1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
61 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
62 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
63 use crate::util::events;
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
67 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
68 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
253 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
254 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
255 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
259 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
264 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
265 payment_id.hash(hasher);
266 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
267 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
268 payment_params.hash(hasher);
273 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
276 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
277 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
279 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
280 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
281 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
282 payment_secret: None,
283 payment_params: None,
288 struct ReceiveError {
294 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
296 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
297 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
298 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
299 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
300 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
302 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
303 err: msgs::LightningError,
304 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
305 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
307 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
309 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
311 err: LightningError {
313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
314 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
327 err: LightningError {
329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
332 shutdown_finish: None,
336 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
337 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
340 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
342 err: LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
351 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
352 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
356 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
359 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
366 log_level: Level::Warn,
369 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
373 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
375 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
376 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 shutdown_finish: None,
389 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
390 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
391 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
392 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
393 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
395 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
396 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
397 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
398 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
399 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
400 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
401 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
403 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
407 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
408 struct ClaimingPayment {
410 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
411 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
414 (0, amount_msat, required),
415 (2, payment_purpose, required),
416 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
419 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
420 struct ClaimablePayments {
421 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
422 /// failed/claimed by the user.
424 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
425 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
427 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
428 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
431 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
432 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
433 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
434 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
437 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
438 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
439 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
440 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
441 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
442 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
445 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
446 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
447 /// quite some time lag.
448 enum BackgroundEvent {
449 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
450 /// commitment transaction.
451 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
454 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
455 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
456 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
457 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
458 /// event can be generated.
459 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
460 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
461 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
464 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
465 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
467 latest_features: InitFeatures,
470 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
471 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
473 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
476 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
477 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
478 struct PendingInboundPayment {
479 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
480 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
481 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
482 /// this payment being removed.
484 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
485 user_payment_id: u64,
486 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
487 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
488 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
491 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
492 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
493 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
494 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
495 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
496 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
497 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
499 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
500 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
506 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
508 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
513 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
514 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
515 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
516 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
517 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
518 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
519 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
520 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
522 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
523 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
525 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
526 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
528 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
529 /// to individual Channels.
531 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
532 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
533 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
534 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
536 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
537 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
538 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
539 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
540 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
541 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
542 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
544 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
545 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
546 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
547 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
550 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
551 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
552 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
553 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
554 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
556 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
557 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
558 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
559 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
560 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
563 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
564 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
565 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
566 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
567 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
571 // `total_consistency_lock`
573 // |__`forward_htlcs`
575 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
577 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
579 // | |__`claimable_payments`
581 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
583 // | |__`channel_state`
587 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
589 // | |__`per_peer_state`
591 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
595 // | |__`pending_events`
597 // | |__`pending_background_events`
599 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
601 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
602 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
603 K::Target: KeysInterface,
604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
608 default_configuration: UserConfig,
609 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
610 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
616 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
618 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
620 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
621 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
623 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
624 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
625 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
626 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
627 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
629 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
630 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
631 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
632 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
634 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
635 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
637 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
638 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
639 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
640 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
641 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
642 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
643 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
644 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
646 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
648 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
649 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
651 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
653 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
654 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
655 /// and via the classic SCID.
657 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
658 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
660 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
662 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
664 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
665 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
666 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
668 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
669 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
671 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
672 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
674 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
675 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
677 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
678 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
679 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
680 /// active channel list on load.
682 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
683 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
685 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
687 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
688 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
689 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
691 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
692 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
693 /// the handling of the events.
696 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
697 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
698 /// would break backwards compatability.
699 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
700 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
701 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
703 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
704 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
706 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
708 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
709 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
710 /// confirmation depth.
712 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
713 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
714 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
716 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
718 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
720 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
722 our_network_key: SecretKey,
723 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
725 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
727 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
728 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
729 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
731 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
732 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
734 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
735 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
736 /// keeping additional state.
737 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
739 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
740 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
741 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
742 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
744 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
745 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
746 /// are currently open with that peer.
747 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
748 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
751 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
752 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
754 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
755 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
756 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
757 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
758 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
759 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
760 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
761 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
762 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
763 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
764 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
766 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
773 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
775 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
776 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
777 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
778 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
779 pub struct ChainParameters {
780 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
781 pub network: Network,
783 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
785 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
786 pub best_block: BestBlock,
789 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
795 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
796 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
797 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
798 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
799 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
800 /// updates are ready for persistence).
802 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
803 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
804 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
805 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
806 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
808 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
809 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
812 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
813 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
814 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
817 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
818 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
820 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
821 persistence_notifier: notifier,
822 should_persist: persist_check,
823 _read_guard: read_guard,
828 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
830 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
831 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
836 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
837 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
839 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
842 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
843 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
844 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
845 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
847 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
848 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
850 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
852 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
853 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
854 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
855 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
856 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
857 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
858 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
859 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
860 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
861 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
862 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
863 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
864 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
866 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
867 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
869 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
870 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
871 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
872 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
874 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
875 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
876 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
877 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
878 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
879 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
882 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
884 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
885 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
888 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
890 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
891 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
893 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
894 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
895 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
896 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
898 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
899 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
900 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
901 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
902 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
903 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
904 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
905 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
906 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
907 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
908 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
911 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
912 /// to better separate parameters.
913 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
914 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
915 /// The node_id of our counterparty
916 pub node_id: PublicKey,
917 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
918 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
919 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
920 pub features: InitFeatures,
921 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
922 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
923 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
925 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
927 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
928 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
929 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
930 /// payments to us through this channel.
931 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
932 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
933 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
934 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
935 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
936 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
937 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
940 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
941 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
942 pub struct ChannelDetails {
943 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
944 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
945 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
946 /// lifetime of the channel.
947 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
948 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
949 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
950 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
951 /// our counterparty already.
953 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
954 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
955 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
956 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
958 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
959 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
960 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
961 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
963 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
964 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
966 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
967 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
969 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
970 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
971 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
972 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
973 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
974 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
975 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
976 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
977 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
980 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
982 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
983 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
984 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
985 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
986 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
987 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
988 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
990 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
991 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
993 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
994 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
995 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
996 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
997 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
998 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
999 /// this value on chain.
1001 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1003 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1005 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1006 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1007 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1008 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1010 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1011 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1012 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1013 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1015 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1016 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1017 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1018 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1020 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1021 pub balance_msat: u64,
1022 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1023 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1024 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1025 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1027 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1029 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1030 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1031 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1032 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1033 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1034 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1035 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1036 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1038 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1039 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1040 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1041 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1042 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1043 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1044 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1046 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1047 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1048 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1049 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1050 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1051 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1052 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1053 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1054 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1056 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1058 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1059 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1060 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1061 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1062 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1064 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1065 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1066 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1067 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1068 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1069 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1070 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1072 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1073 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1074 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1075 pub is_outbound: bool,
1076 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1077 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1078 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1079 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1080 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1082 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1083 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1084 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1085 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1087 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1088 pub is_usable: bool,
1089 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1090 pub is_public: bool,
1091 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1092 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1093 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1094 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1095 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1096 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1098 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1099 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1102 impl ChannelDetails {
1103 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1104 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1105 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1107 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1108 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1109 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1110 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1113 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1114 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1115 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1117 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1118 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1119 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1120 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1124 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1126 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1128 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1129 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1130 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1131 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1133 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1134 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1135 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1138 macro_rules! handle_error {
1139 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1142 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1143 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1145 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1146 // entering the macro.
1147 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1148 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1151 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1153 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1154 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1155 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1156 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1160 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1161 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1162 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1163 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1168 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1169 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1171 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1172 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1173 action: err.action.clone()
1177 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1178 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1181 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1188 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1189 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1190 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1191 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1192 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1193 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1195 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1196 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1197 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1198 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1199 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1201 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1202 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1204 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1208 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1209 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1210 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1212 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1213 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1215 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1216 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1218 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1219 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1220 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1221 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1222 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1223 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1229 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1230 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1234 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1236 $entry.remove_entry();
1244 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1245 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1249 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1251 $entry.remove_entry();
1259 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1260 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1262 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1263 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1269 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1270 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1272 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1273 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1274 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1275 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1276 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1277 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1278 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1279 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1280 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1281 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1282 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1283 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1284 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1285 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1288 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1289 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1290 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1291 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1292 match $action_type {
1293 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1294 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1296 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1297 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1299 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1300 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1301 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1302 if !$resend_commitment {
1303 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1306 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1308 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1309 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1311 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1316 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1317 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1319 $entry.remove_entry();
1323 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1324 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1325 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1327 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1328 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1330 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1331 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1333 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1334 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1336 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1337 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1341 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1342 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1343 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1344 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1345 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1347 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1348 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1349 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1350 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1351 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1352 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1353 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1354 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1355 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1356 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1361 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1362 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1363 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1365 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1366 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1367 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1368 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1369 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1370 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1373 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1378 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
1380 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1381 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1382 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1383 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1387 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1389 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1390 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1392 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1394 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1395 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1396 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1397 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1398 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1399 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1400 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1401 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1403 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1404 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1405 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1410 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1412 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1413 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1414 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1416 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1417 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1418 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1419 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1420 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1421 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1422 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1423 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1425 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1426 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1429 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1430 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1432 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1434 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1436 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1438 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1439 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1440 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1441 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1449 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1450 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1451 &self.default_configuration
1454 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1455 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1456 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1459 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1460 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1462 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1464 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1468 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1473 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1475 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1476 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1477 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1478 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1479 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1481 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1482 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1484 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1485 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1486 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1488 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1489 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1490 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1491 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1492 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1493 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1495 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1496 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1497 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1498 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1499 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1500 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1505 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1506 Some(peer_state) => {
1507 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1508 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1509 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1510 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1511 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1512 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1513 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1517 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1522 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1525 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1528 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1529 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1531 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1532 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1533 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1536 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1538 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1544 node_id: their_network_key,
1547 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1550 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1551 let mut res = Vec::new();
1553 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1554 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1555 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1556 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1557 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1558 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1559 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1560 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1561 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1562 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1563 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1564 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1565 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1566 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1567 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1568 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1569 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1570 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1571 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1572 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1573 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1574 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1576 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1577 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1578 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1579 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1580 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1581 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1582 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1583 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1584 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1585 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1586 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1587 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1588 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1589 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1590 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1591 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1592 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1593 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1594 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1595 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1596 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1597 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1598 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1599 config: Some(channel.config()),
1603 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1604 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1605 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1606 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1612 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1613 /// more information.
1614 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1615 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1618 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1619 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1621 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1622 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1625 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1626 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1627 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1628 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1629 // really wanted anyway.
1630 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1633 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1634 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1635 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1636 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1637 Some(transaction) => {
1638 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1642 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1643 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1644 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1645 reason: closure_reason
1649 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1652 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1653 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1654 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1655 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1656 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1658 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1659 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1661 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1663 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1664 Some(peer_state) => {
1665 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1666 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1667 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1669 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1672 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1674 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1675 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1676 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1677 let (result, is_permanent) =
1678 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1680 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1686 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1690 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1691 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1692 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1693 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1697 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1701 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1705 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1706 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1707 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1708 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1711 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1715 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1716 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1717 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1719 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1720 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1722 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1723 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1724 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1725 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1727 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1729 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1730 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1731 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1732 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1733 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1736 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1737 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1738 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1740 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1741 /// the channel being closed or not:
1742 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1743 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1744 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1745 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1746 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1747 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1748 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1750 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1752 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1753 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1754 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1755 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1756 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1760 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1761 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1762 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1763 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1764 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1765 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1766 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1769 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1770 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1771 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1772 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1773 // ignore the result here.
1774 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1778 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1779 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1780 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1781 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1783 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1785 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1786 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1787 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1789 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1790 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1792 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1794 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1796 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1799 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1800 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1801 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1802 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1808 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1811 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1812 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1813 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1814 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1815 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1816 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1817 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1818 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1819 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1829 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1830 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1831 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1833 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1834 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1835 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1838 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1839 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1840 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1842 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1843 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1844 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1845 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1846 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1849 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1850 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1851 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1852 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1853 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1857 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1858 /// local transaction(s).
1859 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1860 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1861 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1865 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1866 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1868 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1869 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1870 return Err(ReceiveError {
1871 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1873 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1876 // final_expiry_too_soon
1877 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1878 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1879 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1880 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1881 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1882 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1883 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1884 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1885 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1886 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1887 return Err(ReceiveError {
1888 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1889 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1892 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1893 return Err(ReceiveError {
1895 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1896 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1900 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1901 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1902 return Err(ReceiveError {
1903 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1904 err_data: Vec::new(),
1905 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1908 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1909 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1910 return Err(ReceiveError {
1911 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1912 err_data: Vec::new(),
1913 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1915 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1916 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1918 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1919 phantom_shared_secret,
1921 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1922 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1923 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1924 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1925 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1926 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1927 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1928 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1929 return Err(ReceiveError {
1930 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1931 err_data: Vec::new(),
1932 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1936 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1938 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1941 return Err(ReceiveError {
1942 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1943 err_data: Vec::new(),
1944 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1949 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1952 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1953 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1954 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1955 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1959 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
1960 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1961 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1963 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1964 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1965 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1966 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1967 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1968 failure_code: $err_code,
1974 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1975 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1978 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
1980 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1981 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1982 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1983 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1984 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1985 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1986 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1987 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1989 macro_rules! return_err {
1990 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1992 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1993 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1994 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1995 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1996 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
1997 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2003 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2005 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2006 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2008 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2009 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2013 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2014 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2016 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2018 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2019 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2020 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2021 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2022 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2024 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2027 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2028 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2029 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2031 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2032 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2033 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2036 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2037 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2038 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2039 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2043 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2044 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2045 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2048 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2049 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2050 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2051 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2052 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2057 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2058 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2059 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2060 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2061 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2062 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2063 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2064 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2065 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2066 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2067 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2068 // phantom or an intercept.
2069 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2070 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2071 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2075 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2078 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2080 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2081 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2083 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2084 // no consistency guarantees.
2085 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2089 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2090 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2091 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2092 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2093 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2095 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2096 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2097 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2098 // we don't have the channel here.
2099 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2101 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2103 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2104 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2105 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2106 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2107 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2108 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2109 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2111 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2112 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2114 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2115 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2119 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2120 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2121 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2122 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2124 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2131 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2132 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2133 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2134 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2135 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2136 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2138 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2139 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2141 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2142 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2143 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2144 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2145 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2146 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2147 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2148 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2149 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2150 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2156 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2157 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2158 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2159 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2161 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2162 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2164 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2165 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2166 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2168 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2169 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2170 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2171 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2172 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2173 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2174 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2178 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2183 pending_forward_info
2186 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2187 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2188 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2190 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2191 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2192 if !chan.should_announce() {
2193 return Err(LightningError {
2194 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2195 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2198 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2199 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2202 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2205 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2206 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2207 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2208 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2209 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2210 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2212 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2213 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2217 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2219 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2221 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2223 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2224 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2226 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2227 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2228 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2229 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2230 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2231 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2232 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2233 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2236 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2237 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2239 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2245 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2246 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2248 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2249 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2251 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2252 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2253 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2254 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2255 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2257 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2259 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2261 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2262 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2263 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2264 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2267 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2269 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2271 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2272 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2274 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2277 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2278 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2280 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2281 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2283 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2284 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2285 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2288 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2289 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2290 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2292 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2293 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2295 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2296 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2297 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2298 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2299 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2300 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2301 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2302 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2303 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2304 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2306 _ => unreachable!(),
2309 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2310 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2311 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2312 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2313 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2314 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2315 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2316 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2325 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2326 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2327 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2328 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2333 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2334 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2336 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2341 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2343 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2344 /// fields for more info.
2346 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2347 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2348 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2349 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2352 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2353 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2354 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2355 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2356 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2358 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2359 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2361 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2362 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2363 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2365 /// In general, a path may raise:
2366 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2367 /// node public key) is specified.
2368 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2369 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2371 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2372 /// relevant updates.
2374 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2375 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2376 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2378 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2379 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2380 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2381 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2384 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2385 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2386 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2388 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2389 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2390 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2391 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2392 self.pending_outbound_payments
2393 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2394 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2395 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2399 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2400 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2401 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2402 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2403 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2407 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2408 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2409 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height)
2413 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2415 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2416 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2417 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2418 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2419 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2421 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2422 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2423 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2424 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2425 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2426 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2427 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2430 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2432 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2433 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2434 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2436 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2437 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2438 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2440 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2441 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2442 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2443 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2444 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2446 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2447 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2448 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2449 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2450 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2452 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2453 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2457 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2458 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2459 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2460 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2461 /// never reach the recipient.
2463 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2464 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2466 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2467 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2469 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2471 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2472 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2473 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2474 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2475 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2476 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2479 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2480 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2481 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2482 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2483 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2484 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height,
2485 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2486 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2489 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2492 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2493 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2496 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2497 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2498 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2499 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2500 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2502 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2504 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2506 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2507 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2508 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2509 } else { unreachable!(); })
2512 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2514 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2515 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2518 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2519 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2524 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2526 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2529 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2531 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2534 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2535 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2536 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2545 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2546 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2547 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2551 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2553 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2554 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2556 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2557 /// across the p2p network.
2559 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2560 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2562 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2563 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2564 /// keys per-channel).
2566 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2567 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2568 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2570 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2571 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2572 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2574 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2575 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2576 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2577 /// for more details.
2579 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2580 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2581 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2584 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2585 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2587 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2592 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2593 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2594 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2595 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2596 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2598 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2602 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2603 let mut output_index = None;
2604 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2605 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2606 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2607 if output_index.is_some() {
2608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2609 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2612 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2613 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2614 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2617 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2620 if output_index.is_none() {
2621 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2622 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2625 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2629 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2631 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2632 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2633 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2634 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2636 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2637 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2639 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2640 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2642 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2644 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2645 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2646 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2647 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2648 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2649 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2650 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2651 pub fn update_channel_config(
2652 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2653 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2654 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2655 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2656 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2661 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2664 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2665 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2666 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2667 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2668 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2669 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2671 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2672 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2673 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2674 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2678 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2679 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2680 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2683 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2685 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2687 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2696 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2697 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2699 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2700 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2702 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2703 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2704 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2705 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2706 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2708 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2709 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2711 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2714 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2715 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2716 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2717 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2718 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2721 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2723 if !chan.is_usable() {
2724 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2725 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2728 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2730 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2731 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2735 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2736 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2737 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2740 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2741 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2742 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2744 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2746 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2747 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2750 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2751 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2752 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2753 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2754 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2756 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2760 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2761 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2763 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2766 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2767 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2770 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2771 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2772 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2775 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2776 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2777 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2778 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2779 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2780 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2781 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2784 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2785 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2787 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2792 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2794 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2795 /// Will likely generate further events.
2796 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2799 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2800 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2801 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2803 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2804 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2806 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2807 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2808 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2810 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2811 match forward_info {
2812 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2813 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2814 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2815 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2816 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2819 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2820 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2821 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2823 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2824 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2825 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2826 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2827 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2828 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2831 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2832 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2834 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2837 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2838 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2844 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2845 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2847 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2851 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2852 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2854 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2858 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2859 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2860 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2861 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2862 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2864 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2865 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2866 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2867 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2868 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2870 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2872 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2873 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2877 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2878 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2879 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2880 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2886 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2889 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2892 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2893 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2894 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2895 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2896 // problem, not ours.
2902 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2903 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2905 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2909 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2910 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2911 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2913 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2917 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2918 match forward_info {
2919 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2920 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
2921 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2922 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
2923 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
2926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2927 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2928 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2929 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2930 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2931 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2932 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2933 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2935 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
2936 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
2937 onion_packet, &self.logger)
2939 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2940 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2942 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2944 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
2945 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2946 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
2947 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
2952 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2953 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2955 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2956 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2957 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
2958 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
2960 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2963 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
2965 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2966 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2967 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2976 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2977 match forward_info {
2978 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2979 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2980 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2981 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
2984 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
2985 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
2986 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
2987 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
2989 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2990 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
2992 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2995 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2996 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2997 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2998 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2999 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3000 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3001 phantom_shared_secret,
3003 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3005 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3010 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3011 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3012 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3013 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3014 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3016 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3017 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3018 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3019 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3020 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3021 phantom_shared_secret,
3023 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3024 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3028 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3029 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3030 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3031 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3032 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3035 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3036 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3037 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3039 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3040 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3041 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3044 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3045 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3046 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3049 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3050 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3051 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3052 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3054 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3058 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3059 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3060 total_value += htlc.value;
3061 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3062 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3063 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3065 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3066 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3068 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3070 _ => unreachable!(),
3073 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3075 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3076 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3077 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3078 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3079 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3080 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3081 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3084 amount_msat: total_value,
3085 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3086 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3088 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3090 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3091 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3093 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3095 payment_claimable_generated
3099 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3100 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3101 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3102 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3103 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3104 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3105 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3106 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3108 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3109 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3110 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3111 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3112 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3114 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3118 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3120 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3121 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3122 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3123 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3126 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3128 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3129 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3130 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3131 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3132 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3134 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3136 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3137 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3142 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3149 if payment_data.is_none() {
3150 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3151 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3154 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3155 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3157 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3158 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3160 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3161 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3163 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3164 if payment_claimable_generated {
3165 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3171 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3172 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3180 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3181 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3183 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3185 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3186 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3187 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3189 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3191 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3192 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3193 events.append(&mut new_events);
3196 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3198 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3199 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3201 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3202 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3203 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3204 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3205 if background_events.is_empty() {
3209 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3211 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3212 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3213 // monitor updating completing.
3214 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3221 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3222 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3223 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3224 self.process_background_events();
3227 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3228 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3229 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3230 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3232 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3233 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3235 if !chan.is_live() {
3236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3237 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3238 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3241 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3243 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3244 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3248 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3249 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3250 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3251 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3252 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3253 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3254 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3256 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3258 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3259 for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
3260 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3261 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3268 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3270 /// This currently includes:
3271 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3272 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3273 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3275 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3276 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3278 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3279 /// estimate fetches.
3280 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3281 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3282 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3283 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3285 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3287 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3288 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3291 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3292 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3293 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3294 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3295 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3297 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3298 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3299 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3300 if needs_close { return false; }
3303 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3304 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3305 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3306 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3307 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3308 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3309 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3310 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3314 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3315 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3317 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3318 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3319 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3323 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3324 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3329 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3335 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3336 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3337 // This should be unreachable
3338 debug_assert!(false);
3341 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3342 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3343 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3344 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3346 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3347 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3348 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3350 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3357 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3358 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3359 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3360 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3364 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3365 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3368 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3370 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3371 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3372 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3373 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3374 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3381 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3382 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3383 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3385 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3386 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3387 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3388 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3390 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3391 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3392 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3393 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3394 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3397 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3398 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3399 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3400 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3401 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3402 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3403 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3404 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3405 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3410 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3411 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3413 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3415 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3416 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3417 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3418 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3419 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3420 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3421 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3423 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3425 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3426 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3428 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3433 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3434 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3435 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3436 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3437 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3438 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3439 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3440 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3441 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3442 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3444 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3445 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3446 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3447 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3449 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3450 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3451 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3452 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3453 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3457 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3458 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3459 // be surfaced to the user.
3460 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3461 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3462 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3464 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3465 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3467 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3472 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3473 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3474 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3475 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3479 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3480 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3481 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3484 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3485 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3486 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3487 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3488 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3491 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3492 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3493 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3496 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3497 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3498 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3500 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3501 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3503 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3505 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3507 let mut forward_event = None;
3508 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3509 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3510 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3512 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3514 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3516 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3517 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3520 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3521 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3522 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3523 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3524 time_forwardable: time
3527 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3528 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3529 failed_next_destination: destination,
3535 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3536 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3538 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3539 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3540 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3542 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3543 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3544 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3545 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3547 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3548 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3549 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3550 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3551 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3552 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3553 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3558 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3559 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3560 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3561 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3562 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3563 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3564 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3565 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3570 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3571 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3572 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3574 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3575 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3576 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3577 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3582 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3584 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3585 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3586 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3587 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3588 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3590 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3591 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3593 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3594 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3595 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3596 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3597 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3599 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3600 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3601 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3602 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3603 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3604 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3605 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3606 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3613 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3618 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3619 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3620 debug_assert!(false);
3624 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3625 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3626 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3627 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3628 if sources.len() != 1 {
3629 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3630 debug_assert!(false);
3636 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3638 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3639 mem::drop(channel_state);
3640 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3641 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3644 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3645 mem::drop(channel_state);
3646 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3647 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3648 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3652 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3653 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3654 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop,
3656 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3658 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3659 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3660 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3661 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3662 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3666 mem::drop(channel_state);
3668 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3669 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3670 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3671 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3672 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3673 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3674 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3676 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3679 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3680 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3681 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3682 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3686 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3687 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
3688 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3689 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3690 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3692 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3693 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3694 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3695 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3696 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3697 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3698 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3699 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3700 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3702 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3703 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3704 payment_preimage, e);
3705 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3706 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3707 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3708 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3711 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3712 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3713 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3715 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3716 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3717 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3718 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3719 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3720 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3726 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3727 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3733 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3734 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3735 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3737 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3738 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3739 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3740 // again on restart.
3741 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3742 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3743 payment_preimage, e);
3746 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3748 chan.remove_entry();
3750 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3751 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3752 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3756 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3757 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3758 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3762 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3763 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3764 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
3765 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3766 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3767 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3768 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3769 // again on restart.
3770 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3771 payment_preimage, update_res);
3773 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3774 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3775 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3776 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3777 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3778 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3779 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3784 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3785 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3788 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3790 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3791 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3792 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3794 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3795 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3796 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
3797 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3798 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3799 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3800 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3803 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3804 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3806 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3808 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3814 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3815 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3816 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3822 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3823 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3824 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3827 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3828 for action in actions.into_iter() {
3830 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
3831 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3832 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
3833 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3834 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3838 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
3839 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
3845 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
3846 /// update completion.
3847 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
3848 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
3849 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
3850 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
3851 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
3852 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
3853 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
3855 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
3856 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3857 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
3858 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
3861 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
3862 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
3864 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
3865 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3866 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3871 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
3873 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
3874 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
3875 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3876 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3881 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
3882 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
3883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3884 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3885 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3890 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3894 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3900 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
3901 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
3902 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
3908 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3912 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
3913 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3914 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3915 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3919 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3923 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3924 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
3925 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
3926 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3927 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
3928 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
3929 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
3931 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
3932 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3933 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3938 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
3939 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3940 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3943 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
3945 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
3946 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
3948 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3949 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3950 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
3951 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
3955 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
3957 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
3958 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
3961 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
3962 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
3963 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
3965 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
3966 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
3967 /// used to accept such channels.
3969 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
3970 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
3971 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3972 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
3975 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
3976 /// it as confirmed immediately.
3978 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
3979 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
3980 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
3982 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
3983 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
3985 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
3986 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
3988 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
3989 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
3991 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
3992 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
3993 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3994 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
3997 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4004 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4007 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4011 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4012 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4013 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4014 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4015 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4016 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4019 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4020 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4021 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4024 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4025 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4026 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4036 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4037 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4041 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4042 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4045 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4046 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4047 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4049 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4050 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4051 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4052 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4055 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4060 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4061 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4062 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4063 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4064 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4065 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4067 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4068 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4069 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4073 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4074 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4077 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4078 pending_events.push(
4079 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4080 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4081 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4082 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4083 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4084 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4089 entry.insert(channel);
4095 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4096 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4097 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4098 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4099 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4101 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4102 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4104 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4105 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4110 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4111 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4112 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4113 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4114 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4116 user_channel_id: user_id,
4121 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4122 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4123 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4124 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4125 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4128 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4129 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4131 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4136 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4137 // lock before watch_channel
4138 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4139 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4140 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4141 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4142 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4143 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4144 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4145 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4146 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4147 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4148 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4149 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4152 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4153 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4154 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4155 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4156 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4157 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4158 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4161 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4162 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4163 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4167 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4168 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4169 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4172 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4173 funding_msg.channel_id))
4175 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4176 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4179 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4180 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4183 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4184 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4192 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4194 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4195 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4196 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4197 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4199 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4200 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4202 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4203 Ok(update) => update,
4204 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4206 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4207 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4209 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4210 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4211 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4212 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4213 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4214 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4215 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4221 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4222 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4229 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4230 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4234 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4235 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4236 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4237 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4239 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4242 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4243 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4244 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4246 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4247 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4248 msg: announcement_sigs,
4250 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4251 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4252 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4253 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4254 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4255 // announcement_signatures.
4256 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4257 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4258 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4259 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4265 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4273 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4274 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4275 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4276 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4277 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4279 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4281 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4285 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4286 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4287 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4288 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4291 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4292 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4294 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4295 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4296 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4297 let (result, is_permanent) =
4298 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4300 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4305 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4306 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4307 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4317 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4318 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4319 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4320 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4323 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4327 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4328 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4329 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4330 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4331 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4333 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4336 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4337 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4339 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4344 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4345 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4346 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4347 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4348 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4349 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4350 } else { (tx, None) }
4352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4355 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4356 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4357 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4359 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4360 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4361 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4366 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4371 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4372 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4373 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4374 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4376 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4377 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4378 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4379 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4381 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4382 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4383 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4385 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4387 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4388 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4391 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4392 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4393 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4394 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4395 match pending_forward_info {
4396 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4397 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4398 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4399 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4401 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4402 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4403 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4404 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4405 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4408 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4410 _ => pending_forward_info
4413 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4420 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4421 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4422 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4423 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4424 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4426 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4429 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4434 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4438 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4439 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4440 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4443 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4446 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4453 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4454 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4455 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4456 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4458 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4459 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4461 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4462 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4463 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4465 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4472 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4473 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4474 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4475 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4477 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4480 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4481 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4482 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4483 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4484 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4485 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4486 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4491 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4492 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4496 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4497 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4498 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4500 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4501 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4502 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4503 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4504 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4505 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4506 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4507 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4509 commitment_signed: msg,
4515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4520 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4521 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4522 let mut forward_event = None;
4523 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4524 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4525 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4526 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4527 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4528 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4529 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4530 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4532 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4533 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4535 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4536 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4537 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4539 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4540 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4543 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4544 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4546 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4547 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4548 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4550 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4551 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4552 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4553 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4554 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4557 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4558 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4561 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4562 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4563 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4564 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4565 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4566 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4567 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4570 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4571 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4572 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4577 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4578 // payments are being processed.
4579 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4580 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4582 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4583 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4590 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4591 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4594 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4595 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4596 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4599 match forward_event {
4601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4602 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4603 time_forwardable: time
4611 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4612 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4614 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4615 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4616 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4618 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4619 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4621 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4622 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4623 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4624 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4625 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4626 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4627 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4628 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4629 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4630 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4631 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4632 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4634 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4635 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4636 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4637 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4638 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4639 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4641 } else { unreachable!(); }
4643 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4644 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4645 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4649 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4650 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4651 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4652 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4653 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4654 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4659 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4661 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4662 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4664 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4665 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4666 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4668 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4669 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4676 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4677 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4678 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4679 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4681 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4684 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4691 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4692 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4693 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4697 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4698 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4700 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4705 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4706 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
4707 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4708 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4709 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4717 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4718 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4719 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4720 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4722 // It's not a local channel
4723 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4726 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4727 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4728 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4730 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4731 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4732 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4733 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4734 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4735 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4737 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4739 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4740 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4741 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4742 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4744 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4745 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4750 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4753 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4755 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4756 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4757 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4761 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4764 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4765 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4766 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4767 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4768 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4769 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4770 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
4771 let mut channel_update = None;
4772 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4773 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4774 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4777 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4778 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4779 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4780 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4781 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4782 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4783 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4788 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4789 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
4790 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4791 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4792 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4793 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4801 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4802 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4805 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4806 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4811 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4812 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4813 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4814 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4815 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4816 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4817 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
4818 match monitor_event {
4819 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4820 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4821 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4822 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4825 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4826 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4830 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4831 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4832 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4833 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4834 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4835 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4836 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4837 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4838 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4839 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4840 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4844 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4845 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4847 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4849 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4850 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4851 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4852 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4853 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4858 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4859 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4865 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4866 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4869 has_pending_monitor_events
4872 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4873 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4874 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4876 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4877 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4880 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4881 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4882 /// update was applied.
4883 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4884 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4885 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4886 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4888 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4889 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4890 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4891 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4893 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4894 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4895 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4896 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4898 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4900 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
4903 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4904 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4905 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
4906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4907 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4908 updates: commitment_update,
4912 has_monitor_update = true;
4913 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4914 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4915 if close_channel { return false; }
4922 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
4923 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4924 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4931 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4932 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4933 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
4936 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4937 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4943 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4944 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4945 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4946 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4947 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4948 let mut has_update = false;
4950 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4951 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4952 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4953 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4955 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4956 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4957 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4958 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4961 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4964 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4965 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4966 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4967 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4973 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4975 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4976 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4977 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
4983 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
4984 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4991 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4992 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4998 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4999 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5001 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5002 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5003 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5004 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5005 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5006 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5007 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5008 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5009 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5010 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5011 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5012 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5013 assert!(should_broadcast);
5014 } else { unreachable!(); }
5015 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5017 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5021 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5022 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5024 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5025 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5028 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5031 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5032 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5034 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5035 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5036 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5037 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5038 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5039 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5040 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5041 // never fail a payment too early.
5042 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5044 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5052 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5055 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5056 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5058 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5059 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5060 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5062 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5064 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5065 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5069 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5070 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5072 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5074 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5075 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5076 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5077 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5078 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5079 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5082 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5083 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5085 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5088 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5090 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5092 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5093 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5094 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5095 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5096 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5099 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5100 /// stored external to LDK.
5102 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5103 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5104 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5106 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5107 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5110 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5111 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5112 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5113 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5115 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5116 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5117 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5118 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5119 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5121 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5122 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5123 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5124 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5125 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5127 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5128 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5130 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5131 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5135 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5136 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5138 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5140 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5141 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5142 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5143 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5146 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5147 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5149 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5152 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5154 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5156 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5157 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5160 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5161 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5163 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5164 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5165 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5168 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5169 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5171 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5172 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5173 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5174 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5176 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5177 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5178 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5179 Some(_) => continue,
5180 None => return scid_candidate
5185 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5187 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5188 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5190 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5191 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5192 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5196 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5197 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5198 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5200 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5201 /// times to get a unique scid.
5202 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5203 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5204 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5206 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5207 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5208 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5209 return scid_candidate
5213 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5214 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5215 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5216 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5218 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5219 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5220 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5221 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5229 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5230 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5231 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5232 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5233 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5238 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5239 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5240 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5244 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5245 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5249 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5250 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5253 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5254 /// using the given event handler.
5256 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5257 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5260 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5261 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5262 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5264 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5266 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5267 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5268 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5269 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5272 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5273 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5274 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5277 for event in pending_events {
5278 handler(event).await;
5281 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5282 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5287 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5289 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5290 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5291 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5292 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5296 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5297 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5298 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5299 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5301 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5302 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5303 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5304 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5307 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5308 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5310 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5311 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5314 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5315 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5316 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5318 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5319 events.replace(pending_events);
5328 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5330 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5331 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5332 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5333 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5337 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5339 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5340 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5341 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5342 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5343 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5345 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5346 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5347 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5348 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5351 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5352 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5353 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5356 for event in pending_events {
5357 handler.handle_event(event);
5365 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5367 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5368 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5369 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5374 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5376 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5377 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5378 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5379 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5380 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5383 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5384 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5387 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5389 let new_height = height - 1;
5391 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5392 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5393 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5394 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5395 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5396 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5399 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5403 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5405 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5406 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5407 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5408 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5412 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5413 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5414 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5415 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5417 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5418 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5421 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5422 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5424 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5425 if height < last_best_block_height {
5426 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5427 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5431 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5432 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5433 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5434 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5436 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5437 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5441 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5443 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5445 macro_rules! max_time {
5446 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5448 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5449 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5450 // having an explicit local time source.
5451 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5452 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5453 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5454 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5455 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5461 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5462 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5463 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5464 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5468 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5469 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5470 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5471 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5472 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5473 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5479 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5481 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5482 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5483 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5484 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5485 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5486 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5491 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5493 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5494 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5495 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5496 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5500 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5501 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5503 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5504 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5505 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5506 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5507 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5509 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5510 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5512 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5513 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5514 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5515 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5516 let res = f(channel);
5517 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5518 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5519 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5520 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5521 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5523 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5524 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5525 if channel.is_usable() {
5526 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5527 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5528 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5529 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5538 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5540 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5541 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5542 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5543 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5544 msg: announcement_sigs,
5546 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5547 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5550 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5551 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5552 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5557 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5558 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5559 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5560 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5561 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5562 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5563 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5564 // is always consistent.
5565 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5566 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5567 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5568 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5569 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5572 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5573 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5574 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5575 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5576 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5577 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5582 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5583 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5584 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5585 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5586 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5587 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5588 data: reason_message,
5597 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5598 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5599 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5600 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5601 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5602 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5603 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5604 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5605 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5606 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5608 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5609 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5610 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5614 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5617 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5618 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5619 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5620 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5621 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5622 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5623 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5624 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5625 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5628 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5629 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5630 _ => unreachable!(),
5632 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5633 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5634 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5641 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5643 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5644 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5648 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5649 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5650 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5651 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5653 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5655 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5656 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5657 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5658 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5659 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5660 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5663 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5664 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5665 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5667 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5668 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5669 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5670 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5673 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5674 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5675 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5676 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5677 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5680 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5681 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5682 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5685 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5686 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5687 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5688 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5692 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
5693 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
5695 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5696 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5697 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5702 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5704 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5707 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5709 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5712 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5714 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5717 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5719 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5722 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5724 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5727 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5729 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5732 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5734 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5737 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5739 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5742 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5744 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5747 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5749 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5752 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5754 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5757 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5759 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5762 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5764 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5767 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5769 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5772 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5774 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5777 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5778 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5779 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5782 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5787 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5789 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5792 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5794 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5795 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5797 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5798 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5799 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5800 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5801 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5802 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5803 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5804 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5805 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5806 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5807 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5810 no_channels_remain = false;
5815 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5819 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5822 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5823 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5824 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5825 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5826 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5827 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5828 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5829 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5830 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5831 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5832 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5833 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5834 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5835 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5836 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5840 if no_channels_remain {
5841 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5844 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5845 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5849 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
5850 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
5851 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5855 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5857 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5860 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5861 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5863 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5864 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5868 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5873 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5874 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5875 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5876 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5877 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5878 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5879 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5880 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5881 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5885 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5886 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5887 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5892 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5893 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
5894 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
5895 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
5896 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5904 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5908 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5911 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5912 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5913 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5914 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5915 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
5920 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5921 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5922 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5923 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5926 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5928 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5936 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5937 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
5941 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
5942 provided_node_features()
5945 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
5946 provided_init_features()
5950 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5951 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5952 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
5953 provided_init_features().to_context()
5956 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5957 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5959 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
5960 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
5961 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
5962 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
5963 provided_init_features().to_context()
5966 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5967 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5968 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
5969 provided_init_features().to_context()
5972 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5973 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5974 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
5975 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
5976 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
5977 // ErroringMessageHandler.
5978 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
5979 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
5980 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
5981 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
5982 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
5983 features.set_payment_secret_required();
5984 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
5985 features.set_wumbo_optional();
5986 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
5987 features.set_channel_type_optional();
5988 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
5989 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
5993 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5994 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5996 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5997 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5998 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5999 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6002 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6003 (2, node_id, required),
6004 (4, features, required),
6005 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6006 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6007 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6008 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6011 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6012 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6013 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6014 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6015 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6016 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6017 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6018 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6019 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6020 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6021 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6022 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6023 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6024 (7, self.config, option),
6025 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6026 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6027 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6028 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6029 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6030 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6031 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6032 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6033 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6034 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6035 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6036 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6037 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6038 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6039 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6040 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6041 (32, self.is_public, required),
6042 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6043 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6044 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6050 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6051 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6052 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6053 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6054 (2, channel_id, required),
6055 (3, channel_type, option),
6056 (4, counterparty, required),
6057 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6058 (6, funding_txo, option),
6059 (7, config, option),
6060 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6061 (9, confirmations, option),
6062 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6063 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6064 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6065 (16, balance_msat, required),
6066 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6067 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6068 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6069 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6070 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6071 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6072 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6073 (26, is_outbound, required),
6074 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6075 (30, is_usable, required),
6076 (32, is_public, required),
6077 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6078 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6079 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6082 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6083 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6084 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6085 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6086 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6090 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6092 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6093 outbound_scid_alias,
6097 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6098 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6100 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6101 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6102 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6103 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6104 confirmations_required,
6106 force_close_spend_delay,
6107 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6108 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6109 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6110 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6111 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6112 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6117 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6118 (2, channels, vec_type),
6119 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6120 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6123 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6125 (0, onion_packet, required),
6126 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6129 (0, payment_data, required),
6130 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6131 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6133 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6134 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6135 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6139 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6140 (0, routing, required),
6141 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6142 (4, payment_hash, required),
6143 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6144 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6145 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6149 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6150 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6152 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6154 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6155 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6156 reason.write(writer)?;
6158 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6159 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6162 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6163 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6164 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6165 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6172 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6173 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6174 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6177 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6178 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6179 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6180 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6184 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6185 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6186 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6187 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6188 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6191 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6192 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6193 // messages contained in the variants.
6194 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6195 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6196 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6198 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6199 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6200 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6201 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6202 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6205 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6206 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6207 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6208 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6209 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6211 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6216 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6221 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6222 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6223 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6224 (2, outpoint, required),
6225 (4, htlc_id, required),
6226 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6229 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6230 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6231 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6232 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6233 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6235 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6236 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6237 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6238 (2, self.value, required),
6239 (4, payment_data, option),
6240 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6241 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6247 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6248 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6249 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6251 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6252 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6253 let mut total_msat = None;
6254 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6255 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6256 (0, prev_hop, required),
6257 (1, total_msat, option),
6258 (2, value, required),
6259 (4, payment_data, option),
6260 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6261 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6263 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6265 if payment_data.is_some() {
6266 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6268 if total_msat.is_none() {
6269 total_msat = Some(value);
6271 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6274 if total_msat.is_none() {
6275 if payment_data.is_none() {
6276 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6278 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6280 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6284 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6287 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6294 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6295 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6296 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6299 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6300 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6301 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6302 let mut payment_id = None;
6303 let mut payment_secret = None;
6304 let mut payment_params = None;
6305 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6306 (0, session_priv, required),
6307 (1, payment_id, option),
6308 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6309 (3, payment_secret, option),
6310 (4, path, vec_type),
6311 (5, payment_params, option),
6313 if payment_id.is_none() {
6314 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6316 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6318 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6319 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6320 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6321 path: path.unwrap(),
6322 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6327 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6328 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6333 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6334 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6336 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6338 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6339 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6340 (0, session_priv, required),
6341 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6342 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6343 (3, payment_secret, option),
6344 (4, *path, vec_type),
6345 (5, payment_params, option),
6348 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6350 field.write(writer)?;
6357 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6358 (0, forward_info, required),
6359 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6360 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6361 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6362 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6365 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6367 (0, htlc_id, required),
6368 (2, err_packet, required),
6373 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6374 (0, payment_secret, required),
6375 (2, expiry_time, required),
6376 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6377 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6378 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6381 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>
6383 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6384 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6385 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6386 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6390 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6391 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6393 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6395 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6397 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6398 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6399 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6403 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6404 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6405 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6406 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6407 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6408 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6409 unfunded_channels += 1;
6412 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6413 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6414 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6415 channel.write(writer)?;
6421 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6422 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6423 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6424 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6425 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6426 for forward in pending_forwards {
6427 forward.write(writer)?;
6432 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6433 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6434 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6436 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6437 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6438 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6439 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6440 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6441 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6442 htlc.write(writer)?;
6444 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6448 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6449 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6450 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6451 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6452 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6455 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6456 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6457 for event in events.iter() {
6458 event.write(writer)?;
6461 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6462 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6463 for event in background_events.iter() {
6465 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6467 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6468 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6473 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6474 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6475 // likely to be identical.
6476 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6477 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6479 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6480 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6481 hash.write(writer)?;
6482 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6485 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6486 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6487 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6488 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6489 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6492 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6493 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6495 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6496 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6497 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6498 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6501 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6502 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6506 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6507 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6508 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6510 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6512 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6518 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6519 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6520 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6521 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6524 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6525 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6526 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6527 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6528 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6530 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6533 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6534 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6535 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6536 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6537 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6538 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6539 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6540 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6541 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6548 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6550 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6552 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6553 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6554 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6555 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6556 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6557 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6558 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6559 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6560 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6561 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6562 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6563 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6564 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6566 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6567 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6569 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6570 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6572 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6573 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6574 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6575 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6576 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6577 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6579 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6580 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6582 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6583 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6584 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6585 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6589 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6590 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6592 pub keys_manager: K,
6594 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6596 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6597 pub fee_estimator: F,
6598 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6600 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6601 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6602 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6603 pub chain_monitor: M,
6605 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6606 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6607 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6608 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6609 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6610 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
6612 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
6614 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6615 /// deserialization.
6617 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6618 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6619 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6621 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6622 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6624 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6625 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6626 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6627 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6629 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6632 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6633 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6636 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6637 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>
6639 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6640 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6641 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6646 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6647 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6648 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6649 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6650 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6652 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
6653 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6658 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6659 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6660 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6661 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>>)
6663 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6664 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6665 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6666 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6670 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6671 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6672 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6676 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6677 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, R, L>)
6679 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6680 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6681 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6686 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6687 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6689 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6693 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6695 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6696 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6697 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6698 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6699 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6700 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6701 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6702 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6703 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6704 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6705 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6706 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6707 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6708 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6709 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6710 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6711 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6712 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6713 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6714 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6715 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6716 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6717 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6719 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6720 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6721 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6722 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6723 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6724 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6725 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6726 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6727 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6728 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6729 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6730 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6731 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6732 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6733 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6734 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6736 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6737 let mut found_htlc = false;
6738 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
6739 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
6742 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
6743 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
6744 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
6745 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
6746 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
6747 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
6748 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
6749 log_info!(args.logger,
6750 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
6751 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6752 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6756 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6757 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6758 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6760 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6761 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6763 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6765 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
6766 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
6767 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
6768 // safely discard the channel.
6769 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
6770 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6771 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6772 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6773 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
6776 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6777 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6778 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6779 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6780 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6781 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6785 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6786 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6787 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6788 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6792 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6793 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6795 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6796 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6798 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6799 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6800 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6802 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6805 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6806 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6807 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6808 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6809 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6810 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6811 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6812 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6814 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6817 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6819 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6820 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 let peer_state = PeerState {
6822 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6824 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6827 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6829 for _ in 0..event_count {
6830 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6831 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6836 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6838 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6839 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6840 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6841 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6845 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
6846 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6849 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6850 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6851 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6856 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6858 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6859 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6860 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6861 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6862 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6864 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6865 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6869 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6870 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6871 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6872 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
6873 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6874 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6875 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6876 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6877 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
6878 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6879 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6880 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6881 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6882 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6883 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6884 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6885 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6886 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
6888 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6889 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6892 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
6893 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6896 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6897 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6898 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6899 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6900 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6901 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6903 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6905 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6906 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6907 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6908 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6909 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6910 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6911 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6913 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6914 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6915 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6916 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6917 if path.is_empty() {
6918 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6919 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6921 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6922 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6923 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6924 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6926 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6927 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6928 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6931 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6932 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6933 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6934 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6936 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6937 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6938 total_msat: path_amt,
6939 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6941 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6942 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6947 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
6948 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
6949 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
6950 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
6951 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
6953 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
6954 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
6955 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
6956 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
6957 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
6958 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
6959 forwards.retain(|forward| {
6960 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
6961 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
6962 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
6963 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
6968 !forwards.is_empty()
6970 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
6971 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
6972 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
6973 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
6974 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
6975 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
6976 intercepted_id != ev_id
6988 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
6989 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6990 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6991 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6992 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6993 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6994 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6995 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6999 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7000 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7002 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7003 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7004 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7005 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7007 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7008 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7011 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7012 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7013 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7014 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7015 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7017 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7018 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7019 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7020 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7021 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7022 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7023 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7024 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7026 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7027 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7031 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7033 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7035 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7036 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7038 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7042 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7043 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7045 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7046 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7049 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7051 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7053 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7054 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7055 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7056 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7057 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7061 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7062 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7063 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7064 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7066 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7067 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7068 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7070 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7071 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7072 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7073 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7074 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7075 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7077 if chan.is_usable() {
7078 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7079 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7080 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7081 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7082 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7087 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7089 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7090 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7091 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7092 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7093 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7094 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7095 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7096 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7097 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7098 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7099 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7101 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7102 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7104 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7105 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7106 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7107 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7109 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7110 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7111 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7112 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7114 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7115 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7116 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7117 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7119 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7120 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7121 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7123 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7124 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7127 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7130 purpose: payment_purpose,
7131 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7137 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7139 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7140 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7141 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7142 router: args.router,
7144 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7146 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7148 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7150 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7151 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7152 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7153 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7155 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7156 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7157 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7158 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7159 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7160 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7162 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7168 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7170 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7172 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7173 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7174 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7175 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7177 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7178 logger: args.logger,
7179 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7182 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7183 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7184 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7185 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7186 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7189 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7190 //connection or two.
7192 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7198 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7199 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7200 use core::time::Duration;
7201 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7202 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7203 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7204 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7205 use crate::ln::msgs;
7206 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7207 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7208 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7209 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7210 use crate::util::test_utils;
7211 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface};
7214 fn test_notify_limits() {
7215 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7216 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7220 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7222 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7223 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7224 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7225 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7226 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7228 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7230 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7231 // to connect messages with new values
7232 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7233 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7234 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7235 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7237 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7238 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7239 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7240 // ... but the last node should not.
7241 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7242 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7243 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7244 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7246 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7247 // about the channel.
7248 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7249 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7250 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7252 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7254 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7255 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7256 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7257 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7258 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7259 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7261 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7262 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7263 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7265 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7266 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7267 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7268 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7269 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7270 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7272 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7273 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7274 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7275 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7276 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7277 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7278 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7279 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7281 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7282 // the channel info has updated.
7283 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7284 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7285 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7286 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7287 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7288 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7292 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7293 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7298 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7299 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7301 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7302 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7303 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7304 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7306 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7307 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7308 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7309 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7310 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7311 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7313 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7315 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7317 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7318 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7320 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7322 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7323 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7326 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7327 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7328 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7330 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7331 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7332 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7333 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7334 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7335 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7336 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7338 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7340 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7341 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7343 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7345 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7347 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7348 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7349 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7350 // lightning messages manually.
7351 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7352 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7355 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7356 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7357 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7359 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7360 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7362 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7363 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7365 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7366 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7367 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7369 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7370 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7371 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7375 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7377 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7378 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7381 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7382 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7383 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7386 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7387 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7388 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7389 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7394 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7395 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7396 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7397 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7399 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7402 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7403 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7404 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7405 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7412 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7413 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7414 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7415 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7416 // fails as expected.
7417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7420 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7422 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7423 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7425 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7426 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7427 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7429 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7430 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7431 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7432 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7433 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7435 let route = find_route(
7436 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7437 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7439 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7441 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7442 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7443 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7444 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7445 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7447 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7448 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7449 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7450 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7451 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7453 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7454 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7455 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7456 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7457 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7458 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7459 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7460 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7461 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7463 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7464 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7466 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7467 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7468 let route = find_route(
7469 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7470 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7472 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7474 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7475 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7476 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7477 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7478 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7480 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7481 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7482 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7484 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7485 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7486 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7487 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7488 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7490 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7491 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7494 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7495 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7496 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7497 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7498 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7499 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7500 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7501 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7502 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7504 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7505 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7509 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7510 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7511 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7517 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7518 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7519 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7520 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7522 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7523 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7524 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7525 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7526 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7528 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7529 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7530 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7531 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7532 let route = find_route(
7533 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7534 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7537 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7538 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7539 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7540 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7543 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7544 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7545 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7546 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7547 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7548 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7549 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7551 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7555 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7556 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7562 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7563 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7564 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7565 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7567 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7568 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7569 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7570 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7571 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7573 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7574 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7575 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7576 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7577 let route = find_route(
7578 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7579 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7582 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7583 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7584 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7585 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7586 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7589 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7590 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7591 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7592 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7593 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7594 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7595 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7597 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7601 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7605 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7607 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7608 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7609 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7610 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7612 // Marshall an MPP route.
7613 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7614 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7615 route.paths.push(path);
7616 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7617 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7618 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7619 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7620 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7621 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7623 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7624 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7625 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7626 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7631 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7632 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7633 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7636 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7638 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7639 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7641 total_msat: 100_000,
7644 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7645 // payment verification fails as expected.
7646 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7647 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7648 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7649 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7651 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7655 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7656 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7660 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7661 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7662 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7663 // the channel is successfully closed.
7664 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7665 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7666 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7667 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7669 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7670 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7671 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7672 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7673 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7675 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7676 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7678 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7679 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7681 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7684 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7686 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7687 // as it has the funding transaction.
7688 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7689 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7690 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7692 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7695 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7697 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7699 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7700 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7701 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7703 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7704 // as it has the funding transaction.
7705 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7706 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7707 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7710 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7711 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7713 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7714 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7715 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7717 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7718 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7719 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7720 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7722 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7723 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7725 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7726 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7727 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7728 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7729 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7730 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7731 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7733 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7734 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7735 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7736 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7737 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7738 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7739 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7742 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7744 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7745 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7746 // closing transaction).
7747 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7748 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7749 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7751 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7752 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7753 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7754 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7755 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7758 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7760 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7762 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7763 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7764 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7766 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7768 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7769 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7773 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7775 use crate::chain::Listen;
7776 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7777 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7778 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
7779 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7780 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7781 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7782 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7783 use crate::util::test_utils;
7784 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7785 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7787 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7788 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7789 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7791 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7795 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7796 node: &'a ChannelManager<
7797 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7798 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7799 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7800 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7801 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
7802 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
7807 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7808 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7811 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7812 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7813 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7815 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7816 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7818 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7819 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7820 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7821 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
7823 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7824 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7826 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7827 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7828 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7829 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7831 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7833 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7835 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7836 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7837 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7838 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7839 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7841 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7843 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7845 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7846 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7847 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7848 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7849 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7852 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7853 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7854 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7856 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7857 } else { panic!(); }
7859 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7860 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7862 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7865 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7868 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7869 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7871 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7872 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7873 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7874 match msg_events[0] {
7875 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7876 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7877 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7881 match msg_events[1] {
7882 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7886 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7887 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
7889 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
7890 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
7892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7895 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7896 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
7898 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
7899 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7904 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7906 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7907 macro_rules! send_payment {
7908 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7909 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7910 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7911 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7912 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7913 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7914 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7915 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7916 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7917 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7919 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7920 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7922 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7923 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7925 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7926 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7927 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7928 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7929 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7930 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7931 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7932 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7934 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7935 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7936 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7937 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7939 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7940 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7941 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7942 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7943 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7945 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7948 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7949 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7950 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7951 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7953 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7958 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7959 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);