1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct ReceiveError {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
511 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
512 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
513 /// need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
536 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
537 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
538 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
539 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
540 /// event can be generated.
541 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
542 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
543 /// operation of another channel.
545 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
546 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
547 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
548 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
550 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
551 event: events::Event,
552 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
557 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
558 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
559 (0, event, upgradable_required),
560 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
561 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
562 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
563 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
564 // downgrades to prior versions.
565 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
571 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
572 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
573 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
576 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
577 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
578 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
579 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
583 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
584 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
585 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
586 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
587 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
588 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
590 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
591 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
592 channel_id: [u8; 32],
593 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
598 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
600 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
601 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
602 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
603 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
609 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
613 /// State we hold per-peer.
614 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
615 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
617 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
618 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
619 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
621 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
622 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
624 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
625 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
627 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
628 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
630 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
631 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
632 latest_features: InitFeatures,
633 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
634 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
635 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
636 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
637 /// user but which have not yet completed.
639 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
640 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
641 /// for a missing channel.
642 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
643 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
644 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
646 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
647 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
648 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
649 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
651 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
652 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
653 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
654 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
655 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
656 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
657 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
658 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
659 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
660 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
661 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
662 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
663 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
664 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
665 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
669 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
670 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
671 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
672 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
673 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
674 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
677 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
678 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
681 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
682 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
683 self.channel_by_id.len() +
684 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
685 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
688 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
689 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
690 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
691 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
692 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
696 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
697 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
699 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
702 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
703 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
704 struct PendingInboundPayment {
705 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
706 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
707 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
708 /// this payment being removed.
710 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
711 user_payment_id: u64,
712 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
713 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
714 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
717 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
718 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
719 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
720 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
721 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
722 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
723 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
724 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
726 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
727 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
735 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
737 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
738 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
739 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
744 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
745 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
746 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
747 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
748 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
749 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
750 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
751 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
752 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
754 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
755 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
757 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
758 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
759 $vis trait AChannelManager {
760 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
761 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
762 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
763 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
764 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
765 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
766 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
767 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
768 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
769 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
770 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
771 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
772 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
773 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
774 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
775 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
776 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
777 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
780 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
781 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
782 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
783 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
784 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
785 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
787 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
788 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
789 ES::Target: EntropySource,
790 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
791 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
792 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
796 type Watch = M::Target;
798 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
800 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
802 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
804 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
805 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
807 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
809 type Router = R::Target;
811 type Logger = L::Target;
813 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
816 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
817 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
819 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
820 /// to individual Channels.
822 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
823 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
824 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
825 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
827 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
828 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
829 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
830 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
831 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
832 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
833 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
835 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
836 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
837 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
839 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
840 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
841 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
842 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
843 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
845 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
846 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
847 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
848 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
850 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
851 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
852 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
854 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
855 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
856 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
857 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
858 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
860 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
861 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
862 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
863 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
864 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
865 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
866 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
867 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
870 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
871 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
872 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
873 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
874 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
878 // `total_consistency_lock`
880 // |__`forward_htlcs`
882 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
884 // |__`per_peer_state`
886 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
888 // | |__`claimable_payments`
890 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
896 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
898 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
902 // | |__`pending_events`
904 // | |__`pending_background_events`
906 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
908 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
909 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
910 ES::Target: EntropySource,
911 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
913 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
917 default_configuration: UserConfig,
918 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
919 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
925 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
927 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
929 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
930 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
932 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
933 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
934 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
935 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
937 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
938 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
940 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
941 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
942 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
943 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
944 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
945 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
946 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
947 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
949 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
951 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
952 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
954 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
956 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
957 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
958 /// and via the classic SCID.
960 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
961 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
965 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
967 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
968 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
969 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
971 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
972 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
974 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
975 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
977 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
978 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
980 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
981 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
982 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
983 /// active channel list on load.
985 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
986 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
988 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
990 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
991 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
992 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
994 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
995 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
996 /// the handling of the events.
998 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
999 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1002 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1003 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1004 /// would break backwards compatability.
1005 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1006 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1007 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1009 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1010 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1012 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1014 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1015 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1016 /// confirmation depth.
1018 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1019 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1020 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1024 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1026 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1028 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1030 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1032 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1033 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1034 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1036 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1037 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1039 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1040 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1041 /// keeping additional state.
1042 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1044 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1045 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1046 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1047 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1049 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1050 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1052 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1053 /// are currently open with that peer.
1055 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1056 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1059 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1061 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1062 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1063 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1064 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1065 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1067 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1068 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1069 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1070 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1071 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1073 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1074 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1076 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1077 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1078 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1079 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1081 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1082 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1083 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1084 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1085 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1087 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1089 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1091 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1092 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1093 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1094 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1095 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1096 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1097 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1098 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1099 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1101 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1102 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1104 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1108 signer_provider: SP,
1113 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1115 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1116 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1117 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1118 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1119 pub struct ChainParameters {
1120 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1121 pub network: Network,
1123 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1125 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1126 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1129 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1136 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1137 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1138 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1139 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1140 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1141 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1143 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1144 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1145 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1146 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1147 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1149 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1150 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1153 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1154 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1155 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1156 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1158 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1159 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1160 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1161 _read_guard: read_guard,
1166 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1167 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1168 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1169 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1171 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1172 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1173 should_persist: persist_check,
1174 _read_guard: read_guard,
1179 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1180 fn drop(&mut self) {
1181 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1182 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1187 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1188 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1190 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1192 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1193 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1194 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1195 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1196 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1198 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1199 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1201 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1203 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1204 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1205 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1206 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1207 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1208 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1209 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1210 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1211 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1212 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1213 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1214 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1215 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1217 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1218 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1220 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1221 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1222 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1223 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1225 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1226 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1227 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1228 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1229 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1230 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1233 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1235 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1236 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1239 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1241 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1242 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1244 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1245 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1246 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1247 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1249 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1250 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1251 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1253 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1254 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1255 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1257 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1258 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1259 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1260 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1262 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1263 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1264 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1266 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1267 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1268 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1270 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1271 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1272 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1273 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1274 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1275 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1276 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1277 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1278 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1279 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1280 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1283 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1284 /// to better separate parameters.
1285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1286 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1287 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1288 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1289 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1290 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1291 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1292 pub features: InitFeatures,
1293 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1294 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1295 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1297 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1299 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1300 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1301 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1302 /// payments to us through this channel.
1303 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1304 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1305 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1306 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1307 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1308 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1309 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1312 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1313 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1314 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1315 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1316 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1317 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1318 /// lifetime of the channel.
1319 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1320 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1321 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1322 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1323 /// our counterparty already.
1325 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1326 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1327 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1328 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1330 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1331 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1332 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1333 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1335 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1336 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1338 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1339 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1341 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1342 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1343 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1344 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1345 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1346 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1347 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1348 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1349 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1352 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1354 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1355 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1356 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1357 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1358 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1359 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1360 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1362 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1363 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1365 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1366 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1367 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1368 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1369 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1370 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1371 /// this value on chain.
1373 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1375 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1377 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1378 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1379 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1380 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1382 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1383 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1384 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1386 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1387 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1388 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1389 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1390 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1392 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1393 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1394 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1395 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1397 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1398 pub balance_msat: u64,
1399 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1400 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1401 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1402 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1404 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1406 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1407 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1408 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1409 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1410 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1411 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1412 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1413 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1415 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1416 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1417 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1418 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1419 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1420 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1421 /// route which is valid.
1422 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1423 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1424 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1425 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1426 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1427 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1429 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1430 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1431 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1432 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1433 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1434 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1435 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1436 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1437 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1439 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1441 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1442 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1443 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1444 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1445 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1447 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1448 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1449 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1450 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1451 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1452 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1453 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1455 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1456 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1457 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1458 pub is_outbound: bool,
1459 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1460 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1461 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1462 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1463 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1465 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1466 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1467 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1468 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1469 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1470 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1471 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1473 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1474 pub is_usable: bool,
1475 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1476 pub is_public: bool,
1477 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1478 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1479 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1480 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1481 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1482 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1484 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1485 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1488 impl ChannelDetails {
1489 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1490 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1491 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1493 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1494 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1495 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1496 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1499 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1500 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1501 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1503 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1504 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1505 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1506 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1509 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1510 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1512 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1513 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1514 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1516 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1517 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1518 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1519 features: latest_features,
1520 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1521 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1522 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1523 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1524 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1525 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1526 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1527 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1528 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1529 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1531 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1532 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1533 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1534 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1535 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1536 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1537 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1538 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1539 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1540 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1541 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1542 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1543 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1544 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1545 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1546 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1547 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1548 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1549 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1550 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1551 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1552 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1553 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1554 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1555 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1556 config: Some(context.config()),
1557 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1562 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1563 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1564 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1565 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1566 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1567 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1568 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1569 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1570 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1572 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1574 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1575 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1577 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1578 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1579 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1580 /// to drop the channel.
1584 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1585 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1586 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1587 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1588 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1590 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1592 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1593 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1594 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1597 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1598 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1599 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1601 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1602 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1603 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1605 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1606 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1607 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1609 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1610 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1614 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1616 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1618 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1619 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1620 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1621 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1623 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1624 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1625 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1628 macro_rules! handle_error {
1629 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1630 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1631 // entering the macro.
1632 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1633 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1637 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1638 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1640 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1641 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1642 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1643 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1647 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1648 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1649 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1650 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1655 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1656 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1658 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1659 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1660 action: err.action.clone()
1664 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1665 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1666 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1667 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1668 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1672 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1677 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1680 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1681 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1682 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1688 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1689 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1690 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1691 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1692 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1693 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1695 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1696 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1697 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1698 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1699 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1701 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1702 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1704 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1708 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1709 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1710 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1712 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1713 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1715 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1716 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1718 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1719 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1720 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1721 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1722 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1723 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1727 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1729 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1730 // In any case, just close the channel.
1731 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1732 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1733 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1734 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1735 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1736 shutdown_res, None))
1742 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1743 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1747 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1749 $entry.remove_entry();
1757 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1758 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1762 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1764 $entry.remove_entry();
1772 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1773 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1777 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1779 $entry.remove_entry();
1787 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1788 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1790 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1791 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1797 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1798 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1799 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1800 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1801 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1803 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1804 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1805 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1806 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1807 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1808 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1809 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1810 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1811 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1812 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1817 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1818 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1819 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1820 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1821 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1822 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1823 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1824 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1825 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1827 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1832 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1833 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1834 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1835 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1836 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1837 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1838 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1839 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1840 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1842 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1847 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1848 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1849 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1850 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1851 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1852 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1853 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1854 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1855 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1856 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1857 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1859 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1860 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1861 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1867 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1868 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1870 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1871 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1872 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1873 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1874 updates.announcement_sigs);
1875 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1876 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1879 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1880 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1881 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1883 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1885 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1886 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1888 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1889 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1890 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1891 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1896 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1897 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1898 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1899 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1900 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1901 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1902 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1905 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1906 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1907 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1910 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1911 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1912 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1913 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1914 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1915 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1916 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1917 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1921 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1927 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1928 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1929 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1930 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1932 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1933 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1935 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1936 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1937 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1938 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1939 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1940 // filter for uniqueness here.
1941 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1942 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1943 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1944 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1946 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1947 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1948 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1950 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1951 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1952 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1956 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1957 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1961 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1962 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1963 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1964 while !processed_all_events {
1965 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1969 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1972 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1973 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1974 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1976 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1977 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1978 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1980 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1981 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1982 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1983 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1987 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1988 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1989 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1990 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1993 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1995 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1996 $event_to_handle = event;
1998 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1999 post_event_actions.push(action);
2004 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2005 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2006 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2007 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2010 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2011 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2012 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2013 processed_all_events = false;
2016 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2017 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2023 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2025 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2026 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2027 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2028 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2029 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2030 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2034 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2036 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2038 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2039 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2041 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2043 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2044 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2045 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2048 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2049 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2050 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2052 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2053 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2054 current_timestamp: u32,
2056 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2057 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2058 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2059 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2061 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2062 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2063 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2068 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2070 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2071 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2072 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2073 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2074 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2075 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2076 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2077 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2079 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2082 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2083 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2085 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2087 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2089 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2091 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2092 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2093 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2094 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2095 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2096 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2097 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2107 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2108 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2109 &self.default_configuration
2112 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2113 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2114 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2117 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2118 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2120 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2122 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2126 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2131 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2133 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2134 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2135 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2136 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2137 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2139 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2140 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2142 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2143 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2144 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2146 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2147 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2148 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2150 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2151 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2152 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2153 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2154 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2155 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2157 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2158 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2159 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2160 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2161 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2162 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2166 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2167 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2171 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2172 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2174 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2176 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2177 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2178 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2179 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2180 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2181 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2185 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2190 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2192 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2193 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2196 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2198 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2204 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2205 node_id: their_network_key,
2208 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2211 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2212 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2213 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2214 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2215 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2216 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2217 // the same channel.
2218 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2220 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2222 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2225 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2226 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2227 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2235 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2236 /// more information.
2237 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2238 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2239 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2240 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2241 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2242 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2243 // the same channel.
2244 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2246 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2248 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2249 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2250 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2251 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2252 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2253 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2256 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2257 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2258 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2261 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2262 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2263 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2271 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2272 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2274 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2275 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2277 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2278 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2279 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2280 // really wanted anyway.
2281 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2284 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2285 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2286 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2287 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2289 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2290 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2292 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2293 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2296 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2302 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2303 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2305 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2306 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2307 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2309 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2310 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2311 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2312 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2313 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2314 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2315 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2316 total_msat: *total_msat,
2319 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2320 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2322 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2323 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2325 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2330 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2331 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2332 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2333 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2334 Some(transaction) => {
2335 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2336 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2341 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2342 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2343 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2344 reason: closure_reason
2348 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2351 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2352 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2353 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2355 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2356 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2360 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2362 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2363 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2364 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2365 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2366 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2368 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2369 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2370 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2371 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2372 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2376 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2377 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2378 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2379 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2382 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2383 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2384 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2385 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2389 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2397 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2398 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2399 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2400 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2403 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2407 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2408 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2409 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2411 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2412 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2414 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2415 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2416 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2417 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2419 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2421 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2422 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2423 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2426 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2427 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2428 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2429 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2430 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2431 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2434 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2435 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2436 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2438 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2439 /// the channel being closed or not:
2440 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2441 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2442 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2443 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2444 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2445 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2446 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2448 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2449 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2450 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2451 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2453 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2455 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2456 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2457 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2460 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2461 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2462 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2463 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2464 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2465 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2469 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2470 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2471 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2472 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2473 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2474 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2475 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2476 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2478 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2479 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2480 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2481 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2482 // ignore the result here.
2483 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2487 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2488 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2489 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2490 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2491 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2492 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2493 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2494 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2495 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2496 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2497 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2498 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2500 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2502 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2503 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2504 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2505 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2506 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2507 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2508 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2509 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2510 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2511 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2512 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2513 // Prefunded channel has no update
2514 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2515 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2516 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2517 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2518 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2519 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2520 // Prefunded channel has no update
2521 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2523 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2526 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2527 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2528 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2533 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2536 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2538 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2539 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2541 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2542 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2543 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2544 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2545 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2546 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2547 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2558 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2559 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2560 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2562 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2563 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2564 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2567 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2568 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2569 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2571 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2572 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2573 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2574 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2575 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2578 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2579 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2580 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2581 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2582 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2586 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2587 /// local transaction(s).
2588 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2589 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2590 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2594 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2595 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2596 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2597 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2598 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2599 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2600 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2601 return Err(ReceiveError {
2602 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2604 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2607 // final_expiry_too_soon
2608 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2609 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2611 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2612 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2613 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2614 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2615 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2616 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2617 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2618 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2619 return Err(ReceiveError {
2620 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2621 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2624 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2625 (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2626 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2628 return Err(ReceiveError {
2630 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2631 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2635 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2636 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2637 return Err(ReceiveError {
2638 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2639 err_data: Vec::new(),
2640 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2643 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2644 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2645 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2646 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2647 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2648 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2649 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2650 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2651 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2652 return Err(ReceiveError {
2653 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2654 err_data: Vec::new(),
2655 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2658 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2659 return Err(ReceiveError {
2660 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2661 err_data: Vec::new(),
2662 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2665 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2669 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2671 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2672 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2675 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2676 phantom_shared_secret,
2679 return Err(ReceiveError {
2680 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2681 err_data: Vec::new(),
2682 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2687 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2690 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2691 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2692 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2693 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2694 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2698 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2699 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2700 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2701 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2702 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2704 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2705 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2706 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2707 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2708 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2709 failure_code: $err_code,
2715 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2716 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2719 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2720 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2721 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2723 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2724 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2725 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2726 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2727 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2728 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2729 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2730 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2732 macro_rules! return_err {
2733 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2735 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2736 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2737 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2738 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2739 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2740 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2746 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2748 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2749 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2751 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2752 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2755 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2756 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2757 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2758 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2759 outgoing_cltv_value,
2762 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2763 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2764 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2766 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2767 // inbound channel's state.
2768 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2769 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2770 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2772 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2776 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2777 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2778 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2779 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2780 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2781 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2782 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2783 // phantom or an intercept.
2784 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2785 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2786 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2790 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2793 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2795 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2797 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2798 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2799 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2803 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2805 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2806 // have no consistency guarantees.
2807 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2811 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2812 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2813 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2814 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2815 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2817 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2818 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2819 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2820 // we don't have the channel here.
2821 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2823 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2825 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2826 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2827 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2828 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2829 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2830 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2831 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2832 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2833 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2834 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2835 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2837 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2840 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2841 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2843 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2844 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2848 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2849 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2850 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2851 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2853 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2860 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2861 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2862 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2863 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2864 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2865 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2867 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2868 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2870 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2871 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2872 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2873 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2874 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2875 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2876 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2877 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2878 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2879 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2885 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2886 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2887 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2888 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2890 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2891 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2893 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2894 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2895 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2897 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2898 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2899 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2900 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2901 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2902 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2903 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2907 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2909 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2912 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2913 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2914 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2915 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2916 macro_rules! return_err {
2917 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2919 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2920 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2921 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2922 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2923 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2924 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2930 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2932 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2933 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2936 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2937 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2938 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2939 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2940 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2942 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2945 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2946 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2947 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2949 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2950 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2951 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2954 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2955 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2956 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2957 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2961 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2962 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2963 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2966 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2967 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2968 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2969 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2970 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2971 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2977 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2978 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2979 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2981 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2982 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2983 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2985 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2986 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2987 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2988 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2989 return Err(LightningError {
2990 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2991 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2994 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2995 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2997 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2998 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3001 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3002 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3003 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3004 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3006 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3007 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3008 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3010 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3011 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3012 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3014 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3015 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3019 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3022 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3024 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3026 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3027 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3028 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3029 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3030 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3033 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3034 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3036 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3037 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3038 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3039 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3040 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3041 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3042 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3043 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3045 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3046 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3047 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3049 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3051 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3058 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3059 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3060 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
3063 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3064 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3065 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3067 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3068 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3069 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3071 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3072 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3073 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3075 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3076 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3078 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3079 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3080 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3081 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3085 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3086 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3087 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3089 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3090 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3091 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3093 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3094 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3095 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3097 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3098 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3100 }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
3101 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3102 Some(monitor_update) => {
3103 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3104 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3106 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3107 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3108 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3109 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3110 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3111 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3112 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3120 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3121 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3122 // `channel_by_id` map.
3123 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3129 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3130 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3132 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3137 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3139 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3140 /// fields for more info.
3142 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3143 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3145 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3147 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3148 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3149 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3150 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3151 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3153 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3154 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3155 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3156 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3157 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3159 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3160 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3161 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3162 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3164 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3166 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3167 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3168 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3170 /// In general, a path may raise:
3171 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3172 /// node public key) is specified.
3173 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3174 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3176 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3177 /// relevant updates.
3179 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3180 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3181 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3183 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3184 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3185 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3186 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3187 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3188 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3189 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3191 self.pending_outbound_payments
3192 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3193 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3194 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3197 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3198 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3199 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3200 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3202 self.pending_outbound_payments
3203 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3204 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3205 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3206 &self.pending_events,
3207 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3208 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3212 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3213 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3215 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3216 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3217 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3221 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3222 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3223 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3227 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3228 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3232 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3233 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3234 /// retries are exhausted.
3236 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3237 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3239 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3240 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3241 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3243 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3244 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3246 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3247 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3248 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3250 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3253 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3254 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3255 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3256 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3257 /// never reach the recipient.
3259 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3260 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3262 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3263 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3265 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3266 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3267 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3268 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3269 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3270 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3271 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3272 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3273 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3276 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3277 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3279 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3282 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3283 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3284 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3286 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3287 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3288 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3289 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3290 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3291 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3294 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3295 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3296 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3297 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3298 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3299 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3300 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3301 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3302 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3305 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3308 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3309 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3312 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3313 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3314 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3315 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3316 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3317 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3318 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3319 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3323 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3325 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3327 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3328 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3329 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3330 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3331 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3332 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3333 } else { unreachable!(); });
3335 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3336 Err((chan, err)) => {
3337 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3338 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3340 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3341 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3342 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3348 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3350 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3351 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3356 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3357 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3360 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3362 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3365 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3366 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3367 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3376 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3377 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3378 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3382 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3384 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3385 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3387 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3388 /// across the p2p network.
3390 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3391 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3393 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3394 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3395 /// keys per-channel).
3397 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3398 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3399 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3401 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3402 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3403 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3405 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3406 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3407 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3408 /// for more details.
3410 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3411 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3412 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3415 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3416 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3417 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3418 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3423 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3424 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3425 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3426 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3427 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3428 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3429 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3430 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3434 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3435 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3436 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3437 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3441 let mut output_index = None;
3442 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3443 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3444 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3445 if output_index.is_some() {
3446 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3447 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3450 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3453 if output_index.is_none() {
3454 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3455 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3458 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3462 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3464 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3465 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3466 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3467 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3469 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3470 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3472 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3473 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3475 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3477 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3478 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3479 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3480 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3481 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3482 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3483 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3484 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3485 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3486 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3487 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3488 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3489 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3493 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3494 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3495 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3496 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3499 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3500 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3501 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3502 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3506 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3507 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3508 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3509 config.apply(config_update);
3510 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3513 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3514 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3515 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3516 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3517 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3525 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3527 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3528 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3529 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3530 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3532 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3533 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3535 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3536 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3538 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3540 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3541 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3542 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3543 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3544 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3545 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3546 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3547 pub fn update_channel_config(
3548 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3549 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3550 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3553 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3554 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3556 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3557 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3559 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3560 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3561 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3562 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3563 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3565 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3566 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3567 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3570 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3573 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3574 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3575 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3576 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3577 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3578 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3581 let next_hop_scid = {
3582 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3583 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3584 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3585 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3586 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3587 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3589 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3590 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3591 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3594 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3596 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3597 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3598 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3603 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3604 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3605 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3608 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3609 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3610 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3612 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3614 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3615 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3616 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3617 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3618 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3621 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3622 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3623 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3624 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3625 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3627 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3631 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3632 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3634 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3637 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3638 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3639 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3641 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3642 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3643 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3646 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3647 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3648 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3649 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3650 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3651 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3652 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3655 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3656 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3657 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3658 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3663 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3665 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3666 /// Will likely generate further events.
3667 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3670 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3671 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3672 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3674 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3675 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3677 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3678 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3679 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3681 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3682 match forward_info {
3683 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3684 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3685 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3686 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3687 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3690 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3691 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3692 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3694 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3695 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3696 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3697 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3698 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3699 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3702 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3703 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3705 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3708 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3709 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3715 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3716 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3718 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3722 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3723 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3725 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3729 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3730 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3731 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3732 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3733 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3735 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3736 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3737 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3738 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3739 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3741 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3743 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3744 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3748 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3749 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3750 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3751 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3753 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3754 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3760 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3763 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3766 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3767 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3768 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3769 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3770 // problem, not ours.
3776 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3777 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3779 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3784 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3785 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3786 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3793 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3797 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3798 match forward_info {
3799 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3800 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3801 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3802 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3803 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3807 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3808 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3809 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3810 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3811 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3812 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3813 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3815 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3816 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3817 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
3819 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3820 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3822 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3824 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3825 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3826 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3827 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3832 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3833 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3835 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3837 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3838 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3840 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3841 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3843 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3845 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3846 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3847 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3856 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3857 match forward_info {
3858 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3859 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3860 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3861 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3862 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3865 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3866 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3867 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3869 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3870 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3871 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3873 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3874 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3875 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3878 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3879 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3882 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3885 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3886 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3887 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3888 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3889 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3890 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3891 phantom_shared_secret,
3893 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3894 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3895 // if routing nodes overpay
3896 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3897 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3899 total_value_received: None,
3900 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3903 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3906 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3908 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3909 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3910 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3911 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3912 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3913 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3915 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3916 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3917 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3918 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3919 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3920 phantom_shared_secret,
3922 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3923 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3925 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3928 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3929 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3930 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3931 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3932 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3935 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3936 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3937 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3938 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3939 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3940 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3942 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3943 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3944 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3946 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3947 .entry(payment_hash)
3948 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3949 .or_insert_with(|| {
3950 committed_to_claimable = true;
3952 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3955 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3956 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3957 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3958 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3960 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3962 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3964 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3965 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3966 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3969 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3971 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3972 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3973 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3974 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3975 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3976 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3977 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3978 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3979 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3980 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3982 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3984 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3985 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3986 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3987 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3988 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3990 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3991 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3992 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3993 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3994 committed_to_claimable = true;
3996 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3997 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3998 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3999 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4000 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4001 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4002 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4003 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4004 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4005 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4009 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4010 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4011 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4012 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4013 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4015 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4017 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4018 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4020 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4021 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4022 committed_to_claimable = true;
4025 payment_claimable_generated
4029 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4030 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4031 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4032 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4033 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4034 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4035 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4036 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4038 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4039 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4040 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4041 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4042 Ok(result) => result,
4044 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4045 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4048 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4049 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4050 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4051 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4052 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4053 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4056 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4057 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4058 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4060 check_total_value!(purpose);
4062 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4063 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4064 check_total_value!(purpose);
4068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4069 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4071 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4073 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4074 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4075 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4076 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4077 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4078 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4079 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4080 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4082 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4083 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4084 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4086 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4087 if payment_claimable_generated {
4088 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4094 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4095 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4103 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4104 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4105 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4106 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4107 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4108 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4110 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4111 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4113 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4115 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4116 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4117 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4119 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4121 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4122 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4123 events.append(&mut new_events);
4126 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4128 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4129 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4130 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4132 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4133 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4135 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4136 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4137 if background_events.is_empty() {
4138 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4141 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4143 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4144 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4145 // monitor updating completing.
4146 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4148 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4149 let mut updated_chan = false;
4151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4152 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4153 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4154 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4155 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4157 updated_chan = true;
4158 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4159 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4166 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4167 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4169 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4170 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4171 // however, ensure that.
4173 log_error!(self.logger,
4174 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4176 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4180 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4183 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4184 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4185 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4186 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4187 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4190 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4191 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4192 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4193 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4195 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4196 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4198 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4200 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4201 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4204 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4206 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4207 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4211 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4212 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4213 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4214 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4215 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4216 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4217 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4219 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4222 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4225 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4226 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4227 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4235 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4237 /// This currently includes:
4238 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4239 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4240 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4242 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4243 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4244 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4246 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4247 /// estimate fetches.
4249 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4250 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4251 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4252 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4253 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4255 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4257 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4258 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4259 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4261 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4262 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4265 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4266 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4267 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4268 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4269 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4271 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4272 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4273 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4274 if needs_close { return false; }
4277 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4278 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4279 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4280 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4281 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4282 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4283 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4284 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4286 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4287 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4288 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4289 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4293 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4295 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4298 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4300 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4301 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4302 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4303 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4307 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4309 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4315 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4317 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4318 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4319 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4320 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4321 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4322 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4323 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4324 channel_id: *chan_id,
4325 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4333 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4334 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4339 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4340 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4341 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4342 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4343 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4344 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4345 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4346 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4347 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4348 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4349 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4351 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4352 // have no channels to the peer.
4353 let remove_entry = {
4354 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4355 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4358 entry.remove_entry();
4361 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4366 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4367 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4368 // This should be unreachable
4369 debug_assert!(false);
4372 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4373 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4374 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4375 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4376 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4377 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4378 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4381 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4382 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4383 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4385 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4386 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4393 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4394 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4395 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4396 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4397 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4400 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4401 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4404 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4406 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4407 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4408 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4409 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4410 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4417 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4418 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4419 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4421 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4422 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4423 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4424 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4426 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4427 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4428 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4429 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4430 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4431 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4434 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4435 /// reason for the failure.
4437 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4438 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4441 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4442 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4443 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4444 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4445 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4446 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4447 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4452 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4453 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4454 match failure_code {
4455 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4456 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4457 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4458 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4459 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4460 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4465 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4466 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4468 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4470 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4471 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4472 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4473 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4474 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4475 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4476 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4478 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4480 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4481 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4483 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4488 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4489 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4490 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4491 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4492 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4493 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4494 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4495 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4496 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4497 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4499 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4500 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4501 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4502 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4504 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4505 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4506 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4507 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4508 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4512 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4513 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4514 // be surfaced to the user.
4515 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4516 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4517 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4519 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4521 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4522 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4523 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4524 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4526 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4530 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4533 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4534 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4535 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4536 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4540 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4541 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4542 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4543 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4544 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4545 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4546 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4547 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4548 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4551 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4552 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4553 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4556 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4557 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4558 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4560 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4561 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4562 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4563 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4564 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4566 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4568 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4570 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4571 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4572 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4573 push_forward_ev = true;
4575 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4577 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4580 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4583 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4584 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4585 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4586 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4587 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4588 failed_next_destination: destination,
4594 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4595 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4597 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4598 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4599 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4600 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4602 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4603 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4604 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4605 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4607 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4608 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4609 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4610 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4611 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4612 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4613 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4614 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4619 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4620 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4621 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4622 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4623 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4624 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4625 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4626 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4631 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4632 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4633 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4635 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4636 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4637 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4638 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4643 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4645 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4646 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4647 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4648 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4649 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4650 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4651 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4652 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4653 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4655 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4656 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4657 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4658 debug_assert!(false);
4662 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4664 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4665 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4666 debug_assert!(false);
4670 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4671 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4673 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4674 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4675 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4676 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4679 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4680 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4681 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4682 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4686 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4687 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4688 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4689 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4691 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4692 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4693 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4694 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4695 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4700 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4701 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4702 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4703 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4704 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4705 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4706 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4708 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4711 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4712 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4713 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4714 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4718 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4719 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4720 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4721 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4725 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4726 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4727 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4731 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4732 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4733 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4736 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4737 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4738 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4739 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4740 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4741 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4743 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4744 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4746 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4747 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4749 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4750 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4751 if let Err(e) = res {
4752 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4753 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4754 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4755 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4756 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4763 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4764 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4765 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4769 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4770 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4771 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4772 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4773 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4774 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4775 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4776 // again on restart.
4777 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4778 payment_preimage, update_res);
4780 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4781 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4782 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4783 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4784 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4785 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4789 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4790 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4793 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4795 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4796 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4798 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4799 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4800 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4801 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4802 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4803 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4804 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4807 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4808 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4810 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4811 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4812 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4813 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4815 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4819 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4820 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4821 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4827 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4828 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4829 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4832 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4833 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4835 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4836 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4837 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4838 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4839 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4843 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4844 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4846 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4847 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4848 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4855 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4856 /// update completion.
4857 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4858 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4859 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4860 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4861 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4862 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4863 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4864 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4865 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4866 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4867 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4868 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4869 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4871 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4873 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4874 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4875 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4876 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4879 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4880 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4882 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4884 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4889 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4890 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4892 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4897 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4898 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4899 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4900 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4901 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4906 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4910 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4916 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4917 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4918 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4922 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4923 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4924 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4930 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4931 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4933 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4934 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4936 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4937 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4938 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4939 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4940 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4946 let mut peer_state_lock;
4947 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4948 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4949 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4952 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4957 let remaining_in_flight =
4958 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
4959 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
4962 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
4963 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
4964 remaining_in_flight);
4965 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4968 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4971 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4973 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4974 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4977 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4978 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4979 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4981 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4982 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4983 /// used to accept such channels.
4985 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4986 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4987 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4988 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4991 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4992 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4994 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4995 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4996 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4998 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4999 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5001 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5002 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5004 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5005 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5007 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5008 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5009 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5010 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5013 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5016 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5017 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5018 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5019 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5020 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5021 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5022 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5023 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5024 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5026 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5027 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5030 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5031 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5032 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5033 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5034 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5035 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5038 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5039 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5040 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5042 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5043 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5044 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5045 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5046 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5047 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5048 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5049 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5053 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5054 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5058 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5059 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5060 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5064 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5070 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5071 /// or 0-conf channels.
5073 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5074 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5075 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5076 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5077 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5078 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5080 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5081 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5082 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5083 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5084 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5085 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5086 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5090 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5093 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5094 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5096 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5097 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5098 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5099 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5100 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5101 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5103 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5106 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5107 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5108 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5111 num_unfunded_channels
5114 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5115 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5119 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5123 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5124 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5125 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5126 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5128 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5129 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5130 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5131 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5132 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5135 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5137 debug_assert!(false);
5138 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5143 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5144 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5145 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5146 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5147 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5148 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5151 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5152 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5155 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5156 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5157 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5158 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5159 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5162 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5163 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5164 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5167 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5172 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5173 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5175 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5178 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5179 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5180 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5183 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5184 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5186 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5187 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5188 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5191 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5192 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5193 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5194 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5195 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5196 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5197 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5200 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5205 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5206 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5208 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5210 debug_assert!(false);
5211 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5215 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5217 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5218 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5223 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5224 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5225 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5226 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5227 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5229 user_channel_id: user_id,
5234 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5235 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5238 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5240 debug_assert!(false);
5241 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5244 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5245 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5246 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5247 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5248 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5249 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5251 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5252 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5253 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5254 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5255 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5256 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5257 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5258 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5259 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5263 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5266 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5268 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5271 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5274 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5275 funding_msg.channel_id))
5277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5278 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5282 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5283 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5284 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5285 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5286 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5287 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5288 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5292 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5294 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5295 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5296 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5297 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5299 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5300 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5301 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5302 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5303 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5304 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5305 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5306 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5314 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5315 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5317 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5319 debug_assert!(false);
5320 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5323 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5325 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5327 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5328 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5329 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5330 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5331 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5332 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5333 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5334 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5335 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5336 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5345 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5347 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5349 debug_assert!(false);
5350 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5354 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5356 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5357 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5358 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5361 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5362 msg: announcement_sigs,
5364 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5365 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5366 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5367 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5368 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5369 // announcement_signatures.
5370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5371 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5372 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5373 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5380 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5381 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5390 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5391 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5392 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5394 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5396 debug_assert!(false);
5397 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5401 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5404 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5405 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5406 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5407 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5410 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5411 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5412 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5413 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5415 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5416 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5417 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5418 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5419 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5420 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5425 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5426 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5427 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5428 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5435 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5436 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5437 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5438 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5444 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5446 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5448 debug_assert!(false);
5449 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5451 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5454 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5456 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5457 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5458 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5459 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5464 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5465 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5466 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5467 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5468 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5469 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5470 } else { (tx, None) }
5472 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5475 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5476 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5477 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5479 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5480 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5483 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5487 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5492 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5493 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5494 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5495 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5497 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5498 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5499 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5500 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5502 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5503 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5504 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5506 debug_assert!(false);
5507 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5509 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5510 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5511 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5514 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5515 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5516 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5517 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5518 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5520 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5521 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5522 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5523 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5524 match pending_forward_info {
5525 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5526 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5527 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5528 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5530 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5531 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5532 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5533 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5534 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5537 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5539 _ => pending_forward_info
5542 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5549 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5550 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5552 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5554 debug_assert!(false);
5555 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5557 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5558 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5559 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5561 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5566 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5570 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5571 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5572 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5574 debug_assert!(false);
5575 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5579 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5581 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5588 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5589 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5590 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5592 debug_assert!(false);
5593 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5597 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5599 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5600 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5601 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5603 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5610 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5611 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5612 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5614 debug_assert!(false);
5615 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5619 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5621 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5622 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5623 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5624 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5625 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5633 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5634 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5635 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5636 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5637 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5638 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5639 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5640 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5641 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5642 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5643 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5645 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5646 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5648 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5649 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5650 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5651 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5652 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5653 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5656 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5657 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5659 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5660 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5661 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5663 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5664 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5665 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5666 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5667 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5670 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5671 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5674 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5675 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5676 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5677 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5678 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5679 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5680 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5683 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5684 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5685 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5690 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5691 // payments are being processed.
5692 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5693 push_forward_event = true;
5695 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5696 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5703 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5704 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5707 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5708 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5709 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5711 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5715 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5716 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5717 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5718 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5719 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5721 if !forward_ev_exists {
5722 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5724 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5729 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5730 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5731 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5732 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5733 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5734 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5735 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5737 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5738 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5739 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5740 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5741 channel_funding_outpoint,
5742 counterparty_node_id,
5747 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5748 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5750 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5752 debug_assert!(false);
5753 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5754 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5756 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5758 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5759 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5760 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5761 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5762 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5764 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5769 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5773 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5775 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5777 debug_assert!(false);
5778 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5782 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5784 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5791 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5795 debug_assert!(false);
5796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5802 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5803 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5806 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5807 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5808 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5809 msg, &self.default_configuration
5811 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5812 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5813 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5821 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5822 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5823 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5824 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5826 // It's not a local channel
5827 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5831 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5832 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5833 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5835 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5837 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5839 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5840 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5841 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5842 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5843 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5844 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5848 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5849 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5850 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5851 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5853 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5854 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5859 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5862 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5864 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5867 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5869 debug_assert!(false);
5870 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5874 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5876 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5877 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5878 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5879 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5880 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5881 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5882 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5883 let mut channel_update = None;
5884 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5885 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5886 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5889 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5890 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5891 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5892 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5893 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5894 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5895 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5900 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5901 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5902 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5903 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5904 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5905 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5913 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5914 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5917 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5918 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5923 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5924 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5925 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5927 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5928 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5929 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5930 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5931 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5932 match monitor_event {
5933 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5934 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5936 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5939 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5940 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5941 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5944 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5945 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5946 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5947 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5949 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5950 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5951 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5952 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5955 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5957 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5960 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5961 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5962 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5963 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5964 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5969 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5970 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5972 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5974 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5976 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5977 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5978 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5985 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5986 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5992 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5993 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5996 has_pending_monitor_events
5999 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6000 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6001 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6003 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6005 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6008 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6009 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6010 /// update was applied.
6011 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6012 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6013 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6014 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6016 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6017 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6018 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6019 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6022 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6025 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6026 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6027 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6028 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6029 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6030 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
6031 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6032 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6034 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6035 has_monitor_update = true;
6037 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6038 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6039 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6040 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6042 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6044 continue 'peer_loop;
6053 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6054 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6055 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6058 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6059 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6065 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6066 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6067 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6068 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6069 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6070 let mut has_update = false;
6072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6074 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6077 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6078 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6079 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6080 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6081 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6083 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6084 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6087 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6088 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6089 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6090 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6091 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6096 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6098 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6099 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6100 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6106 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6107 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6115 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6116 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6122 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6123 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6125 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6126 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6127 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6128 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6129 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6130 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6131 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6132 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6133 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6134 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6135 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6136 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6137 assert!(should_broadcast);
6138 } else { unreachable!(); }
6139 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6140 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6141 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6144 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6148 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6151 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6152 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6154 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6155 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6156 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6157 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6159 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6161 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6162 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6166 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6167 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6169 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6171 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6172 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6174 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6175 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6176 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6177 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6178 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6179 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6180 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6181 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6182 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6183 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6184 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6187 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6188 /// stored external to LDK.
6190 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6191 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6192 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6194 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6195 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6198 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6199 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6200 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6201 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6203 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6204 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6205 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6206 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6207 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6209 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6210 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6211 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6212 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6213 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6215 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6216 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6218 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6219 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6223 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6224 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6226 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6228 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6229 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6231 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6232 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6233 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6234 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6235 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6236 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6237 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6240 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6241 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6243 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6244 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6245 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6248 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6249 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6251 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6252 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6253 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6254 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6256 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6257 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6258 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6259 Some(_) => continue,
6260 None => return scid_candidate
6265 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6267 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6268 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6270 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6271 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6272 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6276 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6277 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6278 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6280 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6281 /// times to get a unique scid.
6282 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6283 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6284 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6286 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6287 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6288 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6289 return scid_candidate
6293 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6294 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6295 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6296 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6298 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6299 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6302 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6303 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6304 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6305 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6314 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6315 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6316 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6317 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6318 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6322 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6323 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6324 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6325 events.push_back((event, None));
6329 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6330 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6331 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6335 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6336 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6340 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6341 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6344 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6345 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6346 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6347 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6348 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6349 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6352 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6353 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6356 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6357 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6358 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6359 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6361 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6365 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6366 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6367 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6368 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6369 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6371 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6375 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6376 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6377 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6378 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6379 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6380 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6381 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6383 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6385 if further_update_exists {
6386 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6392 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6396 log_debug!(self.logger,
6397 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6398 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6402 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6403 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6404 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6408 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6409 for action in actions {
6411 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6412 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6414 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6420 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6421 /// using the given event handler.
6423 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6424 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6428 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6432 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6434 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6435 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6436 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6437 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6438 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6439 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6443 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6444 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6445 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6446 /// is always placed next to each other.
6448 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6449 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6450 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6451 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6453 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6454 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6455 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6456 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6457 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6458 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6459 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6461 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6462 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6463 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6464 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6467 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6468 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6470 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6471 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6474 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6476 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6477 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6478 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6479 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6480 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6484 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6485 events.replace(pending_events);
6494 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6496 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6497 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6498 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6499 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6500 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6501 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6505 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6507 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6508 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6509 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6511 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6515 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6517 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6518 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6519 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6520 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6521 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6522 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6526 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6528 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6529 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6530 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6531 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6532 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6535 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6536 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6539 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6541 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6542 let new_height = height - 1;
6544 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6545 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6546 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6547 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6548 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6549 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6552 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6556 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6558 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6559 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6560 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6561 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6562 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6563 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6567 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6568 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6569 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6570 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6572 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6573 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6576 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6577 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6578 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6580 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6581 if height < last_best_block_height {
6582 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6583 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6587 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6588 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6589 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6590 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6592 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6593 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6596 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6597 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6599 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6601 macro_rules! max_time {
6602 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6604 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6605 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6606 // having an explicit local time source.
6607 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6608 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6609 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6610 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6611 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6617 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6618 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6619 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6620 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6624 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6625 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6626 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6629 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6630 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6631 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6638 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6639 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6640 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6641 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6642 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6643 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6644 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6645 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6646 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6651 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6653 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6655 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6656 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6657 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6658 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6662 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6663 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6665 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6666 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6667 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6668 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6669 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6671 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6672 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6674 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6675 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6678 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6679 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6680 let res = f(channel);
6681 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6682 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6683 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6684 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6685 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6687 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6688 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6689 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6690 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6691 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6692 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6693 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6703 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6704 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6707 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6709 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6710 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6711 msg: announcement_sigs,
6713 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6714 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6715 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6717 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6718 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6719 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6724 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6725 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6726 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6727 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6728 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6729 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6730 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6731 // is always consistent.
6732 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6733 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6734 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6735 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6736 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6739 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6740 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6741 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6742 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6743 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6744 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6745 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6749 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6750 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6751 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6752 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6753 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6754 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6755 data: reason_message,
6765 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6766 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6767 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6768 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6769 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6770 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6771 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6772 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6773 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6774 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6776 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6777 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6778 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6782 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6785 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6786 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6787 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6788 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6789 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6790 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6791 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6792 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6793 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6796 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6797 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6798 _ => unreachable!(),
6800 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6801 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6802 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6809 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6811 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6812 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6816 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6818 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6819 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6821 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6822 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6825 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6826 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6827 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6830 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6831 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6832 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6833 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6836 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6837 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6838 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6839 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6842 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6843 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6845 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6846 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6847 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6848 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6849 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6852 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6853 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6854 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6855 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6858 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6859 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6860 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6861 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6864 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6865 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6866 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6867 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6871 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6872 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6874 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6875 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6876 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6877 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6878 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6879 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6883 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6885 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6888 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6889 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6890 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6891 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6894 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6896 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6899 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6900 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6901 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6902 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6905 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6910 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6915 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6920 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6922 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6925 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6930 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6935 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6937 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6940 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6942 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6945 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6947 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6950 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6955 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6960 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6962 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6965 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6967 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6970 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6971 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6972 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6973 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6974 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6976 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6981 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6983 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6986 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6988 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6989 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6991 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6992 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6993 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6994 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6996 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6997 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6998 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6999 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7000 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7001 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7006 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7007 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7008 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7011 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7012 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7013 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7016 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7018 // V1 Channel Establishment
7019 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7020 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7022 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7023 // V2 Channel Establishment
7024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7026 // Common Channel Establishment
7027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7029 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7032 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7033 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7034 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7035 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7036 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7038 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7039 // Channel Operations
7040 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7042 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7045 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7048 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7049 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7050 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7051 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7052 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7053 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7054 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7058 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7059 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7060 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7061 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7064 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7066 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7068 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7069 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7073 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7074 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7075 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7081 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7082 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7083 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7084 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7085 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7086 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7089 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7090 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7092 if inbound_peer_limited {
7095 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7096 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7097 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7098 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7099 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7100 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7101 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7102 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7103 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7108 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7109 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7111 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7112 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7113 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7114 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7119 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7120 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7125 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7127 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7128 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7131 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7132 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7133 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7134 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7135 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7136 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7137 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7141 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7142 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7143 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7148 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7149 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7150 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7151 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7152 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7161 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7165 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7168 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7169 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7171 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7172 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7173 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7174 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7175 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7176 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7177 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7179 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7180 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7181 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7185 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7186 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7187 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7188 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7189 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7191 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7192 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7193 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7194 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7202 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7203 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7207 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7208 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7211 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7212 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7215 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7216 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7219 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7220 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7221 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7222 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7225 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7226 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7227 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7228 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7231 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7232 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7233 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7234 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7237 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7238 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7239 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7240 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7243 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7244 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7245 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7246 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7249 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7250 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7251 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7252 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7255 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7256 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7257 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7258 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7261 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7262 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7263 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7264 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7267 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7268 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7269 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7270 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7274 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7275 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7276 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7277 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7280 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7281 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7283 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7284 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7285 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7286 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7287 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7290 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7291 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7292 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7293 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7296 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7297 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7298 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7299 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7302 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7303 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7304 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7305 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7306 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7307 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7308 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7309 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7310 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7311 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7312 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7313 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7314 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7315 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7316 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7317 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7318 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7319 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7320 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7321 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7326 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7327 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7329 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7330 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7331 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7332 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7335 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7336 (2, node_id, required),
7337 (4, features, required),
7338 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7339 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7340 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7341 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7344 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7345 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7346 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7347 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7348 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7349 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7350 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7351 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7352 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7353 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7354 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7355 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7356 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7357 (7, self.config, option),
7358 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7359 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7360 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7361 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7362 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7363 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7364 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7365 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7366 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7367 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7368 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7369 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7370 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7371 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7372 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7373 (32, self.is_public, required),
7374 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7375 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7376 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7377 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7378 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7384 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7385 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7386 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7387 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7388 (2, channel_id, required),
7389 (3, channel_type, option),
7390 (4, counterparty, required),
7391 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7392 (6, funding_txo, option),
7393 (7, config, option),
7394 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7395 (9, confirmations, option),
7396 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7397 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7398 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7399 (16, balance_msat, required),
7400 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7401 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7402 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7403 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7404 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7405 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7406 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7407 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7408 (26, is_outbound, required),
7409 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7410 (30, is_usable, required),
7411 (32, is_public, required),
7412 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7413 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7414 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7415 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7416 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7419 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7420 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7421 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7422 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7423 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7427 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7429 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7430 outbound_scid_alias,
7434 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7435 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7437 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7438 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7439 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7440 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7441 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7442 confirmations_required,
7444 force_close_spend_delay,
7445 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7446 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7447 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7448 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7449 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7450 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7451 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7452 channel_shutdown_state,
7457 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7458 (2, channels, vec_type),
7459 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7460 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7463 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7465 (0, onion_packet, required),
7466 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7469 (0, payment_data, required),
7470 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7471 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7472 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7474 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7475 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7476 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7477 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7478 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7482 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7483 (0, routing, required),
7484 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7485 (4, payment_hash, required),
7486 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7487 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7488 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7489 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7493 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7494 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7496 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7498 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7499 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7500 reason.write(writer)?;
7502 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7503 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7506 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7507 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7508 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7509 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7516 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7517 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7518 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7521 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7522 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7523 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7524 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7528 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7529 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7530 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7531 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7532 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7535 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7536 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7537 // messages contained in the variants.
7538 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7539 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7540 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7542 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7543 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7544 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7545 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7546 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7549 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7550 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7551 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7552 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7553 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7555 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7560 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7565 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7566 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7567 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7568 (2, outpoint, required),
7569 (4, htlc_id, required),
7570 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7573 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7574 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7575 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7576 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7577 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7579 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7580 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7581 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7582 (2, self.value, required),
7583 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7584 (4, payment_data, option),
7585 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7586 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7587 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7588 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7594 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7595 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7596 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7597 (0, prev_hop, required),
7598 (1, total_msat, option),
7599 (2, value_ser, required),
7600 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7601 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7602 (5, total_value_received, option),
7603 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7604 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7605 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7607 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7608 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7609 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7611 if payment_data.is_some() {
7612 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7614 if total_msat.is_none() {
7615 total_msat = Some(value);
7617 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7620 if total_msat.is_none() {
7621 if payment_data.is_none() {
7622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7624 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7626 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7630 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7633 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7634 total_value_received,
7635 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7637 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7638 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7643 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7644 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7645 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7648 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7649 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7650 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7651 let mut payment_id = None;
7652 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7653 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7654 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7655 (0, session_priv, required),
7656 (1, payment_id, option),
7657 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7658 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7659 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7660 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7662 if payment_id.is_none() {
7663 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7665 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7667 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7668 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7669 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7671 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7672 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7673 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7674 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7678 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7679 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7680 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7682 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7685 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7686 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7691 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7692 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7694 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7696 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7697 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7698 (0, session_priv, required),
7699 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7700 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7701 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7702 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7703 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7704 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7707 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7709 field.write(writer)?;
7716 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7717 (0, forward_info, required),
7718 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7719 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7720 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7721 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7724 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7726 (0, htlc_id, required),
7727 (2, err_packet, required),
7732 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7733 (0, payment_secret, required),
7734 (2, expiry_time, required),
7735 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7736 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7737 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7740 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7742 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7744 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7745 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7746 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7747 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7751 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7752 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7754 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7756 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7758 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7759 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7760 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7763 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7766 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7767 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7768 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7771 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7772 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7774 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7775 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7776 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7777 unfunded_channels += 1;
7782 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7784 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7785 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7787 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7788 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7789 channel.write(writer)?;
7796 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7797 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7798 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7799 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7800 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7801 for forward in pending_forwards {
7802 forward.write(writer)?;
7807 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7809 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7810 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7811 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7813 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7814 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7815 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7816 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7817 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7818 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7819 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7820 htlc.write(writer)?;
7822 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7823 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7826 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7827 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7828 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7829 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7830 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7831 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7832 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7835 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7836 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7837 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7838 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7839 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7841 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7842 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7843 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7844 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7845 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7846 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7847 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7852 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7853 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7854 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7855 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7856 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7857 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7858 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7859 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7860 0u64.write(writer)?;
7862 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7863 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7864 event.write(writer)?;
7868 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7869 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7870 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7871 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7872 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7873 0u64.write(writer)?;
7875 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7876 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7877 // likely to be identical.
7878 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7879 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7881 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7882 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7883 hash.write(writer)?;
7884 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7887 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7888 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7889 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7890 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7891 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7894 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7895 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7897 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7898 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7899 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7900 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7903 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7904 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7908 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7909 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7910 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7912 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7913 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7914 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7920 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7921 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7922 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7923 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7926 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7927 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7928 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7929 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7930 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7933 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
7934 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7935 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
7936 if !updates.is_empty() {
7937 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
7938 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
7943 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7944 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7945 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7946 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7947 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7948 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7949 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7950 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7951 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7952 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7953 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
7954 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7955 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7962 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7963 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7964 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7965 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7968 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7969 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7970 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7971 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7972 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7973 // check that the event is sane here.
7974 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7975 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7976 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7977 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7983 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7984 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7985 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7986 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7987 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7988 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7991 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7992 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7993 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7994 events.push_back((ev, action));
7995 } else if action.is_some() {
7996 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8003 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8004 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8005 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8006 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8007 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8008 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8011 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8013 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8015 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8016 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8017 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8018 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8019 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8020 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8021 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8022 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8023 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8024 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8025 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8026 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8027 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8029 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8030 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8032 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8033 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8035 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8036 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8037 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8038 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8039 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8040 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8042 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8043 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8045 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8046 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8047 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8048 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8049 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8050 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8054 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8055 pub entropy_source: ES,
8057 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8058 pub node_signer: NS,
8060 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8061 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8063 pub signer_provider: SP,
8065 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8067 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8068 pub fee_estimator: F,
8069 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8071 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8072 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8073 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8074 pub chain_monitor: M,
8076 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8077 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8078 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8079 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8080 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8081 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8083 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8085 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8086 /// deserialization.
8088 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8089 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8090 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8092 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8093 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8095 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8096 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8097 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8098 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8100 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8103 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8104 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8107 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8108 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8110 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8111 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8112 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8113 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8114 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8115 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8119 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8120 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8121 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8122 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8123 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8125 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8126 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8131 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8132 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8133 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8134 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8136 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8137 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8138 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8139 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8140 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8141 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8145 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8146 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8147 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8151 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8152 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8154 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8155 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8156 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8157 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8158 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8163 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8164 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8166 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8167 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8168 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8170 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8172 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8173 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8174 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8175 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8176 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8177 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8178 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8179 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8180 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8181 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8183 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8184 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8185 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8186 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8187 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8188 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8189 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8190 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8191 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8192 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8193 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8194 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8195 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8196 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8197 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8198 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8201 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8202 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8203 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8204 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8205 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8207 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8208 let mut found_htlc = false;
8209 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8210 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8213 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8214 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8215 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8216 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8217 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8218 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8219 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8220 log_info!(args.logger,
8221 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8222 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8223 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8227 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8228 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8229 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8230 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8231 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8233 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8234 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8236 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8238 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8239 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8242 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8243 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8244 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8248 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8249 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8250 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8251 // safely discard the channel.
8252 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8253 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8254 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8255 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8256 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8259 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8260 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8261 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8262 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8263 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8264 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8268 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8269 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8270 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8271 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8272 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8273 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8274 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8276 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8280 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8281 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8282 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8283 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8284 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8285 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8286 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8287 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8288 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8290 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8293 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8294 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8295 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8296 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8297 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8298 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8299 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8300 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8302 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8305 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8308 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8309 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8310 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8311 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8312 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8313 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8314 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8315 is_connected: false,
8319 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8320 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8321 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8322 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8323 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8324 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8325 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8326 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8329 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8330 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8331 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8332 for _ in 0..event_count {
8333 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8334 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8339 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8340 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8341 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8343 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8344 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8345 // on-startup monitor updates.
8346 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8347 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8349 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8353 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8354 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8356 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8357 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8358 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8359 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8360 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8364 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8365 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8366 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8367 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8368 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8369 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8370 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8372 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8373 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8377 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8378 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8379 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8380 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8381 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8382 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8383 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8384 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8385 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8386 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8387 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8388 let mut events_override = None;
8389 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8390 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8391 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8392 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8393 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8394 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8395 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8396 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8397 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8398 (8, events_override, option),
8399 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8400 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8401 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8402 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8404 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8405 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8408 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8409 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8412 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8413 pending_events_read = events;
8416 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8417 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8420 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8421 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8422 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8423 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8424 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8425 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8427 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8429 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8430 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8431 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8434 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8435 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8436 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8437 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8438 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8440 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8441 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8442 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8444 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8445 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8446 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8447 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8448 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8450 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8451 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8452 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8453 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8454 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8455 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8456 pending_background_events.push(
8457 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8458 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8459 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8460 update: update.clone(),
8463 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8464 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8465 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8467 max_in_flight_update_id
8471 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8474 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8475 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8477 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8478 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8479 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8480 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8481 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8482 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8483 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8484 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8485 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8488 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8489 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8490 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8491 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8492 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8493 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8494 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8495 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8496 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8497 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8498 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8503 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8504 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8505 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8506 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8507 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8508 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8509 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8510 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8512 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8513 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8514 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8516 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8517 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8518 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8519 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8520 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8521 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8522 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8523 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8528 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8529 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8532 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8533 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8534 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8535 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8536 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8537 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8538 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8540 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8541 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8542 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8543 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8544 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8545 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8549 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8550 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8551 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8552 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8554 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8555 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8556 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8559 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8560 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8561 retry_strategy: None,
8562 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8563 payment_params: None,
8564 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8565 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8566 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8567 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8568 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8569 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8570 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8571 total_msat: path_amt,
8572 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8574 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8575 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8580 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8582 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8583 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8584 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8585 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8587 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8588 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8589 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8590 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8591 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8592 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8593 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8594 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8595 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8596 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8597 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8602 !forwards.is_empty()
8604 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8605 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8606 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8607 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8608 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8609 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8610 intercepted_id != ev_id
8617 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8618 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8619 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8620 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8621 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8622 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8623 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8624 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8625 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8626 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8627 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8628 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8629 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8638 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8639 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8640 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8641 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8642 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8643 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8644 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8645 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8649 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8650 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8652 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8653 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8654 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8655 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8657 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8658 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8659 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8661 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8662 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8664 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8665 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8667 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8670 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8671 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8672 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8674 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8678 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8679 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8680 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8681 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8682 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8684 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8685 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8686 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8687 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8688 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8689 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8690 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8691 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8693 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8694 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8698 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8700 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8702 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8703 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8705 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8706 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8711 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8712 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8714 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8716 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8718 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8719 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8720 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8721 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8725 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8726 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8727 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8728 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8729 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8730 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8731 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8733 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8734 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8735 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8737 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8738 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8739 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8740 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8741 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8742 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8744 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8745 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8746 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8747 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8748 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8749 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8755 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8757 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8758 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8759 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8760 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8761 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8762 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8763 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8764 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8765 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8766 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8767 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8769 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8770 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8772 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8773 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8774 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8775 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8777 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8778 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8779 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8780 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8782 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8783 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8784 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8785 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8787 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8788 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8789 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8790 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8791 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8792 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8793 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8796 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8797 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8800 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8803 purpose: payment.purpose,
8804 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8810 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8811 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8812 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8813 for action in actions.iter() {
8814 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8815 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8816 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8818 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8819 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8820 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8821 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8826 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8828 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8829 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8833 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8835 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8836 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8837 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8838 router: args.router,
8840 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8842 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8843 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8844 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8845 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8847 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8848 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8849 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8850 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8851 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8852 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8854 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8859 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8861 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8863 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8864 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8865 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8866 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8867 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8868 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8869 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8871 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8872 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8873 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8875 logger: args.logger,
8876 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8879 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8880 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8881 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8882 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8883 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8886 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8887 //connection or two.
8889 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8895 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8896 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8897 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8898 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8899 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8900 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8901 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8902 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8903 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
8904 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8905 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8906 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8907 use crate::util::test_utils;
8908 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8909 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8912 fn test_notify_limits() {
8913 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8914 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8915 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8916 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8917 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8918 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8920 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8921 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8922 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8923 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8924 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8926 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8928 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8929 // to connect messages with new values
8930 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8931 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8932 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8933 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8934 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8935 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8937 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8938 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8939 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8940 // ... but the last node should not.
8941 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8942 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8943 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8944 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8946 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8947 // about the channel.
8948 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8949 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8950 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8952 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8954 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8955 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8956 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8957 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8958 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8959 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8961 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8962 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8963 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8965 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8966 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8967 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8968 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8969 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8970 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8972 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8973 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8974 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8975 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8976 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8977 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8979 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8981 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8982 // the channel info has updated.
8983 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8984 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8985 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8986 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8987 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8988 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8992 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8993 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8997 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8998 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9001 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9002 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9003 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9004 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9006 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9007 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9008 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9009 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9010 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9011 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9012 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9013 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9015 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9017 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9019 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9020 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9021 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9023 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9025 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9026 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9027 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9029 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9033 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9034 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9035 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9036 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9037 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9038 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9039 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9040 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9041 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9043 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9044 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9045 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9047 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9048 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9049 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9051 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9052 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9053 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9054 // lightning messages manually.
9055 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9056 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9059 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9060 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9061 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9063 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9064 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9066 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9067 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9069 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9070 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9071 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9073 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9074 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9075 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9077 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9079 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9081 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9082 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9085 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9086 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9087 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9090 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9091 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9092 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9093 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9098 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9099 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9100 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9101 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9106 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9107 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9108 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9109 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9111 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9116 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9117 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9118 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9121 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9122 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9123 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9124 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9125 // fails as expected.
9126 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9127 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9128 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9129 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9130 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9131 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9134 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9135 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9137 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9138 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9139 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9140 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9142 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9143 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9144 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9146 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9147 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9148 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9149 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9151 let route = find_route(
9152 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9153 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9155 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9156 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9158 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9159 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9160 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9161 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9162 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9164 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9165 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9166 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9167 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9170 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9171 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9172 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9173 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9174 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9175 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9176 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9177 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9178 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9180 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9181 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9183 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9184 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9185 let route = find_route(
9186 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9187 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9189 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9190 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9192 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9193 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9194 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9195 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9196 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9198 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9199 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9200 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9201 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9203 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9205 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9206 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9207 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9209 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9210 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9211 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9213 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9214 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9215 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9216 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9217 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9218 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9219 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9220 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9221 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9223 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9224 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9226 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9227 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9228 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9229 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9231 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9233 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9234 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9235 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9237 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9238 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9239 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9240 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9242 let route = find_route(
9243 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9244 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9246 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9247 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9248 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9250 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9251 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9252 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9253 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9254 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9256 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9257 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9258 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9260 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9261 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9262 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9263 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9264 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9265 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9266 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9267 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9268 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9270 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9271 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9275 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9276 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9277 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9281 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9283 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9284 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9286 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9287 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9288 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9289 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9291 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9292 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9293 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9294 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9295 let route = find_route(
9296 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9297 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9300 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9301 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9302 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9303 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9304 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9305 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9308 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9309 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9310 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9311 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9312 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9313 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9314 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9316 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9320 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9321 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9322 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9323 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9324 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9328 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9330 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9331 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9333 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9334 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9335 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9336 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9338 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9339 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9340 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9341 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9342 let route = find_route(
9343 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9344 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9347 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9348 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9349 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9350 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9351 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9352 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9353 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9354 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9357 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9358 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9359 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9360 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9361 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9362 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9365 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9369 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9373 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9375 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9376 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9377 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9378 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9380 // Marshall an MPP route.
9381 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9382 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9383 route.paths.push(path);
9384 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9385 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9386 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9387 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9388 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9389 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9391 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9392 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9394 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9395 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9397 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9402 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9403 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9404 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9405 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9406 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9408 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9410 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9411 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9413 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9414 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9416 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9419 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9420 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9421 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9422 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9423 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9424 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9427 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9430 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9431 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9436 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9437 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9441 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9443 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9444 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9446 total_msat: 100_000,
9449 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9450 // payment verification fails as expected.
9451 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9452 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9453 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9454 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9456 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9460 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9461 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9465 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9466 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9467 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9468 // the channel is successfully closed.
9469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9474 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9475 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9476 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9477 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9478 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9480 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9481 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9483 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9484 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9485 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9486 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9489 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9491 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9492 // as it has the funding transaction.
9493 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9494 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9495 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9498 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9500 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9502 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9504 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9505 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9506 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9508 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9511 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9512 // as it has the funding transaction.
9513 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9514 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9515 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9518 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9519 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9521 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9522 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9523 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9524 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9526 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9527 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9528 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9529 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9531 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9532 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9534 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9535 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9536 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9537 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9538 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9539 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9540 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9544 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9545 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9546 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9547 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9548 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9549 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9550 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9553 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9555 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9556 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9557 // closing transaction).
9558 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9559 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9562 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9563 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9564 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9565 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9566 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9569 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9571 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9573 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9574 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9575 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9577 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9579 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9580 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9583 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9584 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9585 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9588 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9589 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9590 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9593 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9595 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9596 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9598 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9599 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9601 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9602 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9607 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9608 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9609 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9610 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9611 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9612 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9613 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9617 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9618 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9619 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9621 // Test the API functions.
9622 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9624 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9626 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9628 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9630 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9632 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9634 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9638 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9639 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9645 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9647 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9648 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9650 let mut funding_tx = None;
9651 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9652 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9653 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9656 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9657 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9658 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9659 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9660 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9662 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9664 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9666 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9668 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9670 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9672 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9675 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9676 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9677 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9678 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9679 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9681 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9682 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9684 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9685 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9686 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9687 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9688 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9689 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9690 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9693 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9694 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9695 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9696 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9697 }, true).unwrap_err();
9699 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9700 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9701 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9702 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9703 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9704 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9705 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9707 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9708 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9710 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9711 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9712 }, true).unwrap_err();
9714 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9715 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9716 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9718 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9720 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9721 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9723 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9724 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9725 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9726 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9727 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9730 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9731 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9733 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9734 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9735 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9737 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9738 // "protected" and can connect again.
9739 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9740 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9741 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9743 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9745 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9747 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9748 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9752 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9753 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9757 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9759 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9761 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9762 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9764 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9765 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9766 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9767 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9770 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9772 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9773 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9774 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9776 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9777 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9778 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9780 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9781 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9782 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9783 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9787 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9788 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9789 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9792 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9793 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9795 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9797 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9799 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9800 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9802 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9803 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9804 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9805 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9806 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9807 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9810 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9811 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9813 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9814 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9818 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9819 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9822 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9823 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9824 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9825 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9826 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9828 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9829 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9831 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9832 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9833 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9834 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9840 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9841 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9843 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9844 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9845 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9847 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9848 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9852 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9856 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
9857 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
9858 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
9859 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
9860 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9861 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
9862 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
9863 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
9864 amt_to_forward: 100,
9865 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9866 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9867 keysend_preimage: None,
9868 payment_metadata: None,
9869 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9870 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9874 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
9875 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
9876 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
9877 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9878 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
9880 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
9881 } else { panic!(); }
9883 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
9884 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
9885 amt_to_forward: 100,
9886 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9887 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9888 keysend_preimage: None,
9889 payment_metadata: None,
9890 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9891 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9895 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9896 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
9900 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
9901 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9902 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9903 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9904 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9906 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
9907 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
9912 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
9913 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9915 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9916 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9918 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9919 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9920 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9921 match &msg_events[0] {
9922 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
9923 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9925 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
9926 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
9927 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
9930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9933 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9934 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9936 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
9937 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
9938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9940 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9944 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9945 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9946 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9947 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9948 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9949 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9950 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9951 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9952 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9953 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9954 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9956 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9957 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9958 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9960 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9961 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9963 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9964 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9969 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9970 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9972 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9973 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9975 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9979 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9980 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9981 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9982 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9983 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9984 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9985 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9986 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9988 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9989 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9992 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9993 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9994 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9995 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9996 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9998 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9999 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10002 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10003 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10006 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10007 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10008 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10009 ..Default::default()
10011 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10012 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10015 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10016 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10019 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10020 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10021 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10022 ..Default::default()
10024 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10026 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10029 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10030 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10037 use crate::chain::Listen;
10038 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10039 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10040 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10041 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10042 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10043 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10044 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10045 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10046 use crate::util::test_utils;
10047 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
10049 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10050 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10051 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10053 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10055 use criterion::Criterion;
10057 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10058 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10059 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10060 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10061 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10062 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10063 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10065 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10066 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10068 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10069 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10071 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10073 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10076 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10077 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10080 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10081 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10082 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10084 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10085 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10087 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10088 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10089 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10090 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10091 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10093 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10094 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10096 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10097 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10098 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10099 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10101 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10102 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10103 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10105 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10106 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10107 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10108 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10109 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10111 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10112 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10113 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10115 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10116 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10118 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10119 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10120 }, false).unwrap();
10121 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10122 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10123 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10126 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10127 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10128 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10130 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10131 } else { panic!(); }
10133 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10134 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10135 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10136 match events_b[0] {
10137 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10138 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10143 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10144 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10145 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10146 match events_a[0] {
10147 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10148 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10150 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10153 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10155 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10156 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10157 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10159 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10160 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10161 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10162 match msg_events[0] {
10163 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10164 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10165 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10169 match msg_events[1] {
10170 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10174 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10175 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10176 match events_a[0] {
10177 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10178 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10183 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10184 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10185 match events_b[0] {
10186 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10187 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10192 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10193 macro_rules! send_payment {
10194 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10195 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10196 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10197 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10198 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10199 payment_count += 1;
10200 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10201 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10203 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10204 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10205 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10206 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10207 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10208 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10209 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10210 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10211 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10212 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10213 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10216 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10217 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10218 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10220 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10221 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10222 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10223 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10224 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10226 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10229 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10230 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10231 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10232 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10234 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10238 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10239 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10240 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);