1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
41 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
42 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
43 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
44 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
48 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
49 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
50 use util::config::UserConfig;
51 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
52 use util::{byte_utils, events};
53 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
54 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
55 use util::logger::Logger;
56 use util::errors::APIError;
59 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
60 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
63 use std::time::Duration;
64 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
66 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
68 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
70 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
71 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
72 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
74 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
75 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
76 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
77 // before we forward it.
79 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
80 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
81 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
82 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
83 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
85 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
86 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
88 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
89 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
92 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
93 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
97 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
98 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
99 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
100 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
102 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
103 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
106 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
107 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
108 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
109 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
112 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
115 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
116 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
119 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
121 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
123 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
127 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
131 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
132 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
133 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
134 short_channel_id: u64,
136 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
139 struct ClaimableHTLC {
140 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
142 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
143 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
144 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
145 /// are part of the same payment.
146 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
150 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
151 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
152 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
153 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
156 session_priv: SecretKey,
157 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
158 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
159 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
164 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
165 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
167 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
168 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
173 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
174 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
176 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
184 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
185 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
186 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
187 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
188 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
189 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
190 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
191 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
192 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
193 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
194 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
195 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
197 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
199 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
200 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
201 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
202 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
203 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
205 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
206 err: msgs::LightningError,
207 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
209 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
211 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
213 err: LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
222 shutdown_finish: None,
226 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
228 err: LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
232 shutdown_finish: None,
236 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
237 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
240 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
242 err: LightningError {
244 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
245 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
251 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
255 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
258 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
260 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
262 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
264 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
265 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
271 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
274 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
281 shutdown_finish: None,
286 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
287 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
288 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
289 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
290 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
292 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
293 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
294 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
295 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
296 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
297 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
298 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
300 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
304 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
305 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
306 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
307 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
308 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
309 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
310 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
311 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
312 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
313 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
314 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
315 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
316 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
318 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
319 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
320 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
321 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
324 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
325 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
327 latest_features: InitFeatures,
330 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
331 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
333 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
334 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
335 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
336 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
337 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
338 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
339 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
340 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
342 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
343 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
344 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
345 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
346 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
347 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
348 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
349 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
350 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
352 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
353 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
355 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
356 /// to individual Channels.
358 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
359 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
360 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
361 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
363 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
364 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
365 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
366 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
367 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
368 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
369 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
371 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
372 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
373 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
374 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
377 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
378 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
379 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
380 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
381 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
383 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
384 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
385 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
386 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
387 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
388 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
389 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
390 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
391 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
392 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
395 default_configuration: UserConfig,
396 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
402 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
404 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
405 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
406 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
409 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
411 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
412 our_network_key: SecretKey,
414 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
415 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
416 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
418 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
419 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
420 /// are currently open with that peer.
421 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
422 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
424 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
426 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
427 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
428 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
429 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
430 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
437 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
438 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
439 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
440 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
441 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
443 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
444 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
445 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
446 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
447 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
448 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
449 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
451 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
452 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
453 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
454 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
455 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
456 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
459 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
461 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
462 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
465 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
467 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
468 pub struct ChannelDetails {
469 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
470 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
471 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
472 /// lifetime of the channel.
473 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
474 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
475 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
476 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
477 /// The node_id of our counterparty
478 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
479 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
480 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
481 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
482 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
483 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
484 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
485 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
487 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
488 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
489 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
490 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
491 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
492 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
493 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
494 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
495 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
496 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
497 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
498 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
499 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
503 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
504 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
507 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
508 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
509 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
510 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
511 ParameterError(APIError),
512 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
513 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
514 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
517 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
519 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
520 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
521 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
522 /// paths than the ones selected).
523 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
524 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
525 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
526 /// in over-/re-payment.
528 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
529 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
530 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
532 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
533 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
534 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
535 /// with the latest update_id.
536 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
539 macro_rules! handle_error {
540 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
543 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
544 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
546 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
547 // entering the macro.
548 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
551 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
553 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
554 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
555 if let Some(update) = update_option {
556 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
562 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
563 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
565 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
566 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
567 action: err.action.clone()
571 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
572 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
575 // Return error in case higher-API need one
582 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
583 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
586 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
587 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
589 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
590 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
591 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
592 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
593 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
595 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
597 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
602 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
603 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
606 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
607 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
609 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
610 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
611 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
612 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
613 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
617 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
618 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
619 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
620 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
621 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
623 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
630 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
631 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
632 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
634 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
636 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
637 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
638 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
639 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
640 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
642 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
643 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
644 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
645 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
646 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
647 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
648 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
649 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
650 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
651 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
654 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
655 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
656 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
657 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
659 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
660 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
662 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
663 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
665 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
666 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
667 if !$resend_commitment {
668 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
671 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
673 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
674 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
680 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
681 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
682 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
684 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
685 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
689 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
690 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
691 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
692 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
693 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
696 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
701 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
702 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
704 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
705 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
708 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
710 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
711 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
713 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
715 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
717 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
718 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
720 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
721 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
722 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
723 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
726 default_configuration: config.clone(),
727 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
728 fee_estimator: fee_est,
732 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
733 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
736 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
737 by_id: HashMap::new(),
738 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
739 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
740 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
741 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
743 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
745 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
747 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
749 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
750 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
758 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
760 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
761 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
762 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
763 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
765 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
766 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
768 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
769 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
770 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
771 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
775 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
776 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
777 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
780 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
781 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
783 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
784 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
786 panic!("RNG is bad???");
789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
791 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
792 node_id: their_network_key,
798 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
799 let mut res = Vec::new();
801 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
802 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
803 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
804 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
805 res.push(ChannelDetails {
806 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
807 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
808 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
809 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
810 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
811 inbound_capacity_msat,
812 outbound_capacity_msat,
813 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
814 is_live: channel.is_live(),
818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
819 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
820 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
821 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
827 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
828 /// more information.
829 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
830 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
833 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
834 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
836 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
837 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
838 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
839 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
840 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
841 // really wanted anyway.
842 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
845 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
846 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
847 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
849 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
850 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
851 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
853 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
854 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
855 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
856 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
858 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
860 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
863 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
864 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
865 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
867 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
868 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
873 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
876 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
877 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
882 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
883 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
884 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
893 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
894 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
895 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
896 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
897 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
899 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
900 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
901 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
902 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
903 // ignore the result here.
904 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
908 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
909 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
910 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
911 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
914 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
915 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
916 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
917 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
918 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
926 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
927 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
928 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
935 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
936 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
937 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
938 for chan in self.list_channels() {
939 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
943 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
944 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
945 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
947 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
948 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
949 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
950 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
951 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
952 failure_code: $err_code,
953 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
958 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
959 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
962 let shared_secret = {
963 let mut arr = [0; 32];
964 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
967 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
969 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
970 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
971 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
972 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
973 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
974 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
975 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
976 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
979 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
980 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
981 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
982 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
983 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
986 let mut channel_state = None;
987 macro_rules! return_err {
988 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
990 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
991 if channel_state.is_none() {
992 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
994 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
995 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
996 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
997 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
998 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1003 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1004 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1005 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1006 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1008 let error_code = match err {
1009 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1010 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1011 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1012 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1013 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1015 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1018 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1019 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1020 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1027 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1030 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1031 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1032 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1033 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1034 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1035 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1036 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1037 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1038 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1039 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1040 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1041 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1045 // final_expiry_too_soon
1046 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1047 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1048 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1049 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1050 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1051 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1053 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1054 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1055 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1057 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1058 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1059 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1062 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1063 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1064 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1065 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1068 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1069 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1070 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1071 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1073 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1074 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1076 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1078 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1079 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1080 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1081 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1084 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1085 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1086 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1088 // Check two things:
1089 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1090 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1091 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1093 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1095 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1096 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1097 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1099 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1101 let blinding_factor = {
1102 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1103 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1104 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1105 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1108 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1110 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1112 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1115 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1116 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1119 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1120 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1121 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1122 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1123 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1127 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1128 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1129 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1130 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1132 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1133 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1134 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1135 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1139 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1140 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1141 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1142 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1143 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1144 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1145 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1146 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1147 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1148 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1150 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1152 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1153 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1155 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1156 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1157 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1158 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1159 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1160 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1161 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1163 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1164 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1166 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1167 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1168 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1170 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1171 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1173 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1174 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1175 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1176 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1177 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1179 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1180 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1182 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1183 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1184 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1185 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1191 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1192 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1193 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1194 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1196 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1197 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1199 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1200 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1201 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1203 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1205 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1210 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1213 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1214 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1215 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1216 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1217 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1221 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1223 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1224 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1225 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1226 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1227 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1228 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1229 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1230 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1231 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1232 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1233 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1236 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1237 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1239 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1245 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1246 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1248 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1249 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1251 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1252 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1253 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1254 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1255 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1257 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1259 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1261 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1262 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1263 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1264 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1265 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1269 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1271 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1272 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1274 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1277 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1279 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1280 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1281 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1283 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1284 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1285 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1286 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1287 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1288 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1289 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1290 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1291 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1294 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1295 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1296 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1297 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1298 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1308 } else { unreachable!(); }
1312 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1313 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1315 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1320 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1322 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1323 /// fields for more info.
1325 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1326 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1327 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1328 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1329 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1330 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1332 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1334 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1335 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1336 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1338 /// In general, a path may raise:
1339 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1340 /// node public key) is specified.
1341 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1342 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1344 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1345 /// relevant updates.
1347 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1348 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1349 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1351 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1352 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1353 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1354 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1356 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1357 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1358 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1359 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1360 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1361 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1363 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1364 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1365 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1366 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1367 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1369 let mut total_value = 0;
1370 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1371 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1372 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1373 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1374 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1375 continue 'path_check;
1377 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1378 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1379 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1380 continue 'path_check;
1383 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1384 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1386 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1387 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1390 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1391 let mut results = Vec::new();
1392 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1393 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1395 let mut has_ok = false;
1396 let mut has_err = false;
1397 for res in results.iter() {
1398 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1399 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1400 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1401 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1408 if has_err && has_ok {
1409 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1411 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1417 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1419 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1420 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1422 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1424 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1425 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1426 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1427 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1430 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1432 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1433 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1434 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1435 } else { unreachable!(); })
1440 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1441 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1444 Err(_) => { return; }
1448 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1449 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1450 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1453 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1455 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1457 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1463 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1464 if !chan.should_announce() {
1465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1469 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1471 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1473 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1474 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1476 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1477 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1478 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1479 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1480 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1485 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1486 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1487 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1489 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1492 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1493 // smaller than 500:
1494 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1496 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1497 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1498 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1500 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1501 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1503 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1504 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1505 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1506 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1508 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1509 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1510 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1512 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1513 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1516 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1517 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1518 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1519 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1520 rgb, alias, addresses,
1521 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1522 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1524 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1526 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1528 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1529 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1530 contents: announcement
1535 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1537 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1538 /// Will likely generate further events.
1539 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1540 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1542 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1543 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1544 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1546 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1547 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1549 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1550 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1551 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1552 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1554 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1555 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1556 match forward_info {
1557 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1558 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1559 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1560 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1561 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1563 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1564 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1567 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1568 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1569 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1570 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1571 // problem, not ours.
1578 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1579 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1580 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1581 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1582 match forward_info {
1583 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1584 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1586 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1587 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1588 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1589 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1590 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1591 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1593 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1595 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1596 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1598 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1600 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1601 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1602 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1608 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1610 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1611 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1612 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1613 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1614 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1615 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1616 // this channel currently :/.
1622 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1623 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1625 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1627 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1629 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1632 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1634 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1635 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1636 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1639 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1641 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1642 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1643 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1644 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1645 // messages when we can.
1646 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1647 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1648 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1655 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1656 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1659 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1660 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1661 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1662 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1663 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1664 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1666 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1668 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1669 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1670 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1672 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1674 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1676 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1680 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1681 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1685 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1686 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1687 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1688 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1689 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1690 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1692 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1700 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1701 match forward_info {
1702 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1703 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1704 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1705 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1706 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1707 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1708 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1711 let mut total_value = 0;
1712 let payment_secret_opt =
1713 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1714 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1715 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1716 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1718 value: amt_to_forward,
1719 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1720 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1722 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1723 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1724 total_value += htlc.value;
1725 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1726 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1728 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1730 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1731 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1732 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1733 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1734 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1735 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1739 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1740 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1741 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1742 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1744 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1747 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1748 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1749 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1750 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1755 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1756 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1757 payment_secret: None,
1758 amt: amt_to_forward,
1762 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1763 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1765 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1766 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1774 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1778 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1779 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1782 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1783 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1784 events.append(&mut new_events);
1787 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1788 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1789 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1791 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1792 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1793 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1794 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1796 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1797 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1798 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1804 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1806 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1807 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1812 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1813 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1814 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1815 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1816 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1817 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1818 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1820 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1821 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1822 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1823 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1824 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1825 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1826 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1827 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1829 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1830 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1831 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1837 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1838 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1839 // be surfaced to the user.
1840 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1841 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1843 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1844 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1845 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1847 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1848 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1850 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1855 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1856 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1857 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1859 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1860 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1861 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1863 rejected_by_dest: false,
1875 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1876 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1877 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1878 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1879 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1880 /// still-available channels.
1881 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1882 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1883 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1884 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1887 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1889 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1890 match &onion_error {
1891 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1893 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1895 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1896 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1897 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1898 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1899 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1900 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1901 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1906 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1907 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1908 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1909 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1911 error_code: onion_error_code,
1913 error_data: onion_error_data
1917 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1923 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1924 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1925 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1926 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1928 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1929 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1930 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1931 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1932 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1933 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1935 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1937 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1943 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1944 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1945 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1946 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1947 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1948 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1950 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1952 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1956 let mut forward_event = None;
1957 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1958 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1960 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1962 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1964 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1965 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1968 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1969 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1970 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1971 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1972 time_forwardable: time
1979 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1980 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1981 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1983 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1984 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1985 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1986 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1987 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1988 /// motivated attackers.
1990 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1991 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1993 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1994 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1995 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1997 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1999 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2000 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2001 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2002 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2004 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2005 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2006 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2007 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2009 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2010 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2011 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2012 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2013 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2016 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2017 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2018 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2020 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2024 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2025 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2026 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2031 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2032 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2033 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2034 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2035 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2036 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2037 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2038 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2040 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2041 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2042 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2044 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2046 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2047 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2048 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2049 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2050 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2051 } else { errs.push(e); }
2053 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2055 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2057 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2062 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2063 // which were generated.
2064 channel_state.take();
2066 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2067 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2068 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2075 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2076 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2077 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2078 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2079 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2085 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2086 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2087 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2088 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2089 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2090 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2091 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2092 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2094 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2098 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2099 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2100 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2101 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2102 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2103 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2104 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2105 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2114 // TODO: Do something with e?
2115 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2116 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2117 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2118 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2119 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2120 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2121 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2125 } else { unreachable!(); }
2128 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2130 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2131 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2132 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2133 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2137 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2138 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2141 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2142 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2143 // why it's missing.
2146 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2148 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2149 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2150 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2156 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2157 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2158 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2161 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2162 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2165 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2166 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2168 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2169 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2170 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2171 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2173 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2174 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2175 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2176 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2177 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2178 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2179 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2180 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2181 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2182 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2184 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2185 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2186 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2187 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2190 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2191 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2192 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2193 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2194 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2198 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2202 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2203 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2204 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2206 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2208 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2209 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2210 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2211 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2216 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2217 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2218 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2219 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2220 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2225 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2229 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2234 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2235 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2236 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2237 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2240 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2242 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2245 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2246 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2247 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2248 msg: announcement_sigs,
2251 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2255 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2257 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2258 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2260 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2262 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2263 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2267 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2268 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2272 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2273 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2274 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2275 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2276 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2278 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2279 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2280 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2281 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2283 entry.insert(channel);
2289 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2290 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2291 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2292 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2293 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2295 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2296 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2298 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2299 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2304 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2305 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2306 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2307 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2308 output_script: output_script,
2309 user_channel_id: user_id,
2314 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2315 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2316 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2317 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2318 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2319 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2320 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2323 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2328 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2329 // lock before watch_channel
2330 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2332 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2333 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2334 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2335 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2336 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2337 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2340 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2341 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2342 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2343 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2344 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2348 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2349 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2350 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2355 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2356 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2365 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2366 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2367 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2368 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2369 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2370 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2371 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2372 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2374 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2375 Ok(update) => update,
2376 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2378 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2379 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2381 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2386 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2387 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2388 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2389 user_channel_id: user_id,
2394 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2395 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2396 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2397 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2399 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2402 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2403 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2405 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2406 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2407 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2408 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2409 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2410 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2411 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2412 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2413 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2415 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2416 msg: announcement_sigs,
2421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2425 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2426 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2428 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2430 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2432 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2435 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2436 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2437 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2438 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2442 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2444 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2448 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2449 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2450 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2452 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2453 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2458 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2459 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2461 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2462 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2463 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2464 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2472 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2473 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2474 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2475 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2478 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2481 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2482 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2483 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2484 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2489 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2490 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2491 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2492 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2493 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2494 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2495 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2497 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2498 } else { (tx, None) }
2500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2503 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2505 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2507 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2508 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2509 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2518 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2519 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2520 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2521 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2523 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2524 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2525 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2526 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2528 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2529 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2531 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2533 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2534 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2537 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2538 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2539 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2540 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2541 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2542 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2543 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2544 match pending_forward_info {
2545 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2546 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2547 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2548 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2549 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2550 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2551 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2555 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2556 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2557 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2558 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2559 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2560 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2561 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2562 // no problem just calling this
2563 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2564 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2566 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2567 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2568 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2571 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2573 _ => pending_forward_info
2576 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2583 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2584 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2586 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2587 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2589 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2592 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2597 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2601 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2602 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2603 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2604 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2606 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2607 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2609 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2616 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2617 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2618 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2619 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2621 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2624 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2625 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2626 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2628 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2635 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2637 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2640 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2641 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2643 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2644 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2645 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2646 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2647 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2648 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2649 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2654 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2655 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2656 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2658 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2659 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2660 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2662 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2663 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2664 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2665 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2666 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2667 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2668 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2669 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2671 commitment_signed: msg,
2675 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2676 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2677 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2688 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2689 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2690 let mut forward_event = None;
2691 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2692 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2693 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2694 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2696 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2697 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2698 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2699 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2702 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2705 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2710 match forward_event {
2712 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2713 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2714 time_forwardable: time
2722 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2723 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2729 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2730 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2732 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2733 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2734 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2735 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2736 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2737 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2738 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2739 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2741 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2743 } else { unreachable!(); }
2746 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2747 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2748 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2752 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2753 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2754 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2758 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")))
2760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2763 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2765 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id)) => {
2766 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2769 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2776 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2777 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2781 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2782 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2784 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2791 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2792 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2795 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2797 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2798 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2800 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2801 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2804 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2805 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2806 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2808 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2809 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2811 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2812 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2813 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2814 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2816 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2817 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2820 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2821 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2827 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2829 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2830 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2831 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2832 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2833 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2834 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2835 contents: announcement,
2837 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2845 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2849 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2851 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2852 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2854 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
2855 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
2856 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
2857 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2858 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2859 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2860 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2861 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2862 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2863 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2864 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2865 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2866 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2868 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2869 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2871 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2872 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2875 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2876 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2877 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2881 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2882 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2883 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2884 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2889 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2890 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2892 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2898 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2902 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2907 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2909 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2919 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2920 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2921 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2922 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2923 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
2925 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2926 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2927 let counterparty_node_id;
2928 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2929 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2930 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2932 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2935 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2936 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2938 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2939 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2941 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2942 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2944 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2945 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2946 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2948 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2951 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2952 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2953 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2954 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2955 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2956 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2957 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2958 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2968 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
2969 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2970 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2974 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
2975 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
2976 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2978 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
2979 match monitor_event {
2980 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
2981 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2982 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2983 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2986 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2989 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
2990 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2991 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2992 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
2993 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2994 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2995 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
2996 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2997 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2999 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3000 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3001 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3011 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3012 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3017 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3018 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3019 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3020 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3021 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3024 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3025 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3026 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3027 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3029 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3030 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3031 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3036 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3037 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3038 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3039 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3040 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3043 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3044 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3045 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3046 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3048 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3049 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3050 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3055 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3056 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3057 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3059 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3060 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3063 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
3064 let header_hash = header.block_hash();
3065 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
3066 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3067 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3068 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3070 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3071 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3072 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3073 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3074 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3075 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3076 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3077 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3078 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3079 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3080 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3084 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3086 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3087 msg: funding_locked,
3089 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3091 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3092 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3093 msg: announcement_sigs,
3096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3098 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3100 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3102 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3103 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3107 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3108 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3109 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3110 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3111 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3112 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3113 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3115 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3116 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3117 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3118 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3119 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3120 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3132 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3133 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3134 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3135 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3136 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3137 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3138 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3139 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3140 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3141 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3142 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3143 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3148 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3151 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3152 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3155 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3156 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3158 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3159 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3161 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3162 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3163 // having an explicit local time source.
3164 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3165 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3166 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3167 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3168 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3174 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3175 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3176 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3177 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3179 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3180 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3181 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3182 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3183 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3184 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3185 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3186 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3188 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3189 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3200 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3201 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3203 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3204 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash();
3208 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3209 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3210 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3212 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3213 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3216 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3217 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3221 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3222 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3226 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3227 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3231 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3232 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3236 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3237 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3241 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3242 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3246 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3247 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3251 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3252 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3256 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3257 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3261 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3262 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3266 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3267 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3268 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3271 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3272 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3273 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3276 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3277 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3281 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3282 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3283 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3286 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3287 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3288 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3291 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3292 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3293 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3296 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3297 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3298 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3299 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3300 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3302 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3304 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3305 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3306 if no_connection_possible {
3307 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3308 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3309 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3310 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3311 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3313 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3314 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3315 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3325 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3326 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3327 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3328 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3329 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3330 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3331 // reestablish logic.
3332 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3333 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3334 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3335 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3336 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3338 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3339 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3340 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3344 no_channels_remain = false;
3350 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3358 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3363 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3364 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3365 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3366 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3367 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3371 if no_channels_remain {
3372 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3375 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3376 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3378 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3379 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3380 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3385 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3386 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3388 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3391 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3392 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3394 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3395 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3399 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3404 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3405 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3406 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3407 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3408 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3409 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3410 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3411 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3412 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3417 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3418 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3424 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3427 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3428 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3430 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3431 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3432 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3433 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3437 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3442 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3443 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3445 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3446 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3447 match &self.routing {
3448 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3450 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3451 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3453 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3455 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3456 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3459 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3460 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3461 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3462 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3467 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3468 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3469 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3470 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3471 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3472 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3473 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3475 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3476 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3477 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3479 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3481 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3482 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3483 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3484 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3489 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3490 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3492 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3494 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3496 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3498 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3505 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3506 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3507 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3508 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3509 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3510 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3515 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3516 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3518 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3520 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3522 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3524 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3531 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3532 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3533 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3534 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3535 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3536 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3541 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3544 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3547 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3554 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3557 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3559 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3561 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3563 path.write(writer)?;
3564 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3565 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3572 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3573 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3574 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3575 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3576 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3577 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3578 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3579 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3581 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3586 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3587 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3589 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3593 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3595 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3596 data.write(writer)?;
3603 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3604 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3605 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3606 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3607 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3608 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3609 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3611 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3616 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3617 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3619 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3621 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3622 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3623 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3625 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3627 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3628 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3635 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3636 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3637 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3638 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3639 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3640 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3641 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3643 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3644 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3645 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3647 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3652 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3653 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3655 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3656 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3659 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3660 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3662 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3663 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3665 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3666 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3667 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3669 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3670 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3671 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3672 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3673 unfunded_channels += 1;
3676 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3677 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3678 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3679 channel.write(writer)?;
3683 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3684 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3685 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3686 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3687 for forward in pending_forwards {
3688 forward.write(writer)?;
3692 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3693 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3694 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3695 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3696 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3697 htlc.write(writer)?;
3701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3702 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3703 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3704 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3705 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3706 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3709 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3710 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3711 for event in events.iter() {
3712 event.write(writer)?;
3715 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3721 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3723 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3725 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3726 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3727 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3728 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3729 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3730 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3731 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3732 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3733 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
3734 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3735 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3736 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3738 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3742 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3743 /// deserialization.
3744 pub keys_manager: K,
3746 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3748 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3749 pub fee_estimator: F,
3750 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3752 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3753 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3754 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3755 pub chain_monitor: M,
3757 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3758 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3759 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3760 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3761 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3762 /// deserialization.
3764 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3765 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3766 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3768 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3769 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3771 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3772 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3773 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3774 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3776 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3779 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
3780 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3783 impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3784 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3785 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3786 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3787 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3788 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3791 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
3792 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
3793 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
3794 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
3795 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>) -> Self {
3797 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
3798 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
3803 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3804 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3805 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3806 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3807 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3808 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3809 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3810 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3813 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3814 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3815 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3819 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3820 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3821 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3823 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3827 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3828 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3829 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3830 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3831 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3834 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3835 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3836 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3838 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3840 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3841 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3842 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3843 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3844 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3845 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3846 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3850 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3851 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3852 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3853 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3854 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3855 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3856 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3857 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3858 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3859 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3860 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3861 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3862 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3863 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3864 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3865 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3866 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3868 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3869 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3871 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3874 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3878 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3879 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3880 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3884 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3885 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3886 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3887 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3888 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3889 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3890 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3891 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3892 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3894 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3897 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3898 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3899 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3900 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3901 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3902 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3903 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3904 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3906 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3909 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3910 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3911 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3912 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3913 let peer_state = PeerState {
3914 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3916 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3919 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3920 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3921 for _ in 0..event_count {
3922 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3923 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3928 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3930 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3932 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3933 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3934 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3936 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3937 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3938 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3940 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3945 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3947 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3949 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3951 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3953 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3954 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3955 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3956 logger: args.logger,
3957 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3960 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3961 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3964 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3965 //connection or two.
3967 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))