1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
136 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
160 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
163 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
169 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
171 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
175 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
183 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
185 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
187 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
215 session_priv: SecretKey,
216 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219 payment_id: PaymentId,
220 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
230 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
235 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239 payment_params.hash(hasher);
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
247 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
250 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253 payment_secret: None,
254 payment_params: None,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
262 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
270 struct ReceiveError {
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
279 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 err: msgs::LightningError,
294 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
301 err: LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
311 shutdown_finish: None,
315 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
322 shutdown_finish: None,
326 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
330 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
346 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
349 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
356 log_level: Level::Warn,
359 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
379 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
380 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
381 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
382 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
383 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
385 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
386 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
387 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
388 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
389 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
390 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
391 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
393 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
397 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
398 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
399 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
400 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
402 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
403 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
404 /// confirmation depth.
405 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
406 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
408 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
409 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
410 /// and via the classic SCID.
412 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
413 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
414 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
415 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
416 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
417 /// failed/claimed by the user.
419 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
420 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
422 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
423 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
424 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
425 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
428 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
429 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
430 /// quite some time lag.
431 enum BackgroundEvent {
432 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
433 /// commitment transaction.
434 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
437 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
438 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
440 latest_features: InitFeatures,
443 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
444 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
446 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
449 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
450 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
451 struct PendingInboundPayment {
452 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
453 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
454 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
455 /// this payment being removed.
457 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
458 user_payment_id: u64,
459 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
460 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
461 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
464 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
465 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
466 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
468 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
471 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
472 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
473 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
474 pending_amt_msat: u64,
475 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
476 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
477 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
479 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
480 starting_block_height: u32,
482 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
483 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
484 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
486 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
487 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
489 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
490 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
491 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
492 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
493 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
495 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
497 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
498 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
502 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
503 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
509 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
515 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
521 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
528 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
537 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
538 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
539 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
546 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
547 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
550 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
551 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
552 let our_payment_hash;
553 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
557 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
558 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
559 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
563 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
567 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
568 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
569 let remove_res = match self {
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
574 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
578 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
579 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
580 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
581 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
582 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
583 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
590 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
591 let insert_res = match self {
592 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
594 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
597 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
600 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
601 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
602 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
603 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
604 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
611 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
615 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
616 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
623 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
624 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
625 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
626 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
627 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
628 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
629 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
631 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
632 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
634 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
635 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
636 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
637 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
638 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
639 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
640 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
641 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
643 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
644 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
646 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
647 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
649 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
650 /// to individual Channels.
652 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
653 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
654 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
655 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
657 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
658 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
659 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
660 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
661 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
662 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
663 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
665 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
666 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
667 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
668 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
671 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
672 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
673 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
674 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
675 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
677 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
678 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
679 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
680 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
681 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
682 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
683 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
684 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
685 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
686 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
689 default_configuration: UserConfig,
690 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
696 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
698 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
699 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
701 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
702 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
703 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
704 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
706 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
707 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
708 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
709 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
710 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
711 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
713 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
714 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
715 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
716 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
717 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
718 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
719 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
720 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
722 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
724 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
725 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
727 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
728 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
729 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
730 /// active channel list on load.
731 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
733 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
735 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
736 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
737 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
739 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
740 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
741 /// the handling of the events.
744 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
745 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
746 /// would break backwards compatability.
747 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
748 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
749 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
750 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
752 our_network_key: SecretKey,
753 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
755 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
757 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
758 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
759 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
761 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
762 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
764 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
765 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
766 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
768 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
769 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
770 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
771 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
773 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
774 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
775 /// are currently open with that peer.
776 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
777 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
780 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
781 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
783 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
784 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
785 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
786 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
787 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
788 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
789 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
790 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
791 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
793 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
800 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
802 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
803 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
804 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
805 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
806 pub struct ChainParameters {
807 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
808 pub network: Network,
810 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
812 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
813 pub best_block: BestBlock,
816 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
822 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
823 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
824 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
825 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
826 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
827 /// updates are ready for persistence).
829 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
830 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
831 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
832 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
833 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
835 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
836 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
839 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
840 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
841 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
844 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
845 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
847 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
848 persistence_notifier: notifier,
849 should_persist: persist_check,
850 _read_guard: read_guard,
855 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
857 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
858 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
863 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
864 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
866 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
868 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
869 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
870 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
871 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
872 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
874 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
875 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
877 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
879 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
880 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
881 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
882 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
883 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
884 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
885 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
886 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
887 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
888 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
889 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
890 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
891 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
893 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
894 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
896 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
897 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
898 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
899 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
901 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
902 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
903 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
904 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
905 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
906 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
909 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
911 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
912 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
915 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
917 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
918 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
919 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
921 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
922 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
924 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
925 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
926 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
927 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
928 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
929 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
930 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
931 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
932 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
933 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
934 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
937 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
938 /// to better separate parameters.
939 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
940 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
941 /// The node_id of our counterparty
942 pub node_id: PublicKey,
943 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
944 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
945 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
946 pub features: InitFeatures,
947 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
948 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
949 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
951 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
953 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
954 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
955 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
956 /// payments to us through this channel.
957 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
958 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
959 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
960 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
961 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
962 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
963 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
966 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
967 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
968 pub struct ChannelDetails {
969 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
970 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
971 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
972 /// lifetime of the channel.
973 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
974 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
975 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
976 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
977 /// our counterparty already.
979 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
980 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
981 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
982 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
984 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
985 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
986 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
987 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
989 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
990 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
992 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
993 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
995 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
996 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
997 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
998 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
999 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1000 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1001 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1002 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1003 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1006 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1008 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1009 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1010 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1011 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1012 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1013 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1014 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1016 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1017 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1019 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1020 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1021 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1022 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1023 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1024 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1025 /// this value on chain.
1027 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1029 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1031 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1032 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1033 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1034 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1035 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1036 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1037 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1039 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1040 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1041 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1042 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1044 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1045 pub balance_msat: u64,
1046 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1047 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1048 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1049 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1051 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1053 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1054 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1055 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1056 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1057 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1058 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1059 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1060 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1062 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1063 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1064 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1065 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1066 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1067 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1068 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1070 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1071 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1072 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1073 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1074 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1075 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1076 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1077 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1078 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1080 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1082 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1083 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1084 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1085 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1086 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1087 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1088 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1089 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1090 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1092 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1093 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1094 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1095 pub is_outbound: bool,
1096 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1097 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1098 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1099 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1100 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1102 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1103 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1104 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1105 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1107 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1108 pub is_usable: bool,
1109 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1110 pub is_public: bool,
1111 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1112 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1113 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1114 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1115 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1116 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1118 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1119 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1122 impl ChannelDetails {
1123 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1124 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1125 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1127 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1128 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1129 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1130 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1133 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1134 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1135 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1137 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1138 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1139 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1140 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1144 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1145 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1146 /// states for more.
1147 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1148 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1149 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1150 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1151 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1152 ParameterError(APIError),
1153 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1154 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1155 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1156 /// payment in full.
1158 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1160 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1161 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1162 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1163 /// paths than the ones selected).
1164 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1165 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1166 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1167 /// in over-/re-payment.
1169 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1170 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1171 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1173 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1174 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1175 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1176 /// with the latest update_id.
1178 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1179 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1180 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1181 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1182 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1183 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1184 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1185 payment_id: PaymentId,
1189 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1191 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1193 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1194 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1195 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1196 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1198 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1199 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1200 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1203 macro_rules! handle_error {
1204 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1207 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1208 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1210 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1211 // entering the macro.
1212 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1213 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1216 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1218 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1219 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1220 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1221 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1225 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1226 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1227 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1228 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1233 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1234 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1236 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1237 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1238 action: err.action.clone()
1242 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1243 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1246 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1253 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1254 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1255 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1256 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1258 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1259 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1260 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1261 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1262 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1264 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1265 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1267 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1268 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1272 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1273 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1274 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1276 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1277 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1279 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1280 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1282 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1283 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1284 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1285 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1286 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1287 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1293 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1294 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1298 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1300 $entry.remove_entry();
1308 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1309 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1313 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1315 $entry.remove_entry();
1323 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1324 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1326 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1327 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1333 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1334 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1336 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1337 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1338 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1339 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1340 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1341 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1342 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1343 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1344 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1345 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1346 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1347 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1348 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1349 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1352 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1353 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1354 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1355 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1356 match $action_type {
1357 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1358 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1360 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1361 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1363 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1364 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1365 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1366 if !$resend_commitment {
1367 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1370 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1372 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1373 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1377 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1378 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1380 $entry.remove_entry();
1384 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1385 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1386 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1388 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1389 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1392 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1394 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1395 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1397 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1398 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1402 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1403 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1404 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1406 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1407 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1411 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1412 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1413 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1414 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1415 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1418 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1423 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1424 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1425 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1426 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1427 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1429 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1430 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1431 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1432 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1433 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1434 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1435 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1436 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1437 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1442 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1443 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1444 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1445 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1446 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1448 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1449 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1450 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1452 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1453 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1454 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1455 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1458 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1459 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1460 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1461 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1462 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1463 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1464 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1465 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1466 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1467 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1468 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1469 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1472 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1473 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1474 // before it should be allowed to.
1475 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1476 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1478 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1479 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1480 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1485 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1486 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1487 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1488 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1489 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1490 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1491 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1492 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1493 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1494 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1495 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1496 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1497 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1498 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1499 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1500 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1501 let mut order = $order;
1503 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1505 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1509 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1510 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1511 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1512 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1517 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1518 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1519 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1520 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1521 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1526 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1530 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1535 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1536 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1537 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1542 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1543 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1544 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1545 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1546 assert!(res.is_ok());
1549 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1553 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1554 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1555 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1557 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1559 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1560 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1565 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1566 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1567 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1568 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1569 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1572 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1574 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1575 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1577 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1579 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1580 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1581 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1582 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1583 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1584 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1585 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1586 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1588 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1589 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1590 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1594 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1596 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1597 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1598 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1599 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1600 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1601 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1603 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1604 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1605 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1606 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1608 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1609 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1612 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1613 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1615 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1616 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1618 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1620 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1621 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1622 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1623 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1631 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1632 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1633 &self.default_configuration
1636 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1637 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1638 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1641 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1642 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1644 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1646 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1650 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1655 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1657 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1658 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1659 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1660 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1661 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1664 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1665 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1667 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1668 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1669 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1671 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1672 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1673 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1674 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1675 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1676 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1678 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1679 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1680 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1681 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1682 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1683 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1688 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1689 Some(peer_state) => {
1690 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1691 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1692 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1693 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1694 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1695 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1696 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1700 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1705 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1708 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1711 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1712 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1714 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1715 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1719 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1721 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1727 node_id: their_network_key,
1730 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1733 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1734 let mut res = Vec::new();
1736 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1738 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1739 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1740 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1741 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1742 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1743 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1744 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1745 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1746 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1747 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1748 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1749 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1750 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1751 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1752 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1753 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1754 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1755 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1756 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1758 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1759 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1760 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1761 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1762 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1763 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1764 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1765 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1766 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1767 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1768 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1769 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1770 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1771 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1772 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1773 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1774 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1775 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1776 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1777 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1778 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1779 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1780 config: Some(channel.config()),
1784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1785 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1786 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1787 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1793 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1794 /// more information.
1795 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1796 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1799 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1800 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1802 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1803 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1806 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1807 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1808 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1809 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1810 // really wanted anyway.
1811 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1814 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1815 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1816 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1817 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1818 Some(transaction) => {
1819 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1823 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1824 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1825 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1826 reason: closure_reason
1830 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1833 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1834 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1835 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1836 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1837 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1839 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1840 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1843 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1844 Some(peer_state) => {
1845 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1846 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1847 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1849 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1851 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1853 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1854 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1855 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1856 let (result, is_permanent) =
1857 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1859 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1865 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1866 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1870 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1871 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1872 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1873 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1877 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1885 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1886 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1889 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1893 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1894 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1895 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1897 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1898 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1900 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1901 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1902 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1903 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1905 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1907 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1908 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1909 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1910 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1911 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1914 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1915 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1916 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1918 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1919 /// the channel being closed or not:
1920 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1921 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1922 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1923 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1924 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1925 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1926 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1928 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1931 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1932 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1933 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1934 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1938 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1939 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1940 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1941 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1944 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1945 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1946 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1947 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1948 // ignore the result here.
1949 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1953 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1954 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1955 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1956 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1958 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1959 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1960 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1961 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1962 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1964 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1965 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1967 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1969 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1971 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1974 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1975 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1976 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1977 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1978 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1983 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1986 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1988 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1989 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1990 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1991 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1992 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1993 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1994 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2004 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2005 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2006 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2008 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2009 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2010 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2013 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2014 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2015 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2017 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2018 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2019 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2020 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2021 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2024 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2025 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2026 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2027 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2028 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2032 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2033 /// local transaction(s).
2034 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2035 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2036 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2040 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2041 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2043 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2044 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2045 return Err(ReceiveError {
2046 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2048 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2051 // final_expiry_too_soon
2052 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2053 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2054 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2055 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2056 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2057 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2058 return Err(ReceiveError {
2060 err_data: Vec::new(),
2061 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2064 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2065 return Err(ReceiveError {
2067 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2068 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2072 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2073 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2074 return Err(ReceiveError {
2075 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2076 err_data: Vec::new(),
2077 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2080 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2081 return Err(ReceiveError {
2082 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2083 err_data: Vec::new(),
2084 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2087 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2088 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2091 err_data: Vec::new(),
2092 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2094 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2095 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2097 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2098 phantom_shared_secret,
2100 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2101 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2102 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2103 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2104 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2105 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2106 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2107 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2108 return Err(ReceiveError {
2109 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2110 err_data: Vec::new(),
2111 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2115 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2117 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2120 return Err(ReceiveError {
2121 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2122 err_data: Vec::new(),
2123 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2128 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2131 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2132 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2133 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2137 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2138 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2139 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2141 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2142 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2143 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2144 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2145 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2146 failure_code: $err_code,
2147 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2152 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2153 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2156 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2158 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2159 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2160 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2161 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2162 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2163 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2164 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2165 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2168 let mut channel_state = None;
2169 macro_rules! return_err {
2170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2173 if channel_state.is_none() {
2174 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2176 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2177 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2178 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2179 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2180 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2185 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2187 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2188 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2190 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2191 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2195 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2196 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2198 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2200 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2201 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2202 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2203 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2204 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2206 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2209 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2210 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2211 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2213 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2214 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2215 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2218 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2219 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2220 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2221 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2222 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2226 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2227 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2228 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2231 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2232 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2233 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2234 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2239 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2240 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2241 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2242 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2243 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2244 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2245 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2246 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2247 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2248 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2249 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2251 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2254 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2257 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2259 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2260 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2261 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2262 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2263 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2264 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2265 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2267 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2268 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2269 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2270 // we don't have the channel here.
2271 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2273 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2275 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2276 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2277 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2278 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2279 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2280 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2281 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2283 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2284 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2286 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2287 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2291 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2293 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2300 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2301 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2302 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2303 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2304 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2305 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2307 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2308 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2310 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2311 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2312 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2313 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2314 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2315 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2316 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2317 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2318 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2319 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2325 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2326 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2327 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2328 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2330 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2331 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2333 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2334 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2335 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2337 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2338 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2339 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2341 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2346 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2349 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2350 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2351 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2353 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2354 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2355 if !chan.should_announce() {
2356 return Err(LightningError {
2357 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2361 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2362 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2365 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2368 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2369 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2370 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2371 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2372 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2373 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2375 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2376 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2380 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2382 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2384 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2386 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2387 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2389 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2390 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2391 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2392 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2393 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2394 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2395 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2396 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2399 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2400 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2402 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2408 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2409 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2410 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2411 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2412 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2413 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2415 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2416 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2417 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2418 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2419 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2421 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2423 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2425 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2426 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2428 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2429 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2430 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2431 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2432 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2433 err: "Payment already completed"
2438 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2439 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2440 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2443 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2445 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2446 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2447 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2448 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2449 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2450 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2451 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2452 total_msat: total_value,
2454 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2458 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2459 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2461 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2462 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2464 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2465 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2467 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2468 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2470 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2471 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2473 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2474 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2475 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2476 channel_state, chan)
2478 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2479 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2480 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2481 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2482 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2483 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2484 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2485 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2486 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2487 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2489 insert_outbound_payment!();
2491 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2492 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2493 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2494 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2495 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2496 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2497 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2498 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2504 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2506 } else { unreachable!(); }
2510 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2511 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2513 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2518 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2520 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2521 /// fields for more info.
2523 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2524 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2525 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2526 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2527 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2528 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2530 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2532 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2533 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2534 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2536 /// In general, a path may raise:
2537 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2538 /// node public key) is specified.
2539 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2540 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2542 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2543 /// relevant updates.
2545 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2546 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2547 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2549 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2550 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2551 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2552 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2554 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2555 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2556 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2557 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2558 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2561 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2562 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2563 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2565 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2566 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2568 let mut total_value = 0;
2569 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2570 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2571 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2572 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2573 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2574 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2575 continue 'path_check;
2577 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2578 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2579 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2580 continue 'path_check;
2583 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2584 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2586 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2587 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2589 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2590 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2591 total_value = amt_msat;
2594 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2595 let mut results = Vec::new();
2596 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2597 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2599 let mut has_ok = false;
2600 let mut has_err = false;
2601 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2602 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2603 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2604 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2605 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2606 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2607 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2611 } else if res.is_err() {
2612 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2613 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2616 if has_err && has_ok {
2617 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2620 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2621 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2622 Some(RouteParameters {
2623 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2624 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2625 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2631 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2632 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2633 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2634 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2640 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2642 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2643 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2644 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2645 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2646 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2648 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2649 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2650 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2651 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2652 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2653 if path.len() == 0 {
2654 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2655 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2660 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2661 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2662 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2664 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2665 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2667 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2668 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2669 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2670 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2673 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2675 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2676 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2677 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2680 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2681 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2682 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2685 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2686 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2687 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2692 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2693 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2697 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2700 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2702 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2703 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2704 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2705 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2707 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2708 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2709 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2711 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2712 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2713 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2714 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2717 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2718 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2719 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2720 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2721 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2723 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2731 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2732 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2733 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2734 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2735 /// never reach the recipient.
2737 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2739 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2740 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2742 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2744 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2745 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2746 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2748 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2750 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2751 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2752 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2757 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2758 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2759 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2760 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2761 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2763 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2765 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2767 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2768 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2769 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2770 } else { unreachable!(); })
2773 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2775 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2776 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2779 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2780 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2785 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2786 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2787 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2790 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2792 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2794 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2795 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2796 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2797 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2806 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2807 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2808 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2812 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2814 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2815 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2817 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2818 /// across the p2p network.
2820 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2821 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2823 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2824 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2825 /// keys per-channel).
2827 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2828 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2829 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2831 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2832 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2833 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2835 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2836 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2837 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2838 /// for more details.
2840 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2841 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2842 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2845 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2846 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2847 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2848 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2853 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2854 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2855 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2856 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2857 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2858 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 {
2859 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2860 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2864 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2865 let mut output_index = None;
2866 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2867 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2868 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2869 if output_index.is_some() {
2870 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2871 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2874 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2875 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2876 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2879 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2882 if output_index.is_none() {
2883 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2884 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2887 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2892 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2893 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when
2894 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2896 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2899 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2900 // smaller than 100:
2901 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100;
2903 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2904 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2905 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2906 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2907 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2908 /// our network addresses.
2910 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2911 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2913 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2914 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2915 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2916 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2918 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100).
2920 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2921 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2924 if addresses.len() > 100 {
2925 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2928 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2929 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2930 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2932 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2933 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2934 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2935 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2936 rgb, alias, addresses,
2937 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2938 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2940 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2941 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2944 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2946 let mut announced_chans = false;
2947 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2948 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2949 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2951 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2956 announced_chans = true;
2958 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2959 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2960 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2964 if announced_chans {
2965 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2966 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2967 signature: node_announce_sig,
2968 contents: announcement
2974 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2976 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2977 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2978 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2979 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2981 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2982 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2984 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2985 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2987 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2989 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2990 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2991 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2992 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2993 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2994 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2995 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2996 pub fn update_channel_config(
2997 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2998 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2999 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3000 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3001 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3005 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3006 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3009 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3010 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3011 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3012 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3013 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3014 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3016 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3017 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3018 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3019 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3023 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3024 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3025 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3028 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3029 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3030 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3031 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3032 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3041 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3043 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3044 /// Will likely generate further events.
3045 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3048 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3049 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3050 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3051 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3053 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3054 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3056 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3057 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3058 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3059 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3061 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3062 match forward_info {
3063 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3064 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3065 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3066 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3067 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3069 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3070 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3071 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3072 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3073 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3074 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3075 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3077 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3078 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3084 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3085 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3086 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3087 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3088 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3090 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3091 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3092 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3093 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3094 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3096 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3098 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3099 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3103 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3104 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3105 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3106 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3112 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3115 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3118 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3119 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3120 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3121 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3122 // problem, not ours.
3129 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3130 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3131 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3132 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3133 match forward_info {
3134 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3135 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3137 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3138 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3140 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3141 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3142 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3143 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3144 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3145 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3146 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3148 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3150 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3153 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3155 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3156 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3157 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3163 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3165 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3166 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3167 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3168 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3169 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3170 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3171 // this channel currently :/.
3177 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3178 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3180 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3182 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3184 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3187 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3189 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3190 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3191 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3194 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3196 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3197 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3198 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3199 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3200 // messages when we can.
3201 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3202 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3203 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3210 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3211 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3214 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3215 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3216 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3217 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3218 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3219 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3221 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3222 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3223 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3224 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3225 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3228 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3232 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3233 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3236 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3237 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3238 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3239 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3240 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3241 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3242 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3243 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3244 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3246 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3254 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3255 match forward_info {
3256 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3257 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3258 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3259 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3260 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3261 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3262 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3264 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3265 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3267 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3270 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3271 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3272 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3273 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3274 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3275 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3276 phantom_shared_secret,
3278 value: amt_to_forward,
3280 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3285 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3287 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3288 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3289 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3291 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3292 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3293 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3294 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3295 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3296 phantom_shared_secret,
3298 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3303 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3304 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3305 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3307 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3308 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3309 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3312 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3313 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3314 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3315 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3317 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3321 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3322 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3323 total_value += htlc.value;
3324 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3325 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3326 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3328 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3329 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3331 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3333 _ => unreachable!(),
3336 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3338 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3339 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3340 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3341 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3342 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3345 amount_msat: total_value,
3347 payment_received_generated = true;
3349 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3350 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3352 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3354 payment_received_generated
3358 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3359 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3360 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3361 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3362 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3363 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3364 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3365 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3367 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3368 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3369 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3370 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3371 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3373 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3377 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3379 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3380 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3381 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3382 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3383 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3384 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3386 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3399 if payment_data.is_none() {
3400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3404 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3405 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3407 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3408 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3410 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3411 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3413 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3414 if payment_received_generated {
3415 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3421 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3422 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3430 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3431 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3433 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3435 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3436 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3439 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3440 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3441 events.append(&mut new_events);
3444 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3446 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3447 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3449 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3450 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3451 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3452 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3453 if background_events.is_empty() {
3457 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3459 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3460 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3461 // monitor updating completing.
3462 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3469 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3470 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3471 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3472 self.process_background_events();
3475 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3476 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3477 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3478 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3480 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3481 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3483 if !chan.is_live() {
3484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3485 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3486 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3489 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3491 let mut retain_channel = true;
3492 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3495 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3496 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3500 let ret_err = match res {
3501 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3502 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3503 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3504 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3508 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3509 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3510 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3511 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3512 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3513 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3514 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3524 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3528 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3529 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3530 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3531 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3532 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3533 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3534 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3536 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3538 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3540 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3541 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3542 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3543 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3544 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3545 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3546 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3548 handle_errors.push(err);
3558 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3560 /// This currently includes:
3561 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3562 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3563 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3565 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3566 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3568 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3569 /// estimate fetches.
3570 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3571 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3572 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3573 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3575 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3577 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3578 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3580 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3581 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3582 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3583 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3584 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3585 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3586 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3587 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3589 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3591 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3593 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3594 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3595 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3596 if needs_close { return false; }
3599 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3600 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3601 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3602 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3603 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3604 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3605 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3606 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3610 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3611 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3613 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3614 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3615 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3619 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3620 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3625 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3630 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3631 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3632 // This should be unreachable
3633 debug_assert!(false);
3636 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3637 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3638 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3639 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3641 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3642 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3643 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3645 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3653 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3657 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3658 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3664 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3665 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3666 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3668 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3669 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3670 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3671 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3673 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3674 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3675 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3676 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3677 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3680 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3681 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3682 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3683 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3684 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3685 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3686 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3687 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3688 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3689 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3690 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3695 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3696 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3698 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3700 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3701 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3702 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3703 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3704 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3705 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3706 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3708 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3710 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3711 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3713 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3718 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3719 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3720 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3721 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3722 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3723 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3724 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3725 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3726 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3728 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3729 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3730 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3731 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3733 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3734 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3735 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3736 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3737 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3741 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3742 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3743 // be surfaced to the user.
3744 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3745 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3746 _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3748 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3750 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3751 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3752 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3754 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3758 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3760 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3762 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3763 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3764 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3765 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3766 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3767 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3768 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3769 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3770 Some(RouteParameters {
3771 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3772 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3773 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3776 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3777 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3778 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3780 rejected_by_dest: false,
3781 network_update: None,
3782 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3784 short_channel_id: None,
3791 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3792 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3794 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3800 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3807 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3808 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3809 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3810 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3811 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3812 /// still-available channels.
3813 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3814 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3815 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3816 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3819 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3820 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3821 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3823 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3824 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3825 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3826 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3827 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3828 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3829 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3830 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3831 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3834 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3835 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3838 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3839 all_paths_failed = true;
3840 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3841 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3843 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3852 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3853 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3854 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3855 Some(RouteParameters {
3856 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3857 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3858 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3863 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3864 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3866 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3868 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3869 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3870 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3871 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3872 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3873 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3874 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3875 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3882 error_code: onion_error_code,
3884 error_data: onion_error_data
3887 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3893 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3894 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3895 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3896 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3898 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3899 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3900 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3901 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3902 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3903 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3904 network_update: None,
3907 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3910 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3912 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3916 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3917 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3918 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3920 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3921 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3922 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3924 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3925 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3926 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3927 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3929 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3930 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3933 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3934 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3935 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3939 let mut forward_event = None;
3940 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3941 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3943 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3945 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3948 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3951 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3952 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3954 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3955 time_forwardable: time
3962 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3963 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3965 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3966 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3967 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3969 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3970 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3971 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3972 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3974 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3975 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3976 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3977 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3978 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3979 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3980 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3981 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3985 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3986 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3987 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3988 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3990 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3991 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3992 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3993 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3995 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3996 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3997 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3998 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3999 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4001 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4002 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4003 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4004 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4005 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4009 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4010 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4011 debug_assert!(false);
4015 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4016 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4017 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4018 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4019 if sources.len() != 1 {
4020 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4021 debug_assert!(false);
4027 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4029 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4030 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4033 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4034 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4035 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4039 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4040 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4041 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4043 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4044 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4045 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4046 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4047 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4048 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4049 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4051 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4052 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4053 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4054 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4055 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4056 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4057 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4058 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4060 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4061 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4062 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4063 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4064 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4065 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4067 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4072 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4073 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4075 purpose: payment_purpose,
4076 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4080 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4081 // which were generated.
4082 channel_state.take();
4084 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4085 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4086 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4091 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4092 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4093 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4094 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4095 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4097 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4101 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4102 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4103 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4104 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4105 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4106 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4107 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4108 payment_preimage, e);
4109 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4110 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4111 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4112 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4115 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4116 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4117 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4118 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4119 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4120 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4121 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4122 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4123 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4124 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4130 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4132 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4135 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4136 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4137 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4138 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4139 payment_preimage, e);
4141 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4142 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4144 chan.remove_entry();
4146 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4149 } else { unreachable!(); }
4152 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4153 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4154 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4155 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4156 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4157 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4158 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4159 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4160 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4161 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4162 pending_events.push(
4163 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4165 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4170 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4178 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4180 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4181 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4182 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4183 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4184 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4185 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4186 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4187 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4188 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4189 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4190 pending_events.push(
4191 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4192 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4198 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4202 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4203 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4204 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4206 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4207 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4208 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4209 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4210 pending_events.push(
4211 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4219 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4227 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4228 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4229 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4230 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4231 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4232 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4233 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4236 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4237 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4238 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4239 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4240 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4243 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4244 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4245 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4246 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4247 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4248 payment_preimage, e);
4250 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4251 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4252 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4253 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4256 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4257 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4258 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4259 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4263 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4264 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4265 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4268 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4269 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4270 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4272 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4274 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4284 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4285 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4286 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4289 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4292 let chan_restoration_res;
4293 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4294 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4295 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4296 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4300 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4304 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4305 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4306 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4307 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4308 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4309 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4311 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4312 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4313 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4318 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4319 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4320 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4322 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4324 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4325 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4326 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4331 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4333 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4334 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4337 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4338 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4339 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4341 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4342 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4343 /// used to accept such channels.
4345 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4346 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4347 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4348 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4351 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4352 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4354 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4355 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4356 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4358 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4359 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4361 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4362 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4364 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4365 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4367 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4368 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4369 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4370 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4373 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4374 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4376 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4377 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4378 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4380 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4381 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4383 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4384 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4387 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4388 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4389 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4390 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4391 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4392 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4395 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4396 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4397 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4400 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4401 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4402 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4406 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4412 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4413 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4417 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4418 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4421 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4422 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4423 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4424 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4427 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4432 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4433 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4434 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4436 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4440 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4441 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4445 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4446 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4449 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4450 pending_events.push(
4451 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4452 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4453 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4454 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4455 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4456 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4461 entry.insert(channel);
4467 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4468 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4469 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4470 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4471 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4473 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4476 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4477 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4483 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4484 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4485 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4486 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4488 user_channel_id: user_id,
4493 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4494 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4495 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4496 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4497 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4498 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4500 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4503 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4508 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4509 // lock before watch_channel
4510 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4512 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4513 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4514 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4515 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4516 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4517 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4518 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4519 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4520 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4521 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4524 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4525 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4526 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4527 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4528 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4529 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4530 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4534 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4535 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4536 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4541 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4542 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4545 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4546 funding_msg.channel_id))
4548 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4549 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4552 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4553 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4556 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4557 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4565 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4567 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4568 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4569 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4570 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4572 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4575 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4576 Ok(update) => update,
4577 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4579 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4580 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4581 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4582 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4583 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4584 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4585 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4586 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4591 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4592 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4599 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4600 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4604 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4607 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4608 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4609 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4612 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4613 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4614 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4615 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4617 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4618 msg: announcement_sigs,
4620 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4621 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4622 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4623 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4624 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4625 // announcement_signatures.
4626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4627 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4628 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4629 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4640 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4641 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4642 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4643 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4644 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4646 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4648 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4649 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4652 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4653 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4654 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4655 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4658 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4659 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4661 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4662 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4663 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4664 let (result, is_permanent) =
4665 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4667 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4673 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4674 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4675 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4685 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4689 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4693 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4694 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4695 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4696 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4697 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4699 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4702 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4703 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4705 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4710 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4711 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4712 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4713 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4714 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4715 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4716 } else { (tx, None) }
4718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4721 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4722 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4723 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4725 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4726 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4727 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4728 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4732 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4737 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4738 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4739 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4740 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4742 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4743 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4744 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4745 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4747 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4748 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4750 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4752 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4753 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4756 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4757 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4758 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4759 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4760 match pending_forward_info {
4761 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4762 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4763 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4764 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4766 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4768 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4769 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4770 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4773 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4775 _ => pending_forward_info
4778 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4785 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4786 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4787 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4788 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4789 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4791 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4792 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4794 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4799 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4803 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4804 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4806 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4808 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4809 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4811 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4818 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4819 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4820 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4821 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4823 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4824 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4826 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4827 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4828 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4830 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4837 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4838 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4839 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4840 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4842 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4843 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4845 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4846 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4847 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4848 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4849 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4850 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4851 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4856 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4857 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4860 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4861 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4863 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4864 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4865 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4866 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4867 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4868 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4869 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4870 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4872 commitment_signed: msg,
4878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4883 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4884 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4885 let mut forward_event = None;
4886 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4887 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4888 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4889 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4891 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4892 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4893 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4894 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4895 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4898 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4899 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4902 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4903 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4908 match forward_event {
4910 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4911 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4912 time_forwardable: time
4920 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4921 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4923 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4924 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4925 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4926 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4927 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4928 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4930 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4931 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4932 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4933 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4934 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4935 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4936 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4937 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4938 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4939 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4940 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4942 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4943 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4944 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4945 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4946 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4948 } else { unreachable!(); }
4951 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4952 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4953 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4957 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4958 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4959 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4960 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4961 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4966 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4968 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4969 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4971 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4972 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4974 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4975 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4982 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4983 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4984 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4985 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4987 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4988 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4990 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4997 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4998 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4999 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5001 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5003 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5004 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5006 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5007 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5011 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5012 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
5013 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5014 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5015 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5023 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5024 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5025 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5027 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5028 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5030 // It's not a local channel
5031 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5034 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5036 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5037 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5038 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5039 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5040 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5041 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5045 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5046 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5047 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5048 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5050 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5055 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5058 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5059 let chan_restoration_res;
5060 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5061 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5062 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5064 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5066 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5067 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5069 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5070 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5071 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5072 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5073 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5074 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5075 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5076 let mut channel_update = None;
5077 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5079 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5082 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5083 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5084 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5085 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5086 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5087 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5088 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5093 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5094 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5095 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5096 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5097 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5098 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5100 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5105 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5106 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5108 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5109 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5114 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5115 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5116 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5117 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5118 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5119 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5120 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5121 match monitor_event {
5122 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5123 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5124 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5125 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5128 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5131 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5132 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5133 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5134 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5135 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5136 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5137 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5138 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5139 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5140 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5141 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5145 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5146 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5148 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5150 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5151 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5152 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5153 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5159 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5160 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5166 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5167 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5170 has_pending_monitor_events
5173 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5174 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5175 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5177 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5178 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5181 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5182 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5183 /// update was applied.
5185 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5186 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5187 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5188 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5189 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5190 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5191 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5192 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5196 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5197 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5198 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5200 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5201 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5202 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5203 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5205 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5207 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5210 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5211 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5212 has_monitor_update = true;
5213 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5214 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5215 if close_channel { return false; }
5217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5218 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5219 updates: commitment_update,
5226 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5227 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5228 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5235 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5236 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5237 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5240 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5241 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5247 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5248 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5249 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5250 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5251 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5252 let mut has_update = false;
5254 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5255 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5256 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5257 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5258 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5260 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5261 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5262 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5263 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5266 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5269 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5270 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5271 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5272 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5278 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5280 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5281 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5282 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5288 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5289 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5296 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5297 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5303 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5304 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5306 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5307 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5308 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5309 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5310 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5311 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5312 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5313 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5314 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5315 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5316 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5317 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5318 assert!(should_broadcast);
5319 } else { unreachable!(); }
5320 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5322 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5326 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5327 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5329 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5333 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5336 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5337 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5339 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5340 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5341 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5342 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5343 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5344 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5345 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5346 // never fail a payment too early.
5347 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5349 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5357 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5360 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5361 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5363 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5364 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5365 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5367 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5369 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5370 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5374 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5375 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5377 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5379 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5380 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5381 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5382 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5383 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5384 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5387 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5388 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5390 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5393 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5395 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5397 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5398 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5399 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5400 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5401 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5404 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5405 /// stored external to LDK.
5407 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5408 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5409 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5411 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5412 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5415 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5416 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5417 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5418 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5420 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5421 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5422 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5423 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5424 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5426 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5427 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5428 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5429 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5430 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5432 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5433 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5435 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5436 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5440 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5441 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5443 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5445 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5446 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5447 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5448 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5451 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5452 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5454 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5457 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5459 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5461 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5462 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5465 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5466 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5468 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5469 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5470 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5473 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5474 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5476 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5477 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5478 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5479 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5481 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5482 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5483 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5490 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5492 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5493 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5495 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5496 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5497 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5502 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5503 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5504 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5505 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5510 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5511 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5515 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5516 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5520 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5521 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5522 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5523 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5524 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5527 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5528 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5529 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5530 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5532 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5533 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5534 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5535 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5538 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5539 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5541 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5542 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5545 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5546 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5547 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5549 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5550 events.replace(pending_events);
5559 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5561 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5562 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5563 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5564 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5567 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5569 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5570 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5572 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5573 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5574 /// restarting from an old state.
5575 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5576 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5577 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5579 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5580 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5581 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5582 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5585 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5586 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5587 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5590 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5591 handler.handle_event(&event);
5599 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5601 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5602 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5603 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5607 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5609 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5610 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5611 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5612 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5613 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5616 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5617 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5620 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5622 let new_height = height - 1;
5624 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5625 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5626 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5627 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5628 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5629 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5632 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5636 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5638 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5639 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5640 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5644 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5645 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5646 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5647 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5649 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5650 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5653 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5654 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5656 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5657 if height < last_best_block_height {
5658 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5659 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5663 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5664 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5665 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5666 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5668 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5669 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5673 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5675 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5677 macro_rules! max_time {
5678 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5680 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5681 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5682 // having an explicit local time source.
5683 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5684 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5685 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5686 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5687 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5693 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5694 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5695 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5696 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5697 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5700 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5701 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5702 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5703 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5704 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5705 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5706 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5707 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5708 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5716 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5717 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5718 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5719 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5720 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5721 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5727 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5729 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5730 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5731 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5732 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5733 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5734 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5739 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5741 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5742 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5743 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5744 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5747 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5748 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5750 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5751 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5752 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5753 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5754 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5756 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5757 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5759 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5760 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5761 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5762 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5763 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5764 let res = f(channel);
5765 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5766 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5767 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5768 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5772 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5773 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5774 if channel.is_usable() {
5775 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5776 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5777 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5778 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5786 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5787 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5788 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5789 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5790 msg: announcement_sigs,
5792 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5793 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5794 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5796 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5797 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5798 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5803 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5804 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5805 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5806 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5807 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5808 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5809 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5810 // is always consistent.
5811 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5812 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5813 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5814 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5817 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5818 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5819 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5820 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5821 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5822 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5827 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5828 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5829 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5830 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5831 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5832 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5833 data: reason_message,
5841 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5842 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5843 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5844 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5845 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5846 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5847 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5848 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5849 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5850 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5851 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5852 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5853 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5858 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5863 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5865 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5866 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5870 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5871 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5872 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5875 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5876 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5877 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5878 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5881 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5882 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5884 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5885 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5888 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5889 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5890 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5891 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5892 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5896 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5897 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5898 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5899 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5903 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5904 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5905 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5906 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5907 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5908 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5911 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5913 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5916 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5918 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5921 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5923 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5926 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5928 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5931 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5933 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5936 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5938 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5941 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5943 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5946 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5948 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5951 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5953 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5956 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5958 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5961 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5966 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5968 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5971 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5973 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5976 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5978 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5981 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5983 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5986 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5987 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5988 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5991 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5996 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5998 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6001 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6003 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6004 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6006 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6007 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6008 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6009 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
6010 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6011 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6012 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6013 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6014 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6015 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6016 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
6017 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6020 no_channels_remain = false;
6025 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6029 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6032 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6033 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6034 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6035 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6036 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6038 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6039 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6040 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6042 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6046 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6050 if no_channels_remain {
6051 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6054 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6055 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6059 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6060 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6065 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6066 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6067 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6068 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6069 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6073 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6078 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6079 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6080 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6081 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6082 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6083 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6084 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6085 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6086 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6091 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6092 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6098 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6101 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6104 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6105 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6106 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6107 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6108 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6113 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6114 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6115 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6116 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6119 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6120 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6121 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6129 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6130 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6135 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6136 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6137 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6138 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6139 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6140 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6143 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6146 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6152 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6153 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6158 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6159 let result = *guard;
6167 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6168 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6169 let current_time = Instant::now();
6171 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6172 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6177 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6178 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6179 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6180 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6181 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6183 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6184 let result = *guard;
6185 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6189 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6190 None => return result,
6196 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6198 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6199 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6200 *persistence_lock = true;
6201 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6206 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6207 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6209 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6210 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6211 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6212 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6215 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6216 (2, node_id, required),
6217 (4, features, required),
6218 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6219 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6220 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6221 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6224 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6225 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6226 (2, channel_id, required),
6227 (3, channel_type, option),
6228 (4, counterparty, required),
6229 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6230 (6, funding_txo, option),
6231 (7, config, option),
6232 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6233 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6234 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6235 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6236 (16, balance_msat, required),
6237 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6238 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6239 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6240 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6241 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6242 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6243 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6244 (26, is_outbound, required),
6245 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6246 (30, is_usable, required),
6247 (32, is_public, required),
6248 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6249 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6252 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6253 (2, channels, vec_type),
6254 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6255 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6258 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6260 (0, onion_packet, required),
6261 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6264 (0, payment_data, required),
6265 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6266 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6268 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6269 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6270 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6274 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6275 (0, routing, required),
6276 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6277 (4, payment_hash, required),
6278 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6279 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6283 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6284 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6286 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6288 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6289 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6290 reason.write(writer)?;
6292 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6293 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6296 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6297 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6298 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6299 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6306 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6307 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6308 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6312 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6313 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6314 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6318 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6319 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6320 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6321 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6322 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6325 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6326 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6327 // messages contained in the variants.
6328 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6329 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6330 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6332 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6333 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6334 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6335 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6336 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6339 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6340 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6341 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6342 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6343 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6345 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6350 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6355 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6356 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6357 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6358 (2, outpoint, required),
6359 (4, htlc_id, required),
6360 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6363 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6364 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6365 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6366 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6367 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6369 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6370 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6371 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6372 (2, self.value, required),
6373 (4, payment_data, option),
6374 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6375 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6381 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6382 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6383 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6385 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6386 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6387 let mut total_msat = None;
6388 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6389 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6390 (0, prev_hop, required),
6391 (1, total_msat, option),
6392 (2, value, required),
6393 (4, payment_data, option),
6394 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6395 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6397 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6399 if payment_data.is_some() {
6400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6402 if total_msat.is_none() {
6403 total_msat = Some(value);
6405 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6408 if total_msat.is_none() {
6409 if payment_data.is_none() {
6410 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6412 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6414 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6418 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6421 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6428 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6429 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6430 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6433 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6434 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6435 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6436 let mut payment_id = None;
6437 let mut payment_secret = None;
6438 let mut payment_params = None;
6439 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6440 (0, session_priv, required),
6441 (1, payment_id, option),
6442 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6443 (3, payment_secret, option),
6444 (4, path, vec_type),
6445 (5, payment_params, option),
6447 if payment_id.is_none() {
6448 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6450 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6452 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6453 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6454 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6455 path: path.unwrap(),
6456 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6461 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6462 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6467 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6468 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6470 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6472 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6473 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6474 (0, session_priv, required),
6475 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6476 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6477 (3, payment_secret, option),
6478 (4, path, vec_type),
6479 (5, payment_params, option),
6482 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6484 field.write(writer)?;
6491 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6492 (0, LightningError) => {
6496 (0, failure_code, required),
6497 (2, data, vec_type),
6501 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6503 (0, forward_info, required),
6504 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6505 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6506 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6509 (0, htlc_id, required),
6510 (2, err_packet, required),
6514 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6515 (0, payment_secret, required),
6516 (2, expiry_time, required),
6517 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6518 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6519 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6522 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6524 (0, session_privs, required),
6527 (0, session_privs, required),
6528 (1, payment_hash, option),
6531 (0, session_privs, required),
6532 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6533 (2, payment_hash, required),
6534 (4, payment_secret, option),
6535 (6, total_msat, required),
6536 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6537 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6540 (0, session_privs, required),
6541 (2, payment_hash, required),
6545 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6546 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6547 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6548 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6549 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6552 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6553 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6555 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6557 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6559 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6560 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6561 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6564 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6565 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6566 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6567 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6568 unfunded_channels += 1;
6571 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6572 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6573 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6574 channel.write(writer)?;
6578 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6579 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6580 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6581 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6582 for forward in pending_forwards {
6583 forward.write(writer)?;
6587 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6588 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6589 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6590 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6591 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6592 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6593 htlc.write(writer)?;
6595 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6599 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6600 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6601 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6602 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6603 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6606 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6607 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6608 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6609 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6610 for event in events.iter() {
6611 event.write(writer)?;
6614 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6615 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6616 for event in background_events.iter() {
6618 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6620 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6621 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6626 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6627 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6629 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6630 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6631 hash.write(writer)?;
6632 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6635 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6636 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6637 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6638 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6639 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6642 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6643 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6645 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6646 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6647 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6648 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6651 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6652 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6656 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6657 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6658 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6660 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6661 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6662 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6667 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6668 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6669 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6670 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6671 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6672 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6679 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6681 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6683 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6684 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6685 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6686 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6687 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6688 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6689 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6690 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6691 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6692 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6693 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6694 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6695 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6697 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6698 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6700 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6701 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6703 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6704 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6705 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6706 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6707 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6708 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6710 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6711 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6712 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6713 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6714 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6715 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6718 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6719 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6721 pub keys_manager: K,
6723 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6725 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6726 pub fee_estimator: F,
6727 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6729 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6730 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6731 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6732 pub chain_monitor: M,
6734 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6735 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6736 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6737 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6738 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6739 /// deserialization.
6741 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6742 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6743 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6745 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6746 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6748 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6749 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6750 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6751 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6753 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6756 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6757 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6760 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6761 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6762 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6763 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6764 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6765 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6768 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6769 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6770 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6771 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6772 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6774 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6775 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6780 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6781 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6782 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6783 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6784 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6785 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6786 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6787 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6790 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6791 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6792 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6796 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6797 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6798 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6799 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6800 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6801 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6804 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6805 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6807 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6809 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6813 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6815 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6816 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6817 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6818 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6819 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6820 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6821 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6822 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6823 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6824 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6825 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6826 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6827 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6828 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6829 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6830 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6831 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6832 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6833 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6834 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6835 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6836 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6837 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6838 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6839 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6840 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6841 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6842 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6843 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6844 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6845 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6846 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6847 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6848 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6849 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6850 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6851 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6852 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6855 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6856 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6857 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6859 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6860 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6862 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6865 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6866 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6867 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6868 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6869 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6870 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6874 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6875 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6876 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6877 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6881 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6882 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6884 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6885 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6888 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6889 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6891 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6894 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6896 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6897 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6899 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6900 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6901 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6903 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6906 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6907 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6908 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6909 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let peer_state = PeerState {
6911 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6916 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6918 for _ in 0..event_count {
6919 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6920 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6924 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6925 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6926 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6927 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6928 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6929 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6930 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6931 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6935 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6937 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6938 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6939 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6940 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6944 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6948 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6949 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6950 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6951 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6955 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6957 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6958 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6959 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6961 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6963 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6964 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6968 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6969 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6970 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6971 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6972 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6973 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6974 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6975 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6976 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6977 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6978 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6979 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6981 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6982 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6985 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6986 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6987 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6988 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6989 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6990 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6992 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6994 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6995 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6996 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6997 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6998 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6999 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7000 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7002 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7003 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7004 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7005 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7006 if path.is_empty() {
7007 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7008 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7010 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7011 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7012 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7013 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7015 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7016 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7017 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7020 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7021 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7022 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7023 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7025 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7026 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7027 total_msat: path_amt,
7028 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7030 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7031 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7040 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7041 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7043 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7044 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7045 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7046 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7048 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7049 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7052 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7053 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7054 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7055 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7056 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7058 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7059 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7060 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7061 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7062 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7063 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7064 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7065 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7067 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7068 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7072 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7074 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7076 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7077 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7079 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7083 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7084 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7086 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7087 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7090 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7092 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7094 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7095 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7096 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7097 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7098 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7102 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7103 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7104 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7105 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7107 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7108 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7109 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7111 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7112 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7113 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7114 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7115 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7116 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7118 if chan.is_usable() {
7119 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7120 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7121 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7122 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7128 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7129 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7130 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7131 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7132 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7133 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7134 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7136 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7137 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7138 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7139 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7141 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7142 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7143 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7144 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7146 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7147 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7148 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7149 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7151 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7152 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7153 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7155 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7156 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7159 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7161 purpose: payment_purpose,
7162 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7168 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7170 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7171 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7172 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7174 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7176 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7181 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7183 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7184 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7185 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7187 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7188 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7189 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7195 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7196 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7198 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7200 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7201 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7202 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7203 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7205 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7206 logger: args.logger,
7207 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7210 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7211 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7214 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7215 //connection or two.
7217 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7223 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7224 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7225 use core::time::Duration;
7226 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7227 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7228 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7229 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7230 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7231 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7233 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7234 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7235 use util::errors::APIError;
7236 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7237 use util::test_utils;
7238 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7242 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7243 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7245 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7248 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7249 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7251 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7252 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7253 thread::spawn(move || {
7255 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7256 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7257 *persistence_lock = true;
7260 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7266 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7267 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7269 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7272 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7277 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7279 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7282 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7289 fn test_notify_limits() {
7290 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7291 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7295 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7297 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7298 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7299 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7300 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7301 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7303 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7305 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7306 // to connect messages with new values
7307 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7308 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7309 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7310 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7312 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7313 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7314 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7315 // ... but the last node should not.
7316 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7317 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7318 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7319 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7321 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7322 // about the channel.
7323 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7324 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7325 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7327 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7329 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7330 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7331 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7332 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7333 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7334 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7336 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7337 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7338 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7340 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7341 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7342 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7343 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7344 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7345 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7347 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7348 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7349 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7350 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7351 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7352 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7353 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7354 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7356 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7357 // the channel info has updated.
7358 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7359 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7360 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7361 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7362 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7363 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7367 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7368 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7374 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7376 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7377 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7378 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7379 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7380 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7381 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7382 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7384 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7385 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7386 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7388 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7389 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7391 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7393 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7394 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7395 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7397 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7398 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7401 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7402 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7403 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7404 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7405 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7406 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7407 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7408 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7409 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7411 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7412 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7414 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7416 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7418 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7419 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7420 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7421 // lightning messages manually.
7422 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7423 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7426 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7427 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7428 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7430 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7431 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7433 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7434 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7436 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7437 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7438 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7440 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7441 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7442 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7444 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7446 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7448 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7449 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7452 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7453 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7454 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7457 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7458 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7459 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7460 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7465 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7466 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7467 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7468 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7473 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7474 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7475 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7476 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7478 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7483 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7484 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7485 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7486 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7487 // fails as expected.
7488 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7491 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7492 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7493 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7494 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7496 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7497 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7498 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7500 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7501 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7502 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7503 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7504 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7506 let route = find_route(
7507 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7508 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7510 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7512 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7513 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7514 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7515 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7516 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7518 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7519 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7520 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7522 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7523 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7524 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7525 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7526 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7527 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7528 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7529 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7530 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7532 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7533 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7535 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7536 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7537 let route = find_route(
7538 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7539 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7541 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7543 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7545 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7546 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7547 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7549 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7550 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7551 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7553 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7554 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7555 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7556 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7559 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7560 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7561 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7563 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7564 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7565 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7566 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7567 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7568 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7569 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7570 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7571 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7573 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7574 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7578 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7579 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7580 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7586 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7587 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7588 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7589 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7591 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7592 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7593 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7594 final_value_msat: 10000,
7595 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7597 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7598 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7599 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7600 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7601 let route = find_route(
7602 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7603 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7606 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7607 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7608 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7611 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7612 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7613 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7614 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7615 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7616 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7619 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7623 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7624 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7630 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7631 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7632 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7633 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7635 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7636 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7637 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7638 final_value_msat: 10000,
7639 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7641 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7642 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7643 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7644 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7645 let route = find_route(
7646 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7647 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7650 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7651 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7652 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7653 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7656 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7657 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7658 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7659 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7660 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7661 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7664 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7668 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7671 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7672 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7674 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7675 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7676 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7677 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7679 // Marshall an MPP route.
7680 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7681 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7682 route.paths.push(path);
7683 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7684 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7685 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7686 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7687 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7688 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7690 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7691 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7692 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7693 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7698 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7699 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7705 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7706 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7708 total_msat: 100_000,
7711 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7712 // payment verification fails as expected.
7713 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7714 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7715 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7716 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7718 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7722 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7723 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7727 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7728 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7729 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7730 // the channel is successfully closed.
7731 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7732 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7733 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7734 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7736 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7737 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7738 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7739 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7740 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7742 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7743 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7745 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7746 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7747 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7748 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7751 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7753 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7754 // as it has the funding transaction.
7755 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7756 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7757 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7759 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7762 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7764 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7766 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7767 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7768 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7770 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7771 // as it has the funding transaction.
7772 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7773 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7774 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7777 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7778 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7780 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7781 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7782 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7784 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7785 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7786 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7787 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7789 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7790 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7792 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7793 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7794 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7795 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7796 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7797 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7798 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7800 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7801 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7802 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7803 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7804 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7805 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7806 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7809 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7811 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7812 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7813 // closing transaction).
7814 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7815 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7816 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7818 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7819 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7820 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7821 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7822 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7825 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7827 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7829 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7830 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7831 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7833 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7835 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7836 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7840 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7843 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7844 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7845 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7846 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7847 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7848 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7849 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7850 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7851 use util::test_utils;
7852 use util::config::UserConfig;
7853 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7855 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7856 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7857 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7859 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7863 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7864 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7865 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7866 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7867 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7868 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7869 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7874 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7875 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7878 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7879 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7880 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7882 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7883 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7885 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7886 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7888 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7889 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7891 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7892 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7893 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7894 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7895 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7897 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7899 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7901 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7902 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7903 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7904 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7905 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7907 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7909 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7911 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7912 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7913 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7914 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7915 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7918 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7919 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7920 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7922 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7923 } else { panic!(); }
7925 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7926 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7928 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7931 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7934 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7935 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7937 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7938 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7939 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7940 match msg_events[0] {
7941 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7942 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7943 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7947 match msg_events[1] {
7948 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7952 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7954 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7955 macro_rules! send_payment {
7956 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7957 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7958 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7959 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7960 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7961 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7962 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7963 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7964 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7965 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7967 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7968 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7970 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7971 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7973 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7974 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7975 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7976 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7977 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7978 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7979 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7980 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7983 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7984 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7985 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7987 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7988 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7989 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7990 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7991 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7993 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7996 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7997 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7998 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7999 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8001 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8006 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8007 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);