1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
118 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
126 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144 /// may overshoot this in either case)
145 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
168 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
176 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
184 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192 short_channel_id: u64,
193 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
195 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
198 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
204 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
206 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
210 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
218 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
220 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222 sender_intended_value: u64,
223 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
225 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
230 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240 value_msat: val.value,
245 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
246 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
249 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
250 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
253 /// Number of bytes in the id.
254 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
257 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
263 impl Readable for PaymentId {
264 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
265 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
270 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
271 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
272 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
276 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
279 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
280 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
288 impl Readable for InterceptId {
289 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
290 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
296 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
297 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
298 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
299 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
302 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
305 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
306 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
309 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
314 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
315 (0, short_channel_id, required),
316 (2, htlc_id, required),
318 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
319 (0, session_priv, required),
324 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
325 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
328 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
331 session_priv: SecretKey,
332 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
333 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
334 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
335 payment_id: PaymentId,
338 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
339 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
340 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
349 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
350 payment_id.hash(hasher);
351 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
357 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
360 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
361 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
362 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
363 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
364 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
369 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
370 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
371 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
372 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
373 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
381 struct InboundOnionErr {
387 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
388 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
392 pub enum FailureCode {
393 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
394 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
395 TemporaryNodeFailure,
396 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
397 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
398 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
399 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
400 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
401 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
402 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
403 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
404 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
405 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
408 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
409 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
412 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
413 fn into(self) -> u16 {
415 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
416 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
417 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
418 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
423 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
424 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
425 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
426 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
427 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
430 err: msgs::LightningError,
431 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
432 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
433 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
449 shutdown_finish: None,
450 channel_capacity: None,
454 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
455 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
458 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
459 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
460 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
461 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
462 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
463 // commitment upon reconnecting.
464 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
469 err: LightningError { err, action },
470 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
471 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
472 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
476 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
479 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
482 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
486 log_level: Level::Warn,
489 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
496 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
510 self.chan_id.is_some()
514 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
515 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
516 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
517 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
518 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
521 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
522 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
523 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
524 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
525 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
526 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
528 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
532 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
533 struct ClaimingPayment {
535 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
537 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
538 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
541 (0, amount_msat, required),
542 (2, payment_purpose, required),
543 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
544 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
545 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
548 struct ClaimablePayment {
549 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
550 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
551 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
554 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
555 struct ClaimablePayments {
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
557 /// failed/claimed by the user.
559 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
560 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
562 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
563 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
564 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
566 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
567 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
568 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
569 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
572 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
573 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
574 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
575 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
577 enum BackgroundEvent {
578 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
579 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
580 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
581 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
586 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
587 /// channel to continue normal operation.
589 /// In general this should be used rather than
590 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
591 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
592 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
594 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
595 /// are regenerated on startup.
596 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
597 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
598 funding_txo: OutPoint,
599 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
601 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
602 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
604 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
605 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
606 channel_id: ChannelId,
611 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
612 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
613 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
614 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
615 /// event can be generated.
616 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
617 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
618 /// operation of another channel.
620 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
621 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
622 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
623 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
625 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
626 event: events::Event,
627 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
629 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
630 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
631 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
633 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
634 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
635 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
636 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
637 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
639 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
640 /// stored for later processing.
641 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
642 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
643 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
644 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
649 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
650 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
651 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
652 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
653 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
654 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
655 (4, blocking_action, required),
657 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
658 (0, event, upgradable_required),
659 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
660 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
661 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
662 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
663 // downgrades to prior versions.
664 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
668 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
669 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
670 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
672 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
676 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
677 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
678 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
682 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
683 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
684 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
685 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
686 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
687 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
689 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
690 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
691 channel_id: ChannelId,
692 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
697 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
698 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
699 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
700 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
701 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
707 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
711 /// State we hold per-peer.
712 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
713 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
715 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
716 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
717 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
719 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
720 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
721 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
722 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
723 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
724 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
725 latest_features: InitFeatures,
726 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
727 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
728 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
729 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
730 /// user but which have not yet completed.
732 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
733 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
734 /// for a missing channel.
735 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
736 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
737 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
739 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
740 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
741 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
742 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
744 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
745 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
746 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
747 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
748 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
749 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
750 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
751 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
752 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
753 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
754 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
755 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
756 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
757 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
758 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
762 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
763 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
764 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
765 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
766 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
767 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
770 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
771 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
772 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
775 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
776 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
777 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
780 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
781 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
782 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
783 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
787 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
788 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
789 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
790 /// The original OpenChannel message.
791 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
792 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
793 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
796 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
797 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
798 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
800 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
801 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
803 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
806 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
807 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
808 struct PendingInboundPayment {
809 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
810 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
811 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
812 /// this payment being removed.
814 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
815 user_payment_id: u64,
816 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
817 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
818 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
821 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
822 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
823 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
824 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
831 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
839 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
841 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
842 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
843 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
848 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
849 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
850 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
851 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
852 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
853 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
854 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
855 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
856 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
858 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
859 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
868 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
870 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
871 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
872 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
877 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
879 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
881 pub trait AChannelManager {
882 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
883 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
884 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
885 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
886 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
887 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
888 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
889 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
890 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
891 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
892 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
893 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
894 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
895 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
896 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
897 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
898 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
899 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
900 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
901 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
902 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
903 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
904 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
905 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
906 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
907 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
908 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
909 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
910 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
911 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
912 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
913 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
914 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
915 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
916 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
917 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
920 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
921 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
923 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
925 ES::Target: EntropySource,
926 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
927 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
932 type Watch = M::Target;
934 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
936 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
938 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
940 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
941 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
943 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
945 type Router = R::Target;
947 type Logger = L::Target;
949 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
952 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
953 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
955 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
956 /// to individual Channels.
958 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
959 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
960 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
961 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
963 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
964 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
965 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
966 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
967 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
968 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
969 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
970 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
971 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
973 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
974 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
975 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
977 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
978 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
979 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
980 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
981 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
983 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
984 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
985 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
986 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
988 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
989 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
990 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
992 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
993 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
994 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
995 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
996 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
998 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
999 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1000 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1001 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1002 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1003 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1004 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1005 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1008 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1009 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1010 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1011 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1012 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1016 // `pending_offers_messages`
1018 // `total_consistency_lock`
1020 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1022 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1024 // |__`per_peer_state`
1026 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1028 // |__`claimable_payments`
1030 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1036 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1038 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1042 // |__`pending_events`
1044 // |__`pending_background_events`
1046 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1048 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1050 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1051 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1052 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1053 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1057 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1058 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1059 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1065 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1067 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1069 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1070 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1072 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1073 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1074 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1075 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1077 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1080 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1081 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1082 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1083 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1084 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1085 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1086 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1087 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1089 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1091 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1092 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1094 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1096 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1097 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1098 /// and via the classic SCID.
1100 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1101 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1103 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1105 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1107 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1108 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1109 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1111 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1112 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1114 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1115 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1117 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1118 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1120 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1121 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1122 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1123 /// active channel list on load.
1125 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1126 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1128 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1130 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1131 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1132 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1134 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1135 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1136 /// the handling of the events.
1138 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1139 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1142 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1143 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1144 /// would break backwards compatability.
1145 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1146 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1147 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1149 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1150 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1152 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1154 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1155 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1156 /// confirmation depth.
1158 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1159 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1160 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1162 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1164 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1166 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1168 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1170 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1172 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1173 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1174 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1176 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1177 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1179 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1180 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1181 /// keeping additional state.
1182 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1184 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1185 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1186 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1187 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1189 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1190 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1192 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1193 /// are currently open with that peer.
1195 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1196 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1199 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1201 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1202 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1203 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1204 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1205 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1207 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1208 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1209 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1210 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1211 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1213 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1214 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1216 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1217 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1218 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1219 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1220 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1222 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1223 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1225 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1226 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1227 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1228 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1229 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1231 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1233 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1235 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1236 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1237 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1238 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1239 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1240 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1241 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1242 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1243 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1244 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1245 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1247 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1248 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1249 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1251 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1253 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1254 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1256 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1260 signer_provider: SP,
1265 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1267 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1268 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1269 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1270 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1271 pub struct ChainParameters {
1272 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1273 pub network: Network,
1275 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1277 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1278 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1281 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1285 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1286 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1289 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1290 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1291 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1292 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1293 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1294 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1296 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1297 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1298 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1299 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1300 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1301 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1303 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1304 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1307 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1308 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1309 /// events to handle.
1311 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1312 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1314 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1315 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1318 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1319 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1320 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1321 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1323 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1324 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1325 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1326 should_persist: move || {
1327 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1328 // processing and return that.
1329 let notify = persist_check();
1330 match (notify, force_notify) {
1331 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1332 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1333 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1334 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1335 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1338 _read_guard: read_guard,
1342 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1343 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1344 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1345 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1346 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1347 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1349 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1350 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1351 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1352 should_persist: persist_check,
1353 _read_guard: read_guard,
1358 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1359 fn drop(&mut self) {
1360 match (self.should_persist)() {
1361 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1362 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1363 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1365 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1366 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1367 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1372 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1373 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1375 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1377 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1378 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1379 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1380 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1381 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1383 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1384 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1386 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1388 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1389 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1390 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1391 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1392 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1393 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1394 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1395 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1396 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1397 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1398 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1399 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1400 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1402 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1403 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1405 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1406 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1407 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1408 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1410 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1411 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1412 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1413 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1414 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1415 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1418 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1420 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1421 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1424 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1426 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1427 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1429 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1430 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1431 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1433 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1434 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1435 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1437 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1438 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1439 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1440 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1442 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1443 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1444 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1446 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1447 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1448 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1450 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1451 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1452 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1453 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1454 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1455 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1456 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1457 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1458 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1459 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1460 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1463 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1464 /// to better separate parameters.
1465 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1466 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1467 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1468 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1469 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1470 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1471 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1472 pub features: InitFeatures,
1473 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1474 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1475 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1477 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1479 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1480 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1481 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1482 /// payments to us through this channel.
1483 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1484 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1485 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1486 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1487 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1488 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1489 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1492 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1493 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1494 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1495 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1496 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1497 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1498 /// lifetime of the channel.
1499 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1500 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1501 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1502 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1503 /// our counterparty already.
1505 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1506 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1507 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1508 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1510 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1511 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1512 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1513 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1515 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1516 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1518 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1519 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1521 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1522 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1523 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1524 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1525 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1526 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1527 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1528 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1529 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1532 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1534 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1535 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1536 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1537 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1538 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1539 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1540 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1542 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1543 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1545 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1546 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1547 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1548 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1549 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1550 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1551 /// this value on chain.
1553 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1555 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1557 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1558 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1559 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1560 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1561 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1562 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1563 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1565 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1566 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1567 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1568 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1569 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1570 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1572 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1573 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1574 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1575 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1576 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1578 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1579 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1580 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1581 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1583 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1584 pub balance_msat: u64,
1585 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1586 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1587 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1588 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1590 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1592 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1593 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1594 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1595 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1596 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1597 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1598 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1599 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1601 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1602 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1603 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1604 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1605 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1606 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1607 /// route which is valid.
1608 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1609 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1610 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1611 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1612 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1613 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1615 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1616 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1617 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1618 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1619 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1620 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1621 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1622 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1623 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1625 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1627 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1628 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1629 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1630 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1631 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1633 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1634 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1635 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1636 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1637 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1638 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1639 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1641 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1642 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1643 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1644 pub is_outbound: bool,
1645 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1646 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1647 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1648 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1649 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1651 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1652 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1653 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1654 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1655 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1656 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1657 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1659 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1660 pub is_usable: bool,
1661 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1662 pub is_public: bool,
1663 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1664 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1665 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1666 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1667 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1668 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1670 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1671 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1674 impl ChannelDetails {
1675 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1676 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1677 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1679 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1680 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1681 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1682 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1685 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1686 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1687 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1689 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1690 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1691 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1692 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1695 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1696 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1697 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1700 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1701 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1703 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1704 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1705 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1707 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1708 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1709 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1710 features: latest_features,
1711 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1712 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1713 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1714 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1715 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1716 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1717 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1718 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1719 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1720 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1722 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1723 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1724 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1725 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1726 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1727 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1728 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1729 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1730 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1731 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1732 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1733 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1734 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1735 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1736 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1737 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1738 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1739 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1740 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1741 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1742 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1743 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1744 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1745 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1746 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1747 config: Some(context.config()),
1748 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1753 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1754 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1755 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1756 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1757 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1758 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1759 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1760 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1761 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1763 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1765 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1766 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1768 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1769 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1770 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1771 /// to drop the channel.
1775 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1776 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1777 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1778 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1779 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1781 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1782 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1783 payment_id: PaymentId,
1785 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1787 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1788 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1789 payment_id: PaymentId,
1790 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1792 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1793 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1794 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1797 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1798 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1799 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1801 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1802 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1803 payment_id: PaymentId,
1804 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1805 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1806 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1808 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1809 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1810 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1812 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1813 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1814 payment_id: PaymentId,
1815 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1816 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1820 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1822 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1824 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1825 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1826 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1827 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1829 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1830 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1831 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1834 macro_rules! handle_error {
1835 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1836 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1837 // entering the macro.
1838 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1839 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1843 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1844 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1846 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1847 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1848 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1849 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1853 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1854 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1855 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1856 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1857 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1858 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1863 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1864 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1866 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1867 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1868 action: err.action.clone()
1872 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1873 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1874 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1875 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1876 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1880 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1885 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1888 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1889 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1890 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1896 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1897 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1898 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1899 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1900 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1901 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1903 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1904 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1905 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1906 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1907 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1909 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1910 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1912 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1916 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1917 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1918 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1920 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1921 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1923 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1924 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1926 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1927 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1928 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1929 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1930 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1931 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1933 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1934 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1938 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1939 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1941 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1942 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1944 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1945 match $channel_phase {
1946 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1947 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1949 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1950 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1952 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1953 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1959 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1960 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1964 let key = *$entry.key();
1965 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1967 $entry.remove_entry();
1975 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1976 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1980 let key = *$entry.key();
1981 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1983 $entry.remove_entry();
1991 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1992 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1994 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1995 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2001 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2002 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2003 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2004 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2005 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2007 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2008 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2009 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2010 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2011 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2012 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2013 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2014 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2015 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2016 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2021 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2022 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2023 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2024 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2025 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2026 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2027 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2028 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2029 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2031 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2036 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2037 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2038 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2039 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2040 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2041 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2042 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2043 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2044 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2046 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2051 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2052 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2053 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2054 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2055 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2056 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2057 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2058 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2059 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2060 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2061 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2063 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2064 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2065 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2071 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2072 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2074 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2075 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2076 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2077 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2078 updates.announcement_sigs);
2079 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2080 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2083 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2084 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2085 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2086 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2088 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2089 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2090 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2091 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2092 let mut batch_completed = false;
2093 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2094 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2095 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2096 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2098 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2099 channel_state.2 = true;
2101 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2103 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2105 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2108 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2109 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2110 if batch_completed {
2111 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2112 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2113 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2114 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2115 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2116 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2117 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2118 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2119 chan.set_batch_ready();
2120 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2121 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2125 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2126 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2127 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2132 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2134 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2135 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2137 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2138 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2139 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2140 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2145 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2146 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2147 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2149 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2150 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2151 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2152 panic!("{}", err_str);
2154 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2155 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2156 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2159 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2165 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2166 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2167 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2169 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2170 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2171 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2172 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2173 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2174 // filter for uniqueness here.
2175 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2176 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2177 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2178 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2180 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2181 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2183 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2184 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2185 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2191 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2192 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2193 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2194 while !processed_all_events {
2195 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2202 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2203 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2204 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2206 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2207 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2208 result = $self.process_background_events();
2210 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2211 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2212 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2213 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2217 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2218 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2219 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2220 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2223 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2225 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2226 $event_to_handle = event;
2228 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2229 post_event_actions.push(action);
2234 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2235 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2236 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2237 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2238 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2239 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2242 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2243 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2244 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2245 processed_all_events = false;
2249 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2250 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2251 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2253 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2254 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2255 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2261 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2272 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2274 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2276 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2277 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2279 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2281 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2282 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2283 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2286 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2287 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2288 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2290 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2291 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2292 current_timestamp: u32,
2294 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2295 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2296 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2297 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2299 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2300 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2301 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2306 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2308 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2309 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2310 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2311 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2312 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2313 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2314 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2315 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2317 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2320 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2321 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2323 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2325 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2327 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2329 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2330 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2331 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2332 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2333 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2335 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2336 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2338 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2348 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2349 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2350 &self.default_configuration
2353 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2354 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2355 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2358 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2359 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2361 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2363 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2367 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2372 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2374 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2375 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2376 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2377 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2378 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2380 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2381 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2383 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2384 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2385 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2387 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2388 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2389 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2391 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2392 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2393 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2394 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2395 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2396 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2398 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2399 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2400 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2401 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2402 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2403 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2407 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2408 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2412 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2413 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2415 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2417 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2418 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2419 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2420 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2421 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2422 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2426 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2431 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2433 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2437 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2439 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2446 node_id: their_network_key,
2449 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2452 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2453 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2454 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2455 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2456 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2457 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2458 // the same channel.
2459 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2461 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2463 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2466 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2467 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2468 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2469 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2473 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2474 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2475 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2483 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2484 /// more information.
2485 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2486 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2487 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2488 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2489 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2490 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2491 // the same channel.
2492 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2494 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2495 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2496 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2499 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2500 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2501 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2509 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2510 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2512 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2513 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2515 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2516 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2517 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2518 // really wanted anyway.
2519 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2522 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2523 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2524 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2527 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2528 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2529 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2530 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2531 let context_to_details = |context| {
2532 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2534 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2536 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2537 .map(context_to_details)
2543 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2544 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2546 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2547 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2548 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2550 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2551 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2552 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2553 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2554 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2555 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2557 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2558 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2559 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2562 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2563 payment_id: *payment_id,
2564 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2565 total_msat: *total_msat,
2568 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2569 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2571 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2572 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2579 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2580 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2581 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2582 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2583 Some(transaction) => {
2584 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2585 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2590 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2591 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2592 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2593 reason: closure_reason,
2594 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2595 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2599 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2602 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2603 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2607 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2608 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2610 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2611 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2613 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2615 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2616 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2617 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2618 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2619 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2620 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2621 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2623 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2624 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2625 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2626 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2627 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2631 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2632 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2634 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2635 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2636 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2637 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2641 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2642 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2643 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2644 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2648 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2649 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2656 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2657 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2659 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2660 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2661 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2662 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2667 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2668 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2669 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2670 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2673 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2674 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2680 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2681 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2682 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2684 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2685 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2687 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2688 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2689 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2690 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2692 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2694 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2695 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2696 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2699 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2700 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2701 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2702 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2703 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2704 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2707 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2708 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2709 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2711 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2712 /// the channel being closed or not:
2713 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2714 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2715 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2716 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2717 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2718 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2719 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2721 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2722 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2723 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2724 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2726 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2728 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2729 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2730 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2733 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2734 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2735 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2736 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2737 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2740 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2741 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2742 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2743 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2744 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2747 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2748 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2749 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2750 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2751 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2752 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2753 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2755 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2756 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2757 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2758 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2759 // ignore the result here.
2760 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2762 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2763 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2764 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2765 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2767 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2768 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2769 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2770 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2771 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2772 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2773 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2774 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2777 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2780 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2781 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2784 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2785 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2789 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2790 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2791 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2792 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2793 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2794 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2795 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2796 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2797 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2798 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2799 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2801 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2803 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2804 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2805 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2806 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2807 mem::drop(peer_state);
2808 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2810 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2811 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2812 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2814 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2815 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2816 // Unfunded channel has no update
2817 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2820 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2821 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2822 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2823 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2825 (None, *peer_node_id)
2827 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2830 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2831 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2832 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2833 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2834 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2835 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2836 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2837 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2838 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2844 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2847 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2849 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2850 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2852 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2853 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2854 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2855 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2856 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2857 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2858 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2869 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2870 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2871 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2873 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2874 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2875 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2878 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2879 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2880 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2882 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2883 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2884 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2885 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2886 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2889 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2890 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2891 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2892 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2893 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2897 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2898 /// local transaction(s).
2899 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2900 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2901 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2905 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2906 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2907 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2908 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2909 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2910 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2911 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2913 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2914 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2918 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2919 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2920 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2921 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2922 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2923 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2924 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2925 err_data: Vec::new(),
2929 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2930 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2931 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2934 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2935 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2936 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2937 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2938 outgoing_cltv_value,
2939 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2943 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2944 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2945 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2946 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2947 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2948 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2949 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2950 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2952 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2953 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2954 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2956 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2957 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2959 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2960 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2961 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2962 err_data: Vec::new(),
2963 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2967 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2968 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2969 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2970 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2972 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2975 // final_expiry_too_soon
2976 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2977 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2979 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2980 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2981 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2982 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2983 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2984 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2985 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2986 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2987 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2988 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2989 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2992 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2993 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2994 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2996 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2998 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2999 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3003 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3004 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3005 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3006 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3007 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3008 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3009 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3010 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3011 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3012 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3013 err_data: Vec::new(),
3014 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3017 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3018 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3019 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3020 err_data: Vec::new(),
3021 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3024 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3028 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3031 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3032 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3035 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3036 phantom_shared_secret,
3040 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3041 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3042 err_data: Vec::new(),
3043 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3046 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3049 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3050 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3051 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3052 outgoing_cltv_value,
3053 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3057 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3058 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3059 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3060 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3061 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3063 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3064 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3065 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3066 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3067 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3068 failure_code: $err_code,
3074 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3075 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3078 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3079 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3080 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3082 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3083 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3084 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3085 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3086 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3087 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3088 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3089 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3091 macro_rules! return_err {
3092 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3094 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3095 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3096 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3097 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3098 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3099 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3105 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3106 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3107 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3110 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3111 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3113 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3114 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3117 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3118 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3119 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3120 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3123 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3124 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3125 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3127 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3128 // inbound channel's state.
3129 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3130 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3131 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3133 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3137 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3138 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3139 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3140 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3141 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3142 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3143 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3144 // phantom or an intercept.
3145 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3146 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3147 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3151 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3154 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3156 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3158 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3159 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3160 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3162 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3163 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3164 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3165 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3168 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3169 // have no consistency guarantees.
3170 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3174 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3175 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3176 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3177 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3178 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3180 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3181 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3182 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3183 // we don't have the channel here.
3184 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3186 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3188 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3189 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3190 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3191 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3192 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3193 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3194 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3195 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3196 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3197 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3198 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3200 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3203 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3204 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3206 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3207 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3211 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3212 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3213 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3214 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3216 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3223 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3224 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3225 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3226 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3227 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3228 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3230 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3231 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3233 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3234 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3235 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3236 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3237 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3238 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3239 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3240 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3241 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3242 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3248 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3249 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3250 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3251 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3253 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3254 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3256 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3257 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3258 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3260 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3261 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3262 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3263 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3264 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3265 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3266 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3270 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3272 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3275 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3276 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3277 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3278 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3279 macro_rules! return_err {
3280 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3282 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3283 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3284 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3285 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3286 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3287 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3293 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3295 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3296 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3299 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3300 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3301 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3302 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3303 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3305 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3308 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3309 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3310 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3311 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3312 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3318 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3319 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3320 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3322 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3323 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3324 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3326 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3327 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3328 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3329 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3330 return Err(LightningError {
3331 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3335 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3336 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3339 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3342 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3343 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3344 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3345 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3347 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3348 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3349 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3351 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3352 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3353 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3355 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3356 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3360 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3363 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3365 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3367 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3368 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3370 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3371 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3374 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3375 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3377 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3378 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3379 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3380 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3381 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3382 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3383 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3384 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3386 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3387 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3388 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3390 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3392 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3399 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3400 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3401 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3402 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3407 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3408 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3409 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3412 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3413 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3415 log_trace!(self.logger,
3416 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3417 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3418 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3419 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3421 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3422 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3423 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3425 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3426 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3428 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3429 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3430 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3431 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3435 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3436 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3437 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3438 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3439 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3440 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3441 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3442 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3443 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3445 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3446 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3447 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3449 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3450 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3452 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3453 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3454 Some(monitor_update) => {
3455 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3457 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3458 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3459 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3460 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3461 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3462 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3463 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3471 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3474 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3475 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3476 // `channel_by_id` map.
3477 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3478 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3483 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3484 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3486 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3491 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3493 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3494 /// fields for more info.
3496 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3497 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3499 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3501 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3502 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3503 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3504 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3505 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3507 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3508 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3509 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3510 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3511 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3513 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3514 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3515 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3516 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3518 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3520 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3521 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3522 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3524 /// In general, a path may raise:
3525 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3526 /// node public key) is specified.
3527 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3528 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3529 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3530 /// relevant updates.
3532 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3533 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3534 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3536 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3537 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3538 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3539 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3540 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3541 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3542 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3543 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3545 self.pending_outbound_payments
3546 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3547 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3548 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3551 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3552 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3553 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3554 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3556 self.pending_outbound_payments
3557 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3558 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3559 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3560 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3564 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3565 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3567 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3568 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3569 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3573 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3574 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3575 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3579 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3580 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3583 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments
3587 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3588 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3589 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3590 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3591 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3595 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3596 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3597 /// retries are exhausted.
3599 /// # Event Generation
3601 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3602 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3604 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3605 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3606 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3608 /// # Requested Invoices
3610 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3611 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3612 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3613 /// once the invoice has been received.
3615 /// # Restart Behavior
3617 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3618 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3619 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3621 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3622 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3624 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3627 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3628 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3629 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3630 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3631 /// never reach the recipient.
3633 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3634 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3636 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3637 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3639 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3640 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3641 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3643 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3644 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3645 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3648 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3649 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3651 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3654 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3655 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3656 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3657 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3658 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3659 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3660 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3661 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3664 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3665 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3666 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3667 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3668 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3670 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3671 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3672 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3675 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3678 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3679 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3682 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3683 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3685 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3686 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3687 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3688 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3689 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3690 let payment_params =
3691 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3693 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3695 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3698 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3699 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3701 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3702 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3703 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3704 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3706 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3707 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3708 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3709 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3710 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3711 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3712 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3713 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3714 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3715 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3717 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3718 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3719 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3720 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3724 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3726 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3727 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3730 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3732 let mut res = Vec::new();
3734 for mut path in route.paths {
3735 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3736 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3737 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3738 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3739 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3742 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3745 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3746 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3748 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3750 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3751 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3756 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3759 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3764 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3765 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3766 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3768 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3769 let used_liquidity =
3770 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3772 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3773 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3775 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3778 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3783 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3784 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3785 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3792 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3793 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3794 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3795 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3796 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3797 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3799 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3800 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3804 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3805 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3806 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3808 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3809 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3810 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3811 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3812 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3813 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3814 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3815 } else { unreachable!(); });
3817 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3818 Err((chan, err)) => {
3819 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3820 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3822 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3823 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3824 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3830 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3831 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3833 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3834 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3837 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3838 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3839 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3843 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3844 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3847 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3849 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3852 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3853 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3854 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3856 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3863 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3864 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3865 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3869 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3871 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3872 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3874 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3875 /// across the p2p network.
3877 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3878 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3880 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3881 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3882 /// keys per-channel).
3884 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3885 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3886 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3888 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3889 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3890 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3892 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3893 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3894 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3895 /// for more details.
3897 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3898 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3899 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3900 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3903 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3905 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3906 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3908 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3909 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3910 /// signature for each channel.
3912 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3913 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3915 let mut result = Ok(());
3917 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3918 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3919 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3920 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3921 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3926 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3927 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3928 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3932 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3933 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3934 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3935 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3936 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3937 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3938 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3939 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3944 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3945 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3946 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3947 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3951 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3952 match states.entry(txid) {
3953 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3954 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3955 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3959 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3962 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3963 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3964 temporary_channel_id,
3965 counterparty_node_id,
3966 funding_transaction.clone(),
3969 let mut output_index = None;
3970 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3971 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3972 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3973 if output_index.is_some() {
3974 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3975 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3978 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3981 if output_index.is_none() {
3982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3983 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3986 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3987 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3988 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3994 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3995 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3996 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3997 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3998 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3999 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4000 .into_iter().flatten()
4001 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4003 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4004 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4006 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4008 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4009 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4010 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4011 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4012 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4014 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4015 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4016 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4020 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4021 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4027 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4029 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4030 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4031 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4032 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4034 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4035 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4037 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4038 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4040 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4042 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4043 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4044 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4045 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4046 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4047 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4048 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4049 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4050 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4051 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4052 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4053 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4054 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4060 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4061 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4062 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4063 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4064 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4065 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4066 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4067 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4071 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4072 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4073 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4074 config.apply(config_update);
4075 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4078 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4079 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4080 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4081 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4082 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4083 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4090 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4091 debug_assert!(false);
4092 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4094 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4095 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4102 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4104 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4105 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4106 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4107 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4109 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4110 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4112 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4113 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4115 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4117 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4118 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4119 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4120 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4121 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4122 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4123 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4124 pub fn update_channel_config(
4125 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4126 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4127 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4130 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4131 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4133 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4134 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4136 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4137 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4138 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4139 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4140 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4142 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4143 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4144 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4147 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4150 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4151 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4152 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4153 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4154 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4155 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4158 let next_hop_scid = {
4159 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4160 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4161 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4162 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4163 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4164 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4165 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4166 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4167 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4168 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4171 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4173 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4174 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4175 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4177 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4178 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4179 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4184 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4185 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4186 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4189 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4190 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4191 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4193 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4195 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4196 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4197 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4198 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4199 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4202 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4203 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4204 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4205 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4206 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4208 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4212 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4213 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4215 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4218 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4219 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4222 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4223 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4224 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4227 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4228 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4229 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4230 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4231 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4232 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4233 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4234 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4237 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4238 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4239 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4240 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4245 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4247 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4248 /// Will likely generate further events.
4249 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4252 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4253 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4254 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4256 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4257 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4259 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4260 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4261 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4263 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4264 match forward_info {
4265 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4266 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4267 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4268 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4269 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4272 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4273 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4274 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4276 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4277 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4278 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4279 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4280 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4281 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4282 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4285 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4286 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4288 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4291 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4292 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4298 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4299 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4301 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4305 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4306 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4308 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4312 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4313 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4314 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4315 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4316 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4317 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4318 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4321 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4322 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4323 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4324 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4325 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4327 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4329 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4330 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4334 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4335 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4336 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4337 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4339 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4340 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4346 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4349 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4352 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4353 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4354 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4355 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4356 // problem, not ours.
4362 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4363 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4364 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4366 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4371 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4372 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4373 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4376 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4377 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4378 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4379 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4380 match forward_info {
4381 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4382 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4383 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4384 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4385 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4389 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4390 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4391 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4392 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4393 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4394 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4395 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4396 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4398 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4399 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4400 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4403 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4406 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4408 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4409 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4410 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4411 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4416 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4417 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4419 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4421 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4422 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4424 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4427 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4429 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4430 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4431 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4438 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4442 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4443 match forward_info {
4444 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4445 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4446 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4447 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4448 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4451 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4452 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4453 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4454 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4455 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4456 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4457 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4459 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4460 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4461 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4465 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4466 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4469 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4472 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4473 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4474 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4475 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4476 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4477 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4478 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4479 phantom_shared_secret,
4481 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4482 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4483 // if routing nodes overpay
4484 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4485 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4487 total_value_received: None,
4488 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4491 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4494 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4496 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4497 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4498 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4499 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4500 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4501 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4503 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4504 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4505 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4506 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4507 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4508 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4509 phantom_shared_secret,
4511 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4512 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4514 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4517 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4518 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4519 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4520 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4521 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4524 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4525 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4526 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4527 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4528 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4529 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4531 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4532 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4533 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4535 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4536 .entry(payment_hash)
4537 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4538 .or_insert_with(|| {
4539 committed_to_claimable = true;
4541 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4544 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4545 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4546 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4547 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4549 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4550 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4551 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4553 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4554 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4555 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4558 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4560 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4561 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4562 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4563 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4564 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4565 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4566 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4568 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4569 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4571 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4573 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4574 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4575 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4576 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4577 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4578 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4580 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4581 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4582 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4583 committed_to_claimable = true;
4585 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4586 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4587 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4588 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4589 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4590 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4591 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4592 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4593 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4594 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4598 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4599 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4600 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4601 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4602 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4604 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4606 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4607 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4609 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4610 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4611 committed_to_claimable = true;
4614 payment_claimable_generated
4618 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4619 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4620 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4621 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4622 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4623 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4624 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4625 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4627 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4628 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4629 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4630 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4631 Ok(result) => result,
4633 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4634 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4637 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4638 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4639 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4641 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4642 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4645 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4646 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4647 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4649 check_total_value!(purpose);
4651 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4652 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4653 check_total_value!(purpose);
4657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4658 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4660 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4662 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4663 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4665 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4666 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4668 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4669 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4671 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4672 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4673 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4675 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4676 if payment_claimable_generated {
4677 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4683 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4684 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4692 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4693 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4694 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4695 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4697 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4698 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4700 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4702 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4703 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4704 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4706 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4708 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4709 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4710 events.append(&mut new_events);
4713 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4715 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4716 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4717 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4719 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4721 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4722 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4723 if background_events.is_empty() {
4724 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4727 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4729 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4730 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4731 // monitor updating completing.
4732 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4734 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4735 let mut updated_chan = false;
4737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4738 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4739 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4740 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4741 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4743 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4744 updated_chan = true;
4745 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4746 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4748 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4756 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4757 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4760 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4762 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4765 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4766 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4768 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4769 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4770 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4771 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4772 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4778 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4781 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4782 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4783 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4784 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4785 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4788 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4789 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4790 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4791 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4792 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4794 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4796 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4798 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4800 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4801 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4804 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4806 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4807 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4811 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4812 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4813 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4814 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4815 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4816 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4817 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4819 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4820 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4823 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4826 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4827 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4829 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4834 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4835 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4843 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4845 /// This currently includes:
4846 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4847 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4848 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4850 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4851 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4852 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4853 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4854 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4855 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4856 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4857 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4859 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4860 /// estimate fetches.
4862 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4863 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4864 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4865 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4866 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4868 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4869 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4871 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4872 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4873 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4874 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4876 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4877 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4878 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4879 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4880 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4881 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4883 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4884 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4885 log_error!(self.logger,
4886 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4887 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4888 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4889 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4890 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4891 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4892 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4893 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4894 channel_id: *chan_id,
4895 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4907 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4910 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4911 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4912 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4914 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4915 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4920 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4921 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4923 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4924 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4925 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4926 if needs_close { return false; }
4929 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4930 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4931 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4932 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4933 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4934 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4935 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4936 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4938 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4939 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4940 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4941 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4945 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4947 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4950 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4952 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4953 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4954 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4959 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4961 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4967 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4969 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4970 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4971 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4972 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4973 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4974 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4975 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4976 channel_id: *chan_id,
4977 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4985 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4986 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4987 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4989 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4990 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4991 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4996 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4997 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4998 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4999 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5000 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5001 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5002 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5003 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5009 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5011 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5012 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5017 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5018 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5019 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5020 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5021 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5022 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5023 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5024 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5025 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5026 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5027 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5029 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5030 // have no channels to the peer.
5031 let remove_entry = {
5032 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5033 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5036 entry.remove_entry();
5039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5044 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5045 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5046 // This should be unreachable
5047 debug_assert!(false);
5050 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5051 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5052 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5053 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5054 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5055 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5056 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5059 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5060 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5061 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5063 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5064 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5071 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5072 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5073 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5074 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5075 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5078 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5079 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5082 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5083 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5086 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5087 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5088 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5089 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5090 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5091 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5092 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5095 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5096 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5099 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5100 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5101 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5102 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5103 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5110 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5111 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5112 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5114 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5115 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5116 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5117 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5119 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5120 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5121 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5122 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5123 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5124 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5127 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5128 /// reason for the failure.
5130 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5131 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5134 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5135 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5136 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5137 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5138 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5139 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5140 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5145 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5146 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5147 match failure_code {
5148 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5149 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5150 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5151 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5152 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5153 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5155 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5156 let fail_data = match data {
5157 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5160 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5165 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5166 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5168 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5170 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5171 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5172 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5173 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5174 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5175 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5176 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5178 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5180 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5181 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5183 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5188 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5189 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5190 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5191 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5192 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5193 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5194 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5195 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5196 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5197 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5199 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5200 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5201 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5202 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5204 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5205 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5206 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5207 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5208 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5212 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5213 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5214 // be surfaced to the user.
5215 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5216 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5217 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5219 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5221 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5222 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5223 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5224 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5226 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5227 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5229 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5230 debug_assert!(false);
5231 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5236 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5239 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5240 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5241 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5242 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5246 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5247 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5248 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5249 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5250 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5251 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5252 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5253 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5254 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5255 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5258 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5259 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5260 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5263 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5264 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5265 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5267 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5268 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5269 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5270 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5271 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5273 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5275 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5277 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5278 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5279 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5280 push_forward_ev = true;
5282 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5284 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5286 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5287 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5290 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5291 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5292 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5293 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5294 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5295 failed_next_destination: destination,
5301 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5302 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5304 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5305 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5306 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5307 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5309 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5310 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5311 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5312 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5314 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5315 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5316 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5318 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5319 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5320 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5321 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5322 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5323 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5324 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5325 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5326 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5329 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5330 /// even type numbers.
5334 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5335 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5337 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5338 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5339 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5342 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5343 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5348 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5349 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5350 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5351 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5352 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5353 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5354 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5355 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5360 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5361 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5362 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5363 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5364 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5366 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5367 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5368 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5372 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5373 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5374 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5375 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5376 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5377 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5378 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5379 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5380 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5381 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5382 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5391 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5393 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5394 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5395 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5396 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5397 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5398 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5399 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5400 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5401 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5402 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5403 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5404 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5405 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5406 debug_assert!(false);
5410 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5412 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5413 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5414 debug_assert!(false);
5418 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5419 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5421 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5422 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5423 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5424 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5427 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5428 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5429 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5430 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5434 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5435 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5436 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5437 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5438 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5439 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5442 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5443 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5444 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5445 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5446 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5451 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5452 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5453 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5454 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5455 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5456 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5457 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5459 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5462 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5463 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5464 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5465 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5469 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5470 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5471 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5472 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5474 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5475 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5476 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5477 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5479 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5480 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5481 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5482 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5485 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5486 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5487 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5488 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5492 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5493 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5494 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5497 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5498 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5499 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5500 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5501 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5502 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5503 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5506 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5507 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5510 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5513 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5514 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5516 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5517 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5518 // monitor update as a background event.
5519 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5520 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5521 counterparty_node_id,
5522 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5523 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5527 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5528 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5533 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5537 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5538 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5539 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5540 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5541 blocking_action: blocker,
5543 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5545 debug_assert!(false,
5546 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5549 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5550 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5551 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5552 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5553 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5555 let mut found_blocker = false;
5556 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5557 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5558 // which case we need to only remove the one
5559 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5560 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5561 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5562 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5564 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5567 debug_assert!(false);
5576 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5577 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5578 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5584 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5585 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5586 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5587 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5588 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5589 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5590 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5591 // again on restart.
5592 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5593 payment_preimage, update_res);
5596 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5597 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5599 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5600 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5601 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5602 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5603 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5604 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5605 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5606 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5607 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5608 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5611 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5612 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5613 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5614 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5615 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5616 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5620 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5621 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5624 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5625 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5626 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5629 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5630 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5631 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5632 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5633 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5635 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5636 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5637 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5639 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5640 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5643 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5644 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5645 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5646 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5647 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5648 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5649 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5650 let chan_to_release =
5651 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5652 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5654 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5655 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5656 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5657 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5662 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5663 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5664 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5665 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5666 // in the background.
5667 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5668 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5669 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5670 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5672 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5673 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5674 funding_txo, update, ..
5676 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5677 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5678 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5679 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5681 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5687 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5688 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5689 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5691 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5692 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5694 monitor_update.updates[0],
5695 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5700 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5701 // immediately once we get going.
5702 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5705 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5707 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5710 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5711 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5712 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5713 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5714 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5715 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5719 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5720 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5721 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5724 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5725 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5727 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5728 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5729 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5730 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5732 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5736 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5737 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5738 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5744 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5745 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5746 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5749 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5750 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5751 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5752 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5754 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5756 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5757 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5758 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5760 payment_purpose: purpose,
5763 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5765 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5769 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5771 sender_intended_total_msat,
5775 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5776 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5778 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5779 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5780 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5783 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5784 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5786 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5787 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5788 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5789 Some(blocking_action),
5796 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5797 /// update completion.
5798 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5799 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5800 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5801 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5802 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5803 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5805 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5806 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5807 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5808 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5809 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5810 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5812 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5814 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5815 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5816 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5817 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5820 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5821 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5823 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5824 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5825 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5830 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5831 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5833 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5838 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5839 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5840 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5841 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5842 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5847 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5851 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5857 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5858 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5859 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5863 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5864 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5865 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5871 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5872 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5874 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5875 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5877 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5878 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5879 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5880 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5881 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5886 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5887 let mut peer_state_lock;
5888 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5889 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5890 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5891 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5893 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5896 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5897 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5898 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5899 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5900 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5903 let remaining_in_flight =
5904 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5905 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5908 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5909 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5910 remaining_in_flight);
5911 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5914 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5917 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5919 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5920 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5923 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5924 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5925 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5927 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5928 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5929 /// used to accept such channels.
5931 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5932 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5933 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5934 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5937 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5938 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5940 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5941 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5942 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5944 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5945 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5947 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5948 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5950 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5951 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5953 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5954 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5955 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5956 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5959 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5962 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5963 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5965 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5966 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5969 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5971 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5972 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5973 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5975 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5976 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5977 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5978 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5979 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5980 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5981 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5983 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5987 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5988 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5989 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5990 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5991 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5992 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5993 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5999 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6000 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6001 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6002 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6003 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6004 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6005 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6006 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6009 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6010 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6014 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6015 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6016 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6018 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6019 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6020 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6023 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6028 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6029 /// or 0-conf channels.
6031 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6032 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6033 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6034 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6035 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6036 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6038 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6039 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6040 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6041 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6042 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6043 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6044 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6048 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6051 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6052 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6054 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6055 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6057 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6058 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6059 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6060 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6061 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6063 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6066 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6067 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6068 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6071 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6072 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6077 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6080 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6081 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6082 // likely to be lost on restart!
6083 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6084 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6087 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6088 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6091 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6092 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6093 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6094 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6095 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6100 debug_assert!(false);
6101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6106 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6107 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6108 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6109 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6110 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6111 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6113 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6114 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6115 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6118 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6119 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6121 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6122 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6125 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6126 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6131 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6132 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6133 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6134 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6135 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6136 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6137 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6138 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6139 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6141 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6142 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6143 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6148 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6149 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6150 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6151 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6152 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6153 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6154 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6157 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6162 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6163 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6166 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6167 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6170 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6171 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6173 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6174 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6175 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6177 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6181 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6182 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6183 // likely to be lost on restart!
6184 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6186 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6188 debug_assert!(false);
6189 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6193 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6195 match phase.get_mut() {
6196 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6197 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6198 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6208 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6209 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6210 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6211 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6212 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6214 user_channel_id: user_id,
6219 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6220 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6223 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6225 debug_assert!(false);
6226 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6229 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6230 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6231 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6232 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6233 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6234 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6236 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6237 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6238 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6239 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6240 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6241 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6242 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6243 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6244 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6248 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6251 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6254 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6256 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6259 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6260 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6262 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6263 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6264 funding_msg.channel_id))
6266 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6267 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6268 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6269 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6270 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6272 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6273 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6274 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6275 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6276 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6277 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6281 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6282 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6283 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6285 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6289 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6290 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6291 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6292 funding_msg.channel_id));
6300 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6301 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6302 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6303 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6305 debug_assert!(false);
6306 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6311 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6313 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6314 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6315 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6316 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6317 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6318 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6321 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6333 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6334 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6335 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6337 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6339 debug_assert!(false);
6340 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6344 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6346 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6347 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6348 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6349 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6351 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6352 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6353 msg: announcement_sigs,
6355 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6356 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6357 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6358 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6359 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6360 // announcement_signatures.
6361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6362 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6363 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6364 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6371 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6372 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6377 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6378 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6381 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6382 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6387 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6388 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6389 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6391 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6392 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6394 debug_assert!(false);
6395 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6397 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6398 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6399 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6400 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6402 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6403 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6404 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6406 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6409 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6410 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6411 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6412 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6414 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6415 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6416 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6417 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6418 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6419 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6423 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6424 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6425 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6426 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6429 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6430 let context = phase.context_mut();
6431 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6432 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6433 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6434 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6441 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6442 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6443 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6444 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6446 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6447 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6453 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6454 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6455 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6457 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6459 debug_assert!(false);
6460 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6462 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6467 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6468 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6469 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6470 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6471 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6472 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6477 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6478 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6479 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6480 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6481 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6482 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6483 } else { (tx, None) }
6485 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6486 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6492 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6493 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6494 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6496 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6497 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6498 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6499 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6500 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6504 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6505 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6507 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6508 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6509 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6514 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6515 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6516 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6517 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6519 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6520 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6521 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6522 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6524 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6525 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6527 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6528 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6529 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6531 debug_assert!(false);
6532 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6534 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6535 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6536 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6538 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6539 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6540 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6541 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6542 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6543 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6545 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6546 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6547 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6548 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6549 match pending_forward_info {
6550 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6551 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6552 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6553 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6555 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6556 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6557 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6558 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6559 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6562 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6564 _ => pending_forward_info
6567 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6569 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6570 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6578 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6580 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6582 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6584 debug_assert!(false);
6585 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6587 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6588 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6589 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6591 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6592 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6593 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6594 log_trace!(self.logger,
6595 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6597 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6598 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6599 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6601 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6602 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6603 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6604 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6605 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6606 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6607 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6610 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6611 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6617 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6621 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6622 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6623 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6624 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6625 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6627 debug_assert!(false);
6628 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6632 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6634 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6635 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6637 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6638 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6646 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6647 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6648 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6650 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6652 debug_assert!(false);
6653 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6655 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6656 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6657 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6659 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6660 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6661 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6663 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6664 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6666 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6667 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6675 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6676 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6677 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6679 debug_assert!(false);
6680 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6684 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6686 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6687 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6688 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6689 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6690 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6691 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6695 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6696 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6704 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6705 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6706 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6707 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6708 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6709 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6710 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6711 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6712 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6713 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6714 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6716 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6717 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6719 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6720 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6721 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6723 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6724 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6727 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6728 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6730 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6731 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6732 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6734 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6735 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6736 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6737 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6738 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6741 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6742 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6745 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6746 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6747 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6748 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6749 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6750 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6751 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6752 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6755 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6756 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6757 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6762 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6763 // payments are being processed.
6764 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6765 push_forward_event = true;
6767 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6768 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6775 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6776 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6779 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6780 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6781 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6783 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6787 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6788 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6789 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6790 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6791 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6793 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6794 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6795 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6796 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6797 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6798 // real by taking more time.
6799 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6800 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6801 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6806 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6807 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6808 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6809 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6810 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6811 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6812 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6814 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6815 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6816 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6817 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6818 channel_funding_outpoint,
6819 counterparty_node_id,
6824 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6825 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6826 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6829 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6830 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6833 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6834 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6835 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6841 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6842 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6844 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6846 debug_assert!(false);
6847 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6848 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6850 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6852 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6853 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6854 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6855 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6856 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6857 *counterparty_node_id)
6859 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6860 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6861 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6862 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6863 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6864 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6865 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6869 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6870 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6876 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6880 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6882 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6884 debug_assert!(false);
6885 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6889 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6891 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6892 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6894 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6895 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6903 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6905 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6907 debug_assert!(false);
6908 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6912 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6914 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6915 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6916 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6919 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6920 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6921 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6922 msg, &self.default_configuration
6923 ), chan_phase_entry),
6924 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6925 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6926 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6929 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6930 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6938 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6939 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6940 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6941 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6943 // It's not a local channel
6944 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6948 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6949 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6950 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6954 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6956 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6957 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6958 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6959 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6960 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6961 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6962 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6966 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6967 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6968 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6969 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6971 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6972 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6973 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6976 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6980 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6981 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6986 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6989 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6991 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6992 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6994 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6996 debug_assert!(false);
6997 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6998 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7004 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7006 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7007 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7008 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7009 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7010 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7011 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7012 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7013 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7014 let mut channel_update = None;
7015 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7017 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7020 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7021 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7022 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7023 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7024 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7025 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7026 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7031 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7032 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7033 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7034 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7035 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7040 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7041 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7045 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7046 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7047 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7048 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7049 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7050 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7051 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7052 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7054 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7055 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7056 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7057 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7058 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7059 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7060 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7061 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7062 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7063 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7064 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7065 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7066 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7067 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7068 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7069 next_funding_txid: None,
7072 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7073 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7074 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7080 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7081 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7082 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7083 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7086 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7087 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7092 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7093 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7094 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7096 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7097 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7098 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7099 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7100 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7101 match monitor_event {
7102 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7103 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7105 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7107 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7108 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7109 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7110 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7113 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7114 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7115 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7117 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7118 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7119 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7120 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7123 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7124 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7125 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7128 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7129 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7131 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7132 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7133 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7137 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7138 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7139 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7140 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7141 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7149 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7150 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7156 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7157 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7160 has_pending_monitor_events
7163 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7164 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7165 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7167 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7169 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7172 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7173 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7174 /// update was applied.
7175 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7176 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7177 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7179 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7180 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7181 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7182 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7184 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7185 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7187 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7188 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7189 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7190 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7192 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7193 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7194 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7195 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7196 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7197 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7199 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7200 has_monitor_update = true;
7202 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7203 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7204 continue 'peer_loop;
7213 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7214 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7215 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7221 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7222 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7223 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7224 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7225 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7226 let mut has_update = false;
7227 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7229 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7231 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7232 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7233 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7234 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7235 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7237 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7238 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7239 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7240 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7241 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7244 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7247 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7248 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7249 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7250 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7251 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7256 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7258 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7259 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7260 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7261 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7267 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7268 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7273 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7279 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7280 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7283 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7284 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7290 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7291 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7293 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7294 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7295 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7296 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7297 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7298 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7299 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7300 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7301 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7302 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7303 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7304 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7305 assert!(should_broadcast);
7306 } else { unreachable!(); }
7307 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7308 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7309 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7312 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7316 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7317 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7318 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7322 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7323 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7324 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7325 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7329 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7332 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7333 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7334 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7335 &self, description: String
7336 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7337 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7338 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7339 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7340 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7341 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7343 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7344 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7348 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7349 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7353 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7354 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7356 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7357 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7358 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7361 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7362 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7363 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7367 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7368 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7369 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7370 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7374 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7375 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7379 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7380 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7382 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7383 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7384 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7385 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7386 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7387 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7388 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7389 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7390 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7391 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7392 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7393 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7395 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7396 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7398 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7399 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7402 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7403 self.pending_outbound_payments
7404 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7405 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7407 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7412 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7413 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7414 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7416 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7417 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7418 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7419 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7420 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7421 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7422 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7426 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7427 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7430 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7431 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7432 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7436 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7437 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7438 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7439 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7443 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7444 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7445 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7449 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7450 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7452 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7453 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7454 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7455 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7456 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7457 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7458 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7459 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7460 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7461 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7462 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7463 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7464 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7465 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7466 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7469 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7470 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7471 let builder = match quantity {
7473 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7475 let builder = match amount_msats {
7477 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7479 let builder = match payer_note {
7481 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7484 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7485 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7487 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7488 self.pending_outbound_payments
7489 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7490 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7492 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7494 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7495 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7496 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7497 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7498 destination: Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7499 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7501 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7503 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7504 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7505 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7506 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7507 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7508 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7509 contents: OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7510 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7511 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7513 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7520 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7523 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7524 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7525 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7529 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7530 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7531 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7532 /// received and no retries will be made.
7534 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7535 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7536 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7537 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7538 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7540 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7541 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7543 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7544 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7545 let payment_paths = vec![
7546 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7548 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7549 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7550 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7552 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7553 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7554 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7556 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7557 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7558 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7560 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7561 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7563 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7564 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7565 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7566 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7567 destination: Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7568 reply_path: Some(reply_path),
7570 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7572 for path in refund.paths() {
7573 let message = PendingOnionMessage {
7574 contents: OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7575 destination: Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7576 reply_path: Some(reply_path.clone()),
7578 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7584 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7588 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7591 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7592 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7594 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7595 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7596 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7597 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7599 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7601 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7602 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7606 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7607 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7609 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7611 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7612 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7614 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7615 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7616 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7617 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7618 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7619 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7620 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7621 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7622 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7623 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7624 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7627 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7628 /// stored external to LDK.
7630 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7631 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7632 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7634 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7635 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7638 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7639 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7640 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7641 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7643 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7644 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7645 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7646 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7647 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7649 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7650 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7651 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7652 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7653 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7655 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7656 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7658 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7659 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7663 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7664 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7666 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7668 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7669 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7671 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7672 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7673 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7674 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7675 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7676 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7677 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7680 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7681 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7683 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7684 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7685 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7688 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7690 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7691 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7692 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7693 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7696 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7698 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7699 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7700 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7701 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7702 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7704 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7705 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7706 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7708 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7710 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7713 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7714 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7715 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7719 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7720 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7722 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7723 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7724 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7725 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7727 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7728 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7729 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7730 Some(_) => continue,
7731 None => return scid_candidate
7736 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7738 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7739 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7741 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7742 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7743 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7747 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7748 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7749 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7751 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7752 /// times to get a unique scid.
7753 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7754 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7755 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7757 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7758 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7759 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7760 return scid_candidate
7764 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7765 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7766 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7767 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7770 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7773 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7774 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7776 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7777 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7778 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7787 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7788 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7789 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7790 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7791 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7795 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7796 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7797 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7798 events.push_back((event, None));
7802 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7803 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7804 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7808 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7809 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7813 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7814 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7817 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7818 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7819 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7820 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7821 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7824 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7825 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7828 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7829 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7830 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7831 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7833 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7837 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7838 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7839 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7840 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7841 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7842 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7843 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7847 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7848 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7849 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7850 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7851 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7852 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7853 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7854 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7855 if further_update_exists {
7856 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7862 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7867 log_debug!(self.logger,
7868 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7869 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7875 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7876 for action in actions {
7878 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7879 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7881 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7887 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7888 /// using the given event handler.
7890 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7891 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7895 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7899 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7901 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7902 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7903 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7904 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7905 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7906 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7910 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7911 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7912 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7913 /// is always placed next to each other.
7915 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7916 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7917 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7918 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7920 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7921 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7922 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7923 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7924 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7925 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7926 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7928 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7929 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7930 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7931 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7934 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7935 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7937 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7938 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7941 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7943 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7946 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7947 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7951 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7952 events.replace(pending_events);
7961 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7963 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7964 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7965 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7966 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7967 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7968 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7972 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7974 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7975 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7976 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7978 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7982 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7984 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7985 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7986 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7987 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7988 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7993 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7995 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7996 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7997 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7998 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7999 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8002 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8003 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8006 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8007 let _persistence_guard =
8008 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8009 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8010 let new_height = height - 1;
8012 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8013 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8014 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8015 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8016 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8017 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8020 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8024 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8026 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8027 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8028 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8029 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8030 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8031 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8035 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8036 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8037 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8038 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8040 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8041 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8043 let _persistence_guard =
8044 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8045 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8046 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8047 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8049 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8050 if height < last_best_block_height {
8051 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8052 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8056 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8057 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8058 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8059 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8061 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8062 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8064 let _persistence_guard =
8065 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8066 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8067 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8069 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8071 macro_rules! max_time {
8072 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8074 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8075 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8076 // having an explicit local time source.
8077 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8078 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8079 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8080 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8081 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8087 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8088 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8089 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8090 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8094 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8095 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8096 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8097 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8098 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8099 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8100 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8101 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8108 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8109 let _persistence_guard =
8110 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8111 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8112 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8113 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8114 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8115 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8116 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8117 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8122 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8124 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8125 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8126 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8127 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8128 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8129 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8133 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8134 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8136 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8137 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8138 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8139 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8140 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8142 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8143 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8145 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8146 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8149 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8150 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8152 // Retain unfunded channels.
8153 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8154 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8155 let res = f(channel);
8156 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8157 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8158 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8159 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8160 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8162 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8163 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8164 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8166 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8167 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8168 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8178 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8179 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8182 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8183 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8184 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8185 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8186 msg: announcement_sigs,
8188 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8189 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8192 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8193 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8194 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8199 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8200 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8201 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8202 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8203 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8204 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8205 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8206 // is always consistent.
8207 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8208 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8209 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8210 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8211 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8214 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8215 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8216 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8217 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8218 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8219 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8224 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8225 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8226 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8227 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8229 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8230 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8231 data: reason_message,
8244 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8245 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8246 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8247 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8248 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8249 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8250 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8251 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8252 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8253 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8255 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8256 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8257 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8261 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8264 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8265 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8266 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8267 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8268 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8269 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8270 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8271 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8272 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8273 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8276 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8277 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8278 _ => unreachable!(),
8280 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8281 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8282 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8289 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8291 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8292 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8296 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8297 /// may have events that need processing.
8299 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8300 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8302 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8303 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8304 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8305 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8308 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8309 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8310 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8313 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8314 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8315 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8318 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8319 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8320 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8321 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8324 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8325 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8326 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8327 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8330 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8331 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8333 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8334 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8335 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8336 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8337 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8340 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8341 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8342 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8343 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8346 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8347 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8348 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8349 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8352 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8353 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8354 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8355 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8358 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8359 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8360 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8361 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8365 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8366 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8368 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8369 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8370 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8371 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8372 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8373 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8377 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8378 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8379 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8380 // change to the contents.
8381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8382 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8383 let persist = match &res {
8384 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8385 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8386 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8388 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8390 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8395 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8396 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8397 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8398 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8401 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8402 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8403 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8404 // change to the contents.
8405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8406 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8407 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8411 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8412 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8413 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8414 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8417 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8419 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8422 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8423 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8424 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8427 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8428 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8429 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8430 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8431 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8432 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8433 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8434 let persist = match &res {
8435 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8436 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8438 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8443 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8444 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8445 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8448 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8449 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8450 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8453 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8454 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8455 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8456 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8458 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8459 let persist = match &res {
8460 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8461 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8462 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8464 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8469 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8471 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8474 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8475 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8476 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8477 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8479 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8480 let persist = match &res {
8481 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8482 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8483 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8485 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8490 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8491 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8492 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8493 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8495 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8496 let persist = match &res {
8497 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8498 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8499 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8501 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8506 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8508 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8511 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8513 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8516 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8517 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8518 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8519 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8521 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8522 let persist = match &res {
8523 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8524 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8525 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8527 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8532 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8534 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8537 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8538 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8539 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8542 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8547 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8549 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8550 let persist = match &res {
8551 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8552 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8553 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8555 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8560 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8562 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8563 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8564 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8566 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8567 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8568 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8571 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8572 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8573 let context = match phase {
8574 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8575 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8576 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8581 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8582 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8585 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8589 // Clean up for removal.
8590 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8591 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8592 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8595 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8596 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8597 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8598 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8600 // V1 Channel Establishment
8601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8603 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8604 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8605 // V2 Channel Establishment
8606 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8607 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8608 // Common Channel Establishment
8609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8610 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8611 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8621 // Channel Operations
8622 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8627 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8629 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8630 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8631 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8632 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8640 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8641 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8642 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8643 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8646 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8648 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8650 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8651 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8655 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8656 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8657 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8661 let mut res = Ok(());
8663 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8664 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8665 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8666 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8667 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8668 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8669 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8672 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8673 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8675 if inbound_peer_limited {
8677 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8679 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8680 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8681 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8682 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8683 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8684 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8685 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8686 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8691 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8692 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8694 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8695 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8696 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8697 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8700 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8703 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8704 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8709 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8711 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8712 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8715 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8717 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8718 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8719 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8720 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8721 // worry about closing and removing them.
8722 debug_assert!(false);
8726 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8727 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8728 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8733 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8734 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8739 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8742 match &msg.data as &str {
8743 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8744 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8746 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8747 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8748 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8749 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8750 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8751 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8752 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8753 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8755 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8756 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8757 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8758 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8759 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8760 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8761 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8765 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8766 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8767 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8768 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8769 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8770 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8772 log_level: Level::Trace,
8782 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8783 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8785 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8786 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8789 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8790 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8791 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8792 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8794 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8795 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8796 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8800 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8802 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8803 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8806 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8807 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8808 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8809 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8817 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8818 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8822 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8823 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8826 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8827 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8830 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8831 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8834 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8835 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8836 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8837 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8840 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8841 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8842 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8843 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8846 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8847 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8848 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8849 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8852 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8853 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8854 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8855 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8858 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8859 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8860 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8861 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8864 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8865 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8866 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8867 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8870 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8871 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8872 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8873 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8876 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8877 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8878 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8879 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8882 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8883 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8884 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8885 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8889 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8890 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8892 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8893 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8894 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8895 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8896 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8897 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8901 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8902 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8903 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8906 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8907 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8910 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8911 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8913 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8914 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8916 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8917 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8920 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8922 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8923 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8924 let payment_paths = vec![
8925 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8927 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8928 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8929 payment_paths, payment_hash
8931 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8932 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8933 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8935 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8936 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8937 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8939 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8940 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8941 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8944 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8945 let payment_paths = vec![
8946 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8948 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8949 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8950 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8951 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8952 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8954 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8955 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8956 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8958 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8959 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8961 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8962 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8963 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8964 InvoiceError::from_str("Failed signing invoice")
8966 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8967 InvoiceError::from_str("Failed invoice signature verification")
8971 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8972 Err(error) => Some(error),
8976 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8980 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8981 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8983 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_str("Unrecognized invoice")))
8985 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8986 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8989 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8990 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8991 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_str(&format!("{:?}", e))))
8998 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
8999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9005 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9006 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9010 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9011 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9012 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9013 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9014 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9018 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9019 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9021 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9022 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9023 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9024 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9025 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9028 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9029 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9030 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9031 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9034 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9035 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9036 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9037 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9040 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9041 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9042 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9043 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9046 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9047 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9048 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9049 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9050 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9051 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9052 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9053 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9054 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9055 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9056 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9057 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9058 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9059 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9060 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9061 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9062 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9063 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9064 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9065 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9070 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9071 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9073 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9074 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9075 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9076 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9079 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9080 (2, node_id, required),
9081 (4, features, required),
9082 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9083 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9084 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9085 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9088 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9089 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9090 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9091 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9092 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9093 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9094 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9095 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9096 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9097 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9098 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9099 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9100 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9101 (7, self.config, option),
9102 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9103 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9104 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9105 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9106 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9107 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9108 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9109 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9110 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9111 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9112 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9113 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9114 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9115 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9116 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9117 (32, self.is_public, required),
9118 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9119 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9120 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9121 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9122 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9128 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9129 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9130 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9131 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9132 (2, channel_id, required),
9133 (3, channel_type, option),
9134 (4, counterparty, required),
9135 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9136 (6, funding_txo, option),
9137 (7, config, option),
9138 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9139 (9, confirmations, option),
9140 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9141 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9142 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9143 (16, balance_msat, required),
9144 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9145 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9146 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9147 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9148 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9149 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9150 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9151 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9152 (26, is_outbound, required),
9153 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9154 (30, is_usable, required),
9155 (32, is_public, required),
9156 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9157 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9158 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9159 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9160 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9163 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9164 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9165 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9166 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9167 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9171 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9173 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9174 outbound_scid_alias,
9178 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9179 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9181 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9182 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9183 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9184 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9185 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9186 confirmations_required,
9188 force_close_spend_delay,
9189 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9190 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9191 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9192 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9193 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9194 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9195 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9196 channel_shutdown_state,
9201 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9202 (2, channels, required_vec),
9203 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9204 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9207 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9209 (0, onion_packet, required),
9210 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9213 (0, payment_data, required),
9214 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9215 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9216 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9217 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9219 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9220 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9221 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9222 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9223 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9224 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9228 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9229 (0, routing, required),
9230 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9231 (4, payment_hash, required),
9232 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9233 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9234 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9235 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9239 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9240 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9242 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9244 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9245 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9246 reason.write(writer)?;
9248 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9249 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9252 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9253 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9254 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9255 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9262 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9263 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9264 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9267 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9268 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9269 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9270 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9274 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9275 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9276 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9277 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9278 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9281 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9282 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9283 // messages contained in the variants.
9284 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9285 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9286 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9288 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9289 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9290 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9291 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9292 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9295 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9296 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9297 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9298 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9299 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9301 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9306 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9311 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9312 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9313 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9314 (2, outpoint, required),
9315 (4, htlc_id, required),
9316 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9317 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9320 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9321 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9322 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9323 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9324 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9326 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9327 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9328 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9329 (2, self.value, required),
9330 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9331 (4, payment_data, option),
9332 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9333 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9334 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9335 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9341 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9342 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9343 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9344 (0, prev_hop, required),
9345 (1, total_msat, option),
9346 (2, value_ser, required),
9347 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9348 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9349 (5, total_value_received, option),
9350 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9351 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9352 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9354 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9355 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9356 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9358 if payment_data.is_some() {
9359 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9361 if total_msat.is_none() {
9362 total_msat = Some(value);
9364 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9367 if total_msat.is_none() {
9368 if payment_data.is_none() {
9369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9371 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9373 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9377 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9380 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9381 total_value_received,
9382 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9384 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9390 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9391 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9392 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9395 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9396 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9397 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9398 let mut payment_id = None;
9399 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9400 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9401 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9402 (0, session_priv, required),
9403 (1, payment_id, option),
9404 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9405 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9406 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9407 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9409 if payment_id.is_none() {
9410 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9412 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9414 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9415 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9416 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9418 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9419 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9420 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9421 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9425 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9426 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9427 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9429 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9432 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9433 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9438 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9441 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9443 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9444 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9445 (0, session_priv, required),
9446 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9447 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9448 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9449 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9450 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9451 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9454 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9456 field.write(writer)?;
9463 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9464 (0, forward_info, required),
9465 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9466 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9467 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9468 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9471 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9473 (0, htlc_id, required),
9474 (2, err_packet, required),
9479 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9480 (0, payment_secret, required),
9481 (2, expiry_time, required),
9482 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9483 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9484 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9487 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9489 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9490 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9491 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9492 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9493 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9494 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9498 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9499 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9501 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9503 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9505 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9506 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9507 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9510 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9513 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9514 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9517 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9518 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9521 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9522 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9526 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9528 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9529 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9530 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9531 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9532 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9533 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9536 channel.write(writer)?;
9542 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9543 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9544 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9545 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9546 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9547 for forward in pending_forwards {
9548 forward.write(writer)?;
9553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9555 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9556 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9557 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9559 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9560 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9561 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9562 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9563 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9564 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9565 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9566 htlc.write(writer)?;
9568 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9569 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9572 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9573 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9574 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9575 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9576 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9577 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9578 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9581 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9582 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9583 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9584 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9585 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9587 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9588 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9589 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9590 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9591 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9592 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9593 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9598 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9599 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9600 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9601 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9602 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9603 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9604 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9605 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9606 0u64.write(writer)?;
9608 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9609 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9610 event.write(writer)?;
9614 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9615 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9616 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9617 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9618 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9619 0u64.write(writer)?;
9621 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9622 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9623 // likely to be identical.
9624 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9625 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9627 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9628 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9629 hash.write(writer)?;
9630 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9633 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9634 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9635 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9636 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9637 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9640 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9641 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9643 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9644 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9645 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9646 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9649 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9650 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9651 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9652 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9656 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9657 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9658 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9660 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9661 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9662 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9668 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9669 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9670 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9671 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9674 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9675 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9676 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9677 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9678 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9681 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9682 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9683 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9684 if !updates.is_empty() {
9685 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9686 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9691 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9692 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9693 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9694 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9695 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9696 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9697 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9698 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9699 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9700 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9701 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9702 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9703 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9710 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9711 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9712 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9713 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9716 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9717 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9718 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9719 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9720 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9721 // check that the event is sane here.
9722 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9723 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9724 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9725 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9731 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9732 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9733 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9734 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9735 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9736 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9739 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9740 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9741 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9742 events.push_back((ev, action));
9743 } else if action.is_some() {
9744 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9751 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9752 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9753 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9754 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9755 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9756 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9759 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9761 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9763 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9764 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9765 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9766 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9767 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9768 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9769 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9770 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9771 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9772 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9773 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9774 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9775 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9777 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9778 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9780 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9781 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9783 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9784 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9785 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9786 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9787 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9788 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9790 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9791 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9793 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9794 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9795 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9796 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9797 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9802 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9803 pub entropy_source: ES,
9805 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9806 pub node_signer: NS,
9808 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9809 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9811 pub signer_provider: SP,
9813 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9815 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9816 pub fee_estimator: F,
9817 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9819 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9820 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9821 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9822 pub chain_monitor: M,
9824 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9825 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9826 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9827 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9828 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9829 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9831 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9833 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9834 /// deserialization.
9836 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9837 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9838 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9840 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9841 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9843 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9844 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9845 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9846 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9848 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9851 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9852 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9855 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9856 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9858 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9859 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9860 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9861 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9862 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9863 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9867 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9868 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9869 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9870 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9871 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9873 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9874 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9879 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9880 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9881 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9882 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9884 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9885 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9886 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9887 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9888 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9889 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9893 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9894 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9895 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9899 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9900 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9902 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9903 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9904 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9905 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9906 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9911 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9912 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9914 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9915 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9916 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9918 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9920 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9921 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9922 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9923 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9924 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9925 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9926 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9927 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9928 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9929 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9931 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9932 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9933 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9934 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9935 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9936 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9937 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9938 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9939 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9940 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9941 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9942 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9943 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9945 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9946 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9947 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9949 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9950 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9951 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9953 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9954 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9955 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9957 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9958 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9961 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9962 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9963 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9966 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9967 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9968 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9969 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9970 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9971 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9972 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9974 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9975 let mut found_htlc = false;
9976 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9977 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9980 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9981 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9982 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9983 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9984 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9985 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9986 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9987 log_info!(args.logger,
9988 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9989 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9990 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9994 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9995 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9996 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9997 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9998 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10000 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10001 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10003 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10005 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10006 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10009 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10010 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10011 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10015 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10016 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10017 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10018 // safely discard the channel.
10019 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10020 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10021 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10022 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10023 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10024 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10025 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10028 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10029 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10030 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10031 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10032 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10037 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10038 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10039 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10040 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10041 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10042 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10043 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10045 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10049 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10050 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10051 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10052 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10053 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10054 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10055 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10056 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10057 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10059 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10062 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10063 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10064 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10065 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10066 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10067 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10068 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10069 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10071 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10074 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10077 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10078 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10079 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10080 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10081 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10082 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10083 is_connected: false,
10087 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10088 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10089 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10090 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10091 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10092 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10093 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10094 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10097 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10098 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10099 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10100 for _ in 0..event_count {
10101 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10102 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10107 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10108 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10109 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10111 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10112 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10113 // on-startup monitor updates.
10114 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10115 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10117 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10121 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10122 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10124 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10125 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10126 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10127 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10128 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10132 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10133 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10134 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10135 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10136 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10137 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10138 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10140 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10145 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10146 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10147 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10148 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10149 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10150 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10151 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10152 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10153 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10154 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10155 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10156 let mut events_override = None;
10157 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10158 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10159 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10160 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10161 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10162 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10163 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10164 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10165 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10166 (8, events_override, option),
10167 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10168 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10169 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10170 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10172 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10173 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10176 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10177 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10180 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10181 pending_events_read = events;
10184 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10185 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10188 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10189 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10190 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10191 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10192 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10193 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10195 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10197 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10198 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10199 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10202 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10203 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10204 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10205 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10206 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10208 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10209 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10210 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10212 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10213 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10214 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10215 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10216 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10218 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10219 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10220 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10221 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10222 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10223 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10224 pending_background_events.push(
10225 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10226 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10227 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10228 update: update.clone(),
10231 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10232 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10233 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10234 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10235 pending_background_events.push(
10236 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10237 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10238 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10241 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10242 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10245 max_in_flight_update_id
10249 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10252 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10253 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10254 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10256 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10257 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10258 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10259 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10260 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10261 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10262 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10263 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10264 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10267 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10268 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10269 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10270 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10271 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10272 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10273 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10274 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10275 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10276 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10277 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10280 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10281 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10282 debug_assert!(false);
10283 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10288 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10289 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10290 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10291 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10292 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10293 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10294 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10295 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10297 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10298 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10299 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10301 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10302 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10303 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10304 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10305 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10306 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10307 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10308 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10313 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10314 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10316 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10317 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10318 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10319 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10322 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10323 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10324 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10325 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10326 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10327 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10328 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10330 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10331 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10332 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10333 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10334 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10335 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10336 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10337 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10340 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10341 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10342 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10343 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10345 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10346 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10347 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10350 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10351 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10352 retry_strategy: None,
10353 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10354 payment_params: None,
10355 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10356 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10357 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10358 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10359 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10360 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10361 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10362 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10363 total_msat: path_amt,
10364 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10365 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10367 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10368 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10373 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10374 match htlc_source {
10375 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10376 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10377 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10378 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10380 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10381 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10382 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10383 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10384 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10385 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10386 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10387 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10388 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10389 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10390 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10395 !forwards.is_empty()
10397 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10398 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10399 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10400 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10401 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10402 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10403 intercepted_id != ev_id
10410 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10411 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10412 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10413 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10414 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10415 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10416 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10417 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10418 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10419 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10420 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10422 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10423 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10424 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10426 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10427 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10428 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10435 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10436 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10438 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10440 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10441 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10442 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10443 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10444 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10445 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10446 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10447 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10448 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10449 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10452 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10453 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10454 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10455 // channel still live case here.
10459 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10460 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10465 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10466 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10467 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10468 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10469 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10470 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10471 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10472 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10476 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10477 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10479 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10480 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10481 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10482 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10484 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10485 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10486 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10488 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10489 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10491 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10492 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10494 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10497 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10498 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10499 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10501 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10505 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10506 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10507 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10508 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10509 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10511 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10512 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10513 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10514 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10515 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10516 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10517 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10518 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10520 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10521 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10525 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10527 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10529 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10530 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10532 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10533 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10538 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10539 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10541 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10543 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10545 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10546 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10547 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10548 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10552 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10553 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10554 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10555 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10556 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10557 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10558 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10559 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10561 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10562 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10563 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10565 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10566 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10567 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10568 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10569 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10570 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10572 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10573 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10574 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10575 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10576 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10577 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10581 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10582 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10583 debug_assert!(false);
10584 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10589 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10591 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10592 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10593 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10594 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10595 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10596 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10597 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10598 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10599 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10600 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10601 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10603 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10604 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10606 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10607 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10608 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10609 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10611 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10612 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10613 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10614 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10616 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10617 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10618 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10619 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10621 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10622 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10626 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10627 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10630 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10631 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10634 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10637 purpose: payment.purpose,
10638 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10639 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10640 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10646 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10647 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10648 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10649 for action in actions.iter() {
10650 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10651 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10652 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10654 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10655 log_trace!(args.logger,
10656 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10657 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10658 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10659 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10660 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10662 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10663 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10664 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10665 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10669 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10670 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10674 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10676 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10677 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10681 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10683 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10684 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10685 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10686 router: args.router,
10688 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10690 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10691 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10692 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10693 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10695 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10696 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10697 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10698 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10699 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10700 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10702 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10704 our_network_pubkey,
10707 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10709 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10711 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10712 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10713 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10714 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10715 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10717 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10718 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10720 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10722 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10724 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10725 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10726 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10728 logger: args.logger,
10729 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10732 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10733 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10734 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10735 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10736 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10739 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10740 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10741 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10742 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10743 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10744 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10747 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10748 //connection or two.
10750 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10756 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10757 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10758 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10759 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10760 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10761 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10762 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10763 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10764 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10765 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10766 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10767 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10768 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10769 use crate::util::test_utils;
10770 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10771 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10774 fn test_notify_limits() {
10775 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10776 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10780 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10782 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10783 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10784 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10785 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10786 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10788 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10790 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10791 // to connect messages with new values
10792 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10793 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10794 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10795 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10796 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10797 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10799 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10800 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10801 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10802 // ... but the last node should not.
10803 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10804 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10805 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10806 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10808 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10809 // about the channel.
10810 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10811 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10812 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10814 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10816 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10817 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10818 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10819 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10820 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10821 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10823 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10824 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10825 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10827 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10828 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10829 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10830 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10831 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10832 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10834 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10835 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10836 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10837 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10838 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10839 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10840 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10841 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10843 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10844 // the channel info has updated.
10845 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10846 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10847 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10848 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10849 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10850 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10854 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10855 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10861 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10863 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10864 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10865 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10866 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10868 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10869 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10870 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10871 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10872 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10873 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10874 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10875 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10877 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10878 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10879 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10881 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10882 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10883 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10885 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10887 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10888 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10889 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10891 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10892 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10893 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10895 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10896 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10897 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10898 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10899 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10900 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10901 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10902 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10903 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10905 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10906 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10907 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10909 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10911 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10913 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10914 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10915 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10916 // lightning messages manually.
10917 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10918 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10921 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10923 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10924 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10926 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10927 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10929 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10930 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10932 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10936 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10937 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10938 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10940 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10942 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10944 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10945 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10948 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10949 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10950 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10951 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10953 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10954 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10955 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10956 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10961 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10962 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10963 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10964 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10971 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10972 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10973 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10976 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10977 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10978 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10979 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10980 // fails as expected.
10981 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10982 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10983 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10984 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10985 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10986 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10989 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10990 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10991 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10992 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10993 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10994 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10995 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10997 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10998 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10999 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11001 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11002 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11003 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11004 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11005 let route = find_route(
11006 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11007 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11009 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11010 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11012 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11014 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11015 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11016 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11018 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11019 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11020 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11021 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11022 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11024 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11025 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11026 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11027 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11028 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11029 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11030 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11031 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11032 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11034 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11035 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11037 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11038 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11039 let route = find_route(
11040 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11041 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11043 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11044 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11048 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11049 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11050 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11052 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11053 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11054 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11055 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11057 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11059 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11060 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11061 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11063 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11064 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11065 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11067 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11068 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11069 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11070 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11071 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11072 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11073 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11074 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11075 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11077 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11078 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11080 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11081 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11082 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11083 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11085 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11087 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11088 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11089 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11091 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11092 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11093 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11096 let route = find_route(
11097 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11098 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11100 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11101 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11102 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11104 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11106 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11107 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11108 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11110 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11114 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11115 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11116 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11117 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11118 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11119 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11122 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11124 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11125 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11129 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11130 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11131 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11137 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11138 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11140 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11141 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11142 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11143 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11144 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11145 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11146 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11147 let route = find_route(
11148 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11149 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11152 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11153 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11154 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11155 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11156 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11157 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11160 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11161 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11162 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11163 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11164 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11165 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11168 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11172 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11173 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11174 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11175 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11176 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11180 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11182 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11183 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11185 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11186 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11187 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11188 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11189 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11190 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11191 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11192 let route = find_route(
11193 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11194 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11197 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11198 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11199 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11200 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11201 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11202 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11203 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11204 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11207 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11208 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11209 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11210 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11211 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11212 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11215 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11219 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11223 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11225 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11226 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11227 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11228 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11230 // Marshall an MPP route.
11231 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11232 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11233 route.paths.push(path);
11234 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11235 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11236 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11237 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11238 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11239 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11241 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11242 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11244 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11245 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11247 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11252 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11258 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11260 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11261 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11263 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11264 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11266 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11269 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11270 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11271 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11272 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11273 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11274 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11277 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11280 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11281 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11286 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11287 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11293 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11294 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11296 total_msat: 100_000,
11299 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11300 // payment verification fails as expected.
11301 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11302 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11303 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11304 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11306 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11310 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11311 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11315 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11316 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11317 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11318 // the channel is successfully closed.
11319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11324 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11325 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11326 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11327 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11328 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11330 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11331 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11333 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11334 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11335 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11339 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11341 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11342 // as it has the funding transaction.
11343 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11344 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11345 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11348 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11350 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11352 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11354 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11355 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11356 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11358 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11361 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11362 // as it has the funding transaction.
11363 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11364 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11365 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11368 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11369 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11371 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11372 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11373 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11374 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11376 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11377 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11378 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11379 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11381 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11382 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11384 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11385 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11386 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11387 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11388 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11389 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11390 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11394 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11395 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11396 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11397 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11398 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11399 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11400 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11403 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11405 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11406 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11407 // closing transaction).
11408 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11409 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11410 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11412 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11413 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11414 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11415 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11416 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11419 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11421 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11423 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11424 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11425 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11427 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11429 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11430 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11433 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11434 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11435 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11438 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11439 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11440 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11443 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11444 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11445 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11448 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11449 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11450 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11453 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11455 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11456 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11458 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11459 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11461 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11462 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11467 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11468 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11469 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11470 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11471 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11472 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11473 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11477 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11478 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11479 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11481 // Test the API functions.
11482 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11484 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11486 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11488 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11490 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11492 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11494 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11498 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11499 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11500 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11501 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11502 // the given `channel_id`.
11503 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11504 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11505 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11508 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11511 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11513 // Test the API functions.
11514 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11516 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11518 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11520 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11522 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11524 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11528 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11529 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11533 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11535 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11537 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11538 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11540 let mut funding_tx = None;
11541 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11542 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11543 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11546 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11547 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11548 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11549 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11550 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11552 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11554 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11556 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11558 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11560 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11562 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11565 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11566 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11567 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11568 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11569 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11571 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11572 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11574 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11575 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11576 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11577 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11578 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11579 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11580 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11583 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11584 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11585 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11586 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11587 }, true).unwrap_err();
11589 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11590 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11591 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11592 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11593 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11594 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11595 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11597 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11598 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11600 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11601 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11602 }, true).unwrap_err();
11604 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11605 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11606 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11607 }, false).unwrap();
11608 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11610 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11611 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11613 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11614 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11615 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11616 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11617 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11619 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11620 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11621 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11623 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11624 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11625 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11627 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11628 // "protected" and can connect again.
11629 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11630 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11631 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11633 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11635 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11637 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11638 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11642 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11643 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11649 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11651 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11652 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11654 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11655 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11656 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11657 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11660 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11662 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11663 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11664 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11666 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11667 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11668 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11670 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11671 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11672 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11673 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11677 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11678 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11679 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11682 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11683 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11685 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11687 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11689 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11690 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11692 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11693 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11694 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11695 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11696 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11697 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11701 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11703 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11704 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11708 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11709 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11712 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11713 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11714 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11715 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11716 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11718 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11719 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11721 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11722 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11723 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11724 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11730 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11731 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11733 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11734 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11735 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11737 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11738 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11742 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11746 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11747 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11748 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11749 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11750 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11751 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11752 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11753 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11755 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11756 payment_metadata: None,
11757 keysend_preimage: None,
11758 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11759 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11761 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11763 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11764 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11765 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11766 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11767 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11769 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11770 } else { panic!(); }
11772 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11773 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11775 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11776 payment_metadata: None,
11777 keysend_preimage: None,
11778 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11779 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11781 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11783 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11784 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11788 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11789 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11790 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11791 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11792 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11794 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11796 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11797 payment_metadata: None,
11798 keysend_preimage: None,
11799 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11800 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11802 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11803 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11805 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11806 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11807 // is not satisfied.
11808 assert!(result.is_ok());
11812 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11813 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11814 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11815 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11816 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11818 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11819 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11821 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11822 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11824 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11825 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11827 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11828 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11830 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11831 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11832 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11833 match &msg_events[0] {
11834 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11835 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11837 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11838 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11839 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11845 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11846 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11848 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11849 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11852 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11856 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11857 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11858 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11859 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11862 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11863 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11864 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11865 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11866 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11868 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11869 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11870 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11872 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11873 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11875 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11876 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11881 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11882 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11884 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11885 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11887 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11888 // not have generated any events.
11889 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11893 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11894 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11895 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11896 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11897 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11898 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11899 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11900 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11902 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11903 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11904 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11906 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11907 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11908 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11909 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11912 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11913 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11916 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11917 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11920 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11921 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11922 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11923 ..Default::default()
11925 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11926 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11929 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11930 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11933 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11934 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11935 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11936 ..Default::default()
11938 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11940 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11941 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11943 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11944 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11947 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11948 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11949 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11950 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11951 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11954 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11955 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11956 ..Default::default()
11958 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11961 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11962 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11963 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11968 fn test_payment_display() {
11969 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11970 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11971 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11972 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11973 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11974 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11978 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11979 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11980 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11981 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11982 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11983 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11985 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11986 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11987 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11988 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11989 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11990 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11991 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11992 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11994 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11995 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11996 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11999 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12000 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12002 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12003 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12005 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12006 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12007 }, false).unwrap();
12008 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12009 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12010 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12012 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12014 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12015 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12016 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12017 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12018 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12019 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12020 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12021 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12022 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12023 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12024 } else { panic!() };
12025 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12026 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12027 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12028 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12030 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12032 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12033 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12034 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12041 use crate::chain::Listen;
12042 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12043 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12044 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12045 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12046 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12047 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12048 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12049 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12050 use crate::util::test_utils;
12051 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12053 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12054 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12055 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12057 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12059 use criterion::Criterion;
12061 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12062 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12063 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12064 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12065 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12066 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12067 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12069 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12070 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12072 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12073 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12075 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12077 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12080 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12081 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12084 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12085 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12086 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12088 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12089 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12091 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12092 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12093 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12094 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12095 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12097 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12098 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12099 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12101 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12102 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12103 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12104 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12106 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12107 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12108 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12110 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12111 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12112 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12113 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12114 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12116 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12117 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12118 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12120 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12121 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12123 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12124 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12125 }, false).unwrap();
12126 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12127 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12128 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12131 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12132 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12133 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12135 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12136 } else { panic!(); }
12138 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12139 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12140 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12141 match events_b[0] {
12142 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12143 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12145 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12148 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12149 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12150 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12151 match events_a[0] {
12152 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12153 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12158 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12160 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12161 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12162 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12164 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12165 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12166 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12167 match msg_events[0] {
12168 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12169 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12170 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12174 match msg_events[1] {
12175 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12179 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12180 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12181 match events_a[0] {
12182 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12183 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12188 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12189 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12190 match events_b[0] {
12191 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12192 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12197 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12198 macro_rules! send_payment {
12199 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12200 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12201 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12202 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12203 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12204 payment_count += 1;
12205 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12206 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12208 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12209 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12210 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12211 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12212 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12213 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12214 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12215 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12216 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12217 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12218 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12221 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12222 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12223 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12225 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12226 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12227 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12228 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12229 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12231 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12234 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12235 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12236 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12237 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12239 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12243 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12244 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12245 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);