err(LightningError {
2317 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2318 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2321 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2322 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2325 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2328 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2329 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2330 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2331 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2332 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2333 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2334 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2335 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2336 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2340 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2342 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2344 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2346 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2347 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2349 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2350 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2351 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2352 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2353 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2354 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2355 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2356 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2359 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2360 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2362 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2368 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2369 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2371 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2372 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2374 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2375 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2376 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2377 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2378 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2380 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2382 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2384 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2385 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2386 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2387 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2390 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2391 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2392 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2394 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2395 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2397 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2398 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2400 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2401 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2403 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2404 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2406 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2407 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2408 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2411 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2412 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2413 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2415 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2416 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2418 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2419 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2420 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2421 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2422 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2423 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2424 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2425 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2426 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2427 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2429 _ => unreachable!(),
2432 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2434 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2435 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2436 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2437 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2438 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2439 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2448 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2449 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2450 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2451 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2456 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2457 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2459 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2464 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2466 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2467 /// fields for more info.
2469 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2470 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2471 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2472 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2475 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2476 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2477 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2478 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2479 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2481 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2482 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2484 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2485 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2486 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2488 /// In general, a path may raise:
2489 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2490 /// node public key) is specified.
2491 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2492 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2494 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2495 /// relevant updates.
2497 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2498 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2499 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2501 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2502 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2503 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2504 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2507 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2508 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2509 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2511 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2512 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2513 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2514 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2515 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2519 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2520 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2523 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2524 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2525 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2526 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2529 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2530 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2533 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2534 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2535 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2536 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2539 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2540 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2543 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2544 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2547 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2552 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2553 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2554 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2556 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2557 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2559 let mut total_value = 0;
2560 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2561 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2562 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2563 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2564 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2565 continue 'path_check;
2567 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2568 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2569 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2570 continue 'path_check;
2573 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2574 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2576 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2577 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2579 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2580 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2581 total_value = amt_msat;
2584 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2585 let mut results = Vec::new();
2586 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2587 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2588 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2591 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2592 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2593 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2594 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2597 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2598 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2599 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2600 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2602 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2603 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2607 results.push(path_res);
2609 let mut has_ok = false;
2610 let mut has_err = false;
2611 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2612 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2613 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2614 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2615 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2616 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2617 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2621 } else if res.is_err() {
2622 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2623 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2626 if has_err && has_ok {
2627 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2630 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2631 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2632 Some(RouteParameters {
2633 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2634 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2635 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2641 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2642 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2643 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2644 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2645 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2651 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2653 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2654 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2655 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2656 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2657 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2659 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2660 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2661 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2662 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2663 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2664 if path.len() == 0 {
2665 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2666 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2671 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2672 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2673 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2676 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2677 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2678 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2680 let res = match payment {
2681 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2682 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2684 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2685 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2686 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2687 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2690 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2692 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2693 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2694 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2697 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2698 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2699 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2702 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2703 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2704 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2708 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2709 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2714 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2715 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2719 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2722 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2724 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2725 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2726 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2727 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2729 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2730 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2731 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2733 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2734 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2735 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2736 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2739 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2740 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2741 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2742 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2743 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2745 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2753 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2754 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2755 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2756 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2757 /// never reach the recipient.
2759 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2760 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2762 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2763 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2765 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2767 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2768 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2769 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2771 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2773 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2774 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2776 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2777 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2782 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2783 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2784 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2785 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2786 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2788 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2791 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2792 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2796 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2797 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2799 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2800 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2805 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2807 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2808 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2809 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2812 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2813 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2814 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2815 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2816 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2817 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2820 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2821 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2822 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2823 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2824 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2826 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2828 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2830 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2831 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2832 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2833 } else { unreachable!(); })
2836 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2838 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2839 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2842 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2843 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2848 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2849 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2850 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2853 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2855 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2858 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2859 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2860 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2869 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2870 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2871 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2875 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2877 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2878 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2880 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2881 /// across the p2p network.
2883 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2884 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2886 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2887 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2888 /// keys per-channel).
2890 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2891 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2892 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2894 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2895 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2896 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2898 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2899 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2900 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2901 /// for more details.
2903 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2904 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2905 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2908 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2909 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2911 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2916 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2917 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2918 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2919 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2920 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2922 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2926 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2927 let mut output_index = None;
2928 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2929 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2930 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2931 if output_index.is_some() {
2932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2933 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2936 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2938 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2941 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2944 if output_index.is_none() {
2945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2946 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2949 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2953 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2955 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2956 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2957 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2958 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2960 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2961 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2963 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2964 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2966 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2968 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2969 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2970 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2971 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2972 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2973 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2974 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2975 pub fn update_channel_config(
2976 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2977 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2978 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2980 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2985 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2988 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2989 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2990 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2991 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2992 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2993 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2995 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2996 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2998 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3002 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3003 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3004 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3007 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3008 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3009 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3011 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3020 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3022 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3023 /// Will likely generate further events.
3024 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3027 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3028 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3029 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3030 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3032 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3033 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3035 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3036 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3037 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3039 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3040 match forward_info {
3041 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3042 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3043 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3044 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3045 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3048 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3049 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3050 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3052 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3053 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3054 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3055 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3056 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3057 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3060 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3061 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3063 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3066 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3067 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3073 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3074 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3076 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3080 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3081 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3083 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3087 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3088 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3089 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3090 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3091 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3093 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3094 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3095 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3096 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3097 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3099 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3101 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3102 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3106 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3107 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3108 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3109 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3115 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3118 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3121 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3122 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3123 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3124 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3125 // problem, not ours.
3131 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3132 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3134 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3138 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3139 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3140 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3142 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3145 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3146 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3147 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3148 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3149 match forward_info {
3150 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3151 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3152 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3153 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3154 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3158 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3159 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3160 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3161 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3163 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3164 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3166 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3168 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3171 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3173 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3174 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3175 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3176 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3182 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3184 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3185 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3186 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3187 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3188 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3189 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3190 // this channel currently :/.
3196 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3197 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3199 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3200 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3201 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3203 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3206 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3208 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3209 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3210 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3213 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3215 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3216 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3217 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3218 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3219 // messages when we can.
3220 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3221 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3222 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3229 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3230 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3233 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3234 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3235 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3236 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3237 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3238 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3240 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3242 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3243 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3244 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3247 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3251 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3252 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3254 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3258 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3259 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3261 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3262 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3263 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3264 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3265 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3266 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3268 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3275 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3276 match forward_info {
3277 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3278 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3279 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3280 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3283 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3284 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3285 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3286 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3288 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3289 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3291 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3294 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3295 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3296 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3297 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3298 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3299 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3300 phantom_shared_secret,
3302 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3304 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3309 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3310 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3311 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3312 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3313 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3315 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3316 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3317 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3318 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3319 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3320 phantom_shared_secret,
3322 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3323 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3327 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3328 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3329 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3330 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3331 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3334 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3335 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3336 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3338 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3339 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3340 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3343 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3344 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3345 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3346 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3347 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3349 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3353 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3354 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3355 total_value += htlc.value;
3356 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3357 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3358 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3360 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3361 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3363 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3365 _ => unreachable!(),
3368 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3370 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3371 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3372 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3373 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3374 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3375 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3376 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3379 amount_msat: total_value,
3380 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3381 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3383 payment_received_generated = true;
3385 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3386 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3388 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3390 payment_received_generated
3394 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3395 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3396 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3397 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3398 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3399 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3400 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3401 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3403 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3404 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3405 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3406 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3407 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3409 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3413 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3415 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3416 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3418 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3419 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3420 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3421 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3422 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3424 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3426 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3427 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3432 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3439 if payment_data.is_none() {
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3441 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3444 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3445 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3447 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3448 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3450 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3451 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3453 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3454 if payment_received_generated {
3455 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3461 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3462 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3470 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3471 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3473 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3475 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3476 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3479 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3480 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3481 events.append(&mut new_events);
3484 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3486 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3487 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3489 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3490 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3491 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3492 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3493 if background_events.is_empty() {
3497 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3499 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3500 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3501 // monitor updating completing.
3502 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3509 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3510 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3511 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3512 self.process_background_events();
3515 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3516 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3517 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3518 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3520 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3521 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3523 if !chan.is_live() {
3524 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3525 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3526 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3529 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3531 let mut retain_channel = true;
3532 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3535 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3536 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3540 let ret_err = match res {
3541 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3542 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3543 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3544 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3545 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3546 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3547 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3548 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3549 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3550 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3551 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3558 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3559 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3567 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3571 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3572 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3573 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3574 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3575 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3576 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3577 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3579 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3581 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3583 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3584 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3585 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3586 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3587 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3588 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3590 handle_errors.push(err);
3600 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3601 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3602 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3603 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3604 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3605 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3606 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3608 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3609 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3610 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3611 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3612 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3613 if no_remaining_entries {
3614 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3616 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3617 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3618 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3619 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3620 no_remaining_entries = false;
3628 if no_remaining_entries {
3629 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3630 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3632 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3639 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3641 /// This currently includes:
3642 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3643 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3644 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3646 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3647 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3649 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3650 /// estimate fetches.
3651 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3652 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3653 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3654 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3656 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3658 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3659 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3661 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3662 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3663 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3664 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3665 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3666 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3667 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3669 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3671 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3673 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3674 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3675 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3676 if needs_close { return false; }
3679 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3680 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3681 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3682 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3683 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3684 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3685 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3690 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3691 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3693 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3694 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3695 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3699 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3700 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3705 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3711 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3712 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3713 // This should be unreachable
3714 debug_assert!(false);
3717 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3718 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3719 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3720 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3722 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3723 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3724 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3726 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3733 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3734 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3735 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3738 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3739 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3742 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3748 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3749 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3750 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3752 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3753 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3754 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3755 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3757 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3758 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3759 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3760 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3761 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3764 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3765 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3766 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3767 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3768 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3769 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3770 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3771 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3772 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3773 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3778 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3779 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3781 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3783 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3784 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3785 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3786 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3787 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3788 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3789 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3791 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3793 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3794 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3796 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3801 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3802 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3803 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3804 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3805 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3806 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3807 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3808 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3809 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3810 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3812 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3813 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3814 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3815 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3817 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3818 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3819 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3820 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3821 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3825 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3826 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3827 // be surfaced to the user.
3828 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3829 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3830 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3832 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3833 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3834 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3835 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3836 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3841 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3842 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3846 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3847 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3848 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3849 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3851 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3852 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3853 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3854 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3855 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3858 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3859 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3860 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3863 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3864 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3865 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3867 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3868 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3869 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3870 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3871 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3872 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3873 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3874 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3875 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3878 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3882 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3883 all_paths_failed = true;
3884 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3885 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3887 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3893 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3896 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3897 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3898 Some(RouteParameters {
3899 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3900 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3901 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3904 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3906 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3907 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3909 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3911 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3913 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3914 if !payment_retryable {
3915 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3917 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3921 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3923 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3929 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3930 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3931 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3932 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3933 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3935 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3936 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3937 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3938 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3945 error_code: onion_error_code,
3947 error_data: onion_error_data
3951 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3957 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3958 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3959 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3960 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3962 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3963 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3964 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3965 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3967 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3968 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3970 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3972 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3975 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3976 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3977 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3978 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3979 network_update: None,
3982 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3985 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3987 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3992 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3993 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3994 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3996 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
3997 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3998 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4000 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4001 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4002 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4003 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4005 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4006 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4009 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4011 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4015 let mut forward_event = None;
4016 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4017 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4018 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4020 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4022 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4024 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4025 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4028 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4029 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4030 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4031 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4032 time_forwardable: time
4035 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4036 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4037 failed_next_destination: destination
4043 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4044 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4046 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4047 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4048 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4050 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4051 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4052 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4053 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4055 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4056 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4057 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4058 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4059 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4060 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4061 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4062 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4066 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4067 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4068 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4070 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4071 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4072 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4073 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4075 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4076 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4077 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4078 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4079 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4081 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4082 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4083 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4084 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4085 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4086 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4088 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4089 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4090 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4091 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4098 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4103 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4104 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4105 debug_assert!(false);
4109 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4110 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4111 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4112 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4113 if sources.len() != 1 {
4114 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4115 debug_assert!(false);
4120 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4121 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4122 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4123 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4124 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4127 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4129 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4130 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4133 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4134 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4135 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4139 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4140 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4141 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4142 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4143 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4144 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4145 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4146 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4147 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4149 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4150 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4151 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4152 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4153 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4154 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4156 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4160 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4162 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4163 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4164 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4165 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4166 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4167 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4168 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4169 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4173 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4174 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4177 purpose: payment_purpose,
4178 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4182 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4183 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4184 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4185 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4190 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4191 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4192 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4193 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4194 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4196 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4200 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4201 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4202 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4203 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4204 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4205 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4207 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4208 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4209 payment_preimage, e);
4210 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4211 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4212 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4213 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4217 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4218 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4219 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4221 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4222 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4223 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4224 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4225 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4226 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4232 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4234 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4237 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4238 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4239 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4241 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4242 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4243 payment_preimage, e);
4246 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4247 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4249 chan.remove_entry();
4251 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4254 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4257 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4258 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4259 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4260 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4261 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4262 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4263 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4264 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4265 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4266 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4267 pending_events.push(
4268 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4270 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4280 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4282 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4283 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4284 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4285 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4286 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4287 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4288 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4289 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4290 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4291 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4292 pending_events.push(
4293 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4294 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4300 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4304 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4305 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4306 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4308 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4309 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4310 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4311 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4312 pending_events.push(
4313 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4325 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4326 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4327 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4328 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4329 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4330 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4331 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4334 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4335 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4336 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4337 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4338 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4341 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4342 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4343 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4344 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4345 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4346 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4347 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4348 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4349 // again on restart.
4350 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4351 payment_preimage, update_res);
4353 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4354 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4355 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4356 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4359 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4360 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4361 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4362 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4366 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4367 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4368 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4371 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4372 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4373 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4375 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4377 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4387 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4388 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4389 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4392 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4393 /// update completion.
4394 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4395 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4396 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4397 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4398 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4399 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4400 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4402 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4403 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4404 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4405 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4408 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4409 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4411 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4413 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4418 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4420 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4421 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4422 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4423 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4428 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4429 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4431 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4432 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4437 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4441 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4447 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4448 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4449 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4455 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4459 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4460 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4462 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4466 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4470 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4471 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4472 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4473 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4474 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4475 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4476 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4478 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4479 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4480 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4485 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4486 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4487 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4490 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4492 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4493 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4495 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4496 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4497 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4498 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4502 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4504 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4505 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4508 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4509 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4510 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4512 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4513 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4514 /// used to accept such channels.
4516 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4517 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4518 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4519 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4522 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4523 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4525 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4526 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4527 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4529 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4530 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4532 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4533 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4535 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4536 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4538 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4539 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4540 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4541 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4544 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4547 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4548 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4549 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4551 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4552 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4554 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4555 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4558 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4559 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4560 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4561 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4562 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4563 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4566 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4567 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4568 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4572 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4573 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4577 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4583 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4584 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4585 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4588 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4589 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4592 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4593 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4594 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4596 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4597 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4598 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4599 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4602 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4603 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4607 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4608 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4609 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4611 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4612 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4615 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4616 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4620 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4621 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4625 pending_events.push(
4626 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4627 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4628 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4629 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4630 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4631 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4636 entry.insert(channel);
4642 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4643 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4644 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4645 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4646 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4648 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4649 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4651 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4652 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4657 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4658 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4659 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4660 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4661 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4663 user_channel_id: user_id,
4668 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4669 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4670 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4671 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4673 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4675 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4676 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4678 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4683 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4684 // lock before watch_channel
4685 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4686 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4687 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4688 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4689 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4690 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4691 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4692 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4693 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4694 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4695 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4696 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4697 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4699 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4700 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4701 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4702 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4703 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4704 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4705 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4708 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4709 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4710 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4712 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4715 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4716 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4719 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4720 funding_msg.channel_id))
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4723 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4727 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4730 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4731 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4739 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4741 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4742 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4743 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4744 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4746 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4747 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4749 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4750 Ok(update) => update,
4751 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4753 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4754 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4756 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4757 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4758 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4759 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4760 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4761 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4762 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4768 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4769 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4776 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4777 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4781 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4782 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4783 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4784 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4786 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4789 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4790 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4791 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4792 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4793 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4794 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4795 msg: announcement_sigs,
4797 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4798 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4799 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4800 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4801 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4802 // announcement_signatures.
4803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4804 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4805 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4806 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4812 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4820 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4821 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4822 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4826 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4828 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4829 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4832 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4833 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4834 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4835 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4838 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4839 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4841 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4842 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4843 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4844 let (result, is_permanent) =
4845 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4847 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4852 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4853 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4854 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4864 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4865 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4866 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4869 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4873 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4874 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4875 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4876 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4877 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4879 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4880 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4882 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4883 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4884 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4885 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4890 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4891 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4892 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4893 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4894 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4895 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4896 } else { (tx, None) }
4898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4901 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4902 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4903 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4905 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4906 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4907 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4912 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4917 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4918 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4919 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4920 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4922 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4923 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4924 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4925 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4927 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4933 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4937 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4938 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4939 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4940 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4941 match pending_forward_info {
4942 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4943 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4944 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4945 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4947 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4949 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4950 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4951 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4954 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4956 _ => pending_forward_info
4959 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4966 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4967 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4968 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4969 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4970 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4972 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4975 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4980 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4984 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4985 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4987 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4989 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4990 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4992 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
4994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4999 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5000 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5004 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5007 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5008 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5009 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5011 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5018 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5019 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5020 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5021 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5023 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5026 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5027 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5028 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5029 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5030 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5031 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5032 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5037 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5038 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5042 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5043 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5044 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5046 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5048 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5049 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5050 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5051 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5052 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5053 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5055 commitment_signed: msg,
5061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5066 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5067 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5068 let mut forward_event = None;
5069 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5070 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5071 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5072 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5074 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5075 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5076 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5077 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5078 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5081 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5082 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5085 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5086 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5091 match forward_event {
5093 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5094 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5095 time_forwardable: time
5103 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5104 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5106 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5107 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5108 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5110 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5111 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5113 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5114 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5115 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5116 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5117 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5118 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5119 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5120 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5121 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5122 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5123 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5124 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5126 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5127 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5128 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5129 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5130 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5131 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5133 } else { unreachable!(); }
5135 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5136 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5137 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5141 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5142 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5143 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5144 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5145 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5146 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5151 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5153 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5154 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5156 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5157 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5158 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5160 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5161 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5168 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5169 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5170 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5171 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5173 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5176 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5183 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5184 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5185 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5187 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5189 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5192 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5196 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5197 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5198 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5199 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5200 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5201 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5209 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5210 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5211 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5212 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5214 // It's not a local channel
5215 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5218 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5220 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5222 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5223 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5224 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5225 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5226 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5227 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5231 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5232 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5233 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5234 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5236 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5237 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5242 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5245 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5247 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5248 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5249 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5251 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5253 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5256 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5257 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5258 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5259 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5260 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5261 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5262 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5263 let mut channel_update = None;
5264 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5265 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5266 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5269 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5270 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5271 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5272 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5273 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5274 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5275 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5280 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5281 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5282 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5283 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5284 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5285 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5293 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5294 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5297 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5298 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5303 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5304 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5305 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5306 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5307 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5308 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5309 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5310 match monitor_event {
5311 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5312 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5314 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5317 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5318 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5321 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5322 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5323 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5324 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5325 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5326 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5327 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5328 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5329 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5330 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5331 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5335 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5336 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5338 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5340 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5341 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5342 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5343 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5344 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5349 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5350 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5356 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5357 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5360 has_pending_monitor_events
5363 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5364 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5365 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5367 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5368 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5371 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5372 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5373 /// update was applied.
5375 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5376 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5377 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5378 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5379 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5380 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5381 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5382 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5386 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5387 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5389 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5390 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5391 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5392 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5394 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5396 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5399 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5400 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5401 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5402 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5403 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5404 updates: commitment_update,
5408 has_monitor_update = true;
5409 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5410 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5411 if close_channel { return false; }
5418 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5419 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5420 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5427 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5428 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5429 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5432 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5433 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5439 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5440 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5441 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5442 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5443 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5444 let mut has_update = false;
5446 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5447 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5448 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5449 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5451 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5452 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5453 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5454 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5456 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5457 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5460 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5461 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5462 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5463 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5469 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5471 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5472 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5473 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5479 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5480 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5487 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5488 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5494 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5495 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5497 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5498 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5499 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5500 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5501 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5502 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5503 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5504 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5505 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5506 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5507 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5508 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5509 assert!(should_broadcast);
5510 } else { unreachable!(); }
5511 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5513 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5517 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5518 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5520 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5521 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5524 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5527 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5528 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5530 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5531 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5532 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5533 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5534 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5535 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5536 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5537 // never fail a payment too early.
5538 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5540 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5548 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5551 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5552 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5554 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5555 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5556 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5558 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5560 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5561 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5565 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5566 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5568 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5570 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5571 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5572 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5573 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5574 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5575 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5578 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5579 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5581 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5584 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5586 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5588 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5589 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5590 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5591 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5592 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5595 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5596 /// stored external to LDK.
5598 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5599 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5600 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5602 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5603 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5606 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5607 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5608 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5609 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5611 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5612 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5613 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5614 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5615 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5617 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5618 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5619 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5620 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5621 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5623 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5624 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5626 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5627 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5631 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5632 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5634 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5636 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5637 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5638 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5639 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5642 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5643 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5645 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5648 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5650 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5652 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5653 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5656 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5657 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5659 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5660 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5661 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5664 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5665 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5667 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5668 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5670 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5672 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5673 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5674 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5675 Some(_) => continue,
5676 None => return scid_candidate
5681 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5683 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5684 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5686 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5687 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5688 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5692 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5693 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5694 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5695 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5697 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5698 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5699 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5700 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5709 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5710 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5711 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5712 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5717 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5718 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5722 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5723 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5726 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5727 /// using the given event handler.
5729 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5730 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5733 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5734 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5735 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5737 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5739 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5740 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5741 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5742 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5745 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5746 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5747 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5750 for event in pending_events {
5751 handler(event).await;
5754 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5755 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5760 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5761 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5762 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5763 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5764 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5767 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5768 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5769 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5770 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5772 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5773 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5774 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5775 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5778 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5779 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5781 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5782 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5785 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5786 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5787 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5789 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5790 events.replace(pending_events);
5799 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5801 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5802 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5803 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5804 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5807 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5809 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5810 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5811 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5812 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5813 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5815 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5816 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5817 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5818 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5821 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5822 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5823 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5826 for event in pending_events {
5827 handler.handle_event(event);
5835 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5837 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5838 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5839 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5843 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5845 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5846 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5847 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5848 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5849 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5852 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5853 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5856 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5858 let new_height = height - 1;
5860 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5861 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5862 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5863 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5864 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5865 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5868 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5872 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5874 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5875 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5876 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5877 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5880 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5881 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5882 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5883 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5885 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5886 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5889 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5890 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5892 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5893 if height < last_best_block_height {
5894 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5895 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5899 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5900 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5901 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5902 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5904 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5905 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5909 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5911 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5913 macro_rules! max_time {
5914 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5916 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5917 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5918 // having an explicit local time source.
5919 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5920 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5921 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5922 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5923 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5929 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5930 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5931 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5932 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5936 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5937 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5938 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5939 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5940 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5941 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5947 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5949 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5950 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5951 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5952 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5953 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5954 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5959 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5961 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5962 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5963 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5964 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5967 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5968 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5970 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5971 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5972 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5973 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5974 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5976 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5977 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5979 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5980 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5981 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5982 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5983 let res = f(channel);
5984 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5985 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5986 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5987 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5989 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5991 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5992 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5993 if channel.is_usable() {
5994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5995 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5996 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5997 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6006 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6008 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6009 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6010 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6011 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6012 msg: announcement_sigs,
6014 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6015 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6018 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6019 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6020 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6025 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6026 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6027 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6028 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6029 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6030 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6031 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6032 // is always consistent.
6033 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6034 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6035 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6036 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6037 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6040 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6041 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6042 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6043 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6044 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6045 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6050 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6051 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6052 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6053 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6054 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6055 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6056 data: reason_message,
6065 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6066 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6067 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6068 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6069 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6070 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6071 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6072 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6073 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6074 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6076 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6077 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6078 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6079 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6083 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6087 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6089 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6090 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6094 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6095 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6096 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6097 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6099 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6101 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6102 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6103 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6104 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6105 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6106 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6109 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6110 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6111 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6113 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6114 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6115 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6116 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6119 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6120 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6121 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6122 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6123 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6126 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6127 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6128 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6131 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6132 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6133 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6134 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6138 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6139 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6140 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6141 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6142 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6143 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6146 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6148 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6151 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6156 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6158 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6161 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6166 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6171 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6176 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6181 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6186 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6191 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6196 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6206 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6222 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6223 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6226 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6231 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6239 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6241 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6242 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6243 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6244 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6245 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6246 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6247 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6248 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6249 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6250 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6251 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6254 no_channels_remain = false;
6259 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6261 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6262 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6263 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6264 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6265 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6266 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6267 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6268 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6269 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6270 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6271 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6273 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6274 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6275 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6276 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6284 if no_channels_remain {
6285 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6288 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6289 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6293 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6294 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6295 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6299 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6304 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6305 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6307 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6308 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6311 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6312 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6317 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6319 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6320 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6321 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6322 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6323 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6324 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6325 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6329 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6330 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6331 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6336 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6337 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6338 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6339 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6340 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6348 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6352 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6355 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6356 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6357 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6358 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6359 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6364 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6365 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6366 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6367 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6370 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6371 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6372 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6380 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6381 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6385 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6386 provided_node_features()
6389 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6390 provided_init_features()
6394 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6395 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6396 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6397 provided_init_features().to_context()
6400 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6401 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6403 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6404 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6405 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6406 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6407 provided_init_features().to_context()
6410 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6411 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6412 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6413 provided_init_features().to_context()
6416 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6417 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6418 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6419 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6420 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6421 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6422 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6423 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6424 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6425 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6426 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6427 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6428 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6429 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6430 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6431 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6432 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6433 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6437 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6438 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6440 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6441 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6442 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6443 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6446 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6447 (2, node_id, required),
6448 (4, features, required),
6449 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6450 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6451 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6452 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6455 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6456 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6457 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6458 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6459 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6460 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6461 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6462 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6463 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6464 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6465 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6466 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6467 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6468 (7, self.config, option),
6469 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6470 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6471 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6472 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6473 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6474 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6475 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6476 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6477 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6478 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6479 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6480 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6481 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6482 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6483 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6484 (32, self.is_public, required),
6485 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6486 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6487 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6493 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6494 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6495 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6496 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6497 (2, channel_id, required),
6498 (3, channel_type, option),
6499 (4, counterparty, required),
6500 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6501 (6, funding_txo, option),
6502 (7, config, option),
6503 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6504 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6505 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6506 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6507 (16, balance_msat, required),
6508 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6509 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6510 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6511 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6512 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6513 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6514 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6515 (26, is_outbound, required),
6516 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6517 (30, is_usable, required),
6518 (32, is_public, required),
6519 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6520 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6521 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6524 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6525 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6526 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6527 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6528 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6532 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6534 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6535 outbound_scid_alias,
6539 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6540 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6542 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6543 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6544 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6545 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6546 confirmations_required,
6547 force_close_spend_delay,
6548 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6549 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6550 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6551 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6552 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6553 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6558 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6559 (2, channels, vec_type),
6560 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6561 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6564 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6566 (0, onion_packet, required),
6567 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6570 (0, payment_data, required),
6571 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6572 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6574 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6575 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6576 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6580 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6581 (0, routing, required),
6582 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6583 (4, payment_hash, required),
6584 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6585 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6586 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6590 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6591 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6593 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6595 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6596 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6597 reason.write(writer)?;
6599 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6600 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6603 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6604 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6605 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6606 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6613 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6614 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6615 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6618 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6619 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6620 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6621 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6625 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6626 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6627 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6628 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6629 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6632 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6633 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6634 // messages contained in the variants.
6635 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6636 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6637 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6639 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6641 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6642 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6643 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6646 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6648 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6649 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6650 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6652 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6657 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6662 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6663 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6664 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6665 (2, outpoint, required),
6666 (4, htlc_id, required),
6667 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6670 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6671 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6672 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6673 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6674 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6676 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6677 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6678 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6679 (2, self.value, required),
6680 (4, payment_data, option),
6681 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6682 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6688 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6689 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6690 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6692 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6693 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6694 let mut total_msat = None;
6695 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6696 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6697 (0, prev_hop, required),
6698 (1, total_msat, option),
6699 (2, value, required),
6700 (4, payment_data, option),
6701 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6702 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6704 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6706 if payment_data.is_some() {
6707 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6709 if total_msat.is_none() {
6710 total_msat = Some(value);
6712 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6715 if total_msat.is_none() {
6716 if payment_data.is_none() {
6717 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6719 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6721 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6725 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6728 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6735 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6736 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6737 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6740 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6741 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6742 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6743 let mut payment_id = None;
6744 let mut payment_secret = None;
6745 let mut payment_params = None;
6746 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6747 (0, session_priv, required),
6748 (1, payment_id, option),
6749 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6750 (3, payment_secret, option),
6751 (4, path, vec_type),
6752 (5, payment_params, option),
6754 if payment_id.is_none() {
6755 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6757 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6759 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6760 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6761 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6762 path: path.unwrap(),
6763 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6768 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6769 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6774 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6775 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6777 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6779 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6780 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6781 (0, session_priv, required),
6782 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6783 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6784 (3, payment_secret, option),
6785 (4, *path, vec_type),
6786 (5, payment_params, option),
6789 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6791 field.write(writer)?;
6798 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6799 (0, LightningError) => {
6803 (0, failure_code, required),
6804 (2, data, vec_type),
6808 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6809 (0, forward_info, required),
6810 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6811 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6812 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6813 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6816 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6818 (0, htlc_id, required),
6819 (2, err_packet, required),
6824 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6825 (0, payment_secret, required),
6826 (2, expiry_time, required),
6827 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6828 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6829 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6832 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6834 (0, session_privs, required),
6837 (0, session_privs, required),
6838 (1, payment_hash, option),
6839 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6842 (0, session_privs, required),
6843 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6844 (2, payment_hash, required),
6845 (4, payment_secret, option),
6846 (6, total_msat, required),
6847 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6848 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6851 (0, session_privs, required),
6852 (2, payment_hash, required),
6856 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6857 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6858 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6859 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6860 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6863 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6864 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6866 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6868 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6870 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6871 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6872 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6876 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6877 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6878 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6879 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6880 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6881 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6882 unfunded_channels += 1;
6885 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6886 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6887 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6888 channel.write(writer)?;
6894 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6895 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6896 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6897 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6898 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6899 for forward in pending_forwards {
6900 forward.write(writer)?;
6905 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6906 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6907 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6909 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6910 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6911 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6912 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6913 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6914 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6915 htlc.write(writer)?;
6917 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6921 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6922 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6923 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6924 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6925 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6928 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6929 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6930 for event in events.iter() {
6931 event.write(writer)?;
6934 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6935 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6936 for event in background_events.iter() {
6938 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6940 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6941 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6946 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6947 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6948 // likely to be identical.
6949 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6950 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6952 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6953 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6954 hash.write(writer)?;
6955 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6958 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6959 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6960 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6961 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6962 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6965 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6966 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6968 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6969 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6970 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6971 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6974 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6975 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6979 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6980 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6981 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6983 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6984 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6985 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6990 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6991 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6992 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6993 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6994 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6995 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6996 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7003 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7005 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7007 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7008 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7009 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7010 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7011 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7012 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7013 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7014 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7015 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7016 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7017 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7018 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7019 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7021 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7022 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7024 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7025 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7027 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7028 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7029 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7030 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7031 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7032 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7034 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7035 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7036 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7037 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7038 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7039 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7042 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7043 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7045 pub keys_manager: K,
7047 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7049 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7050 pub fee_estimator: F,
7051 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7053 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7054 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7055 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7056 pub chain_monitor: M,
7058 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7059 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7060 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7061 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7062 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7063 /// deserialization.
7065 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7066 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7067 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7069 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7070 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7072 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7073 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7074 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7075 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7077 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7080 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7081 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7084 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7085 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7086 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7087 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7088 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7089 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7092 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7093 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7094 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7095 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7096 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7098 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7099 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7104 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7105 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7106 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7107 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7108 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7109 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7110 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7111 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7114 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7115 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7116 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7120 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7121 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7122 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7123 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7124 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7125 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7128 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7129 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7131 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7137 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7139 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7140 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7141 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7142 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7143 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7144 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7145 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7146 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7147 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7148 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7149 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7150 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7151 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7152 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7153 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7154 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7155 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7156 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7157 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7158 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7159 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7160 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7161 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7162 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7163 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7164 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7165 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7166 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7167 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7168 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7169 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7170 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7171 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7172 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7173 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7174 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7175 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7176 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7179 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7180 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7181 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7183 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7184 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7186 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7188 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7189 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7190 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7191 // safely discard the channel.
7192 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7193 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7194 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7195 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7196 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7199 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7200 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7201 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7202 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7203 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7204 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7208 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7209 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7210 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7211 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7215 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7216 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7217 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7218 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7219 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7222 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7223 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7225 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7228 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7229 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7230 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7231 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7234 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7235 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7237 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7240 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7241 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7242 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7243 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7244 let peer_state = PeerState {
7245 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7247 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7250 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7251 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7252 for _ in 0..event_count {
7253 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7254 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7258 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7259 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7260 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7261 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7262 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7263 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7264 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7265 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7269 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7270 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7271 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7272 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7273 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7274 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7278 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7279 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7281 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7282 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7283 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7284 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7285 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7289 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7291 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7292 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7293 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7295 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7297 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7302 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7303 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7304 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7305 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7306 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7307 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7308 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7309 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7310 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7311 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7312 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7313 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7314 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7315 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7317 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7318 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7321 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7322 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7325 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7326 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7327 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7328 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7329 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7330 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7332 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7334 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7335 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7336 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7337 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7338 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7339 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7340 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7342 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7343 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7344 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7345 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7346 if path.is_empty() {
7347 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7350 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7351 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7352 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7353 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7355 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7356 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7357 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7360 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7361 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7362 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7363 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7365 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7366 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7367 total_msat: path_amt,
7368 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7370 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7371 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7380 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7381 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7383 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7384 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7385 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7386 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7388 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7389 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7392 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7393 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7394 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7395 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7398 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7399 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7400 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7401 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7402 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7403 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7404 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7405 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7407 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7408 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7412 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7414 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7416 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7417 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7419 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7423 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7424 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7426 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7427 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7430 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7432 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7434 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7435 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7436 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7437 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7438 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7442 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7443 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7444 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7445 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7447 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7448 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7449 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7451 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7452 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7453 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7454 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7455 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7456 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7458 if chan.is_usable() {
7459 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7460 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7461 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7462 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7463 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7468 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7470 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7471 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7472 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7473 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7474 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7475 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7476 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7477 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7478 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7479 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7480 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7482 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7483 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7485 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7486 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7487 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7488 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7490 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7491 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7492 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7493 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7495 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7496 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7497 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7498 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7500 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7501 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7502 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7504 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7505 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7508 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7511 purpose: payment_purpose,
7512 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7518 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7520 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7521 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7522 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7524 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7526 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7528 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7530 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7531 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7532 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7534 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7535 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7536 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7537 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7538 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7539 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7541 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7547 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7549 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7551 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7552 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7553 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7554 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7556 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7557 logger: args.logger,
7558 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7561 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7562 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7563 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7564 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7567 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7568 //connection or two.
7570 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7576 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7577 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7578 use core::time::Duration;
7579 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7580 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7581 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7582 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7583 use crate::ln::msgs;
7584 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7585 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7586 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7587 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7588 use crate::util::test_utils;
7589 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7592 fn test_notify_limits() {
7593 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7594 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7598 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7600 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7601 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7602 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7603 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7604 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7606 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7608 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7609 // to connect messages with new values
7610 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7611 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7612 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7613 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7615 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7616 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7617 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7618 // ... but the last node should not.
7619 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7620 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7621 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7622 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7624 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7625 // about the channel.
7626 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7627 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7628 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7630 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7632 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7633 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7634 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7635 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7636 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7637 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7639 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7640 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7641 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7643 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7644 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7645 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7646 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7647 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7648 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7650 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7651 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7652 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7653 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7654 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7655 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7656 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7657 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7659 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7660 // the channel info has updated.
7661 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7662 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7663 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7664 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7665 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7666 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7670 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7671 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7676 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7677 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7679 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7680 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7681 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7682 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7684 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7685 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7686 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7687 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7688 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7689 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7691 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7692 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7693 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7695 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7696 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7700 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7701 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7704 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7705 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7706 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7708 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7709 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7710 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7711 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7712 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7713 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7714 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7715 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7716 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7718 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7719 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7723 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7725 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7726 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7727 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7728 // lightning messages manually.
7729 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7730 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7733 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7734 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7735 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7737 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7738 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7740 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7741 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7743 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7744 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7745 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7747 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7748 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7749 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7751 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7753 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7755 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7756 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7759 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7760 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7761 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7762 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7764 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7765 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7766 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7767 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7772 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7773 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7774 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7775 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7780 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7781 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7782 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7783 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7790 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7791 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7792 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7793 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7794 // fails as expected.
7795 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7796 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7797 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7798 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7799 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7800 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7801 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7803 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7804 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7805 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7807 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7808 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7809 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7810 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7811 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7813 let route = find_route(
7814 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7815 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7817 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7819 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7821 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7822 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7823 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7825 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7826 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7827 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7828 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7829 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7831 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7832 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7833 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7834 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7835 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7836 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7837 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7838 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7839 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7841 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7842 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7844 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7845 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7846 let route = find_route(
7847 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7848 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7850 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7852 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7854 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7855 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7856 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7858 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7859 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7860 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7862 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7864 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7865 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7866 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7868 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7869 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7870 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7872 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7873 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7874 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7875 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7876 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7877 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7878 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7879 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7880 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7882 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7883 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7887 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7888 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7889 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7893 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7895 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7896 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7897 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7898 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7900 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7901 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7902 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7903 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7904 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7906 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7907 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7908 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7909 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7910 let route = find_route(
7911 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7912 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7915 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7916 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7917 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7918 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7921 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7922 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7923 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7924 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7925 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7926 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7927 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7929 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7933 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7934 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7940 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7941 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7942 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7943 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7945 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7946 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7947 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7948 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7949 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7951 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7952 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7953 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7954 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7955 let route = find_route(
7956 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7957 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7960 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7961 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7962 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7963 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7964 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7967 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7968 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7969 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7970 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7971 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7972 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7975 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7979 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7980 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7981 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7982 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7983 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7985 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7986 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7987 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7988 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7990 // Marshall an MPP route.
7991 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7992 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7993 route.paths.push(path);
7994 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7995 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7996 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7997 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7998 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7999 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8001 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8002 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8003 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8004 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8009 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8010 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8014 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8016 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8017 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8019 total_msat: 100_000,
8022 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8023 // payment verification fails as expected.
8024 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8025 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8026 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8027 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8029 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8033 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8034 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8038 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8039 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8040 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8041 // the channel is successfully closed.
8042 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8043 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8044 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8045 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8047 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8048 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8049 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8050 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8051 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8053 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8054 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8056 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8057 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8058 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8059 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8062 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8064 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8065 // as it has the funding transaction.
8066 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8067 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8068 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8070 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8073 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8075 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8077 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8078 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8079 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8081 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8082 // as it has the funding transaction.
8083 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8084 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8085 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8088 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8089 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8091 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8092 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8093 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8095 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8096 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8097 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8098 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8100 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8103 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8104 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8105 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8106 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8107 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8108 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8109 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8111 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8112 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8113 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8114 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8115 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8116 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8117 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8120 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8122 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8123 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8124 // closing transaction).
8125 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8126 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8127 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8129 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8130 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8131 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8132 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8133 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8136 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8138 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8140 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8141 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8142 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8144 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8146 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8147 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8151 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8153 use crate::chain::Listen;
8154 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8155 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8156 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8157 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8158 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8159 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8160 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8161 use crate::util::test_utils;
8162 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8163 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8165 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8166 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8167 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8169 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8173 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8174 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8175 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8176 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8177 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8178 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8179 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8184 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8185 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8188 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8189 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8190 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8192 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8193 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8195 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8196 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8198 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8199 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8201 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8202 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8203 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8204 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8205 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8207 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8209 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8211 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8212 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8213 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8214 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8215 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8217 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8219 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8221 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8222 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8223 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8224 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8225 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8228 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8229 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8230 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8232 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8233 } else { panic!(); }
8235 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8236 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8238 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8241 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8244 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8245 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8247 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8248 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8249 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8250 match msg_events[0] {
8251 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8252 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8253 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8257 match msg_events[1] {
8258 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8262 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8263 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8265 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8266 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8271 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8272 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8274 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8275 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8280 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8282 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8283 macro_rules! send_payment {
8284 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8285 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8286 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8287 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8288 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8289 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8290 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8291 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8292 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8293 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8295 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8296 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8298 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8299 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8301 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8302 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8303 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8304 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8305 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8306 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8307 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8308 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8310 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8311 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8312 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8313 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8315 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8316 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8317 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8318 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8319 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8321 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8324 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8325 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8326 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8327 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8329 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8334 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8335 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);