1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
84 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
85 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
86 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
87 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
88 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
93 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
94 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
97 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
100 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
101 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
104 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
106 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
108 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
112 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
116 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
117 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
118 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
119 short_channel_id: u64,
121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 struct ClaimableHTLC {
125 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
127 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
128 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
129 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
130 /// are part of the same payment.
131 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
134 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
135 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
136 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
137 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
140 session_priv: SecretKey,
141 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
142 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
143 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
148 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
149 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
151 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
152 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
157 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
158 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
160 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
168 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
169 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
170 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
171 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
172 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
173 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
174 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
175 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
176 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
178 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
180 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
181 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
182 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
183 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
184 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
186 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
187 err: msgs::LightningError,
188 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
190 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
192 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
194 err: LightningError {
196 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
197 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
199 data: err.to_string()
203 shutdown_finish: None,
207 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
209 err: LightningError {
211 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
213 shutdown_finish: None,
217 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
218 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
221 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
223 err: LightningError {
225 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
226 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
228 data: err.to_string()
232 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
236 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
239 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
241 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
243 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
246 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
248 data: msg.to_string()
252 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
257 data: msg.to_string()
262 shutdown_finish: None,
267 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
268 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
269 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
270 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
271 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
273 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
274 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
275 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
276 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
277 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
278 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
279 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
281 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
285 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
286 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
287 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
288 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
289 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
290 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
291 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
292 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
293 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
294 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
295 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
296 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
297 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
299 /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to
301 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
302 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
303 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
304 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
307 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
308 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
310 latest_features: InitFeatures,
313 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
314 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
316 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
317 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
318 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
319 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
320 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
321 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
322 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
323 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
325 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
326 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
327 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
328 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
329 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
330 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
331 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
332 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
333 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
335 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
336 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
338 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
339 /// to individual Channels.
341 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
342 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
343 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
344 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
346 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
347 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
348 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
349 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
350 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
351 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
352 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
354 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
355 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
356 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
357 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
360 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
361 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
362 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
363 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
364 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
366 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
367 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
368 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
369 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
370 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
371 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
372 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
373 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
374 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
377 default_configuration: UserConfig,
378 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
384 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
386 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
387 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
388 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
391 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
393 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
394 our_network_key: SecretKey,
396 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
397 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
398 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
400 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
401 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
402 /// are currently open with that peer.
403 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
404 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
406 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
408 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
409 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
410 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
411 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
412 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
419 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
420 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
421 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
422 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
423 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
425 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
426 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
427 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
428 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
429 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
430 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
431 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
433 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
434 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
435 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
436 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
437 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
438 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
441 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
443 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
444 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
447 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
449 macro_rules! secp_call {
450 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
453 Err(_) => return Err($err),
458 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
459 pub struct ChannelDetails {
460 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
461 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
462 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
463 /// lifetime of the channel.
464 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
465 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
466 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
467 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
468 /// The node_id of our counterparty
469 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
470 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
471 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
472 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
473 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
474 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
475 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
476 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
478 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
479 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
480 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
481 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
482 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
483 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
484 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
485 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
486 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
487 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
488 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
489 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
490 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
494 macro_rules! handle_error {
495 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
498 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
499 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
501 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
502 // entering the macro.
503 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
506 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
508 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
509 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
510 if let Some(update) = update_option {
511 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
517 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
518 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
520 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
521 node_id: $their_node_id,
522 action: err.action.clone()
526 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
527 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
530 // Return error in case higher-API need one
537 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
538 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
541 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
542 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
544 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
545 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
546 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
547 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
548 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
550 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
551 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
556 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
557 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
560 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
563 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
564 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
565 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
566 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
567 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
569 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
571 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
572 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
573 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
574 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
575 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
577 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
579 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
580 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
581 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
582 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
583 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
584 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
587 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
594 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
595 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
596 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
598 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
600 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
601 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
602 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
603 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
604 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
606 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
607 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
608 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
609 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
610 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
611 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
612 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
613 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
614 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
615 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
618 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
619 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
620 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
621 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
623 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
624 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
626 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
627 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
629 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
630 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
631 if !$resend_commitment {
632 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
635 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
637 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
638 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
644 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
645 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
646 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
648 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
649 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
653 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
654 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
655 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
656 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
657 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
660 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
665 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
666 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
667 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
668 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
671 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
673 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
674 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
676 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
678 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
680 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
681 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
683 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
684 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
685 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
686 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
687 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
689 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
692 let res = ChannelManager {
693 default_configuration: config.clone(),
694 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
695 fee_estimator: fee_est,
699 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
700 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
703 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
704 by_id: HashMap::new(),
705 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
706 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
707 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
708 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
710 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
712 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
714 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
716 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
717 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
727 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
729 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
730 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
731 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
732 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
734 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
735 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
737 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
738 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
739 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
740 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
741 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
744 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
745 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
746 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
748 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
749 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
750 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
752 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
753 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
755 panic!("RNG is bad???");
758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
760 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
761 node_id: their_network_key,
767 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
768 let mut res = Vec::new();
770 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
771 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
772 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
773 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
774 res.push(ChannelDetails {
775 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
776 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
777 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
778 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
779 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
780 inbound_capacity_msat,
781 outbound_capacity_msat,
782 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
783 is_live: channel.is_live(),
787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
788 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
789 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
790 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
796 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
797 /// more information.
798 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
799 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
802 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
803 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
805 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
806 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
807 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
808 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
809 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
810 // really wanted anyway.
811 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
814 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
815 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
816 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
818 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
819 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
820 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
822 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
825 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
827 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
829 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
832 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
833 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
834 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
836 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
837 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
842 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
845 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
846 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
851 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
852 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
853 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
862 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
863 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
864 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
865 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
866 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
868 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
869 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
870 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
871 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
872 // ignore the result here.
873 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
877 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
878 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
879 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
880 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
883 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
884 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
885 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
886 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
887 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
894 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
895 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
896 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
897 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
904 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
905 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
906 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
907 for chan in self.list_channels() {
908 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
912 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
913 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
914 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
916 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
917 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
918 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
919 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
920 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
921 failure_code: $err_code,
922 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
927 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
928 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
931 let shared_secret = {
932 let mut arr = [0; 32];
933 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
936 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
938 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
939 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
940 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
941 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
942 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
943 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
944 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
945 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
948 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
949 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
950 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
951 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
952 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
955 let mut channel_state = None;
956 macro_rules! return_err {
957 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
959 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
960 if channel_state.is_none() {
961 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
963 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
964 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
965 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
966 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
967 })), channel_state.unwrap());
972 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
973 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
974 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
975 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
977 let error_code = match err {
978 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
979 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
980 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
981 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
982 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
984 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
987 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
988 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
989 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
996 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
999 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1000 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1001 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1002 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1003 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1004 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1005 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1006 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1007 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1008 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1009 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1010 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1014 // final_expiry_too_soon
1015 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1016 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1018 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1019 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1020 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1022 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1023 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1024 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1027 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1028 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1029 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1030 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1033 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1034 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1035 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1036 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1038 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1039 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
1040 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1041 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1042 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1043 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1046 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1047 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1048 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1050 // Check two things:
1051 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1052 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1053 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1055 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1057 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1058 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1059 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1061 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1063 let blinding_factor = {
1064 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1065 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1066 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1067 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1070 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1072 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1074 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1077 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1078 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1081 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1082 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1083 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1084 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1085 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1089 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1090 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1091 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1092 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1094 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1095 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1096 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1097 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1101 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1102 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1103 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1104 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1105 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1106 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1107 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1108 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1109 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1110 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1112 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1114 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1115 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1117 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1118 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1119 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1120 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1121 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1122 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1123 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1125 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1126 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1128 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1129 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1130 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1132 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1133 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1135 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1136 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1137 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1138 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1140 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1141 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1146 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1147 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1148 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1149 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1151 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1152 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1154 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1155 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1157 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1159 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1164 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1167 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1168 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1169 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1170 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1171 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1175 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1177 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1178 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1179 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1180 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1181 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1182 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1183 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1184 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1185 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1186 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1189 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1190 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1192 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1198 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1200 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1201 /// fields for more info.
1203 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1204 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1205 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1206 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1207 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1208 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1210 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1212 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1213 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1214 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1215 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1216 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1217 /// relevant updates.
1219 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1220 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1221 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1222 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1223 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1225 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1226 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1227 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1228 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1230 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1231 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1232 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1233 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1234 if route.paths.len() < 1 || route.paths.len() > 1 {
1235 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "We currently don't support MPP, and we need at least one path"});
1237 if route.paths[0].len() < 1 || route.paths[0].len() > 20 {
1238 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1240 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1241 for (idx, hop) in route.paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
1242 if idx != route.paths[0].len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1243 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1247 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1249 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1251 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv),
1252 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1253 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1254 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1255 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1257 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1259 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1261 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1262 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1263 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.paths[0].first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1264 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1265 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1269 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1271 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey {
1272 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1274 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1277 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1278 path: route.paths[0].clone(),
1279 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1280 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1281 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1283 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1284 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1285 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1286 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1287 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1288 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1289 // something else in case we will resend later!
1290 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1294 node_id: route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey,
1295 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1296 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1297 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1298 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1307 } else { unreachable!(); }
1311 match handle_error!(self, err, route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1312 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1313 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1317 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1319 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1320 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1322 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1324 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1325 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1326 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1327 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1329 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1330 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1332 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1333 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1334 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1335 } else { unreachable!(); })
1340 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1341 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1342 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1344 Err(_) => { return; }
1347 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1348 // lock before add_monitor
1349 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1351 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1352 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1353 Err(_) => { return; },
1354 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1357 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1358 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1359 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1360 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1362 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1367 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1368 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1369 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1372 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1374 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1382 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1383 if !chan.should_announce() {
1384 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1388 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1390 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1392 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1393 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1395 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1396 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1397 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1398 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1399 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1404 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1405 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1406 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1408 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1411 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1412 // smaller than 500:
1413 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1415 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1416 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1417 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1419 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1420 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1422 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1423 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1424 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1425 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1427 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1428 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1429 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1431 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1432 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1435 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1436 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1437 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1438 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1439 rgb, alias, addresses,
1440 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1441 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1443 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1445 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1446 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1447 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1448 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1449 contents: announcement
1454 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1456 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1457 /// Will likely generate further events.
1458 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1459 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1461 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1462 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1463 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1465 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1466 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1468 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1469 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1470 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1471 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1473 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1474 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1475 match forward_info {
1476 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1477 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1478 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1479 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1480 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1482 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1483 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1486 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1487 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1488 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1489 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1490 // problem, not ours.
1497 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1498 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1499 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1500 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1501 match forward_info {
1502 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1503 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1505 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1506 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1507 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1508 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1509 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1510 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1512 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1514 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1515 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1517 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1519 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1520 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1521 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1527 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1529 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1530 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1531 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1532 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1533 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1534 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1535 // this channel currently :/.
1541 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1542 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1544 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1545 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1546 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1548 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1549 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1551 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1553 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1554 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1555 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1558 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1560 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1561 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1562 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1563 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1564 // messages when we can.
1565 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1566 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1567 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1574 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1575 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1578 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1579 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1580 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1581 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1582 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1583 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1585 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1586 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1587 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1588 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1589 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1591 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1593 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1595 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1599 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1600 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1604 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1605 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1606 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1607 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1608 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1609 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1611 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1619 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1620 match forward_info {
1621 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1622 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
1623 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1624 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1625 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1626 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1627 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1630 let mut total_value = 0;
1631 let payment_secret_opt =
1632 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1633 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1634 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1635 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1637 value: amt_to_forward,
1638 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1640 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1641 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1642 total_value += htlc.value;
1643 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1644 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1646 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1648 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1649 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1650 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1651 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1652 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1653 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1655 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }
1658 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1659 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1660 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1661 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1666 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1667 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1668 payment_secret: None,
1669 amt: amt_to_forward,
1673 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1674 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1676 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1677 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1685 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1689 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1690 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1693 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1694 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1695 events.append(&mut new_events);
1698 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1699 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1700 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1702 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1703 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1704 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1705 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1706 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1707 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1708 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1709 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1715 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1717 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1718 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1723 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1724 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1725 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1726 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1727 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1728 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1731 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1732 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1733 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1734 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1735 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1737 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1738 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
1744 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1745 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1746 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1747 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1748 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1749 /// still-available channels.
1750 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1751 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1752 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1753 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1756 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1757 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1758 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1759 match &onion_error {
1760 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1762 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1764 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1765 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1766 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1767 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1768 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1769 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1770 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1775 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1776 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1777 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1778 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1780 error_code: onion_error_code
1784 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1788 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1789 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1790 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1791 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1793 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1794 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1795 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1796 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1797 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1798 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1800 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1806 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1807 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1808 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1809 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1810 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1811 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1813 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1814 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1815 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1819 let mut forward_event = None;
1820 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1821 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1823 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1825 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1828 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1831 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1832 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1833 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1834 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1835 time_forwardable: time
1842 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1843 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1844 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1846 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1847 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1848 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1849 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1850 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1851 /// motivated attackers.
1853 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1854 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1855 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1857 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1859 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1860 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1861 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1862 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1863 let valid_mpp_amount = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1864 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1865 data.total_msat == expected_amount
1867 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1871 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
1872 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1873 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1874 if !valid_mpp_amount && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2) {
1875 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1876 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1877 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1878 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1879 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
1880 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1882 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_preimage);
1883 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
1889 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1890 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1892 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1893 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1894 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1895 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1899 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1900 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1903 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1904 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1906 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1907 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1908 // why it's missing.
1913 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1914 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1915 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1916 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1917 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
1918 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1919 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1920 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1922 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1926 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1928 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1929 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1930 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1931 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1932 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1933 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1941 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1942 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1943 //TODO: Do something with e?
1947 } else { unreachable!(); }
1953 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1954 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1957 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1958 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1959 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1962 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
1963 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1966 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
1967 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
1969 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
1970 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
1971 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
1972 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
1974 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
1975 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
1976 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
1977 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
1978 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
1979 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
1980 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
1981 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
1982 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
1983 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1985 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1986 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1987 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1988 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1991 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1992 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1993 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1994 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1995 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
1999 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2003 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
2004 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2005 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2007 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2009 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2010 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2012 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2017 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2018 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2019 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2020 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2021 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2026 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2030 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2035 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2036 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2037 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2038 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2041 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2043 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2046 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2047 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2048 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2049 msg: announcement_sigs,
2052 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2056 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2058 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2059 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2061 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2063 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2064 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2068 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2069 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2073 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
2074 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2075 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2076 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2077 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2081 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2082 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2084 entry.insert(channel);
2090 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2091 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2092 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2093 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2094 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2096 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2097 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2099 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2100 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2105 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2106 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2107 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2108 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2109 output_script: output_script,
2110 user_channel_id: user_id,
2115 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2116 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2117 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2119 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2121 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2122 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2124 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2129 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2130 // lock before add_monitor
2131 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2133 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2134 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2135 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2136 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2137 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2140 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2141 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2142 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2143 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2144 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2145 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2149 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2150 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2151 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2152 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2153 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2156 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2157 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2166 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2167 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2168 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2169 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2170 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2172 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2173 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2175 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2176 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2177 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2178 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2179 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2180 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2183 Ok(update) => update,
2185 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2186 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2188 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2190 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2193 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2194 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2195 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2196 user_channel_id: user_id,
2201 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2202 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2203 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2206 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2209 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2210 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2211 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2212 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2213 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2214 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2215 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2216 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2217 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2218 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2219 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2220 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2222 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2223 msg: announcement_sigs,
2228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2232 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2233 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2234 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2237 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2239 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2242 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2243 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2244 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2245 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2249 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2250 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2251 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2255 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2256 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2257 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2259 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2260 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2265 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2266 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2268 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2269 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2270 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2279 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2280 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2281 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2282 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2283 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2285 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2288 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2289 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2291 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2296 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2297 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2298 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2299 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2300 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2301 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2302 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2304 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2305 } else { (tx, None) }
2307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2310 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2311 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2312 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2314 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2315 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2316 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2317 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2325 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2326 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2327 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2328 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2330 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2331 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2332 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2333 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2335 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2338 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2340 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2343 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2344 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2345 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2346 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2347 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2348 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2349 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2350 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2351 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2352 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2353 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2354 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2355 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2356 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2358 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2359 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2360 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2361 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2365 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2366 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2367 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2368 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2369 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2370 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2375 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2382 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2383 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2388 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2389 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2391 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2396 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2400 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2401 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2402 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2403 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2405 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2406 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2408 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2415 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2416 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2420 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2423 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2424 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2425 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2427 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2434 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2435 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2436 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2437 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2439 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2440 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2442 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2443 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2444 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2445 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2446 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2447 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2448 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2453 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2454 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2455 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2457 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2458 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2459 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2461 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2463 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2464 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2465 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2467 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2468 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2470 commitment_signed: msg,
2474 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2476 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2487 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2488 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2489 let mut forward_event = None;
2490 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2491 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2492 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2493 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2495 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2496 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2497 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2498 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2501 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2504 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2509 match forward_event {
2511 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2512 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2513 time_forwardable: time
2521 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2522 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2523 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2524 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2525 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2527 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2528 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2530 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2531 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2532 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2533 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2534 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2535 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2536 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2538 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2541 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2542 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2543 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2547 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2549 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2553 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2558 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2559 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2561 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2566 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2567 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2568 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2569 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2571 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2572 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2574 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2581 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2582 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2583 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2585 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2587 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2590 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2594 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2595 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2596 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2598 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2599 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2600 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2601 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2602 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2603 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2606 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2608 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2609 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2610 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2611 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2612 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2613 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2614 contents: announcement,
2616 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2624 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2625 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2626 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2628 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2630 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2631 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2633 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2634 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2635 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2636 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2637 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2638 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2639 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2640 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2641 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2643 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2644 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2646 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2647 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2650 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2651 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2652 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2656 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2657 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2658 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2659 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2664 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2665 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2667 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2673 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2677 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2682 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2683 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2684 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2694 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2695 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2696 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2697 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2699 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2700 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2702 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2704 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2706 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2709 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2710 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2712 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2713 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2715 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2716 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2718 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2719 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2720 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2722 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2725 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2726 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2727 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2728 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2729 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2730 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2731 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2732 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2742 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2743 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2744 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2749 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2750 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2751 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2752 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2755 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2756 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2757 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2758 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2760 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2761 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2762 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2763 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2764 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2766 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2772 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2773 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2774 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2779 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2780 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2781 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2782 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2783 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2785 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2786 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2787 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2788 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2790 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2791 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2792 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2793 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2794 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2796 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2797 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2802 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2803 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2804 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2809 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2810 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2811 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2812 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2813 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2814 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2816 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2817 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2818 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2819 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2820 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2822 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2824 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2825 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2826 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2827 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2828 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2829 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2830 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2831 msg: funding_locked,
2833 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2834 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2835 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2836 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2837 msg: announcement_sigs,
2840 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2842 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2843 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2844 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2845 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2846 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2850 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2851 for tx in txn_matched {
2852 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2853 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2854 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2855 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2856 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2858 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2859 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2860 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2861 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
2862 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2872 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2873 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2874 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2876 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2877 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2878 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2879 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
2880 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2881 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2890 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2891 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2893 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2894 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2896 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
2897 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
2898 // having an explicit local time source.
2899 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
2900 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
2901 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
2902 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
2903 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
2909 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2910 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2911 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2912 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2914 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2915 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2916 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2917 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2918 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2919 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2920 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2921 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2923 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
2924 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2925 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2935 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2936 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2938 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2939 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2943 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2944 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2945 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2946 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2947 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2948 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2950 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2951 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2955 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2956 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2960 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2961 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2962 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2965 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2966 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2967 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2970 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2971 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2972 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2975 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2976 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2980 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2981 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2982 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2985 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2986 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2987 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2990 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2991 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2992 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2995 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2996 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3000 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3001 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3002 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3005 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3006 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3007 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3010 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3011 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3012 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3015 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3016 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3017 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3020 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3021 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3022 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3025 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3026 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3027 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3030 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3031 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3032 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3033 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3034 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3036 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3037 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3038 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3039 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3040 if no_connection_possible {
3041 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3042 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3043 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3044 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3045 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3047 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3048 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3049 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3059 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3060 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3061 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3062 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3063 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3064 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3065 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3066 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3068 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3069 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3070 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3074 no_channels_remain = false;
3080 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3082 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3083 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3084 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3086 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3088 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3089 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3090 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3091 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3092 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3093 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3094 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3095 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3096 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3097 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3101 if no_channels_remain {
3102 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3105 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3106 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3108 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3109 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3110 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3115 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3116 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3118 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3121 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3122 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3124 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3125 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3129 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3134 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3135 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3136 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3137 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3138 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3139 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3140 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3141 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3142 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3146 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3147 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3148 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3154 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3157 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3158 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3160 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3161 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3162 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3163 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3167 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3172 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3173 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3175 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3176 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3177 match &self.routing {
3178 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3180 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3181 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3183 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data } => {
3185 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3188 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3189 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3190 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3191 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3196 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3197 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3198 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3199 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3200 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3201 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3202 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3204 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3205 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3207 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3209 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3210 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3211 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3212 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3217 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3218 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3220 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3222 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3224 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3226 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3233 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3234 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3235 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3236 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3237 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3238 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3243 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3244 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3246 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3248 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3250 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3252 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3259 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3260 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3261 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3262 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3263 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3264 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3269 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3272 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3275 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3281 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3282 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3284 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3286 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3288 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3290 path.write(writer)?;
3291 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3292 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3299 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3300 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3301 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3302 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3303 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3304 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3305 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3306 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3308 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3313 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3314 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3316 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3320 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3322 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3323 data.write(writer)?;
3330 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3331 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3332 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3333 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3334 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3335 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3336 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3338 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3343 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3344 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3346 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3348 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3349 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3350 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3352 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3354 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3355 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3362 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3363 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3364 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3365 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3366 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3367 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3368 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3370 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3371 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3372 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3374 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3379 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3380 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3381 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3382 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3383 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3385 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3386 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3388 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3389 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3391 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3392 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3393 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3395 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3396 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3397 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3398 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3399 unfunded_channels += 1;
3402 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3403 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3404 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3405 channel.write(writer)?;
3409 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3410 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3411 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3412 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3413 for forward in pending_forwards {
3414 forward.write(writer)?;
3418 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3419 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3420 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3421 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3422 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3423 htlc.write(writer)?;
3427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3428 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3429 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3430 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3431 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3432 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3435 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3441 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3443 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3445 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3446 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3447 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3448 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3449 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3450 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3451 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3452 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3453 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3454 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3455 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3456 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3457 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3458 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3459 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3460 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3463 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3464 /// deserialization.
3465 pub keys_manager: K,
3467 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3469 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3470 pub fee_estimator: F,
3471 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3473 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3474 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3475 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3478 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3479 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3480 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3481 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3482 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3483 /// deserialization.
3484 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3485 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3486 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3487 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3489 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3490 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3492 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3493 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3494 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3495 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3497 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3499 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3502 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3503 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3504 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3505 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3506 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3507 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3508 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3509 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3511 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3512 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3513 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3517 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3518 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3519 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3520 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3521 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3522 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3524 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3525 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3526 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3527 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3528 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3531 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3532 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3533 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3535 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3537 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3538 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3539 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3540 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3541 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3542 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3543 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3544 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3547 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3548 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3549 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3550 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3551 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3552 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3553 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3554 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3556 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3557 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3558 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3559 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3560 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3561 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3562 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3563 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3565 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3566 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3568 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3571 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3575 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3576 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3577 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3581 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3582 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3583 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3584 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3585 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3586 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3587 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3588 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3590 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3593 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3594 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3595 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3596 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3597 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3598 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3599 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3600 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3602 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3605 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3606 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3607 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3608 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3609 let peer_state = PeerState {
3610 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3612 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3615 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3617 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3619 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3620 monitor: args.monitor,
3621 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3623 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3624 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3625 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3627 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3632 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3634 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3636 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3638 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3640 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3641 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3642 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3643 logger: args.logger,
3644 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3647 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3648 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3651 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3652 //connection or two.
3654 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))