1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
80 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
81 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
82 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
83 crate::sign::KeysManager,
87 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
88 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
91 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
94 use crate::prelude::*;
96 use core::cell::RefCell;
98 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
99 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
100 use core::time::Duration;
101 use core::ops::Deref;
103 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
104 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
105 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
107 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
109 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
110 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
111 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
113 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
114 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
115 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
116 // before we forward it.
118 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
119 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
120 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
121 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
122 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
124 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
127 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
128 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
130 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
131 /// do with the HTLC.
132 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
133 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
135 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
136 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
137 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
138 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
139 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
140 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
142 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
144 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
145 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
147 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
148 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
149 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
150 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
151 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
153 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
154 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
155 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
156 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
157 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
159 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
160 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
161 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
162 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
164 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
167 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
168 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
169 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
170 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
171 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
172 requires_blinded_error: bool,
174 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
175 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
176 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
178 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
179 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
181 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
182 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
183 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
185 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
186 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
187 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
189 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
190 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
191 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
192 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
194 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
195 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
196 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
198 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
199 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
200 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
204 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
205 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
206 pub struct BlindedForward {
207 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
208 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
209 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
210 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
211 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
212 /// the introduction node.
213 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
216 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
217 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
218 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
220 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
221 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
227 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
229 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
230 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
231 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
232 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
233 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
234 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
236 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
237 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
238 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
239 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
242 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
244 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
245 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
246 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
248 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
249 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
250 /// it along another path).
252 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
253 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
254 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
255 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
256 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
257 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
258 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
259 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
260 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
262 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
265 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
267 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
269 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
272 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
273 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
274 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
275 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
278 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
281 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
282 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
285 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
286 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
287 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
289 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
290 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
291 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
294 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
295 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
297 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
298 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
301 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
302 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
303 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
306 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
311 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
315 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
316 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
317 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub enum BlindedFailure {
319 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
320 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
321 FromIntroductionNode,
322 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
323 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
329 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
330 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
331 short_channel_id: u64,
332 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
334 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
335 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
336 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
338 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
339 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
344 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
346 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
347 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
348 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
350 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
351 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
354 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
355 struct ClaimableHTLC {
356 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
358 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
360 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
361 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
362 sender_intended_value: u64,
363 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
365 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
366 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
367 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
368 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
370 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
371 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
374 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
375 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
376 events::ClaimedHTLC {
377 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
378 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
379 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
380 value_msat: val.value,
381 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
386 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
387 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
389 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
390 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
391 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
394 /// Number of bytes in the id.
395 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
398 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
399 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
404 impl Readable for PaymentId {
405 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
406 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
411 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
412 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
413 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
417 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
419 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
420 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
421 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
423 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
424 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
429 impl Readable for InterceptId {
430 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
431 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
436 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
437 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
438 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
439 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
440 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
443 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
445 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
446 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
447 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
449 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
450 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
454 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
455 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
456 (0, short_channel_id, required),
457 (2, htlc_id, required),
459 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
460 (0, session_priv, required),
465 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
466 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
467 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
468 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
469 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
472 session_priv: SecretKey,
473 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
474 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
475 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
476 payment_id: PaymentId,
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
481 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
483 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
485 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
487 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
490 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
491 payment_id.hash(hasher);
492 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
498 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
500 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
502 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
503 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
504 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
505 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
509 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
510 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
511 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
512 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
513 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
514 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
516 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
522 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
523 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
525 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
526 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
527 pub enum FailureCode {
528 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
529 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
530 TemporaryNodeFailure,
531 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
532 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
533 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
534 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
535 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
536 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
537 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
538 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
539 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
540 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
542 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
543 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
544 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
547 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
548 fn into(self) -> u16 {
550 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
551 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
552 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
553 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
558 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
559 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
560 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
561 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
562 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
564 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
565 err: msgs::LightningError,
566 closes_channel: bool,
567 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
569 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
571 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
573 err: LightningError {
575 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
576 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
582 closes_channel: false,
583 shutdown_finish: None,
587 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
588 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
591 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
592 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
593 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
594 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
595 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
596 // commitment upon reconnecting.
597 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
599 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
602 err: LightningError { err, action },
603 closes_channel: true,
604 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
608 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
611 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
613 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
614 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
618 log_level: Level::Warn,
621 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
623 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
625 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
628 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
635 closes_channel: false,
636 shutdown_finish: None,
640 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
645 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
646 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
647 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
648 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
649 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
651 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
652 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
653 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
654 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
655 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
656 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
657 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
659 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
663 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
664 struct ClaimingPayment {
666 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
667 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
668 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
669 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
672 (0, amount_msat, required),
673 (2, payment_purpose, required),
674 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
675 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
676 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
679 struct ClaimablePayment {
680 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
681 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
682 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
685 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
686 struct ClaimablePayments {
687 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
688 /// failed/claimed by the user.
690 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
691 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
693 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
694 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
695 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
697 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
698 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
699 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
700 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
703 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
704 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
705 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
706 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
708 enum BackgroundEvent {
709 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
710 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
711 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
712 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
714 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
715 /// are regenerated on startup.
716 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
717 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
718 /// channel to continue normal operation.
720 /// In general this should be used rather than
721 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
722 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
723 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
725 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
726 /// are regenerated on startup.
727 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
728 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
729 funding_txo: OutPoint,
730 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
732 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
733 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
735 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
736 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
742 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
743 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
744 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
745 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
746 /// event can be generated.
747 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
748 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
749 /// operation of another channel.
751 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
752 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
753 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
754 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
756 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
757 event: events::Event,
758 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
760 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
761 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
762 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
764 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
765 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
766 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
767 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
768 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
770 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
771 /// stored for later processing.
772 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
773 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
774 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
775 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
779 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
780 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
781 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
782 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
783 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
784 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
785 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
786 (4, blocking_action, required),
788 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
789 (0, event, upgradable_required),
790 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
791 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
792 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
793 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
794 // downgrades to prior versions.
795 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
799 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
800 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
801 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
802 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
803 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
806 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
807 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
808 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
809 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
813 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
814 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
815 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
816 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
817 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
818 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
820 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
821 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
822 channel_id: ChannelId,
823 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
828 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
829 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
830 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
831 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
832 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
837 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
838 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
842 /// State we hold per-peer.
843 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
844 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
846 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
847 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
848 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
850 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
851 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
852 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
853 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
854 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
855 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
856 latest_features: InitFeatures,
857 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
858 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
859 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
860 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
861 /// user but which have not yet completed.
863 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
864 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
865 /// for a missing channel.
866 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
867 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
868 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
870 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
871 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
872 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
873 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
875 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
876 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
877 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
878 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
879 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
880 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
881 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
882 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
883 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
884 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
885 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
886 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
887 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
888 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
889 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
893 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
894 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
895 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
896 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
897 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
898 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
901 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
902 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
903 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
906 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
907 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
908 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
911 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
912 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
913 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
914 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
918 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
919 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
920 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
921 /// The original OpenChannel message.
922 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
923 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
924 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
927 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
928 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
929 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
931 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
932 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
934 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
937 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
938 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
939 struct PendingInboundPayment {
940 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
941 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
942 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
943 /// this payment being removed.
945 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
946 user_payment_id: u64,
947 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
948 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
949 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
952 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
953 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
954 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
955 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
956 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
957 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
958 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
959 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
961 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
962 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
963 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
971 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
973 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
974 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
975 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
981 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
982 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
983 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
984 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
985 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
986 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
987 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
988 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
990 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
991 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
992 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1001 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1003 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1004 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1005 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1010 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1012 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1014 pub trait AChannelManager {
1015 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1016 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1017 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1018 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1019 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1020 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1021 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1022 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1023 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1024 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1025 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1026 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1027 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1028 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1029 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1030 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1031 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1032 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1033 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1034 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1035 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1036 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1037 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1038 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1039 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1040 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1041 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1042 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1043 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1044 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1045 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1046 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1047 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1048 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1049 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1050 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1053 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1054 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1056 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1057 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1058 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1059 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1060 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1061 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1065 type Watch = M::Target;
1067 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1069 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1071 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1073 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1074 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1076 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1078 type Router = R::Target;
1080 type Logger = L::Target;
1082 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1085 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1086 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1088 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1089 /// to individual Channels.
1091 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1092 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1093 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1094 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1096 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1097 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1098 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1099 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1100 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1101 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1102 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1103 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1104 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1106 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1107 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1108 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1110 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1111 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1112 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1113 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1114 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1116 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1117 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1118 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1119 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1121 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1122 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1123 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1125 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1126 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1127 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1128 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1129 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1131 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1132 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1133 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1134 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1135 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1136 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1137 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1138 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1141 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1142 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1143 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1144 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1145 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1149 // `pending_offers_messages`
1151 // `total_consistency_lock`
1153 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1155 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1157 // |__`per_peer_state`
1159 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1161 // |__`claimable_payments`
1163 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1167 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1169 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1171 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1175 // |__`pending_events`
1177 // |__`pending_background_events`
1179 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1181 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1183 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1185 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1190 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1191 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1192 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1198 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1200 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1202 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1203 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1205 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1206 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1207 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1208 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1210 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1211 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1213 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1214 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1215 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1216 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1217 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1218 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1219 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1220 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1222 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1224 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1225 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1227 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1229 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1230 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1231 /// and via the classic SCID.
1233 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1234 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1236 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1238 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1240 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1241 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1242 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1244 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1245 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1247 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1248 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1250 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1251 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1253 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1254 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1255 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1256 /// active channel list on load.
1258 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1259 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1261 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1263 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1264 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1265 /// the handling of the events.
1267 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1268 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1271 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1272 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1273 /// would break backwards compatability.
1274 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1275 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1276 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1278 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1280 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1282 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1284 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1286 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1287 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1288 /// confirmation depth.
1290 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1291 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1292 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1294 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1296 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1298 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1300 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1302 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1304 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1305 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1306 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1308 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1309 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1311 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1312 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1313 /// keeping additional state.
1314 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1316 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1317 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1318 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1319 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1321 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1322 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1324 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1325 /// are currently open with that peer.
1327 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1328 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1331 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1333 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1334 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1335 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1336 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1337 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1339 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1340 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1341 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1342 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1343 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1345 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1346 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1348 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1349 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1350 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1351 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1352 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1354 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1355 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1357 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1358 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1359 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1360 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1361 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1363 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1365 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1367 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1368 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1369 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1370 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1371 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1372 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1373 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1374 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1375 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1376 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1377 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1379 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1380 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1381 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1383 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1385 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1386 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1388 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1392 signer_provider: SP,
1397 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1399 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1400 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1401 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1402 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1403 pub struct ChainParameters {
1404 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1405 pub network: Network,
1407 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1409 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1410 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1413 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1417 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1418 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1421 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1422 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1423 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1424 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1425 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1426 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1428 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1429 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1430 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1431 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1432 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1433 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1435 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1436 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1439 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1440 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1441 /// events to handle.
1443 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1444 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1446 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1447 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1450 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1451 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1452 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1453 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1455 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1456 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1457 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1458 should_persist: move || {
1459 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1460 // processing and return that.
1461 let notify = persist_check();
1462 match (notify, force_notify) {
1463 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1464 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1465 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1466 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1467 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1470 _read_guard: read_guard,
1474 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1475 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1476 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1477 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1478 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1479 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1481 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1482 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1483 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1484 should_persist: persist_check,
1485 _read_guard: read_guard,
1490 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1491 fn drop(&mut self) {
1492 match (self.should_persist)() {
1493 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1494 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1495 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1497 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1498 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1499 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1504 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1505 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1507 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1509 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1510 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1511 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1512 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1513 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1515 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1516 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1518 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1520 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1521 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1522 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1523 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1524 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1525 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1526 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1527 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1528 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1529 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1530 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1531 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1532 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1534 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1535 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1537 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1538 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1539 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1540 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1542 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1543 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1544 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1545 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1546 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1547 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1549 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1551 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1552 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1554 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1556 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1557 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1559 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1560 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1561 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1563 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1564 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1565 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1567 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1568 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1569 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1570 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1572 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1573 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1574 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1576 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1577 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1578 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1580 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1581 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1582 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1583 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1584 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1585 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1586 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1587 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1588 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1589 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1590 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1593 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1594 /// to better separate parameters.
1595 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1596 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1597 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1598 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1599 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1600 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1601 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1602 pub features: InitFeatures,
1603 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1604 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1605 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1607 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1609 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1610 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1611 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1612 /// payments to us through this channel.
1613 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1614 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1615 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1616 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1617 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1618 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1619 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1622 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1623 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1624 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1625 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1626 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1627 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1628 /// lifetime of the channel.
1629 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1630 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1631 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1632 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1633 /// our counterparty already.
1635 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1636 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1637 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1638 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1640 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1641 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1642 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1643 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1645 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1646 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1648 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1649 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1651 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1652 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1653 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1654 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1655 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1656 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1657 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1658 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1659 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1662 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1664 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1665 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1666 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1667 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1668 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1669 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1670 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1672 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1673 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1675 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1676 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1677 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1678 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1679 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1680 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1681 /// this value on chain.
1683 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1685 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1687 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1688 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1689 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1690 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1691 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1692 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1693 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1695 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1696 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1697 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1698 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1699 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1700 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1702 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1703 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1704 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1705 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1706 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1708 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1709 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1710 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1711 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1713 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1714 pub balance_msat: u64,
1715 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1716 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1717 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1718 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1720 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1722 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1723 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1724 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1725 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1726 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1727 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1728 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1729 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1731 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1732 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1733 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1734 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1735 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1736 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1737 /// route which is valid.
1738 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1739 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1740 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1741 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1742 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1743 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1745 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1746 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1747 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1748 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1749 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1750 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1751 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1752 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1753 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1755 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1757 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1758 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1759 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1760 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1761 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1763 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1764 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1765 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1766 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1767 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1768 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1769 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1771 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1772 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1773 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1774 pub is_outbound: bool,
1775 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1776 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1777 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1778 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1779 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1781 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1782 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1783 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1784 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1785 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1786 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1787 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1789 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1790 pub is_usable: bool,
1791 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1792 pub is_public: bool,
1793 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1794 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1795 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1796 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1797 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1798 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1800 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1801 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1804 impl ChannelDetails {
1805 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1806 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1807 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1809 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1810 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1811 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1812 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1815 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1816 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1817 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1819 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1820 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1821 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1822 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1825 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1826 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1827 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1830 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1831 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1833 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1834 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1835 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1837 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1838 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1839 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1840 features: latest_features,
1841 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1842 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1843 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1844 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1845 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1846 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1847 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1848 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1849 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1850 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1852 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1853 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1854 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1855 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1856 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1857 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1858 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1859 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1860 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1861 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1862 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1863 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1864 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1865 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1866 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1867 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1868 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1869 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1870 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1871 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1872 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1873 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1874 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1875 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1876 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1877 config: Some(context.config()),
1878 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1883 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1884 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1885 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1886 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1887 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1888 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1889 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1890 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1891 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1893 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1895 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1896 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1898 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1899 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1900 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1901 /// to drop the channel.
1905 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1906 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1907 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1908 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1909 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1911 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1912 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1913 payment_id: PaymentId,
1915 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1917 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1918 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1919 payment_id: PaymentId,
1920 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1922 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1923 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1924 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1927 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1928 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1929 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1931 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1932 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1933 payment_id: PaymentId,
1934 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1935 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1936 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1938 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1939 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1940 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1942 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1943 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1944 payment_id: PaymentId,
1945 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1946 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1950 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1952 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1954 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1955 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1956 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1957 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1959 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1960 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1961 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1964 macro_rules! handle_error {
1965 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1966 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1967 // entering the macro.
1968 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1969 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1973 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1974 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1976 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1977 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1978 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1979 let logger = WithContext::from(
1980 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1982 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1984 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1985 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1986 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1991 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1994 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1996 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1997 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1998 action: err.action.clone()
2002 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2003 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2004 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2005 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2006 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2010 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2017 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2018 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2019 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2020 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2022 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2023 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2024 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2026 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2027 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2028 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2029 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2030 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2032 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2033 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2035 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2039 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2040 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2041 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2043 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2044 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2046 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2047 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2049 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2050 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2051 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2052 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2053 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2054 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2056 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2061 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2062 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2064 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2065 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2067 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2068 match $channel_phase {
2069 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2070 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2072 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2073 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2075 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2076 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2082 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2083 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2087 let key = *$entry.key();
2088 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2090 $entry.remove_entry();
2098 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2099 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2103 let key = *$entry.key();
2104 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2106 $entry.remove_entry();
2114 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2115 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2117 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2118 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2124 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2125 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2126 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2127 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2128 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2130 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2131 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2132 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2133 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2134 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2135 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2136 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2137 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2138 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2139 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2144 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2145 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2146 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2147 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2148 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2149 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2150 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2151 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2152 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2154 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2159 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2160 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2161 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2162 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2163 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2164 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2165 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2166 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2167 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2169 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2174 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2175 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2176 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2177 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2178 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2179 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2180 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2181 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2182 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2183 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2184 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2185 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2187 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2188 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2189 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2195 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2196 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2198 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2199 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2200 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2201 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2202 updates.announcement_sigs);
2203 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2204 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2207 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2208 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2209 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2210 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2212 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2213 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2214 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2215 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2216 let mut batch_completed = false;
2217 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2218 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2219 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2220 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2222 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2223 channel_state.2 = true;
2225 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2227 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2229 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2232 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2233 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2234 if batch_completed {
2235 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2236 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2237 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2238 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2239 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2240 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2241 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2242 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2243 chan.set_batch_ready();
2244 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2245 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2249 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2250 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2251 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2256 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2258 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2259 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2261 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2262 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2263 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2264 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2269 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2270 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2271 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2272 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2274 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2275 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2276 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2277 panic!("{}", err_str);
2279 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2280 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2281 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2284 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2290 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2291 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2292 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2294 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2295 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2296 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2297 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2298 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2299 // filter for uniqueness here.
2300 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2301 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2302 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2303 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2305 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2306 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2308 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2309 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2310 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2316 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2317 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2318 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2319 while !processed_all_events {
2320 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2327 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2328 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2329 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2331 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2332 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2333 result = $self.process_background_events();
2335 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2336 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2337 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2338 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2342 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2343 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2344 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2345 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2348 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2350 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2351 $event_to_handle = event;
2353 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2354 post_event_actions.push(action);
2359 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2360 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2361 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2362 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2363 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2364 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2367 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2368 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2369 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2370 processed_all_events = false;
2374 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2375 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2376 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2378 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2379 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2380 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2386 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2388 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2389 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2390 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2391 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2392 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2393 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2397 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2399 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2401 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2402 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2404 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2406 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2407 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2408 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2411 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2412 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2413 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2415 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2416 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2417 current_timestamp: u32,
2419 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2420 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2421 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2422 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2424 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2425 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2426 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2431 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2433 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2434 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2435 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2436 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2437 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2438 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2439 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2440 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2442 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2445 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2446 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2448 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2450 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2452 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2454 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2455 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2456 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2457 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2458 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2459 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2460 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2461 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2463 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2473 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2474 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2475 &self.default_configuration
2478 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2479 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2480 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2483 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2484 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2486 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2488 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2492 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2497 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2499 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2500 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2501 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2502 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2503 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2505 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2506 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2508 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2509 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2510 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2512 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2513 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2514 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2516 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2517 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2519 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2520 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2521 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2522 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2523 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2524 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2526 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2527 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2528 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2529 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2530 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2531 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2535 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2536 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2540 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2541 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2543 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2545 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2546 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2547 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2552 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2553 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2554 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2555 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2556 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2557 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2561 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2566 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2568 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2569 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2574 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2580 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2581 node_id: their_network_key,
2584 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2587 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2588 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2589 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2590 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2591 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2592 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2593 // the same channel.
2594 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2596 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2597 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2598 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2601 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2602 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2603 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2604 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2608 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2609 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2610 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2618 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2619 /// more information.
2620 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2621 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2622 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2623 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2624 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2625 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2626 // the same channel.
2627 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2629 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2631 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2634 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2635 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2636 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2644 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2645 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2647 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2648 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2650 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2651 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2652 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2653 // really wanted anyway.
2654 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2657 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2658 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2659 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2662 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2663 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2664 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2665 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2666 let context_to_details = |context| {
2667 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2669 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2671 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2672 .map(context_to_details)
2678 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2679 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2681 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2682 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2683 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2685 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2686 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2687 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2688 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2689 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2690 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2692 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2693 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2694 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2696 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2697 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2698 payment_id: *payment_id,
2699 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2700 total_msat: *total_msat,
2703 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2704 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2706 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2707 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2709 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2714 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2717 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2718 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2724 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2731 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2732 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2733 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2734 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2735 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2736 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2738 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2739 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2740 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2741 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2742 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2746 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2747 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2749 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2750 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2751 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2752 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2755 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2756 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2760 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2762 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2763 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2770 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2771 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2772 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2773 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2776 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2777 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2783 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2784 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2785 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2787 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2788 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2790 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2791 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2792 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2793 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2795 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2797 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2798 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2799 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2802 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2803 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2804 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2805 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2806 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2807 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2810 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2811 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2812 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2814 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2815 /// the channel being closed or not:
2816 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2817 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2818 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2819 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2820 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2821 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2822 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2824 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2825 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2826 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2827 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2829 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2831 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2832 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2833 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2836 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2837 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2838 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2839 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2840 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2843 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2844 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2845 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2846 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2847 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2850 let logger = WithContext::from(
2851 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2854 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2855 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2856 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2857 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2858 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2859 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2860 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2862 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2863 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2864 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2865 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2866 // ignore the result here.
2867 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2869 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2870 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2871 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2872 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2874 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2875 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2876 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2877 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2878 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2879 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2880 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2883 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2886 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2887 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2892 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2893 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2894 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2895 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2896 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2897 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2898 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2899 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2902 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2903 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2904 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2908 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2909 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2913 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2914 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2915 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2916 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2919 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2920 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2921 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2922 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2923 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2925 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2927 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2928 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2929 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2930 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2931 mem::drop(peer_state);
2932 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2934 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2935 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2936 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2938 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2939 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2940 // Unfunded channel has no update
2941 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2944 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2945 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2946 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2947 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2949 (None, *peer_node_id)
2951 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2954 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2955 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2956 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2959 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2960 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2961 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2962 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2968 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2971 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2973 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2974 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2976 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2977 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2979 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2980 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2981 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2982 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2993 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2994 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2995 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2997 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2998 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2999 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3002 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3003 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3004 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3006 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3007 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3008 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3009 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3010 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3013 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3014 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3015 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3016 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3017 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3021 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3022 /// local transaction(s).
3023 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3024 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3025 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3029 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3030 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3032 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3034 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3035 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3038 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3039 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3040 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3041 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3047 macro_rules! return_err {
3048 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3051 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3052 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3054 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3055 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3056 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3057 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3058 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3059 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3060 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3064 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3065 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3066 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3067 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3068 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3069 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3070 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3071 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3077 let NextPacketDetails {
3078 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3079 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3080 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3081 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3082 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3085 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3086 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3087 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3088 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3089 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3090 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3091 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3092 // phantom or an intercept.
3093 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3094 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3095 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3099 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3102 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3104 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3105 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3106 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3107 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3108 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3110 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3112 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3113 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3116 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3117 // have no consistency guarantees.
3118 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3122 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3123 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3124 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3125 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3126 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3128 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3129 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3130 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3131 // we don't have the channel here.
3132 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3134 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3136 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3137 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3138 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3139 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3140 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3141 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3142 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3143 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3144 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3145 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3146 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3148 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3151 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3152 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3154 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3155 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3162 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3164 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3165 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3167 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3168 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3169 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3170 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3171 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3173 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3174 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3180 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3181 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3182 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3183 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3185 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3186 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3188 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3189 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3190 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3192 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3193 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3194 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3195 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3196 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3197 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3198 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3202 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3204 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3207 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3208 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3209 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3210 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3211 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3212 macro_rules! return_err {
3213 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3215 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3216 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3217 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3218 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3219 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3220 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3221 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3222 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3223 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3227 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3228 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3229 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3230 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3231 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3237 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3239 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3240 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3241 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3242 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3245 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3246 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3247 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3248 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3249 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3251 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3254 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3255 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3256 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3257 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3258 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3264 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3265 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3266 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3268 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3269 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3270 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3272 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3273 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3274 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3275 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3276 return Err(LightningError {
3277 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3278 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3281 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3282 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3284 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3285 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3286 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3289 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3290 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3291 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3292 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3294 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3295 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3296 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3298 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3299 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3300 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3301 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3302 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3303 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3304 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3308 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3311 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3312 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3313 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3314 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3316 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3317 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3318 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3319 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3320 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3323 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3324 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3326 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3327 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3328 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3329 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3330 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3331 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3332 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3333 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3335 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3336 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3337 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3339 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3341 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3348 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3349 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3350 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3351 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3356 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3357 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3358 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3361 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3362 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3363 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3364 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3366 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3367 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3368 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3370 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3371 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3375 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3376 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3378 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3379 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3380 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3382 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3385 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3387 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3388 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3391 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3392 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3395 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3396 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3397 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3398 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3399 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3401 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3402 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3403 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3404 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3406 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3407 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3409 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3410 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3411 Some(monitor_update) => {
3412 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3414 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3415 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3416 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3417 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3418 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3419 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3420 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3428 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3431 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3432 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3433 // `channel_by_id` map.
3434 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3435 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3439 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3440 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3442 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3447 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3449 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3450 /// fields for more info.
3452 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3453 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3455 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3457 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3458 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3459 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3460 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3461 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3463 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3464 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3465 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3466 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3467 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3469 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3470 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3471 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3472 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3474 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3476 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3477 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3478 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3480 /// In general, a path may raise:
3481 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3482 /// node public key) is specified.
3483 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3484 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3485 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3486 /// relevant updates.
3488 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3489 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3490 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3492 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3493 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3494 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3495 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3496 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3497 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3498 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3499 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3501 self.pending_outbound_payments
3502 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3503 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3504 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3507 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3508 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3509 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3510 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3512 self.pending_outbound_payments
3513 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3514 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3515 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3516 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3520 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3521 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3523 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3524 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3525 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3529 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3530 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3531 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3535 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3536 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3539 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3540 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3542 self.pending_outbound_payments
3543 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3544 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3545 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3546 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3547 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3551 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3552 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3553 /// retries are exhausted.
3555 /// # Event Generation
3557 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3558 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3560 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3561 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3562 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3564 /// # Requested Invoices
3566 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3567 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3568 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3569 /// once the invoice has been received.
3571 /// # Restart Behavior
3573 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3574 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3575 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3577 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3578 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3580 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3583 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3584 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3585 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3586 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3587 /// never reach the recipient.
3589 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3590 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3592 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3593 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3595 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3596 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3597 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3599 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3600 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3601 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3604 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3605 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3607 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3610 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3611 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3612 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3614 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3615 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3616 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3617 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3620 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3621 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3622 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3623 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3624 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3625 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3626 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3627 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3628 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3631 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3634 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3635 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3638 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3639 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3641 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3642 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3643 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3644 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3645 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3646 let payment_params =
3647 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3649 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3651 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3654 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3655 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3657 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3658 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3659 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3660 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3662 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3663 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3664 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3665 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3666 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3667 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3668 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3669 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3670 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3671 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3673 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3674 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3675 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3676 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3680 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3682 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3683 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3686 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3688 let mut res = Vec::new();
3690 for mut path in route.paths {
3691 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3692 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3693 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3694 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3695 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3698 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3701 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3702 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3704 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3706 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3707 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3712 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3715 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3720 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3721 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3722 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3724 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3725 let used_liquidity =
3726 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3728 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3729 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3731 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3734 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3739 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3740 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3741 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3748 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3749 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3750 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3751 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3752 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3753 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3755 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3756 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3761 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3762 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3763 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3765 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3766 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3767 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3768 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3769 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3770 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3771 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3772 } else { unreachable!(); });
3774 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3775 Err((chan, err)) => {
3776 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3777 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3778 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3779 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3780 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3786 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3787 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3789 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3790 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3793 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3794 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3795 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3799 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3800 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3801 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3805 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3807 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3810 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3811 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3815 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3816 funding_txo, o.get()
3818 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3819 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3820 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3821 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3822 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3823 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3826 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3833 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3834 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3835 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3839 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3841 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3842 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3844 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3845 /// across the p2p network.
3847 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3848 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3850 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3851 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3852 /// keys per-channel).
3854 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3855 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3856 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3858 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3859 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3860 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3862 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3863 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3864 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3865 /// for more details.
3867 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3868 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3869 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3870 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3873 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3875 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3876 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3878 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3879 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3880 /// signature for each channel.
3882 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3883 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3885 let mut result = Ok(());
3887 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3888 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3889 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3890 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3891 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3896 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3897 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3898 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3902 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3903 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3904 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3905 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3906 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3907 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3908 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3909 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3911 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3912 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3917 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3918 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3919 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3920 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3924 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3925 match states.entry(txid) {
3926 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3927 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3928 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3932 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3935 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3936 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3937 temporary_channel_id,
3938 counterparty_node_id,
3939 funding_transaction.clone(),
3942 let mut output_index = None;
3943 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3944 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3945 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3946 if output_index.is_some() {
3947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3948 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3951 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3954 if output_index.is_none() {
3955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3956 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3959 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3960 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3961 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3967 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3968 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3969 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3970 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3971 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3972 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3973 .into_iter().flatten()
3974 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3976 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3977 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3979 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3982 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3983 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3984 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3985 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3987 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3988 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3989 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3993 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
3994 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3995 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4001 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4003 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4004 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4005 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4006 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4008 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4009 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4011 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4012 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4014 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4016 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4017 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4018 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4019 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4020 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4021 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4022 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4023 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4024 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4025 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4026 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4027 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4028 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4034 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4035 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4036 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4037 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4038 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4039 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4040 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4041 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4045 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4046 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4047 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4048 config.apply(config_update);
4049 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4052 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4053 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4055 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4056 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4057 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4064 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4065 debug_assert!(false);
4066 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4068 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4069 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4076 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4078 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4079 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4080 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4081 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4083 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4084 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4086 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4087 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4089 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4091 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4092 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4093 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4094 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4095 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4096 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4097 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4098 pub fn update_channel_config(
4099 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4100 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4101 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4104 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4105 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4107 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4108 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4110 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4111 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4112 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4113 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4114 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4116 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4117 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4118 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4121 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4124 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4125 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4126 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4127 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4128 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4129 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4132 let next_hop_scid = {
4133 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4134 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4135 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4136 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4138 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4139 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4140 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4141 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4142 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4145 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4147 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4148 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4149 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4152 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4153 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4154 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4155 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4156 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4163 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4164 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4165 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4168 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4169 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4170 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4171 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4174 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4176 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4177 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4178 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4179 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4180 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4183 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4184 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4185 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4186 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4187 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4189 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4193 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4194 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4196 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4199 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4200 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4203 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4204 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4205 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4208 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4209 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4210 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4211 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4212 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4213 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4214 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4215 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4216 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4219 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4220 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4221 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4222 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4227 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4229 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4230 /// Will likely generate further events.
4231 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4234 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4235 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4236 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4238 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4239 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4241 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4242 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4243 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4244 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4246 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4247 match forward_info {
4248 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4249 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4250 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4251 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4252 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4255 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4256 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4257 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4258 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4260 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4261 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4262 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4263 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4264 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4265 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4266 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4267 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4270 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4271 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4273 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4276 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4277 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4283 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4284 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4286 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4290 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4291 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4293 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4297 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4298 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4299 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4300 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4301 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4302 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4303 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4306 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4307 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4308 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4309 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4310 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4312 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4314 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4315 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4319 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4320 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4321 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4322 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4323 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4324 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4326 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4327 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4333 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4336 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4339 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4340 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4341 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4342 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4343 // problem, not ours.
4349 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4350 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4351 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4353 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4357 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4359 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4360 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4361 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4364 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4365 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4366 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4367 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4368 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4369 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4370 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4371 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4372 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4373 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4374 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4375 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4376 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4379 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4380 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4381 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4382 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4383 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4384 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4385 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4386 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4387 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4388 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4390 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4391 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4392 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4393 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4394 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4395 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4398 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4399 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4400 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4403 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4404 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4406 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4408 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4409 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4410 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4411 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4417 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4418 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4420 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4421 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4422 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4424 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4425 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4426 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4427 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4429 Some((res, htlc_id))
4432 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4433 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4434 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4435 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4437 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4439 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4440 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4441 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4447 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4451 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4452 match forward_info {
4453 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4454 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4455 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4456 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4457 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4460 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4461 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4462 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4463 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4464 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4466 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4467 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4468 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4469 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4470 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4472 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4473 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4474 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4478 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4479 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4482 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4485 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4486 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4487 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4488 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4489 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4490 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4491 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4492 phantom_shared_secret,
4495 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4496 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4497 // if routing nodes overpay
4498 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4499 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4501 total_value_received: None,
4502 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4505 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4508 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4510 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4511 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4512 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4513 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4514 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4515 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4517 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4518 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4519 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4520 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4521 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4522 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4523 phantom_shared_secret,
4526 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4527 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4529 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4532 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4533 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4534 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4535 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4536 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4539 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4540 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4541 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4542 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4543 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4544 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4546 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4547 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4548 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4550 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4551 .entry(payment_hash)
4552 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4553 .or_insert_with(|| {
4554 committed_to_claimable = true;
4556 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4559 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4560 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4562 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4564 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4566 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4568 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4569 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4570 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4573 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4575 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4576 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4577 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4578 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4579 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4580 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4581 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4582 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4583 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4584 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4586 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4588 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4589 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4590 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4591 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4592 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4593 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4595 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4596 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4597 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4598 committed_to_claimable = true;
4600 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4601 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4602 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4603 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4604 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4605 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4606 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4607 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4608 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4609 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4613 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4614 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4615 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4616 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4617 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4619 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4621 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4622 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4624 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4625 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4626 committed_to_claimable = true;
4629 payment_claimable_generated
4633 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4634 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4635 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4636 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4637 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4638 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4639 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4640 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4642 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4643 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4644 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4645 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4646 Ok(result) => result,
4648 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4649 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4652 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4653 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4654 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4656 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4657 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4660 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4661 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4662 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4664 check_total_value!(purpose);
4666 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4667 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4668 check_total_value!(purpose);
4672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4673 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4675 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4677 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4678 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4679 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4680 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4681 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4683 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4684 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4686 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4687 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4688 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4690 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4691 if payment_claimable_generated {
4692 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4698 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4699 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4707 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4708 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4709 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4710 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4712 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4713 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4715 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4717 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4718 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4719 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4721 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4723 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4724 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4725 events.append(&mut new_events);
4728 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4730 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4731 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4732 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4734 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4736 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4737 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4738 if background_events.is_empty() {
4739 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4742 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4744 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4745 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4746 // monitor updating completing.
4747 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4749 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4750 let mut updated_chan = false;
4752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4753 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4756 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4758 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4759 updated_chan = true;
4760 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4761 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4763 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4771 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4772 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4775 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4777 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4780 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4781 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4783 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4784 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4785 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4786 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4787 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4793 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4796 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4797 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4798 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4799 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4800 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4803 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4804 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4806 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4808 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4809 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4810 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4811 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4812 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4814 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4816 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4817 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4818 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4819 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4821 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4822 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4824 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4825 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4829 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4830 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4831 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4832 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4833 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4834 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4835 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4837 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4838 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4840 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4841 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4842 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4843 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4844 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4845 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4847 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4852 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4853 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4861 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4863 /// This currently includes:
4864 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4865 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4866 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4868 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4869 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4870 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4871 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4872 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4873 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4874 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4875 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4877 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4878 /// estimate fetches.
4880 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4881 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4882 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4883 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4884 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4886 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4887 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4889 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4890 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4891 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4892 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4894 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4895 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4896 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4897 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4898 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4899 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4901 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4902 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4903 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4905 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4906 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4907 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4908 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4909 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4910 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4911 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4912 channel_id: *chan_id,
4913 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4925 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4926 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4927 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4928 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4929 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4930 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4932 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4933 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4938 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4939 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4941 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4942 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4943 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4944 if needs_close { return false; }
4947 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4948 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4949 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4950 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4951 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4952 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4953 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4954 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4956 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4957 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4958 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4963 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4965 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4968 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4970 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4971 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4972 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4973 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4977 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4979 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4985 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4987 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4988 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4989 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4990 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4991 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4992 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4993 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4994 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4995 channel_id: *chan_id,
4996 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5004 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5005 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5006 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5008 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5009 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5010 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5015 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5016 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5017 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5018 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5019 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5020 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5021 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5022 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5023 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5029 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5031 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5032 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5037 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5038 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5039 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5040 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5041 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5042 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5043 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5044 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5045 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5046 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5047 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5049 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5050 // have no channels to the peer.
5051 let remove_entry = {
5052 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5053 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5056 entry.remove_entry();
5059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5064 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5065 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5066 // This should be unreachable
5067 debug_assert!(false);
5070 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5071 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5072 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5073 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5074 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5075 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5076 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5079 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5080 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5081 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5083 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5084 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5091 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5092 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5093 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5094 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5095 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5098 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5099 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5102 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5103 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5106 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5107 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5108 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5109 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5110 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5111 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5112 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5115 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5116 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5119 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5120 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5121 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5122 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5123 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5130 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5131 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5132 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5134 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5135 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5136 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5137 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5139 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5140 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5141 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5142 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5143 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5147 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5148 /// reason for the failure.
5150 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5151 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5154 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5155 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5156 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5157 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5158 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5159 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5160 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5165 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5166 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5167 match failure_code {
5168 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5169 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5170 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5171 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5172 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5173 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5175 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5176 let fail_data = match data {
5177 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5180 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5185 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5186 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5188 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5190 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5191 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5192 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5193 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5194 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5195 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5196 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5198 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5200 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5201 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5203 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5208 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5209 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5210 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5211 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5212 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5213 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5214 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5215 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5216 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5217 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5219 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5220 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5221 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5222 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5224 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5225 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5226 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5227 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5228 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5232 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5233 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5234 // be surfaced to the user.
5235 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5236 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5237 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5239 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5241 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5242 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5243 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5244 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5246 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5247 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5249 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5250 debug_assert!(false);
5251 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5254 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5256 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5259 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5260 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5261 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5262 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5266 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5267 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5268 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5269 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5270 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5271 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5272 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5273 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5274 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5275 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5278 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5279 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5280 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5283 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5284 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5285 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5287 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5288 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5289 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5290 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5291 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5293 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5294 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5295 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5298 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5299 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5300 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5302 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5303 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5304 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5305 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5306 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5308 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5310 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5311 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5313 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5314 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5318 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5319 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5321 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5325 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5326 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5327 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5328 push_forward_ev = true;
5330 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5332 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5335 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5338 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5339 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5341 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5342 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5343 failed_next_destination: destination,
5349 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5350 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5352 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5353 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5354 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5355 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5357 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5358 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5359 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5360 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5362 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5363 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5364 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5366 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5367 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5368 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5369 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5370 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5371 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5372 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5373 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5374 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5377 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5378 /// even type numbers.
5382 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5383 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5385 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5386 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5387 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5390 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5391 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5396 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5397 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5398 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5399 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5400 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5401 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5402 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5403 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5408 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5409 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5410 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5411 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5412 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5414 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5415 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5416 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5420 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5421 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5422 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5423 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5424 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5425 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5426 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5427 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5428 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5429 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5430 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5439 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5441 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5442 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5443 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5444 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5445 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5446 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5447 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5448 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5449 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5451 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5452 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5453 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5454 debug_assert!(false);
5458 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5460 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5461 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5462 debug_assert!(false);
5466 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5467 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5469 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5470 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5471 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5472 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5475 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5476 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5477 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5478 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5482 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5483 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5484 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5485 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5486 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5487 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5488 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5491 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5492 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5493 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5494 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5495 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5496 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5501 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5502 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5503 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5504 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5505 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5506 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5507 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5509 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5512 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5513 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5514 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5515 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5519 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5520 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5521 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5522 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5524 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5525 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5526 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5527 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5529 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5530 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5531 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5532 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5536 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5537 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5538 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5542 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5543 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5544 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5547 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5548 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5549 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5550 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5551 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5552 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5553 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5554 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5557 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5558 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5559 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5561 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5564 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5565 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5567 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5568 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5569 // monitor update as a background event.
5570 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5571 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5572 counterparty_node_id,
5573 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5574 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5578 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5579 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5584 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5586 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5588 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5589 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5590 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5591 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5592 blocking_action: blocker,
5594 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5596 debug_assert!(false,
5597 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5600 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5601 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5602 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5603 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5604 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5606 let mut found_blocker = false;
5607 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5608 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5609 // which case we need to only remove the one
5610 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5611 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5612 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5613 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5615 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5618 debug_assert!(false);
5627 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5628 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5629 counterparty_node_id: None,
5630 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5636 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5637 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5638 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5639 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5640 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5641 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5642 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5643 // again on restart.
5644 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5645 payment_preimage, update_res);
5648 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5649 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5651 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5652 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5653 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5654 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5655 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5656 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5657 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5658 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5659 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5660 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5663 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5664 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5665 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5666 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5667 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5668 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5672 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5673 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5676 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5677 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5678 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5681 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5682 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5683 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5684 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5685 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5687 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5688 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5689 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5691 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5692 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5695 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5696 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5697 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5698 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5699 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5700 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5701 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5702 let chan_to_release =
5703 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5704 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5706 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5707 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5708 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5709 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5714 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5715 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5716 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5717 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5718 // in the background.
5719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5720 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5721 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5722 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5724 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5725 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5726 funding_txo, update, ..
5728 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5729 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5730 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5731 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5733 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5739 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5740 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5741 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5743 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5744 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5746 monitor_update.updates[0],
5747 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5752 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5753 // immediately once we get going.
5754 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5757 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5759 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5762 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5763 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5764 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5765 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5766 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5767 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5771 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5772 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5773 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5776 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5777 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5779 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5780 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5781 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5782 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5784 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5788 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5789 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5790 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5796 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5797 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5798 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5801 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5802 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5803 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5804 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5806 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5808 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5809 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5810 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5812 payment_purpose: purpose,
5815 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5817 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5821 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5823 sender_intended_total_msat,
5827 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5828 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5830 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5831 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5832 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5835 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5836 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5838 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5839 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5840 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5841 Some(blocking_action),
5848 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5849 /// update completion.
5850 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5851 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5852 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5853 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5854 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5855 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5856 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5857 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5858 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5859 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5860 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5861 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5862 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5863 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5865 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5867 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5868 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5869 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5870 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5873 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5874 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5876 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5877 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5878 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5883 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5884 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5885 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5886 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5891 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5892 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5893 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5894 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5895 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5900 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5904 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5910 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5911 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5912 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5916 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5917 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5918 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5924 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5925 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5927 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5928 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5930 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5931 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5932 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5933 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5934 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5940 let mut peer_state_lock;
5941 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5942 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5943 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5946 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5949 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5950 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5951 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5952 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5953 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5956 let remaining_in_flight =
5957 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5958 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5961 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5962 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5963 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5964 remaining_in_flight);
5965 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5968 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5971 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5973 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5974 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5977 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5978 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5979 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5981 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5982 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5983 /// used to accept such channels.
5985 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5986 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5987 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5988 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5991 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5992 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5994 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5995 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5996 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5998 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5999 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6001 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6002 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6004 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6005 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6007 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6008 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6009 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6010 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6013 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6015 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6018 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6019 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6021 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6023 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6024 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6026 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6030 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6032 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6033 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6034 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6036 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6037 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6038 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6039 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6040 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6041 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6042 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6043 let err_str = e.to_string();
6044 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6046 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6050 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6051 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6053 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6058 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6059 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6060 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6061 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6062 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6063 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6064 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6067 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6068 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6069 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6071 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6073 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6074 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6075 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6076 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6077 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6078 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6079 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6080 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6083 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6084 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6085 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6087 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6091 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6092 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6093 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6095 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6096 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6097 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6100 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6105 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6106 /// or 0-conf channels.
6108 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6109 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6110 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6111 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6112 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6113 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6115 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6116 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6117 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6118 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6119 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6120 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6121 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6125 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6128 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6129 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6131 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6132 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6134 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6135 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6136 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6137 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6138 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6140 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6143 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6144 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6145 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6148 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6149 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6154 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6157 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6158 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6159 // likely to be lost on restart!
6160 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6164 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6168 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6169 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6170 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6171 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6172 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6175 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6177 debug_assert!(false);
6178 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6180 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6183 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6184 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6185 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6186 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6187 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6188 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6191 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6192 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6195 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6196 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6197 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6198 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6199 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6202 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6203 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6208 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6209 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6210 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6211 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6213 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6215 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6216 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6217 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6218 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6219 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6220 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6223 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6224 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6225 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6230 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6231 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6232 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6233 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6234 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6235 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6236 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6244 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6245 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6248 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6252 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6253 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6255 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6256 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6257 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6259 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6263 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6264 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6265 // likely to be lost on restart!
6266 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6267 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6268 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6270 debug_assert!(false);
6271 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6273 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6275 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6277 match phase.get_mut() {
6278 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6279 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6280 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6283 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6290 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6291 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6292 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6293 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6294 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6296 user_channel_id: user_id,
6301 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6302 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6304 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6305 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6307 debug_assert!(false);
6308 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6313 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6314 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6315 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6316 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6317 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6319 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6320 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6321 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6322 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6323 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6324 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6325 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6326 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6327 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6331 Some(mut phase) => {
6332 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6333 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6334 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6336 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6339 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6341 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6342 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6343 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6344 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6345 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6346 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6348 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6349 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6350 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6353 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6355 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6358 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6359 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6361 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6364 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6365 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6366 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6367 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6369 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6370 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6371 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6372 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6373 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6374 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6375 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6380 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6381 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6382 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6384 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6388 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6389 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6390 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6398 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6399 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6401 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6403 debug_assert!(false);
6404 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6409 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6411 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6412 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6413 let logger = WithContext::from(
6415 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6416 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6419 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6421 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6422 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6423 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6424 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6425 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6426 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6427 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6428 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6429 } else { unreachable!(); }
6432 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6433 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6434 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6435 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6436 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6437 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6438 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6442 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6443 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6444 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6445 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6446 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6447 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6458 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6459 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6460 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6462 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6464 debug_assert!(false);
6465 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6469 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6471 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6472 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6473 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6474 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6475 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6476 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6477 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6478 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6479 msg: announcement_sigs,
6481 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6482 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6483 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6484 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6485 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6486 // announcement_signatures.
6487 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6488 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6489 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6490 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6497 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6498 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6503 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6504 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6508 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6513 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6514 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6515 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6518 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6520 debug_assert!(false);
6521 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6525 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6526 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6528 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6529 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6530 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6531 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6533 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6536 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6537 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6538 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6539 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6541 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6542 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6543 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6544 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6545 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6546 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6550 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6551 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6552 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6553 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6556 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6557 let context = phase.context_mut();
6558 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6559 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6560 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6561 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6568 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6569 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6570 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6571 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6573 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6574 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6580 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6582 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6584 debug_assert!(false);
6585 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6587 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6590 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6592 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6593 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6594 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6595 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6597 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6602 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6603 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6604 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6605 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6606 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6607 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6608 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6610 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6611 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6617 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6618 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6619 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6620 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6622 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6623 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6626 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6631 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6632 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6633 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6638 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6639 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6640 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6641 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6643 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6644 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6645 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6646 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6648 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6649 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6651 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6653 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6655 debug_assert!(false);
6656 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6660 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6662 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6663 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6664 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6665 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6666 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6667 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6669 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6671 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6672 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6673 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6674 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6675 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6676 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6677 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6678 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6682 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6683 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6684 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6685 match pending_forward_info {
6686 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6687 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6689 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6690 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6691 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6692 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6693 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6695 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6696 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6697 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6698 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6699 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6702 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6704 _ => pending_forward_info
6707 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6708 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6710 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6711 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6719 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6721 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6723 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6725 debug_assert!(false);
6726 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6730 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6732 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6733 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6734 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6735 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6737 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6739 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6740 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6741 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6743 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6744 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6745 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6746 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6747 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6748 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6749 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6752 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6753 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6759 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6763 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6764 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6765 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6767 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6769 debug_assert!(false);
6770 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6776 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6777 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6779 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6780 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6788 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6789 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6790 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6792 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6794 debug_assert!(false);
6795 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6799 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6801 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6802 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6803 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6805 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6806 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6808 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6809 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6817 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6819 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6821 debug_assert!(false);
6822 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6826 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6828 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6829 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6830 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6831 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6832 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6833 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6834 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6838 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6839 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6847 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6848 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6849 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6850 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6851 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6852 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6853 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6854 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6855 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6856 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6857 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6859 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6860 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6862 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6863 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6864 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6866 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6867 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6870 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6871 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6873 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6874 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6875 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6877 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6878 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6879 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6880 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6881 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6884 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6885 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6888 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6889 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6890 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6891 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6892 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6893 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6894 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6895 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6896 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6897 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6900 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6901 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6902 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6907 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6908 // payments are being processed.
6909 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6910 push_forward_event = true;
6912 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6913 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6920 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6924 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6925 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6926 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6928 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6932 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6933 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6934 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6935 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6936 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6938 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6939 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6940 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6941 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6942 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6943 // real by taking more time.
6944 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6945 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6946 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6951 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6952 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6953 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6954 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6955 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6956 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6957 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6959 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6960 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6961 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6962 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6963 channel_funding_outpoint,
6964 counterparty_node_id,
6969 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6970 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6971 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6974 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6975 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6978 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6979 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6980 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6986 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6987 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6989 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6991 debug_assert!(false);
6992 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6993 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6994 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6995 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6997 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6998 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6999 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7000 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7001 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7002 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
7003 *counterparty_node_id)
7005 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7006 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7007 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7008 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7009 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7010 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7011 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7015 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7016 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7022 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7026 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7028 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7030 debug_assert!(false);
7031 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7035 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7037 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7038 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7039 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7041 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7042 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7050 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7051 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7052 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7054 debug_assert!(false);
7055 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7057 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7058 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7059 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7061 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7062 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7063 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7066 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7067 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7068 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7069 msg, &self.default_configuration
7070 ), chan_phase_entry),
7071 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7072 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7073 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7076 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7077 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7085 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7086 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7087 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7088 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7090 // It's not a local channel
7091 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7094 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7095 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7096 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7097 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7099 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7101 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7102 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7103 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7104 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7105 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7106 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7107 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7108 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7109 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7111 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7113 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7114 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7115 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7116 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7118 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7119 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7120 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7121 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7124 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7128 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7129 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7134 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7137 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7139 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7142 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7144 debug_assert!(false);
7145 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7146 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7150 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7151 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7152 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7153 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7155 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7156 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7157 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7158 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7159 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7160 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7161 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7162 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7163 let mut channel_update = None;
7164 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7165 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7166 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7169 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7170 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7171 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7172 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7173 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7174 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7175 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7180 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7181 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7182 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7183 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7184 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7185 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7189 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7190 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7194 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7196 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7197 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7198 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7199 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7200 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7201 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7203 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7204 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7205 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7206 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7207 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7208 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7209 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7210 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7211 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7212 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7213 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7214 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7215 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7216 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7217 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7218 next_funding_txid: None,
7221 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7222 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7223 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7229 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7230 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7231 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7232 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7235 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7236 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7241 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7242 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7243 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7245 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7246 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7247 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7248 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7249 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7250 match monitor_event {
7251 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7252 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7253 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7254 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7255 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7257 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7258 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7259 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7260 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7263 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7264 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7265 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7267 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7268 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7269 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7270 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7273 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7275 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7278 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7279 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7280 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7281 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7282 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7287 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7288 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7289 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7290 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7298 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7299 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7305 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7306 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7309 has_pending_monitor_events
7312 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7313 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7314 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7316 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7318 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7321 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7322 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7323 /// update was applied.
7324 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7325 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7326 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7328 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7329 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7330 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7331 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7333 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7334 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7337 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7338 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7339 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7341 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7342 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7343 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7344 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7345 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7346 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7348 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7349 has_monitor_update = true;
7351 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7352 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7353 continue 'peer_loop;
7362 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7363 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7364 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7370 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7371 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7373 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7374 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7376 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7377 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7378 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7381 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7382 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7384 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7385 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7386 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7387 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7392 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7398 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7399 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7402 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7403 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7404 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7410 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7415 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7416 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7419 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7420 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7424 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7427 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7428 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7434 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7435 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7436 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7437 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7438 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7439 let mut has_update = false;
7440 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7442 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7444 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7447 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7448 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7450 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7451 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7452 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7453 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7454 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7456 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7457 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7460 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7461 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7462 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7464 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7465 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7466 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7467 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7468 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7473 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7474 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7475 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7481 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7482 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7487 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7493 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7494 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7497 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7498 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7504 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7505 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7507 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7508 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7509 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7510 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7511 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7512 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7513 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7514 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7515 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7516 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7517 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7518 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7519 assert!(should_broadcast);
7520 } else { unreachable!(); }
7521 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7522 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7523 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7526 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7531 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7532 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7533 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7534 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7538 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7539 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7540 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7541 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7542 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7544 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7548 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7553 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7555 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7557 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7558 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7559 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7560 &$self, description: String
7561 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7562 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7563 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7564 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7565 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7567 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7568 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7569 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7571 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7578 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7579 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7580 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7584 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7585 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7587 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7588 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7589 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7592 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7593 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7594 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7596 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7597 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7601 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7602 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7603 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7604 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7605 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7607 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7611 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7612 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7617 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7618 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7619 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7621 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7623 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7624 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7625 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7626 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7627 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7628 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7629 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7630 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7631 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7632 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7633 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7634 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7636 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7637 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7638 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7640 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7641 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7644 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7645 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7646 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7647 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7649 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7655 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7657 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7658 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7659 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7660 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7661 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7662 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7666 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7667 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7668 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7669 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7672 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7674 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7676 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7677 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7678 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7680 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7681 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7682 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7683 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7684 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7685 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7686 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7688 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7689 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7693 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7694 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7697 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7698 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7699 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7703 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7704 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7705 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7706 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7710 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7711 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7712 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7717 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7718 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7719 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7722 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7723 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7724 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7725 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7726 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7727 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7728 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7729 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7730 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7731 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7732 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7733 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7734 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7735 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7736 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7739 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7740 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7741 let builder = match quantity {
7743 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7745 let builder = match amount_msats {
7747 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7749 let builder = match payer_note {
7751 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7753 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7754 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7756 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7757 self.pending_outbound_payments
7758 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7759 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7761 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7763 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7764 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7765 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7766 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7767 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7770 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7772 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7773 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7774 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7775 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7776 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7777 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7778 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7779 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7780 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7782 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7789 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7792 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7793 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7794 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7798 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7799 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7800 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7801 /// received and no retries will be made.
7805 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7806 /// path for the invoice.
7808 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7809 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7810 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7811 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7812 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7814 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7815 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7817 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7818 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7819 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7820 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7822 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7823 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7824 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7826 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7827 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7828 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7830 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7831 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7832 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7834 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7835 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7836 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7838 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7839 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7840 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7841 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7842 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7845 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7847 for path in refund.paths() {
7848 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7849 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7850 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7851 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7853 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7859 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7863 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7866 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7867 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7869 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7870 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7871 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7872 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7874 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7876 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7877 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7881 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7882 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7884 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7886 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7887 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7889 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7890 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7891 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7892 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7893 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7894 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7895 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7896 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7897 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7898 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7899 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7902 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7903 /// stored external to LDK.
7905 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7906 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7907 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7909 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7910 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7913 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7914 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7915 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7916 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7918 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7919 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7920 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7921 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7922 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7924 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7925 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7926 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7927 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7928 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7930 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7931 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7933 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7934 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7938 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7939 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7941 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7943 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7944 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7946 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7947 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7948 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7949 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7950 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7951 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7952 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7955 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7956 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7958 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7959 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7960 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7963 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7965 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7966 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7967 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7968 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7969 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7971 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7973 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7974 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7975 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7978 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7979 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7982 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7983 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7984 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7985 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7986 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7987 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7988 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7990 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7991 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7992 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7993 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7994 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7996 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7998 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8001 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8002 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
8006 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8007 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8009 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8010 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8011 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8012 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8014 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8015 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8016 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8017 Some(_) => continue,
8018 None => return scid_candidate
8023 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8025 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8026 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8028 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8029 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8030 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8034 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8035 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8036 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8038 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8039 /// times to get a unique scid.
8040 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8041 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8042 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8044 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8045 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8046 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8047 return scid_candidate
8051 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8052 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8053 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8054 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8056 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8057 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8058 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8059 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8060 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8061 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8063 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8064 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8065 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8074 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8075 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8076 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8077 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8078 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8082 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8083 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8084 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8085 events.push_back((event, None));
8089 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8090 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8091 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8095 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8096 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8100 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8101 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8104 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8105 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8106 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8107 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8108 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8109 let logger = WithContext::from(
8110 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8113 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8114 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8115 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8116 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8117 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8118 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8119 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8120 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8122 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8126 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8127 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8128 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8129 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8130 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8131 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8132 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8136 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8137 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8138 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8139 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8140 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8141 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8142 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8143 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8144 if further_update_exists {
8145 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8150 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8151 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8157 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8158 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8164 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8165 for action in actions {
8167 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8168 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8170 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8176 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8177 /// using the given event handler.
8179 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8180 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8184 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8188 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8190 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8191 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8192 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8193 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8194 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8199 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8200 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8201 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8202 /// is always placed next to each other.
8204 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8205 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8206 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8207 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8209 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8210 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8211 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8212 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8213 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8214 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8215 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8217 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8218 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8219 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8220 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8223 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8224 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8226 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8227 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8230 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8231 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8232 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8235 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8236 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8240 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8241 events.replace(pending_events);
8250 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8252 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8253 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8254 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8255 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8256 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8257 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8261 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8263 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8264 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8265 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8267 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8271 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8273 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8274 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8275 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8276 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8277 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8278 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8282 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8284 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8285 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8286 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8287 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8288 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8291 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8292 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8295 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8296 let _persistence_guard =
8297 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8298 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8299 let new_height = height - 1;
8301 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8302 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8303 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8304 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8305 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8306 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8309 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8313 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8315 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8317 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8318 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8319 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8320 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8324 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8325 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8326 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8327 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8329 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8330 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8332 let _persistence_guard =
8333 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8334 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8335 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8336 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8338 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8339 if height < last_best_block_height {
8340 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8341 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8345 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8346 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8347 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8348 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8350 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8351 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8353 let _persistence_guard =
8354 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8355 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8356 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8358 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8360 macro_rules! max_time {
8361 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8363 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8364 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8365 // having an explicit local time source.
8366 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8367 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8368 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8369 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8370 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8376 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8377 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8378 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8379 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8383 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8384 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8385 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8388 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8389 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8390 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8391 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8392 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8393 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8400 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8401 let _persistence_guard =
8402 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8403 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8404 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8405 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8406 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8407 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8408 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8409 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8414 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8416 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8417 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8418 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8419 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8420 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8421 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8425 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8426 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8428 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8429 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8430 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8431 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8432 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8434 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8435 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8438 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8441 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8442 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8444 // Retain unfunded channels.
8445 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8446 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8447 let res = f(channel);
8448 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8449 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8450 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8451 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8452 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8454 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8455 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8456 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8457 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8458 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8459 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8460 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8461 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8466 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8471 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8472 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8475 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8476 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8478 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8479 msg: announcement_sigs,
8481 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8482 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8485 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8486 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8487 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8492 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8493 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8494 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8495 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8496 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8497 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8498 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8499 // is always consistent.
8500 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8501 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8502 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8503 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8504 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8507 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8508 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8509 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8510 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8511 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8512 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8513 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8514 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8518 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8519 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8520 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8521 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8522 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8523 data: reason_message,
8536 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8537 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8538 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8539 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8540 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8541 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8542 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8543 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8544 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8545 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8547 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8548 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8549 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8553 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8556 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8557 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8558 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8559 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8560 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8561 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8562 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8563 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8564 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8565 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8566 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8569 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8570 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8571 _ => unreachable!(),
8573 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8574 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8575 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8576 let logger = WithContext::from(
8577 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8579 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8585 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8587 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8588 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8592 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8593 /// may have events that need processing.
8595 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8596 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8598 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8599 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8600 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8601 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8604 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8605 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8606 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8609 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8610 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8611 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8614 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8615 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8616 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8617 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8620 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8621 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8622 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8623 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8626 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8627 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8629 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8630 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8631 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8632 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8633 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8636 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8637 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8638 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8639 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8642 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8643 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8644 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8645 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8648 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8649 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8650 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8651 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8654 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8655 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8656 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8657 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8661 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8662 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8664 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8665 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8666 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8667 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8668 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8673 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8674 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8675 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8676 // change to the contents.
8677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8678 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8679 let persist = match &res {
8680 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8681 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8682 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8684 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8686 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8691 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8692 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8693 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8694 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8697 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8698 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8699 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8700 // change to the contents.
8701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8702 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8703 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8707 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8708 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8709 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8710 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8713 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8715 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8718 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8720 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8723 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8724 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8725 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8726 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8727 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8729 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8730 let persist = match &res {
8731 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8732 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8734 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8739 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8740 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8741 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8742 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8745 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8746 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8747 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8748 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8751 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8752 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8753 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8754 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8757 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8758 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8759 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8760 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8763 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8765 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8768 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8770 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8773 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8774 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8775 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8776 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8778 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8779 let persist = match &res {
8780 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8781 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8782 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8784 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8789 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8791 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8794 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8795 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8796 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8797 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8799 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8800 let persist = match &res {
8801 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8802 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8803 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8805 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8810 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8811 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8812 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8813 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8815 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8816 let persist = match &res {
8817 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8818 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8819 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8821 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8826 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8828 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8831 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8833 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8836 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8837 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8838 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8839 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8841 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8842 let persist = match &res {
8843 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8844 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8845 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8847 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8852 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8854 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8857 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8858 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8859 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8862 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8867 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8869 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8870 let persist = match &res {
8871 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8872 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8873 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8875 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8880 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8882 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8883 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8884 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8887 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8888 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8889 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8891 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8894 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8895 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8896 let context = match phase {
8897 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8898 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8899 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8900 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8905 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8906 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8909 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8913 // Clean up for removal.
8914 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8915 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8918 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8919 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8920 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8921 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8923 // V1 Channel Establishment
8924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8926 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8927 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8928 // V2 Channel Establishment
8929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8931 // Common Channel Establishment
8932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8940 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8943 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8944 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8947 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8948 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8949 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8950 // Channel Operations
8951 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8953 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8954 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8956 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8959 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8960 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8961 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8963 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8969 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8970 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8971 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8972 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8975 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8977 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8979 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8980 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8984 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8985 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8986 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8987 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8991 let mut res = Ok(());
8993 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8994 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8995 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8996 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8997 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8998 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8999 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9002 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9003 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9005 if inbound_peer_limited {
9007 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9009 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9010 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9011 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9012 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9013 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9014 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9015 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9016 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9021 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9022 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9024 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9025 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9026 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9027 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9030 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9033 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9034 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9039 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9041 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9042 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9043 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9044 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9045 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9047 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9048 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9050 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9051 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9052 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9053 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9058 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9059 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9064 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9067 match &msg.data as &str {
9068 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9069 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9071 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9072 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9073 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9074 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9075 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9076 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9077 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9078 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9079 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9080 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9081 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9082 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9083 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9084 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9085 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9086 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9090 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9091 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9092 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9093 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9094 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9095 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9097 log_level: Level::Trace,
9107 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9108 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9109 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9110 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9111 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9112 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9113 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9114 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9115 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9116 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9117 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9119 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9120 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9121 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9125 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9127 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9128 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9131 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9132 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9134 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9142 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9143 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9147 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9148 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9151 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9152 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9155 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9156 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9159 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9160 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9161 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9162 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9165 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9166 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9167 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9168 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9171 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9172 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9173 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9174 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9177 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9178 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9179 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9180 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9183 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9184 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9185 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9186 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9189 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9190 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9191 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9192 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9195 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9196 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9197 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9198 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9201 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9202 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9203 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9204 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9207 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9208 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9209 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9210 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9214 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9215 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9217 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9218 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9219 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9220 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9221 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9222 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9226 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9227 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9228 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9231 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9232 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9235 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9236 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9238 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9239 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9241 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9242 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9246 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9247 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9248 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9250 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9252 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9253 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9257 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9258 amount_msats, payment_secret
9260 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9262 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9263 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9267 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9268 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9269 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9272 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9273 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9274 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9275 payment_paths, payment_hash
9277 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9278 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9279 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9281 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9282 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9283 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9286 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9287 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9288 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9289 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9290 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9292 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9293 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9295 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9296 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9297 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9298 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9300 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9301 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9305 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9306 Err(error) => Some(error),
9310 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9311 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9313 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9315 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9316 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9319 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9321 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9328 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9335 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9336 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9340 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9341 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9342 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9343 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9344 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9348 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9349 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9351 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9352 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9353 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9354 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9355 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9358 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9359 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9360 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9361 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9364 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9365 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9366 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9367 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9370 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9371 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9372 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9373 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9376 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9377 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9378 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9379 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9380 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9381 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9382 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9383 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9384 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9385 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9386 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9387 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9388 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9389 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9390 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9391 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9392 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9393 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9394 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9395 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9396 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9401 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9402 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9404 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9405 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9406 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9407 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9410 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9411 (2, node_id, required),
9412 (4, features, required),
9413 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9414 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9415 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9416 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9419 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9420 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9421 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9422 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9423 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9424 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9425 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9426 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9427 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9428 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9429 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9430 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9431 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9432 (7, self.config, option),
9433 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9434 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9435 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9436 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9437 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9438 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9439 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9440 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9441 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9442 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9443 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9444 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9445 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9446 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9447 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9448 (32, self.is_public, required),
9449 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9450 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9451 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9452 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9453 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9459 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9460 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9461 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9462 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9463 (2, channel_id, required),
9464 (3, channel_type, option),
9465 (4, counterparty, required),
9466 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9467 (6, funding_txo, option),
9468 (7, config, option),
9469 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9470 (9, confirmations, option),
9471 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9472 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9473 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9474 (16, balance_msat, required),
9475 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9476 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9477 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9478 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9479 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9480 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9481 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9482 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9483 (26, is_outbound, required),
9484 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9485 (30, is_usable, required),
9486 (32, is_public, required),
9487 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9488 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9489 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9490 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9491 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9494 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9495 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9496 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9497 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9498 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9502 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9504 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9505 outbound_scid_alias,
9509 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9510 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9512 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9513 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9514 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9515 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9516 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9517 confirmations_required,
9519 force_close_spend_delay,
9520 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9521 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9522 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9523 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9524 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9525 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9526 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9527 channel_shutdown_state,
9532 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9533 (2, channels, required_vec),
9534 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9535 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9538 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9539 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9540 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9543 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9545 (0, onion_packet, required),
9546 (1, blinded, option),
9547 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9550 (0, payment_data, required),
9551 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9552 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9553 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9554 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9555 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9557 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9558 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9559 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9560 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9561 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9562 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9566 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9567 (0, routing, required),
9568 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9569 (4, payment_hash, required),
9570 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9571 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9572 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9573 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9577 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9578 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9580 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9582 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9583 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9584 reason.write(writer)?;
9586 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9587 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9590 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9591 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9592 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9593 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9600 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9601 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9602 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9605 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9606 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9607 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9608 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9612 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9613 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9614 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9615 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9616 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9619 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9620 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9621 // messages contained in the variants.
9622 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9623 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9624 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9626 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9627 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9628 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9629 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9630 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9633 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9634 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9635 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9636 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9637 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9639 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9644 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9649 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9650 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9651 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9654 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9655 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9656 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9657 (2, outpoint, required),
9658 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9659 (4, htlc_id, required),
9660 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9661 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9664 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9665 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9666 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9667 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9668 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9670 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9671 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9672 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9673 (2, self.value, required),
9674 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9675 (4, payment_data, option),
9676 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9677 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9678 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9679 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9685 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9686 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9687 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9688 (0, prev_hop, required),
9689 (1, total_msat, option),
9690 (2, value_ser, required),
9691 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9692 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9693 (5, total_value_received, option),
9694 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9695 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9696 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9698 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9699 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9700 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9702 if payment_data.is_some() {
9703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9705 if total_msat.is_none() {
9706 total_msat = Some(value);
9708 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9711 if total_msat.is_none() {
9712 if payment_data.is_none() {
9713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9715 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9717 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9721 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9724 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9725 total_value_received,
9726 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9728 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9729 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9734 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9735 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9736 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9739 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9740 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9741 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9742 let mut payment_id = None;
9743 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9744 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9745 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9746 (0, session_priv, required),
9747 (1, payment_id, option),
9748 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9749 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9750 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9751 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9753 if payment_id.is_none() {
9754 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9756 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9758 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9759 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9760 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9762 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9763 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9764 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9765 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9769 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9770 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9771 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9773 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9776 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9777 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9782 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9783 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9785 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9787 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9788 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9789 (0, session_priv, required),
9790 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9791 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9792 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9793 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9794 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9795 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9798 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9800 field.write(writer)?;
9807 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9808 (0, forward_info, required),
9809 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9810 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9811 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9812 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9815 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9816 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9817 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9819 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9823 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9824 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9825 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9826 (0, htlc_id, required),
9827 (2, err_packet, required),
9830 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9831 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9832 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9833 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9834 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9835 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9836 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9837 (0, htlc_id, required),
9838 (1, failure_code, required),
9839 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9840 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9848 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9849 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9850 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9852 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9854 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9855 (0, htlc_id, required),
9856 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9857 (2, err_packet, required),
9858 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9860 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9861 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9862 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9864 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9868 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9869 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9873 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9878 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9879 (0, payment_secret, required),
9880 (2, expiry_time, required),
9881 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9882 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9883 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9886 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9888 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9889 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9890 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9891 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9892 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9897 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9898 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9900 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9902 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9904 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9905 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9906 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9909 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9912 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9913 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9916 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9917 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9920 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9921 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9925 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9927 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9930 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9931 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9932 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9935 channel.write(writer)?;
9941 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9942 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9943 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9944 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9945 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9946 for forward in pending_forwards {
9947 forward.write(writer)?;
9952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9954 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9955 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9956 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9958 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9959 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9960 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9961 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9962 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9963 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9964 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9965 htlc.write(writer)?;
9967 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9968 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9971 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9972 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9973 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9974 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9975 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9976 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9977 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9980 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9981 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9982 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9983 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9984 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9986 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9987 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9988 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9989 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9990 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9991 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9992 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9997 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9998 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9999 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10000 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10001 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10002 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10003 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10004 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10005 0u64.write(writer)?;
10007 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10008 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10009 event.write(writer)?;
10013 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10014 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10015 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10016 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10017 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10018 0u64.write(writer)?;
10020 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10021 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10022 // likely to be identical.
10023 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10024 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10026 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10027 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10028 hash.write(writer)?;
10029 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10032 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10033 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10034 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10035 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10036 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10039 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10040 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10042 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10043 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10044 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10045 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10048 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10049 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10050 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10051 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10055 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10056 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10057 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10059 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10060 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10061 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10067 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10068 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10069 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10070 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10073 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10074 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10075 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10076 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10077 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10080 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10081 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10082 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10083 if !updates.is_empty() {
10084 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10085 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10090 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10091 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10092 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10093 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10094 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10095 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10096 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10097 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10098 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10099 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10100 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10101 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10102 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10109 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10111 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10112 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10115 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10116 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10117 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10118 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10119 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10120 // check that the event is sane here.
10121 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10122 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10123 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10124 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10130 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10131 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10132 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10133 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10134 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10135 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10138 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10139 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10140 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10141 events.push_back((ev, action));
10142 } else if action.is_some() {
10143 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10150 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10151 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10152 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10153 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10154 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10155 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10158 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10160 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10162 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10163 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10164 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10165 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10166 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10167 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10168 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10169 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10170 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10171 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10172 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10173 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10174 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10176 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10177 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10179 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10180 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10182 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10183 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10184 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10185 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10186 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10187 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10189 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10190 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10192 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10193 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10194 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10195 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10196 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10197 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10201 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10202 pub entropy_source: ES,
10204 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10205 pub node_signer: NS,
10207 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10208 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10210 pub signer_provider: SP,
10212 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10214 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10215 pub fee_estimator: F,
10216 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10218 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10219 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10220 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10221 pub chain_monitor: M,
10223 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10224 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10225 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10226 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10227 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10228 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10230 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10232 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10233 /// deserialization.
10235 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10236 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10237 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10239 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10240 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10242 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10243 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10244 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10245 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10247 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10250 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10251 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10254 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10255 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10257 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10258 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10259 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10260 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10261 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10266 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10267 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10268 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10269 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10270 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10272 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10273 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10278 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10279 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10280 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10281 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10283 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10285 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10286 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10287 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10292 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10293 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10294 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10298 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10299 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10301 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10302 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10303 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10304 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10305 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10306 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10310 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10311 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10313 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10314 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10315 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10317 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10319 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10320 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10321 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10322 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10323 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10324 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10325 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10326 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10327 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10328 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10330 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10331 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10332 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10333 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10334 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10335 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10336 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10337 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10338 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10339 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10340 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10341 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10342 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10343 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10345 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10346 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10347 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10349 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10350 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10351 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10353 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10354 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10355 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10357 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10358 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10359 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10361 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10362 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10363 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10366 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10367 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10368 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10369 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10370 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10371 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10372 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10373 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10375 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10376 let mut found_htlc = false;
10377 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10378 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10381 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10382 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10383 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10384 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10385 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10386 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10387 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10389 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10390 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10391 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10395 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10396 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10397 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10398 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10399 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10401 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10402 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10404 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10406 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10407 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10410 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10411 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10412 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10416 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10417 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10418 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10419 // safely discard the channel.
10420 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10421 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10422 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10423 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10424 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10425 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10426 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10427 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10430 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10431 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10432 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10433 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10434 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10435 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10439 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10440 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10441 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10442 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10443 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10444 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10445 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10446 counterparty_node_id: None,
10447 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10449 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10453 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10454 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10455 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10456 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10457 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10458 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10459 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10460 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10461 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10463 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10466 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10467 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10468 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10469 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10470 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10471 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10472 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10473 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10475 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10478 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10481 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10482 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10483 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10484 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10485 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10486 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10487 is_connected: false,
10491 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10492 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10493 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10494 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10495 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10496 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10497 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10498 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10501 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10502 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10503 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10504 for _ in 0..event_count {
10505 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10506 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10511 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10512 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10513 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10515 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10516 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10517 // on-startup monitor updates.
10518 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10519 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10521 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10525 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10526 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10528 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10529 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10530 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10531 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10532 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10536 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10537 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10538 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10539 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10540 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10541 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10542 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10544 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10545 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10549 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10550 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10551 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10552 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10553 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10554 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10555 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10556 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10557 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10558 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10559 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10560 let mut events_override = None;
10561 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10562 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10563 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10564 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10565 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10566 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10567 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10568 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10569 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10570 (8, events_override, option),
10571 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10572 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10573 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10574 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10576 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10577 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10580 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10581 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10584 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10585 pending_events_read = events;
10588 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10589 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10592 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10593 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10594 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10595 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10596 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10597 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10599 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10601 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10602 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10603 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10606 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10607 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10608 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10609 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10610 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10612 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10613 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10614 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10616 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10617 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10618 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10619 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10620 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10622 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10623 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10624 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10625 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10626 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10627 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10628 pending_background_events.push(
10629 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10630 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10631 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10632 update: update.clone(),
10635 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10636 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10637 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10638 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10639 pending_background_events.push(
10640 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10641 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10642 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10645 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10646 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10647 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10649 max_in_flight_update_id
10653 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10654 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10655 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10656 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10657 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10658 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10660 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10662 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10663 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10664 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10665 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10666 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10667 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10668 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10669 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10670 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10673 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10674 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10675 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10676 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10677 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10678 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10679 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10680 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10681 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10682 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10683 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10686 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10687 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10688 debug_assert!(false);
10689 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10694 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10695 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10696 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10697 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10698 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10699 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10700 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10701 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10702 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10704 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10705 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10706 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10708 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10709 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10710 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10711 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10712 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10713 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10714 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10720 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10721 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10723 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10724 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10725 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10726 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10729 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10730 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10731 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10732 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10733 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10734 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10735 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10737 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10738 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10739 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10740 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10741 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10742 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10743 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10744 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10748 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10749 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10750 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10751 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10753 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10754 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10755 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10758 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10759 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10760 retry_strategy: None,
10761 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10762 payment_params: None,
10763 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10764 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10765 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10766 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10767 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10768 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10769 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10770 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10771 total_msat: path_amt,
10772 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10773 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10775 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10776 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10781 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10782 match htlc_source {
10783 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10784 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10785 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10786 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10788 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10789 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10790 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10791 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10792 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10793 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10794 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10795 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10796 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10797 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10798 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10803 !forwards.is_empty()
10805 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10806 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10807 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10808 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10809 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10810 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10811 intercepted_id != ev_id
10818 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10819 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10820 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10821 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10822 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10823 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10824 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10825 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10826 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10827 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10828 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10830 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10831 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10832 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10834 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10835 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10836 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10843 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10844 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10846 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10848 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10849 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10850 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10851 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10852 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10853 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10854 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10855 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10856 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10857 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10860 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10861 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10862 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10863 // channel still live case here.
10867 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10868 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10873 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10874 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10875 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10876 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10877 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10878 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10879 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10880 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10884 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10885 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10887 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10888 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10889 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10890 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10892 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10893 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10896 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10897 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10899 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10900 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10902 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10905 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10906 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10907 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10909 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10913 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10914 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10915 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10916 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10917 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10919 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10920 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10921 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10922 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10923 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10924 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10925 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10926 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10928 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10929 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10933 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10935 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10937 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10938 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10940 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10941 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10946 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10947 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10949 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10951 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10953 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10954 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10955 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10956 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10960 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10961 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10964 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10965 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10966 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10967 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10968 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10970 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10971 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10972 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10974 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10975 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10976 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10977 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10978 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10979 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10981 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10982 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10983 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10984 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10985 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10986 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10990 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10991 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10992 debug_assert!(false);
10993 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10998 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11000 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11001 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11002 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11003 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11004 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11005 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11006 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11007 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11008 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11009 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11010 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11012 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11013 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11015 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11016 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11017 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11018 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11020 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11021 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11022 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11023 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11025 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11026 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11027 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11028 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11030 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
11031 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11032 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11035 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11036 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11037 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11040 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11041 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11044 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11047 purpose: payment.purpose,
11048 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11049 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11050 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11056 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11057 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11058 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11059 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11060 for action in actions.iter() {
11061 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11062 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11063 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11065 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11067 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11068 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11069 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11070 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11071 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11073 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11074 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11075 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11076 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11080 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11081 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11085 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11087 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11088 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11092 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11094 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11095 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11096 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11097 router: args.router,
11099 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11101 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11102 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11103 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11104 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11106 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11107 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11108 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11109 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11110 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11111 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11113 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11115 our_network_pubkey,
11118 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11120 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11122 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11123 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11124 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11125 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11126 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11128 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11129 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11131 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11133 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11135 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11136 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11137 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11139 logger: args.logger,
11140 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11143 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11144 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11145 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11146 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11147 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11150 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11151 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11152 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11153 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11154 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11155 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11158 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11159 //connection or two.
11161 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11167 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11168 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11169 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11170 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11171 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11172 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11173 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11174 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11175 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11176 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11177 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11178 use crate::prelude::*;
11179 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11180 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11181 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11182 use crate::util::test_utils;
11183 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11184 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11187 fn test_notify_limits() {
11188 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11189 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11193 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11195 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11196 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11197 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11198 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11199 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11201 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11203 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11204 // to connect messages with new values
11205 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11206 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11207 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11208 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11209 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11210 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11212 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11213 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11214 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11215 // ... but the last node should not.
11216 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11217 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11218 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11219 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11221 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11222 // about the channel.
11223 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11224 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11225 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11227 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11229 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11230 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11231 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11232 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11233 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11234 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11236 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11237 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11238 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11240 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11241 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11242 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11243 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11244 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11245 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11247 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11248 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11249 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11250 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11251 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11252 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11253 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11254 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11256 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11257 // the channel info has updated.
11258 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11259 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11260 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11261 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11262 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11263 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11267 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11268 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11273 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11274 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11276 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11277 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11278 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11279 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11281 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11282 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11283 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11284 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11285 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11286 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11287 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11288 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11290 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11292 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11294 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11295 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11296 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11298 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11300 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11301 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11302 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11304 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11305 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11306 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11308 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11309 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11310 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11311 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11312 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11313 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11314 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11315 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11316 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11318 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11319 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11320 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11322 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11324 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11326 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11327 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11328 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11329 // lightning messages manually.
11330 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11331 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11334 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11335 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11336 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11337 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11339 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11340 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11342 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11343 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11345 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11346 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11347 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11349 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11350 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11351 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11353 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11355 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11357 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11358 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11361 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11362 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11363 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11366 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11367 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11368 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11369 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11374 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11375 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11376 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11377 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11384 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11385 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11386 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11389 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11390 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11391 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11392 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11393 // fails as expected.
11394 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11395 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11396 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11397 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11398 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11399 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11402 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11403 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11405 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11406 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11407 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11408 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11410 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11411 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11412 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11414 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11415 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11416 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11417 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11418 let route = find_route(
11419 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11420 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11422 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11423 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11425 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11426 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11427 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11428 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11431 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11432 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11433 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11434 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11437 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11438 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11439 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11440 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11441 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11442 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11443 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11444 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11445 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11447 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11448 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11450 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11451 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11452 let route = find_route(
11453 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11454 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11456 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11457 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11459 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11460 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11461 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11462 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11463 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11465 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11466 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11467 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11468 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11470 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11472 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11473 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11474 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11476 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11477 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11478 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11480 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11481 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11482 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11483 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11484 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11485 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11487 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11488 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11490 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11491 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11493 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11494 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11495 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11496 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11498 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11500 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11501 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11502 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11504 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11505 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11506 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11509 let route = find_route(
11510 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11511 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11513 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11514 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11515 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11517 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11518 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11519 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11520 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11521 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11523 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11524 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11525 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11527 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11528 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11529 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11530 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11531 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11532 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11533 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11534 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11535 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11537 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11538 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11542 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11543 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11544 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11545 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11548 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11550 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11551 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11553 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11554 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11555 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11556 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11557 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11558 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11559 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11560 let route = find_route(
11561 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11562 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11565 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11566 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11567 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11568 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11569 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11570 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11573 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11574 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11575 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11576 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11577 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11578 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11579 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11581 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11585 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11586 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11587 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11588 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11589 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11595 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11596 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11598 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11599 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11600 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11601 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11602 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11603 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11604 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11605 let route = find_route(
11606 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11607 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11610 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11611 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11612 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11613 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11614 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11615 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11616 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11617 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11620 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11621 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11622 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11623 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11624 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11625 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11626 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11628 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11632 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11633 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11636 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11638 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11639 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11640 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11641 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11643 // Marshall an MPP route.
11644 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11645 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11646 route.paths.push(path);
11647 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11648 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11649 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11650 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11651 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11652 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11654 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11655 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11657 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11658 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11660 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11665 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11666 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11669 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11671 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11673 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11674 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11676 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11677 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11679 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11682 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11683 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11684 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11685 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11686 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11687 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11690 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11693 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11694 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11699 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11700 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11701 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11702 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11703 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11704 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11706 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11707 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11709 total_msat: 100_000,
11712 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11713 // payment verification fails as expected.
11714 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11715 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11716 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11717 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11719 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11723 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11724 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11728 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11729 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11730 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11731 // the channel is successfully closed.
11732 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11733 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11735 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11737 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11738 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11739 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11740 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11741 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11743 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11744 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11746 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11747 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11748 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11749 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11752 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11754 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11755 // as it has the funding transaction.
11756 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11757 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11758 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11761 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11763 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11765 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11767 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11768 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11769 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11771 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11774 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11775 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11776 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11777 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11778 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11781 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11782 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11784 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11785 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11786 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11787 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11789 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11790 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11791 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11792 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11794 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11795 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11797 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11798 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11799 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11800 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11801 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11802 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11803 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11807 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11808 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11809 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11810 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11811 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11812 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11813 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11816 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11818 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11819 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11820 // closing transaction).
11821 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11822 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11823 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11825 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11826 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11827 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11828 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11829 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11832 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11834 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11836 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11837 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11838 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11840 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11842 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11843 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11846 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11847 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11848 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11851 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11852 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11853 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11856 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11857 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11858 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11861 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11862 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11863 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11866 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11868 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11869 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11871 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11872 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11874 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11875 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11880 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11881 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11882 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11883 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11884 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11885 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11886 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11887 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11890 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11891 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11892 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11894 // Test the API functions.
11895 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11897 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11899 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11901 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11903 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11905 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11907 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11911 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11912 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11913 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11914 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11915 // the given `channel_id`.
11916 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11917 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11918 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11921 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11924 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11926 // Test the API functions.
11927 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11929 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11931 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11933 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11935 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11937 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11941 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11942 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11943 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11944 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11945 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11946 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11948 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11950 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11951 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11953 let mut funding_tx = None;
11954 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11955 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11956 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11959 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11960 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11961 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11962 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11963 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11965 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11967 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11969 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11971 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11973 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11975 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11978 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11979 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11980 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11981 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11982 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11984 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11985 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11987 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11988 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11989 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11990 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11991 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11992 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11993 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11996 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11997 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11998 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11999 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12000 }, true).unwrap_err();
12002 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12003 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12004 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12005 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12006 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12007 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12008 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12010 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12011 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12013 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12014 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12015 }, true).unwrap_err();
12017 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12018 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12019 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12020 }, false).unwrap();
12021 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12023 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12024 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12026 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12027 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12028 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12029 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12030 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12032 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12033 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12034 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12036 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12037 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12038 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12040 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12041 // "protected" and can connect again.
12042 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12043 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12044 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12046 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12048 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12050 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12051 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12055 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12056 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12057 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12060 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12062 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12064 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12065 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12067 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12068 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12069 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12070 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12073 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12075 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12076 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12077 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12079 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12080 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12081 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12083 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12084 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12085 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12086 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12090 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12091 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12092 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12095 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12096 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12100 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12102 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12103 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12105 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12106 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12107 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12108 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12109 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12110 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12113 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12114 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12116 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12117 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12121 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12122 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12125 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12126 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12127 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12128 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12129 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12131 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12132 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12134 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12135 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12136 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12137 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12143 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12144 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12146 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12147 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12148 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12150 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12151 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12155 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12159 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12160 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12161 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12162 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12163 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12164 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12165 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12166 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12167 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12168 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12169 payment_metadata: None,
12170 keysend_preimage: None,
12171 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12172 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12174 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12176 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12177 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12178 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12179 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12180 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12181 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12182 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12184 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12185 } else { panic!(); }
12187 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12188 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12189 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12190 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12191 payment_metadata: None,
12192 keysend_preimage: None,
12193 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12194 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12196 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12198 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12199 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12200 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12201 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12205 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12206 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12207 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12208 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12209 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12211 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12212 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12213 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12214 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12215 payment_metadata: None,
12216 keysend_preimage: None,
12217 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12218 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12220 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12221 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12222 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12224 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12225 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12226 // is not satisfied.
12227 assert!(result.is_ok());
12231 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12232 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12233 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12234 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12235 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12237 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12238 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12243 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12244 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12246 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12247 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12249 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12250 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12251 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12252 match &msg_events[0] {
12253 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12254 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12256 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12257 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12258 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12264 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12265 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12267 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12268 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12271 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12275 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12276 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12277 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12278 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12281 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12282 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12283 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12287 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12288 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12289 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12291 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12292 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12294 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12295 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12300 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12301 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12303 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12304 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12306 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12307 // not have generated any events.
12308 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12312 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12313 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12314 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12315 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12316 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12317 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12318 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12319 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12321 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12322 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12325 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12326 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12327 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12328 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12331 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12332 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12335 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12336 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12339 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12340 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12341 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12342 ..Default::default()
12344 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12345 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12348 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12349 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12352 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12353 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12354 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12355 ..Default::default()
12357 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12358 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12359 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12362 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12363 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12366 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12367 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12368 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12369 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12370 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12373 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12374 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12375 ..Default::default()
12377 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12380 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12381 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12382 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12383 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12387 fn test_payment_display() {
12388 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12389 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12390 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12391 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12392 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12393 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12397 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12398 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12399 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12400 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12401 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12402 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12404 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12405 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12406 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12407 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12408 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12409 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12410 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12413 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12414 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12415 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12418 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12419 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12421 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12422 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12424 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12425 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12426 }, false).unwrap();
12427 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12428 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12429 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12431 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12433 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12434 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12435 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12436 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12437 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12438 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12439 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12440 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12441 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12442 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12443 } else { panic!() };
12444 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12445 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12446 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12447 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12449 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12451 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12452 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12453 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12458 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12459 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12460 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12461 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12464 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12465 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12466 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12468 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12469 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12471 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12472 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12475 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12476 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12477 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12479 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12483 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12484 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12485 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12487 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12492 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12493 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12494 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12495 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12497 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12498 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12499 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12501 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12503 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12504 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12505 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12506 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12508 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12509 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12511 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12517 use crate::chain::Listen;
12518 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12519 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12520 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12521 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12522 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12523 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12524 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12525 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12526 use crate::util::test_utils;
12527 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12529 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12530 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12531 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12532 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12534 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12536 use criterion::Criterion;
12538 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12539 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12540 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12541 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12542 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12543 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12544 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12546 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12547 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12549 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12550 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12552 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12554 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12557 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12558 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12561 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12562 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12563 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12565 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12566 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12568 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12569 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12570 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12571 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12572 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12574 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12575 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12576 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12578 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12579 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12580 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12581 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12583 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12584 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12585 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12587 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12588 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12589 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12590 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12591 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12593 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12594 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12595 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12597 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12598 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12600 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12601 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12602 }, false).unwrap();
12603 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12604 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12605 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12608 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12609 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12610 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12612 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12613 } else { panic!(); }
12615 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12616 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12617 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12618 match events_b[0] {
12619 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12620 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12625 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12626 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12627 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12628 match events_a[0] {
12629 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12630 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12632 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12635 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12637 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12638 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12639 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12641 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12642 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12643 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12644 match msg_events[0] {
12645 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12646 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12647 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12651 match msg_events[1] {
12652 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12656 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12657 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12658 match events_a[0] {
12659 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12660 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12665 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12666 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12667 match events_b[0] {
12668 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12669 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12674 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12675 macro_rules! send_payment {
12676 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12677 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12678 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12679 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12680 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12681 payment_count += 1;
12682 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12683 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12685 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12686 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12687 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12688 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12689 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12690 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12691 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12692 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12693 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12694 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12695 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12697 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12698 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12699 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12700 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12702 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12703 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12704 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12705 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12706 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12708 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12711 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12712 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12713 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12714 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12716 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12720 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12721 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12722 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);