1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
451 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
452 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
453 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
454 // commitment upon reconnecting.
455 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
457 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
460 err: LightningError { err, action },
461 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
462 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
463 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
467 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
470 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
472 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
473 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
477 log_level: Level::Warn,
480 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
482 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
484 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
486 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
487 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
495 shutdown_finish: None,
496 channel_capacity: None,
500 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
501 self.chan_id.is_some()
505 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
506 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
507 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
508 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
509 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
511 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
512 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
513 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
514 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
515 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
516 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
517 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
519 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
523 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
524 struct ClaimingPayment {
526 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
527 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
528 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
529 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
531 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
532 (0, amount_msat, required),
533 (2, payment_purpose, required),
534 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
535 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
536 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
539 struct ClaimablePayment {
540 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
541 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
542 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
545 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
546 struct ClaimablePayments {
547 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
548 /// failed/claimed by the user.
550 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
551 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
553 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
554 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
555 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
557 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
558 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
559 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
560 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
563 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
564 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
565 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
566 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
567 enum BackgroundEvent {
568 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
569 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
570 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
571 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
573 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
574 /// are regenerated on startup.
575 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
576 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
577 /// channel to continue normal operation.
579 /// In general this should be used rather than
580 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
581 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
582 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
584 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
585 /// are regenerated on startup.
586 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
587 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
588 funding_txo: OutPoint,
589 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
591 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
592 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
594 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
595 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
596 channel_id: ChannelId,
601 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
602 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
603 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
604 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
605 /// event can be generated.
606 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
607 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
608 /// operation of another channel.
610 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
611 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
612 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
613 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
615 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
616 event: events::Event,
617 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
621 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
622 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
623 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
624 (0, event, upgradable_required),
625 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
626 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
627 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
628 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
629 // downgrades to prior versions.
630 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
634 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
635 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
636 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
637 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
638 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
641 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
642 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
643 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
644 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
648 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
649 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
650 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
651 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
652 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
653 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
655 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
656 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
657 channel_id: ChannelId,
658 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
663 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
664 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
665 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
666 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
667 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
672 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
673 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
677 /// State we hold per-peer.
678 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
679 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
681 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
682 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
683 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
685 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
686 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
687 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
688 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
689 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
690 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
691 latest_features: InitFeatures,
692 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
693 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
694 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
695 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
696 /// user but which have not yet completed.
698 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
699 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
700 /// for a missing channel.
701 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
702 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
703 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
705 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
706 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
707 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
708 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
710 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
711 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
712 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
713 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
714 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
715 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
716 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
717 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
718 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
719 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
720 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
721 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
722 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
723 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
724 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
728 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
729 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
730 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
731 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
732 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
733 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
736 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
737 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
738 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
741 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
742 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
743 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
746 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
747 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
748 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
749 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
753 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
754 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
755 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
756 /// The original OpenChannel message.
757 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
758 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
759 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
762 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
763 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
764 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
766 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
767 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
769 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
772 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
773 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
774 struct PendingInboundPayment {
775 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
776 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
777 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
778 /// this payment being removed.
780 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
781 user_payment_id: u64,
782 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
783 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
784 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
787 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
788 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
789 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
790 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
791 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
792 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
793 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
794 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
796 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
797 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
805 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
807 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
808 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
809 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
814 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
815 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
816 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
817 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
818 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
819 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
820 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
821 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
822 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
824 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
825 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
834 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
836 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
837 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
838 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
843 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
845 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
847 pub trait AChannelManager {
848 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
849 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
850 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
851 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
852 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
853 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
854 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
855 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
856 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
857 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
858 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
859 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
860 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
861 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
862 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
863 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
864 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
865 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
866 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
867 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
868 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
869 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
870 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
871 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
872 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
873 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
874 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
875 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
876 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
877 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
878 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
879 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
880 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
881 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
882 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
883 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
886 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
887 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
889 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
890 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
891 ES::Target: EntropySource,
892 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
893 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
898 type Watch = M::Target;
900 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
902 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
904 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
906 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
907 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
909 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
911 type Router = R::Target;
913 type Logger = L::Target;
915 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
918 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
919 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
921 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
922 /// to individual Channels.
924 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
925 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
926 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
927 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
929 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
930 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
931 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
932 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
933 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
934 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
935 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
936 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
937 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
939 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
940 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
941 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
943 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
944 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
945 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
946 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
947 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
949 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
950 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
951 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
952 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
954 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
955 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
956 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
958 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
959 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
960 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
961 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
962 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
964 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
965 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
966 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
967 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
968 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
969 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
970 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
971 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
974 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
975 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
976 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
977 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
978 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
982 // `total_consistency_lock`
984 // |__`forward_htlcs`
986 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
988 // |__`per_peer_state`
990 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
992 // | |__`claimable_payments`
994 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1000 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
1002 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1004 // | |__`best_block`
1006 // | |__`pending_events`
1008 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1010 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1012 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1013 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1014 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1015 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1016 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1017 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1021 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1022 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1023 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1029 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1031 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1033 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1034 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1036 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1037 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1038 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1039 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1041 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1042 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1044 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1045 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1046 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1047 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1048 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1049 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1050 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1051 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1053 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1055 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1056 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1058 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1060 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1061 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1062 /// and via the classic SCID.
1064 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1065 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1067 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1071 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1072 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1073 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1075 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1076 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1078 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1079 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1081 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1082 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1084 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1085 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1086 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1087 /// active channel list on load.
1089 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1090 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1092 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1094 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1095 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1096 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1098 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1099 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1100 /// the handling of the events.
1102 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1103 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1106 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1107 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1108 /// would break backwards compatability.
1109 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1110 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1111 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1113 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1116 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1118 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1119 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1120 /// confirmation depth.
1122 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1123 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1124 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1126 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1128 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1130 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1132 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1134 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1136 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1137 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1138 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1140 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1141 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1143 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1144 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1145 /// keeping additional state.
1146 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1148 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1149 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1150 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1151 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1153 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1154 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1156 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1157 /// are currently open with that peer.
1159 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1160 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1163 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1165 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1166 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1167 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1168 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1169 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1171 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1172 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1173 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1174 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1175 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1177 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1178 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1180 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1181 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1182 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1183 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1184 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1186 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1187 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1189 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1190 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1191 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1192 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1193 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1195 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1197 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1199 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1200 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1201 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1202 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1203 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1204 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1205 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1206 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1207 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1208 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1209 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1211 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1212 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1213 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1215 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1217 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1218 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1222 signer_provider: SP,
1227 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1229 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1230 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1231 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1232 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1233 pub struct ChainParameters {
1234 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1235 pub network: Network,
1237 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1239 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1240 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1243 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1247 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1248 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1251 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1252 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1253 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1254 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1255 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1256 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1258 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1259 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1260 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1261 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1262 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1263 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1265 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1266 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1269 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1270 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1271 /// events to handle.
1273 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1274 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1276 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1277 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1280 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1281 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1282 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1283 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1285 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1286 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1287 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1288 should_persist: move || {
1289 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1290 // processing and return that.
1291 let notify = persist_check();
1292 match (notify, force_notify) {
1293 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1294 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1295 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1296 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1297 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1300 _read_guard: read_guard,
1304 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1305 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1306 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1307 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1308 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1309 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1311 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1312 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1313 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1314 should_persist: persist_check,
1315 _read_guard: read_guard,
1320 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1321 fn drop(&mut self) {
1322 match (self.should_persist)() {
1323 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1324 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1325 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1327 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1328 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1329 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1334 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1335 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1337 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1339 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1340 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1341 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1342 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1343 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1345 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1346 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1348 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1350 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1351 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1352 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1353 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1354 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1355 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1356 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1357 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1358 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1359 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1360 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1361 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1362 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1364 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1365 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1367 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1368 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1369 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1370 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1372 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1373 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1374 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1375 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1376 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1377 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1380 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1382 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1383 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1386 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1388 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1389 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1391 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1392 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1393 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1395 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1396 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1397 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1399 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1400 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1401 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1402 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1404 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1405 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1406 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1408 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1409 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1410 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1412 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1413 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1414 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1415 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1416 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1417 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1418 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1419 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1420 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1421 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1422 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1425 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1426 /// to better separate parameters.
1427 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1428 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1429 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1430 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1431 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1432 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1433 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1434 pub features: InitFeatures,
1435 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1436 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1437 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1439 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1441 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1442 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1443 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1444 /// payments to us through this channel.
1445 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1446 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1447 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1448 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1449 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1450 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1451 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1454 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1455 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1456 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1457 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1458 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1459 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1460 /// lifetime of the channel.
1461 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1462 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1463 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1464 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1465 /// our counterparty already.
1467 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1468 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1469 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1470 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1472 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1473 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1474 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1475 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1477 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1478 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1480 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1481 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1483 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1484 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1485 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1486 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1487 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1488 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1489 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1490 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1491 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1494 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1496 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1497 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1498 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1499 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1500 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1501 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1502 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1504 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1505 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1507 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1508 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1509 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1510 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1511 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1512 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1513 /// this value on chain.
1515 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1517 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1519 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1520 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1521 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1522 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1523 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1524 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1525 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1527 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1528 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1529 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1530 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1531 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1532 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1534 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1535 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1536 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1537 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1538 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1540 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1541 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1542 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1543 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1545 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1546 pub balance_msat: u64,
1547 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1548 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1549 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1550 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1552 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1554 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1555 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1556 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1557 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1558 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1559 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1560 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1561 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1563 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1564 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1565 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1566 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1567 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1568 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1569 /// route which is valid.
1570 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1571 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1572 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1573 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1574 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1575 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1577 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1578 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1579 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1580 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1581 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1582 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1583 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1584 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1585 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1587 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1589 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1590 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1591 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1592 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1593 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1595 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1596 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1597 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1598 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1599 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1600 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1601 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1603 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1604 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1605 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1606 pub is_outbound: bool,
1607 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1608 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1609 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1610 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1611 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1613 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1614 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1615 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1616 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1617 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1618 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1619 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1621 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1622 pub is_usable: bool,
1623 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1624 pub is_public: bool,
1625 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1626 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1627 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1628 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1629 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1630 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1632 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1633 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1636 impl ChannelDetails {
1637 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1638 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1639 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1641 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1642 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1643 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1644 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1647 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1648 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1649 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1651 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1652 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1653 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1654 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1657 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1658 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1659 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1662 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1663 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1665 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1666 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1667 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1669 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1670 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1671 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1672 features: latest_features,
1673 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1674 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1675 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1676 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1677 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1678 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1679 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1680 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1681 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1682 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1684 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1685 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1686 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1687 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1688 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1689 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1690 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1691 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1692 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1693 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1694 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1695 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1696 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1697 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1698 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1699 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1700 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1701 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1702 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1703 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1704 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1705 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1706 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1707 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1708 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1709 config: Some(context.config()),
1710 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1715 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1716 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1717 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1718 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1719 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1720 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1721 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1722 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1723 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1725 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1727 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1728 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1730 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1731 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1732 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1733 /// to drop the channel.
1737 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1738 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1739 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1740 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1741 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1743 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1744 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1745 payment_id: PaymentId,
1747 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1749 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1750 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1751 payment_id: PaymentId,
1752 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1754 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1755 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1756 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1759 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1760 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1761 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1763 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1764 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1765 payment_id: PaymentId,
1766 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1767 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1768 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1770 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1771 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1772 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1774 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1775 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1776 payment_id: PaymentId,
1777 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1778 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1782 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1784 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1786 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1787 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1788 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1789 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1791 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1792 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1793 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1796 macro_rules! handle_error {
1797 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1798 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1799 // entering the macro.
1800 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1801 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1805 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1806 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1808 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1809 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1810 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1811 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1815 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1816 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1817 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1818 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1819 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1820 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1825 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1826 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1828 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1829 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1830 action: err.action.clone()
1834 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1835 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1836 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1837 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1842 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1847 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1850 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1851 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1852 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1858 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1859 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1860 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1861 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1862 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1863 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1865 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1866 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1867 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1868 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1869 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1871 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1872 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1874 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1878 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1879 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1880 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1882 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1883 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1885 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1886 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1888 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1889 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1890 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1891 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1892 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1893 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1895 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1896 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1900 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1901 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1903 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1904 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1906 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1907 match $channel_phase {
1908 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1909 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1911 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1912 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1915 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1921 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1922 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1926 let key = *$entry.key();
1927 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1929 $entry.remove_entry();
1937 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1938 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1942 let key = *$entry.key();
1943 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1945 $entry.remove_entry();
1953 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1954 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1956 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1957 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1963 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1964 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1965 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1966 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1967 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1969 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1970 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1971 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1972 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1973 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1974 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1975 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1976 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1977 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1978 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1983 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1984 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1985 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1986 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1987 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1988 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1989 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1990 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1991 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1993 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1998 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1999 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2000 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2001 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2002 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2003 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2004 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2005 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2006 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2008 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2013 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2014 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2015 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2016 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2017 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2018 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2019 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2020 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2021 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2022 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2023 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2025 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2026 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2027 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2033 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2034 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2036 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2037 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2038 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2039 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2040 updates.announcement_sigs);
2041 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2042 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2045 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2046 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2047 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2048 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2050 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2051 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2052 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2053 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2054 let mut batch_completed = false;
2055 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2056 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2057 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2058 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2060 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2061 channel_state.2 = true;
2063 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2065 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2067 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2070 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2071 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2072 if batch_completed {
2073 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2074 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2075 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2076 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2077 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2078 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2079 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2080 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2081 chan.set_batch_ready();
2082 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2083 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2087 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2088 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2089 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2094 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2096 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2097 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2099 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2100 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2101 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2102 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2107 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2108 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2109 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2111 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2112 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2113 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2114 panic!("{}", err_str);
2116 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2117 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2118 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2121 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2127 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2128 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2129 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2131 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2132 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2133 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2134 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2135 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2136 // filter for uniqueness here.
2137 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2138 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2139 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2140 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2142 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2143 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2145 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2146 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2147 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2153 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2154 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2155 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2156 while !processed_all_events {
2157 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2164 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2165 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2166 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2168 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2169 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2170 result = $self.process_background_events();
2172 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2173 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2174 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2175 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2179 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2180 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2181 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2182 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2185 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2187 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2188 $event_to_handle = event;
2190 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2191 post_event_actions.push(action);
2196 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2197 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2198 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2199 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2200 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2201 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2204 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2205 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2206 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2207 processed_all_events = false;
2211 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2212 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2213 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2215 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2216 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2217 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2223 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2225 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2227 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2228 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2229 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2230 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2234 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2236 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2238 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2239 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2241 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2243 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2244 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2245 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2248 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2249 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2250 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2252 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2253 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2254 current_timestamp: u32,
2256 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2257 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2258 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2259 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2261 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2262 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2263 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2268 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2270 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2271 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2272 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2273 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2274 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2275 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2276 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2277 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2279 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2282 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2283 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2285 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2287 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2289 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2291 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2292 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2293 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2294 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2295 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2296 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2297 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2298 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2308 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2309 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2310 &self.default_configuration
2313 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2314 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2315 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2318 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2319 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2321 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2323 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2327 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2332 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2334 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2335 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2336 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2337 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2338 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2340 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2341 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2343 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2344 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2345 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2347 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2348 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2349 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2351 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2352 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2353 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2354 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2355 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2356 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2358 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2359 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2360 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2361 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2362 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2363 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2367 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2368 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2372 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2373 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2375 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2377 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2378 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2379 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2380 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2381 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2382 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2386 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2391 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2393 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2394 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2397 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2399 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2405 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2406 node_id: their_network_key,
2409 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2412 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2413 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2414 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2415 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2416 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2417 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2418 // the same channel.
2419 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2423 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2424 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2425 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2426 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2427 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2428 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2429 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2433 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2434 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2435 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2443 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2444 /// more information.
2445 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2446 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2447 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2448 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2449 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2450 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2451 // the same channel.
2452 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2454 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2456 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2459 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2460 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2461 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2469 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2470 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2472 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2473 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2475 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2476 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2477 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2478 // really wanted anyway.
2479 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2482 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2483 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2484 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2485 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2487 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2488 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2489 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2490 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2491 let context_to_details = |context| {
2492 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2494 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2496 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2497 .map(context_to_details)
2503 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2504 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2506 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2507 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2508 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2510 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2511 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2512 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2513 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2514 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2515 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2517 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2518 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2519 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2522 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2523 payment_id: *payment_id,
2524 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2525 total_msat: *total_msat,
2528 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2529 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2531 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2532 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2534 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2539 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2540 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2541 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2542 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2543 Some(transaction) => {
2544 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2545 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2550 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2551 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2552 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2553 reason: closure_reason,
2554 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2555 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2559 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2562 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2563 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2565 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2567 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2568 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2573 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2575 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2576 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2577 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2578 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2579 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2580 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2581 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2583 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2584 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2585 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2586 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2587 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2591 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2592 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2594 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2595 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2596 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2597 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2601 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2602 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2603 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2604 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2608 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2609 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2616 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2617 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2619 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2620 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2625 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2626 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2627 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2628 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2631 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2632 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2638 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2639 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2640 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2642 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2643 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2645 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2646 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2647 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2648 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2650 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2652 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2653 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2654 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2657 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2658 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2659 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2660 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2661 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2662 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2665 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2666 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2667 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2669 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2670 /// the channel being closed or not:
2671 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2672 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2673 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2674 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2675 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2676 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2677 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2679 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2680 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2681 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2682 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2684 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2686 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2687 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2688 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2691 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2692 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2693 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2694 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2695 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2696 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2699 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2700 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2701 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2702 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2703 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2706 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2707 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2708 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2709 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2710 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2711 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2712 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2714 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2715 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2716 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2717 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2718 // ignore the result here.
2719 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2721 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2722 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2723 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2724 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2725 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2726 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2727 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2728 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2729 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2730 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2731 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2732 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2733 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2736 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2739 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2740 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2743 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2744 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2748 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2749 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2750 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2751 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2753 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2754 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2755 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2756 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2757 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2758 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2760 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2762 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2763 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2764 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2765 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2766 mem::drop(peer_state);
2767 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2769 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2770 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2771 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2773 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2774 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2775 // Unfunded channel has no update
2776 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2779 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2780 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2781 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2782 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2784 (None, *peer_node_id)
2786 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2789 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2790 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2791 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2793 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2794 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2795 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2796 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2797 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2803 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2806 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2808 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2809 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2811 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2812 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2813 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2814 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2815 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2816 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2817 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2828 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2829 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2830 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2832 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2833 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2834 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2837 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2838 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2839 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2841 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2842 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2843 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2844 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2845 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2848 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2849 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2850 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2851 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2852 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2856 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2857 /// local transaction(s).
2858 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2859 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2860 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2864 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2865 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2866 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2867 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2868 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2869 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2870 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2872 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2873 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2877 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2878 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2879 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2880 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2881 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2882 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2883 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2884 err_data: Vec::new(),
2888 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2889 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2890 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2893 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2894 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2895 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2896 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2897 outgoing_cltv_value,
2898 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2902 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2903 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2904 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2905 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2906 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2907 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2908 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2909 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2911 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2912 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2913 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2915 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2916 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2918 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2919 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2920 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2921 err_data: Vec::new(),
2922 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2926 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2927 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2928 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2929 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2931 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2934 // final_expiry_too_soon
2935 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2936 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2938 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2939 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2940 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2941 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2942 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2943 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2944 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2945 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2946 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2947 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2948 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2951 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2952 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2953 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2955 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2957 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2958 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2962 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2963 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2964 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2965 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2966 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2967 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2968 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2969 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2970 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2971 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2972 err_data: Vec::new(),
2973 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2976 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2977 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2978 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2979 err_data: Vec::new(),
2980 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2983 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2987 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2990 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2991 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2994 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2995 phantom_shared_secret,
2999 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3000 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3001 err_data: Vec::new(),
3002 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3005 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3008 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3009 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3010 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3011 outgoing_cltv_value,
3012 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3016 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3017 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3018 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3019 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3020 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3022 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3023 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3024 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3025 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3026 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3027 failure_code: $err_code,
3033 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3034 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3037 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3038 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3039 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3041 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3042 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3043 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3044 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3045 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3046 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3047 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3048 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3050 macro_rules! return_err {
3051 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3053 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3054 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3055 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3056 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3057 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3058 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3064 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3065 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3066 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3069 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3070 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3072 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3073 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3076 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3077 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3078 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3079 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3082 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3083 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3084 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3086 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3087 // inbound channel's state.
3088 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3089 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3090 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3092 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3096 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3097 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3098 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3099 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3100 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3101 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3102 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3103 // phantom or an intercept.
3104 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3105 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3106 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3110 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3115 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3116 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3117 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3118 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3119 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3123 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3124 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3127 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3128 // have no consistency guarantees.
3129 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3133 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3134 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3135 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3136 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3137 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3139 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3140 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3141 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3142 // we don't have the channel here.
3143 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3145 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3147 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3148 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3149 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3150 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3151 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3152 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3153 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3154 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3155 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3156 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3157 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3159 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3162 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3163 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3165 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3166 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3170 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3171 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3172 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3173 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3175 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3182 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3183 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3184 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3185 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3186 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3187 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3189 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3190 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3192 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3193 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3194 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3195 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3196 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3197 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3198 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3199 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3200 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3201 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3207 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3208 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3209 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3210 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3212 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3213 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3215 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3216 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3217 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3219 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3220 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3221 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3222 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3223 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3224 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3225 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3229 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3231 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3234 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3235 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3236 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3237 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3238 macro_rules! return_err {
3239 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3241 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3242 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3243 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3244 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3245 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3246 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3252 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3254 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3255 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3258 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3259 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3260 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3261 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3262 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3264 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3267 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3268 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3269 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3270 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3271 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3277 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3278 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3279 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3281 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3282 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3283 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3285 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3286 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3287 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3288 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3289 return Err(LightningError {
3290 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3291 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3294 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3295 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3298 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3301 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3302 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3303 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3304 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3306 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3307 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3308 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3310 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3311 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3312 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3314 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3315 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3319 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3322 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3324 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3326 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3327 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3328 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3329 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3330 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3333 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3334 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3336 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3337 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3338 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3339 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3340 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3341 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3342 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3343 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3345 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3346 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3347 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3349 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3351 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3358 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3359 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3360 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3361 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3366 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3367 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3368 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3371 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3372 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3374 log_trace!(self.logger,
3375 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3376 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3377 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3378 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3380 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3381 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3382 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3384 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3385 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3387 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3388 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3389 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3390 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3394 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3395 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3398 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3399 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3400 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3401 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3402 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3404 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3405 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3406 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3408 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3409 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3411 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3412 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3413 Some(monitor_update) => {
3414 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3416 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3417 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3418 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3419 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3420 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3421 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3422 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3430 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3433 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3434 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3435 // `channel_by_id` map.
3436 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3437 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3442 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3443 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3445 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3450 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3452 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3453 /// fields for more info.
3455 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3456 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3458 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3460 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3461 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3462 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3463 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3464 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3466 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3467 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3468 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3469 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3470 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3472 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3473 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3474 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3475 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3477 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3479 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3480 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3481 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3483 /// In general, a path may raise:
3484 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3485 /// node public key) is specified.
3486 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3487 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3488 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3489 /// relevant updates.
3491 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3492 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3493 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3495 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3496 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3497 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3498 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3499 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3500 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3501 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3502 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3504 self.pending_outbound_payments
3505 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3506 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3507 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3510 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3511 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3512 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3513 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3515 self.pending_outbound_payments
3516 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3517 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3518 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3519 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3523 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3524 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3526 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3527 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3528 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3532 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3533 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3534 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3538 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3539 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3543 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3544 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3545 /// retries are exhausted.
3547 /// # Event Generation
3549 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3550 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3552 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3553 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3554 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3556 /// # Restart Behavior
3558 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3559 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3560 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3562 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3565 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3566 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3567 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3568 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3569 /// never reach the recipient.
3571 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3572 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3574 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3575 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3577 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3578 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3579 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3582 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3583 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3586 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3587 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3589 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3592 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3593 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3594 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3596 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3597 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3598 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3599 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3602 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3603 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3604 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3605 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3606 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3608 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3609 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3610 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3613 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3616 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3617 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3620 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3621 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3623 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3624 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3625 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3626 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3627 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3628 let payment_params =
3629 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3631 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3633 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3636 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3637 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3639 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3640 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3641 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3642 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3644 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3645 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3646 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3647 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3648 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3649 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3650 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3651 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3652 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3653 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3655 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3656 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3657 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3658 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3662 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3664 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3665 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3668 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3670 let mut res = Vec::new();
3672 for mut path in route.paths {
3673 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3674 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3675 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3676 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3677 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3680 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3683 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3684 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3686 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3688 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3689 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3694 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3697 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3702 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3703 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3704 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3706 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3707 let used_liquidity =
3708 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3710 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3711 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3713 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3716 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3721 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3722 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3723 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3730 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3731 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3732 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3733 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3734 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3735 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3737 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3738 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3742 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3743 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3744 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3746 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3747 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3748 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3749 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3750 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3751 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3752 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3753 } else { unreachable!(); });
3755 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3756 Err((chan, err)) => {
3757 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3758 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3760 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3761 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3762 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3768 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3769 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3771 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3772 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3775 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3776 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3777 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3781 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3782 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3785 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3787 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3790 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3791 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3792 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3794 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3801 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3802 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3803 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3807 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3809 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3810 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3812 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3813 /// across the p2p network.
3815 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3816 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3818 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3819 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3820 /// keys per-channel).
3822 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3823 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3824 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3826 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3827 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3828 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3830 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3831 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3832 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3833 /// for more details.
3835 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3836 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3837 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3838 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3841 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3843 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3844 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3846 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3847 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3848 /// signature for each channel.
3850 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3851 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3853 let mut result = Ok(());
3855 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3856 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3857 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3858 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3859 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3864 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3865 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3866 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3870 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3871 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3872 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3873 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3874 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3875 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3876 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3877 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3882 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3883 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3884 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3885 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3889 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3890 match states.entry(txid) {
3891 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3892 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3893 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3897 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3900 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3901 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3902 temporary_channel_id,
3903 counterparty_node_id,
3904 funding_transaction.clone(),
3907 let mut output_index = None;
3908 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3909 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3910 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3911 if output_index.is_some() {
3912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3913 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3916 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3919 if output_index.is_none() {
3920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3921 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3924 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3925 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3926 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3932 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3933 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3934 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3935 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3936 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3937 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3938 .into_iter().flatten()
3939 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3941 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3942 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3944 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3947 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3948 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3949 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3950 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3952 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3953 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3954 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3958 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3959 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3965 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3967 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3968 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3969 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3970 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3972 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3973 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3975 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3976 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3978 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3980 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3981 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3982 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3983 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3984 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3985 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3986 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3987 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3988 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3989 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3990 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3991 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3992 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3998 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3999 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4002 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4003 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4004 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4005 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4009 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4010 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4011 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4012 config.apply(config_update);
4013 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4016 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4017 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4018 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4019 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4020 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4021 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4028 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4029 debug_assert!(false);
4030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4032 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4033 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4040 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4042 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4043 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4044 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4045 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4047 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4048 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4050 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4051 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4053 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4055 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4056 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4057 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4058 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4059 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4060 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4061 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4062 pub fn update_channel_config(
4063 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4064 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4065 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4068 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4069 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4071 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4072 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4074 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4075 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4076 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4077 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4078 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4080 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4081 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4082 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4085 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4088 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4089 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4090 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4091 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4092 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4093 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4096 let next_hop_scid = {
4097 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4098 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4099 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4102 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4103 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4104 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4105 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4106 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4109 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4111 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4112 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4113 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4115 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4116 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
4117 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4122 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4123 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4124 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4127 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4128 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4129 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4131 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4133 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4134 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4135 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4136 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4137 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4140 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4141 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4142 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4143 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4144 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4146 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4150 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4151 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4153 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4156 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4157 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4160 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4161 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4162 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4165 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4166 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4167 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4168 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4169 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4170 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4172 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4175 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4176 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4177 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4178 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4183 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4185 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4186 /// Will likely generate further events.
4187 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4190 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4191 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4192 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4194 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4195 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4197 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4198 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4199 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4201 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4202 match forward_info {
4203 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4204 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4205 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4206 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4207 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4210 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4211 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4214 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4215 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4216 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4217 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4218 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4219 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4220 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4223 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4224 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4226 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4229 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4230 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4236 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4237 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4239 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4243 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4244 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4246 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4250 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4251 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4252 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4253 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4254 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4255 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4256 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4259 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4260 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4261 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4262 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4263 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4265 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4267 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4268 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4272 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4273 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4274 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4275 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4277 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4278 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4284 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4287 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4290 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4291 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4292 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4293 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4294 // problem, not ours.
4300 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4301 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4303 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4308 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4309 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4310 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4315 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4316 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4317 match forward_info {
4318 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4319 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4320 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4321 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4322 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4325 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4326 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4327 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4328 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4329 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4330 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4332 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4333 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4335 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4336 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4337 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4340 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4343 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4345 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4346 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4347 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4348 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4353 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4354 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4356 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4358 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4359 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4361 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4364 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4366 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4367 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4368 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4375 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4379 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4380 match forward_info {
4381 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4382 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4383 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4384 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4385 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4388 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4389 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4390 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4391 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4392 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4393 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4394 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4396 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4397 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4398 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4402 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4403 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4406 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4409 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4410 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4411 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4412 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4413 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4414 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4415 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4416 phantom_shared_secret,
4418 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4419 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4420 // if routing nodes overpay
4421 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4422 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4424 total_value_received: None,
4425 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4428 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4431 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4433 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4434 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4435 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4436 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4437 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4438 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4440 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4441 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4442 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4443 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4444 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4445 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4446 phantom_shared_secret,
4448 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4449 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4451 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4454 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4455 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4456 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4457 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4458 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4461 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4462 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4463 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4464 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4465 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4466 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4468 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4469 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4472 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4473 .entry(payment_hash)
4474 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4475 .or_insert_with(|| {
4476 committed_to_claimable = true;
4478 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4481 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4482 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4484 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4486 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4488 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4490 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4491 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4492 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4495 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4497 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4498 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4499 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4500 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4501 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4502 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4503 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4505 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4506 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4508 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4510 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4511 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4512 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4513 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4514 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4515 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4517 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4518 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4519 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4520 committed_to_claimable = true;
4522 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4523 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4524 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4525 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4526 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4527 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4528 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4529 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4530 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4531 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4535 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4536 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4537 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4538 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4539 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4541 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4543 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4544 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4546 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4547 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4548 committed_to_claimable = true;
4551 payment_claimable_generated
4555 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4556 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4557 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4558 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4559 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4560 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4561 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4562 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4564 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4565 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4566 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4567 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4568 Ok(result) => result,
4570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4571 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4574 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4575 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4576 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4578 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4579 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4582 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4583 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4584 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4586 check_total_value!(purpose);
4588 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4589 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4590 check_total_value!(purpose);
4594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4595 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4596 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4597 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4599 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4600 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4602 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4603 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4605 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4606 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4608 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4609 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4610 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4612 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4613 if payment_claimable_generated {
4614 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4620 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4621 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4629 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4630 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4631 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4632 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4634 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4637 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4639 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4640 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4641 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4643 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4645 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4646 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4647 events.append(&mut new_events);
4650 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4652 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4653 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4654 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4656 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4658 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4659 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4660 if background_events.is_empty() {
4661 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4664 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4666 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4667 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4668 // monitor updating completing.
4669 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4671 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4672 let mut updated_chan = false;
4674 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4675 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4680 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4681 updated_chan = true;
4682 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4683 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4685 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4693 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4694 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4697 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4698 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4699 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4702 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4703 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4705 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4706 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4707 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4708 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4709 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4715 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4718 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4719 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4720 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4721 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4722 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4725 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4726 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4727 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4728 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4729 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4731 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4733 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4735 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4737 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4738 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4741 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4743 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4744 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4748 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4749 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4750 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4751 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4752 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4753 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4754 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4756 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4757 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4760 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4761 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4762 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4763 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4764 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4766 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4771 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4772 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4780 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4782 /// This currently includes:
4783 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4784 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4785 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4787 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4788 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4789 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4790 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4792 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4793 /// estimate fetches.
4795 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4796 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4797 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4798 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4799 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4801 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4802 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4804 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4805 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4806 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4807 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4809 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4810 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4811 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4812 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4813 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4816 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4817 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4818 log_error!(self.logger,
4819 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4820 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4821 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4822 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4823 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4824 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4825 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4826 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4827 channel_id: *chan_id,
4828 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4839 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4840 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4843 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4844 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4845 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4847 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4848 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4853 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4854 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4856 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4857 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4858 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4859 if needs_close { return false; }
4862 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4863 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4864 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4865 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4866 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4867 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4868 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4869 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4871 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4872 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4873 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4874 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4878 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4880 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4883 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4885 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4886 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4887 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4888 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4892 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4894 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4900 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4902 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4903 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4904 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4905 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4906 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4907 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4908 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4909 channel_id: *chan_id,
4910 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4919 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4920 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4923 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4924 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4929 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4930 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4931 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4932 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4933 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4934 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4935 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4936 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4942 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4944 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4945 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4950 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4951 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4952 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4953 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4954 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4955 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4956 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4957 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4958 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4959 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4960 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4962 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4963 // have no channels to the peer.
4964 let remove_entry = {
4965 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4966 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4969 entry.remove_entry();
4972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4977 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4978 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4979 // This should be unreachable
4980 debug_assert!(false);
4983 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4984 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4985 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4986 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4987 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4988 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4989 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4992 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4993 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4994 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4996 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4997 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5004 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5005 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5006 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5007 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5008 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5011 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5012 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5015 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5016 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5019 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
5021 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5022 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5023 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5024 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5025 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5032 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5033 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5034 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5036 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5037 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5038 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5039 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5041 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5042 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5043 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5044 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5045 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5046 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5049 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5050 /// reason for the failure.
5052 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5053 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5056 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5057 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5058 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5059 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5060 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5061 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5062 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5067 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5068 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5069 match failure_code {
5070 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5071 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5072 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5073 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5074 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5075 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5077 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5078 let fail_data = match data {
5079 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5082 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5087 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5088 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5090 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5092 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5093 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5094 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5095 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5096 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5097 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5098 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5100 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5102 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5103 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5105 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5110 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5111 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5112 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5113 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5114 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5115 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5116 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5117 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5118 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5119 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5121 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5122 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5123 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5124 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5126 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5127 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5128 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5129 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5130 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5134 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5135 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5136 // be surfaced to the user.
5137 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5138 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5139 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5141 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5143 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5144 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5145 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5146 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5147 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5148 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5149 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5151 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5152 debug_assert!(false);
5153 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5156 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5158 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5161 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5162 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5163 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5164 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5168 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5169 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5170 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5171 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5172 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5173 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5174 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5175 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5176 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5177 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5180 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5181 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5182 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5185 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5186 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5187 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5189 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5190 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5191 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5192 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5193 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5195 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5197 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5199 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5200 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5201 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5202 push_forward_ev = true;
5204 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5206 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5209 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5212 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5213 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5214 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5215 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5216 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5217 failed_next_destination: destination,
5223 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5224 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5226 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5227 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5228 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5229 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5231 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5232 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5233 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5234 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5236 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5237 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5238 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5240 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5241 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5242 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5243 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5244 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5245 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5246 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5247 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5248 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5251 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5252 /// even type numbers.
5256 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5257 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5259 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5260 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5261 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5264 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5265 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5270 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5271 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5272 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5273 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5274 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5275 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5276 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5277 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5282 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5283 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5284 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5285 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5286 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5288 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5289 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5290 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5294 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5295 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5296 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5297 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5298 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5299 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5300 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5301 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5302 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5303 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5304 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5313 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5315 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5316 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5317 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5318 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5319 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5320 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5321 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5322 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5323 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5324 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5325 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5326 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5327 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5328 debug_assert!(false);
5332 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5334 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5335 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5336 debug_assert!(false);
5340 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5341 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5343 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5344 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5345 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5346 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5349 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5350 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5351 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5352 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5356 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5357 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5358 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5359 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5361 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5362 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5363 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5364 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5365 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5370 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5371 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5372 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5373 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5374 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5375 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5376 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5378 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5381 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5382 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5383 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5384 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5388 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5389 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5390 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5391 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5393 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5394 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5395 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5396 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5400 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5401 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5402 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5406 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5407 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5408 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5411 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5414 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5415 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5416 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5417 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5419 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5420 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5423 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5426 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5427 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5429 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5430 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5431 // monitor update as a background event.
5432 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5433 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5434 counterparty_node_id,
5435 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5436 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5445 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5446 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5447 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5453 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5454 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5455 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5456 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5457 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5458 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5459 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5460 // again on restart.
5461 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5462 payment_preimage, update_res);
5465 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5466 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5468 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5469 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5470 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5471 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5472 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5473 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5474 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5475 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5476 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5477 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5480 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5481 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5482 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5483 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5484 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5485 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5489 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5490 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5493 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5494 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5495 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5498 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5499 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5500 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5501 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5502 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5504 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5505 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5506 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5508 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5509 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5512 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5513 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5514 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5515 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5516 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5517 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5518 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5519 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5522 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5523 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5525 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5526 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5527 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5528 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5530 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5531 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5532 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5534 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5535 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5536 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5537 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5544 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5545 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5546 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5552 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5553 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5554 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5557 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5558 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5560 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5561 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5562 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5564 payment_purpose: purpose,
5567 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5569 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5573 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5575 sender_intended_total_msat,
5579 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5580 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5582 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5583 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5584 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5591 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5592 /// update completion.
5593 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5594 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5595 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5596 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5597 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5598 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5599 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5600 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5601 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5602 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5603 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5604 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5605 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5607 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5609 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5610 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5611 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5612 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5615 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5616 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5618 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5620 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5625 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5626 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5628 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5633 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5634 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5636 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5637 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5642 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5646 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5652 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5653 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5654 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5659 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5660 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5666 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5667 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5669 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5670 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5672 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5673 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5674 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5675 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5676 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5682 let mut peer_state_lock;
5683 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5684 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5685 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5688 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5691 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5692 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5693 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5694 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5695 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5698 let remaining_in_flight =
5699 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5700 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5703 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5704 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5705 remaining_in_flight);
5706 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5709 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5712 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5714 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5715 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5718 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5719 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5720 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5722 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5723 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5724 /// used to accept such channels.
5726 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5727 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5728 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5729 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5732 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5733 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5735 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5736 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5737 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5739 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5740 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5742 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5743 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5745 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5746 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5748 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5750 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5751 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5754 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5757 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5758 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5760 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5761 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5764 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5766 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5767 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5768 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5770 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5771 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5772 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5773 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5774 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5775 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5776 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5778 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5782 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5783 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5784 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5785 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5786 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5787 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5788 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5791 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5792 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5794 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5795 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5796 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5797 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5798 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5799 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5800 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5801 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5804 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5805 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5809 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5810 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5811 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5813 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5814 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5815 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5818 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5823 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5824 /// or 0-conf channels.
5826 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5827 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5828 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5829 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5830 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5831 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5833 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5834 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5835 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5836 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5837 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5838 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5839 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5843 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5846 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5847 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5849 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5850 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5852 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5853 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5854 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5855 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5856 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5858 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5861 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5862 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5863 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5866 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5867 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5872 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5875 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5876 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5877 // likely to be lost on restart!
5878 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5882 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5886 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5887 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5888 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5889 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5890 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5893 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5895 debug_assert!(false);
5896 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5901 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5902 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5903 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5904 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5905 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5906 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5908 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5909 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5910 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5913 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5914 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5916 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5917 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5920 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5921 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5926 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5927 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5928 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5929 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5930 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5931 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5932 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5933 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5934 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5936 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5937 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5938 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5943 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5944 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5945 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5946 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5947 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5948 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5949 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5957 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5958 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5961 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5965 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5966 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5968 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5969 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5970 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5972 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5976 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5977 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5978 // likely to be lost on restart!
5979 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5981 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5983 debug_assert!(false);
5984 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5986 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5987 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5988 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5990 match phase.get_mut() {
5991 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5992 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5993 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6003 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6004 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6005 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6006 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6007 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6009 user_channel_id: user_id,
6014 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6015 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6018 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6020 debug_assert!(false);
6021 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6026 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6027 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6028 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6029 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6031 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6032 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6033 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6034 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6035 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6036 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6037 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6039 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6043 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6044 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6046 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6049 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6051 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6054 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6055 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6057 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6058 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6059 funding_msg.channel_id))
6061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6062 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6063 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6064 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6065 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6067 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6068 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6069 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6070 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6071 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6072 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6076 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6077 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6078 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6080 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6084 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6085 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6086 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6087 funding_msg.channel_id));
6095 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6096 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6100 debug_assert!(false);
6101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6106 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6108 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6109 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6110 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6111 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6112 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6113 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6116 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6128 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6129 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6130 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6131 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6132 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6134 debug_assert!(false);
6135 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6139 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6141 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6142 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6143 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6144 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6145 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6146 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6147 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6148 msg: announcement_sigs,
6150 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6151 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6152 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6153 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6154 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6155 // announcement_signatures.
6156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6157 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6158 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6159 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6166 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6167 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6172 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6173 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6177 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6182 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6183 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6184 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6186 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6187 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6189 debug_assert!(false);
6190 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6194 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6195 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6197 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6198 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6199 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6201 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6204 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6205 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6206 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6207 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6209 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6210 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6211 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6212 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6214 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6218 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6219 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6220 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6221 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6224 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6225 let context = phase.context_mut();
6226 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6227 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6228 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6229 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6236 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6237 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6238 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6239 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6241 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6242 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6248 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6249 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6250 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6254 debug_assert!(false);
6255 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6257 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6260 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6262 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6263 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6264 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6265 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6266 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6267 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6272 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6273 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6274 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6275 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6276 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6277 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6278 } else { (tx, None) }
6280 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6281 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6287 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6288 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6289 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6291 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6292 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6293 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6294 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6295 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6299 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6300 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6302 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6303 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6304 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6309 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6310 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6311 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6312 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6314 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6315 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6316 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6317 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6319 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6320 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6322 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6324 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6326 debug_assert!(false);
6327 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6329 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6330 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6331 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6333 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6334 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6335 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6336 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6337 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6338 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6340 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6341 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6342 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6343 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6344 match pending_forward_info {
6345 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6346 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6347 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6348 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6350 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6351 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6352 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6353 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6354 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6357 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6359 _ => pending_forward_info
6362 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6364 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6365 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6373 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6375 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6376 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6377 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6379 debug_assert!(false);
6380 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6383 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6384 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6386 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6387 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6388 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6389 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6390 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6391 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6393 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6394 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6395 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6396 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6397 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6398 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6399 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6402 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6403 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6409 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6413 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6414 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6415 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6417 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6419 debug_assert!(false);
6420 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6424 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6426 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6427 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6429 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6430 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6438 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6439 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6440 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6442 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6444 debug_assert!(false);
6445 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6449 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6451 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6452 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6453 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6455 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6456 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6458 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6459 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6467 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6471 debug_assert!(false);
6472 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6476 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6478 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6479 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6480 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6481 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6482 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6483 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6487 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6488 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6496 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6497 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6498 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6499 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6500 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6501 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6502 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6503 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6504 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6505 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6506 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6508 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6509 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6511 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6512 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6513 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6515 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6516 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6519 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6520 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6522 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6523 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6524 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6526 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6527 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6528 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6529 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6530 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6533 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6534 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6537 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6538 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6539 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6540 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6541 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6542 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6543 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6544 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6547 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6548 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6549 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6554 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6555 // payments are being processed.
6556 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6557 push_forward_event = true;
6559 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6560 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6567 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6568 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6571 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6572 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6573 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6575 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6579 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6580 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6581 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6582 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6583 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6585 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6586 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6587 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6588 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6589 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6590 // real by taking more time.
6591 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6592 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6593 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6598 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6599 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6600 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6601 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6602 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6603 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6604 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6606 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6607 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6608 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6609 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6610 channel_funding_outpoint,
6611 counterparty_node_id,
6616 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6617 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6618 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6621 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6622 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6623 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6625 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6626 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6627 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6633 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6634 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6636 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6638 debug_assert!(false);
6639 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6640 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6642 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6644 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6645 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6646 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6647 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6648 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6649 *counterparty_node_id)
6651 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6652 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6653 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6654 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6655 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6656 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6657 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6661 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6662 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6668 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6672 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6676 debug_assert!(false);
6677 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6683 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6684 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6686 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6687 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6695 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6697 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6699 debug_assert!(false);
6700 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6702 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6703 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6704 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6706 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6707 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6711 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6712 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6713 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6714 msg, &self.default_configuration
6715 ), chan_phase_entry),
6716 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6717 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6718 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6721 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6722 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6730 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6731 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6732 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6733 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6735 // It's not a local channel
6736 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6740 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6741 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6742 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6748 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6749 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6750 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6751 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6752 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6753 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6754 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6758 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6759 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6760 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6761 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6763 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6764 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6765 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6768 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6772 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6773 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6776 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6778 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6781 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6783 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6786 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6788 debug_assert!(false);
6789 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6790 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6794 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6795 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6798 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6799 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6800 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6801 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6802 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6803 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6804 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6805 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6806 let mut channel_update = None;
6807 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6808 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6809 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6812 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6813 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6814 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6815 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6816 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6817 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6818 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6823 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6824 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6825 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6826 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6827 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6828 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6832 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6833 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6837 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6838 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6839 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6840 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6841 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6842 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6843 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6844 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6846 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6847 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6848 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6849 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6850 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6851 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6852 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6853 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6854 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6855 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6856 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6857 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6858 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6859 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6860 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6861 next_funding_txid: None,
6864 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6865 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6866 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6872 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6873 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6874 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6875 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6878 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6879 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6884 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6885 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6886 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6888 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6889 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6890 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6891 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6892 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6893 match monitor_event {
6894 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6895 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6897 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6899 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6900 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6901 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6902 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6905 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6906 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6907 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6909 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6910 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6911 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6912 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6915 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6917 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6920 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6921 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6922 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6923 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6924 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6925 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6929 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6930 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6931 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6932 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6933 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6941 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6942 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6948 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6949 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6952 has_pending_monitor_events
6955 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6956 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6957 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6959 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6961 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6964 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6965 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6966 /// update was applied.
6967 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6968 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6969 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6971 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6972 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6973 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6974 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6977 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6980 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6981 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6982 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6984 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6985 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6986 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6987 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6988 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6989 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6991 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6992 has_monitor_update = true;
6994 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6995 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6996 continue 'peer_loop;
7005 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7006 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7007 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7013 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7014 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7015 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7016 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7017 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7018 let mut has_update = false;
7019 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7023 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7026 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7027 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7029 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7030 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7031 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7032 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7033 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7035 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7036 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7039 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7040 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7041 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7048 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7050 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7051 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7052 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7053 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7059 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7060 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7065 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7071 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7072 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7075 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7076 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7082 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7083 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7085 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7086 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7087 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7088 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7089 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7090 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7091 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7092 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7093 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7094 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7095 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7096 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7097 assert!(should_broadcast);
7098 } else { unreachable!(); }
7099 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7100 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7101 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7104 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7108 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7111 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7112 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7114 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7115 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7116 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7117 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7119 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7121 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7122 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7126 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7127 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7129 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7131 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7132 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7134 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7135 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7136 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7137 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7138 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7139 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7140 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7141 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7142 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7143 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7144 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7147 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7148 /// stored external to LDK.
7150 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7151 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7152 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7154 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7155 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7158 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7159 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7160 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7161 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7163 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7164 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7165 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7166 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7167 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7169 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7170 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7171 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7172 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7173 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7175 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7176 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7178 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7179 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7183 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7184 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7186 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7188 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7189 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7191 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7192 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7193 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7194 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7195 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7196 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7197 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7200 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7201 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7203 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7204 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7205 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7208 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7209 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7211 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7212 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7213 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7214 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7216 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7217 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7218 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7219 Some(_) => continue,
7220 None => return scid_candidate
7225 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7227 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7228 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7230 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7231 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7232 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7236 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7237 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7238 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7240 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7241 /// times to get a unique scid.
7242 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7243 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7244 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7246 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7247 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7248 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7249 return scid_candidate
7253 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7254 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7255 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7256 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7259 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7260 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7261 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7262 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7263 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7265 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7266 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7267 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7276 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7277 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7278 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7279 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7280 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7284 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7285 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7286 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7287 events.push_back((event, None));
7291 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7292 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7293 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7297 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7298 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7302 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7303 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7306 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7307 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7308 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7309 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7310 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7313 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7314 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7317 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7318 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7319 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7320 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7322 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7326 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7327 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7328 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7329 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7330 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7332 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7336 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7337 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7338 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7339 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7340 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7341 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7342 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7343 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7344 if further_update_exists {
7345 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7351 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7356 log_debug!(self.logger,
7357 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7358 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7364 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7365 for action in actions {
7367 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7368 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7370 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7376 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7377 /// using the given event handler.
7379 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7380 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7384 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7388 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7390 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7391 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7392 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7393 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7394 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7395 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7399 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7400 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7401 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7402 /// is always placed next to each other.
7404 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7405 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7406 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7407 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7409 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7410 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7411 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7412 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7413 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7414 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7415 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7417 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7418 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7419 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7420 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7423 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7424 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7426 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7427 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7430 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7431 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7432 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7435 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7436 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7440 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7441 events.replace(pending_events);
7450 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7452 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7453 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7454 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7455 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7456 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7457 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7461 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7463 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7464 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7465 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7467 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7471 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7473 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7475 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7476 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7477 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7478 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7482 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7484 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7485 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7486 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7487 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7488 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7491 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7492 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7495 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7496 let _persistence_guard =
7497 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7498 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7499 let new_height = height - 1;
7501 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7502 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7503 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7504 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7505 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7506 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7509 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7513 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7515 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7516 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7517 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7518 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7519 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7524 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7525 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7526 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7527 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7529 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7530 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7532 let _persistence_guard =
7533 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7534 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7535 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7536 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7538 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7539 if height < last_best_block_height {
7540 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7541 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7545 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7546 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7547 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7548 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7550 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7551 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7553 let _persistence_guard =
7554 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7555 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7556 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7558 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7560 macro_rules! max_time {
7561 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7563 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7564 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7565 // having an explicit local time source.
7566 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7567 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7568 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7569 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7570 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7576 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7577 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7578 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7579 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7583 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7584 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7585 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7586 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7587 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7588 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7589 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7590 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7597 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7598 let _persistence_guard =
7599 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7600 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7601 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7602 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7603 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7604 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7605 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7606 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7611 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7613 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7614 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7615 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7616 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7617 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7618 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7622 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7623 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7625 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7626 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7627 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7628 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7629 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7631 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7632 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7635 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7636 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7638 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7639 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7641 // Retain unfunded channels.
7642 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7643 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7644 let res = f(channel);
7645 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7646 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7647 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7648 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7649 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7651 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7652 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7653 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7655 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7657 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7667 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7668 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7671 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7673 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7674 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7675 msg: announcement_sigs,
7677 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7678 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7679 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7681 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7682 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7683 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7688 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7689 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7690 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7691 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7692 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7693 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7694 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7695 // is always consistent.
7696 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7697 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7698 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7699 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7700 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7703 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7704 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7705 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7706 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7707 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7708 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7709 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7713 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7714 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7715 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7716 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7717 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7718 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
7719 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7720 data: reason_message,
7733 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7734 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7735 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7736 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7737 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7738 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7739 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7740 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7741 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7742 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7744 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7745 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7746 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7750 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7753 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7754 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7755 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7756 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7757 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7758 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7759 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7761 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7762 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7765 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7766 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7767 _ => unreachable!(),
7769 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7770 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7771 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7772 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7778 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7780 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7781 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7785 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7786 /// may have events that need processing.
7788 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7789 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7791 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7792 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7793 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7794 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7797 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7798 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7799 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7802 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7803 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7804 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7807 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7808 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7809 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7810 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7813 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7814 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7815 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7816 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7819 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7820 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7822 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7823 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7824 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7825 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7826 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7829 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7830 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7831 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7832 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7835 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7836 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7837 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7838 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7841 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7842 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7843 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7844 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7848 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7849 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7851 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7852 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7853 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7854 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7855 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7856 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7860 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7861 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7862 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7863 // change to the contents.
7864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7865 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7866 let persist = match &res {
7867 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7868 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7869 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7871 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7873 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7878 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7879 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7880 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7881 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7884 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7885 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7886 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7887 // change to the contents.
7888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7889 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7890 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7894 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7895 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7896 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7897 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7900 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7902 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7905 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7910 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7911 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7912 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7913 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7914 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7916 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7917 let persist = match &res {
7918 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7919 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7921 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7926 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7928 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7931 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7933 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7936 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7937 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7938 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7939 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7941 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7942 let persist = match &res {
7943 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7944 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7945 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7947 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7952 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7954 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7957 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7958 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7959 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7960 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7962 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7963 let persist = match &res {
7964 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7965 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7966 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7968 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7973 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7974 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7975 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7976 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7978 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7979 let persist = match &res {
7980 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7981 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7982 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7984 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7989 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7991 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7994 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7996 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7999 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8000 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8001 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8002 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8004 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8005 let persist = match &res {
8006 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8007 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8008 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8010 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8015 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8017 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8020 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8021 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8022 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8025 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8030 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8032 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8033 let persist = match &res {
8034 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8035 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8036 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8038 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8043 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8045 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8046 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8047 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8049 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8050 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8051 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8052 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8053 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8054 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8055 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8056 let context = match phase {
8057 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8058 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8059 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8064 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8065 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8068 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8072 // Clean up for removal.
8073 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8074 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8075 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8078 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8079 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8080 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8081 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8083 // V1 Channel Establishment
8084 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8086 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8088 // V2 Channel Establishment
8089 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8090 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8091 // Common Channel Establishment
8092 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8093 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8094 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8096 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8097 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8099 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8100 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8103 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8104 // Channel Operations
8105 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8109 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8110 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8113 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8114 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8115 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8116 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8117 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8118 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8119 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8120 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8123 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8124 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8125 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8126 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8129 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8131 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8133 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8134 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8138 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8139 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8140 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8144 let mut res = Ok(());
8146 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8147 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8148 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8149 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8150 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8151 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8152 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8155 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8156 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8158 if inbound_peer_limited {
8160 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8162 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8163 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8164 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8165 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8166 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8167 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8168 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8169 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8174 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8175 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8177 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8178 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8179 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8180 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8183 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8186 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8187 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8192 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8194 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8195 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8198 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8200 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8201 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8202 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8203 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8204 // worry about closing and removing them.
8205 debug_assert!(false);
8209 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8210 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8211 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8216 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8217 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8222 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8225 match &msg.data as &str {
8226 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8227 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8229 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8230 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8231 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8232 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8233 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8234 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8235 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8236 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8238 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8239 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8240 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8241 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8242 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8243 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8244 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8248 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8249 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8250 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8251 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8252 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8253 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8255 log_level: Level::Trace,
8265 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8266 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8267 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8268 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8269 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8272 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8273 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8274 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8275 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8277 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8278 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8279 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8283 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8285 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8286 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8287 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8288 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8289 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8290 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8291 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8292 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8300 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8301 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8305 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8306 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8309 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8310 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8313 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8314 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8317 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8318 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8319 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8320 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8323 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8324 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8325 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8326 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8329 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8330 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8331 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8332 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8335 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8336 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8337 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8338 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8341 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8342 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8343 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8344 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8347 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8348 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8349 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8350 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8353 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8354 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8355 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8356 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8359 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8360 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8361 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8362 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8365 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8366 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8367 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8368 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8372 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8373 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8374 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8375 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8376 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8380 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8381 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8383 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8384 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8385 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8386 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8387 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8390 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8391 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8392 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8393 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8396 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8397 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8398 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8399 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8402 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8403 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8404 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8405 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8406 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8407 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8408 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8409 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8410 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8411 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8412 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8413 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8414 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8415 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8416 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8417 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8418 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8419 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8420 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8421 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8426 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8427 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8429 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8430 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8431 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8432 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8435 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8436 (2, node_id, required),
8437 (4, features, required),
8438 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8439 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8440 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8441 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8444 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8445 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8446 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8447 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8448 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8449 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8450 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8451 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8452 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8453 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8454 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8455 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8456 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8457 (7, self.config, option),
8458 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8459 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8460 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8461 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8462 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8463 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8464 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8465 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8466 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8467 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8468 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8469 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8470 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8471 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8472 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8473 (32, self.is_public, required),
8474 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8475 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8476 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8477 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8478 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8484 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8485 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8486 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8487 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8488 (2, channel_id, required),
8489 (3, channel_type, option),
8490 (4, counterparty, required),
8491 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8492 (6, funding_txo, option),
8493 (7, config, option),
8494 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8495 (9, confirmations, option),
8496 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8497 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8498 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8499 (16, balance_msat, required),
8500 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8501 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8502 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8503 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8504 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8505 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8506 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8507 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8508 (26, is_outbound, required),
8509 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8510 (30, is_usable, required),
8511 (32, is_public, required),
8512 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8513 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8514 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8515 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8516 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8519 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8520 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8521 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8522 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8523 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8527 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8529 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8530 outbound_scid_alias,
8534 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8535 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8537 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8538 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8539 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8540 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8541 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8542 confirmations_required,
8544 force_close_spend_delay,
8545 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8546 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8547 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8548 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8549 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8550 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8551 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8552 channel_shutdown_state,
8557 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8558 (2, channels, required_vec),
8559 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8560 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8563 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8565 (0, onion_packet, required),
8566 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8569 (0, payment_data, required),
8570 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8571 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8572 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8573 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8575 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8576 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8577 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8578 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8579 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8580 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8584 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8585 (0, routing, required),
8586 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8587 (4, payment_hash, required),
8588 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8589 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8590 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8591 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8595 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8596 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8598 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8600 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8601 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8602 reason.write(writer)?;
8604 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8605 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8608 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8609 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8610 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8611 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8618 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8619 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8620 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8623 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8624 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8625 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8626 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8630 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8631 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8632 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8633 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8634 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8637 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8638 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8639 // messages contained in the variants.
8640 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8641 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8642 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8644 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8645 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8646 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8647 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8648 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8651 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8652 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8653 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8654 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8655 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8657 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8662 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8667 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8668 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8669 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8670 (2, outpoint, required),
8671 (4, htlc_id, required),
8672 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8673 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8676 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8677 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8678 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8679 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8680 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8682 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8683 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8684 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8685 (2, self.value, required),
8686 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8687 (4, payment_data, option),
8688 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8689 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8690 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8691 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8697 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8698 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8699 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8700 (0, prev_hop, required),
8701 (1, total_msat, option),
8702 (2, value_ser, required),
8703 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8704 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8705 (5, total_value_received, option),
8706 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8707 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8708 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8710 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8711 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8712 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8714 if payment_data.is_some() {
8715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8717 if total_msat.is_none() {
8718 total_msat = Some(value);
8720 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8723 if total_msat.is_none() {
8724 if payment_data.is_none() {
8725 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8727 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8729 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8733 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8736 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8737 total_value_received,
8738 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8740 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8741 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8746 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8747 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8748 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8751 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8752 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8753 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8754 let mut payment_id = None;
8755 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8756 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8757 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8758 (0, session_priv, required),
8759 (1, payment_id, option),
8760 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8761 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8762 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8763 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8765 if payment_id.is_none() {
8766 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8768 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8770 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8771 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8772 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8774 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8775 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8776 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8777 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8781 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8782 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8783 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8785 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8788 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8789 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8794 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8795 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8797 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8799 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8800 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8801 (0, session_priv, required),
8802 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8803 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8804 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8805 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8806 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8807 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8810 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8812 field.write(writer)?;
8819 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8820 (0, forward_info, required),
8821 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8822 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8823 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8824 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8827 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8829 (0, htlc_id, required),
8830 (2, err_packet, required),
8835 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8836 (0, payment_secret, required),
8837 (2, expiry_time, required),
8838 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8839 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8840 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8843 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8845 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8846 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8847 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8848 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8849 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8850 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8854 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8855 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8857 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8859 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8861 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8862 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8863 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8866 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8869 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8870 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8871 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8872 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8873 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8874 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8877 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8878 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
8882 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8884 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8887 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8888 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8889 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8892 channel.write(writer)?;
8898 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8899 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8900 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8901 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8902 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8903 for forward in pending_forwards {
8904 forward.write(writer)?;
8909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8911 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8912 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8913 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8915 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8916 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8917 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8918 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8919 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8920 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8921 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8922 htlc.write(writer)?;
8924 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8925 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8928 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8929 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8930 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8931 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8932 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8933 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8934 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8937 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8938 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8939 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8940 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8941 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8943 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8944 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8945 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8946 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8947 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8948 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8949 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8954 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8955 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8956 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8957 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8958 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8959 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8960 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8961 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8962 0u64.write(writer)?;
8964 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8965 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8966 event.write(writer)?;
8970 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8971 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8972 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8973 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8974 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8975 0u64.write(writer)?;
8977 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8978 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8979 // likely to be identical.
8980 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8981 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8983 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8984 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8985 hash.write(writer)?;
8986 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8989 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8990 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8991 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8992 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8993 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8996 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8997 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8999 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9000 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9001 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9002 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9005 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9006 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9007 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9008 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9012 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9013 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9014 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9016 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9017 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9018 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9024 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9025 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9026 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9027 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9030 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9031 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9032 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9033 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9034 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9037 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9038 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9039 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9040 if !updates.is_empty() {
9041 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9042 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9047 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9048 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9049 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9050 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9051 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9052 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9053 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9054 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9055 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9056 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9057 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9058 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9059 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9066 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9067 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9068 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9069 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9072 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9073 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9074 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9075 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9076 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9077 // check that the event is sane here.
9078 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9079 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9080 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9081 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9087 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9088 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9089 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9090 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9091 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9092 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9095 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9096 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9097 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9098 events.push_back((ev, action));
9099 } else if action.is_some() {
9100 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9107 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9108 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9109 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9110 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9111 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9112 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9115 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9117 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9119 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9120 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9121 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9122 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9123 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9124 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9125 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9126 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9127 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9128 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9129 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9130 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9131 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9133 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9134 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9136 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9137 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9139 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9140 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9141 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9142 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9143 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9144 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9146 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9147 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9149 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9150 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9151 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9152 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9153 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9154 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9158 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9159 pub entropy_source: ES,
9161 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9162 pub node_signer: NS,
9164 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9165 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9167 pub signer_provider: SP,
9169 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9171 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9172 pub fee_estimator: F,
9173 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9175 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9176 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9177 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9178 pub chain_monitor: M,
9180 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9181 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9182 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9183 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9184 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9185 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9187 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9189 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9190 /// deserialization.
9192 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9193 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9194 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9196 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9197 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9199 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9200 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9201 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9202 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9204 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9207 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9208 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9211 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9212 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9214 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9216 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9217 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9218 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9223 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9224 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9225 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9226 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9227 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9229 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9230 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9235 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9236 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9237 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9238 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9240 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9241 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9242 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9243 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9244 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9245 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9249 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9250 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9251 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9255 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9256 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9258 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9259 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9260 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9261 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9262 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9263 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9267 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9268 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9270 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9271 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9272 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9274 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9276 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9277 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9278 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9279 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9280 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9281 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9282 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9283 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9284 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9285 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9287 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9288 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9289 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9290 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9291 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9292 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9293 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9294 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9295 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9296 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9297 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9298 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9299 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9301 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9302 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9303 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9305 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9306 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9307 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9309 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9310 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9311 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9313 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9314 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9317 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9318 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9319 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9322 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9323 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9324 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9325 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9326 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9327 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9328 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9330 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9331 let mut found_htlc = false;
9332 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9333 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9336 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9337 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9338 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9339 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9340 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9341 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9342 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9343 log_info!(args.logger,
9344 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9345 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9346 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9350 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9351 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9352 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9353 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9354 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9356 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9357 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9359 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9361 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9362 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9365 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9366 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9367 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9371 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9372 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9373 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9374 // safely discard the channel.
9375 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9376 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9377 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9378 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9379 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9380 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9381 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9384 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9385 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9386 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9387 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9388 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9389 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9393 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9394 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9395 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9396 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9397 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9398 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9399 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9401 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9405 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9406 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9407 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9408 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9409 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9410 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9411 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9412 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9413 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9415 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9418 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9419 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9420 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9421 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9422 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9423 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9424 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9425 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9427 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9430 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9433 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9434 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9435 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9436 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9437 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9438 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9439 is_connected: false,
9443 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9444 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9445 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9446 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9447 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9448 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9449 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9450 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9453 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9454 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9455 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9456 for _ in 0..event_count {
9457 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9458 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9463 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9464 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9465 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9467 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9468 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9469 // on-startup monitor updates.
9470 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9471 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9473 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9477 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9478 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9480 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9481 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9482 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9483 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9484 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9488 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9489 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9490 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9491 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9492 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9493 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9494 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9496 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9497 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9501 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9502 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9503 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9504 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9505 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9506 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9507 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9508 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9509 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9510 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9511 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9512 let mut events_override = None;
9513 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9514 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9515 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9516 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9517 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9518 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9519 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9520 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9521 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9522 (8, events_override, option),
9523 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9524 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9525 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9526 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9528 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9529 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9532 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9533 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9536 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9537 pending_events_read = events;
9540 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9541 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9544 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9545 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9546 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9547 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9548 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9549 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9551 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9553 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9554 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9555 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9558 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9559 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9560 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9561 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9562 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9564 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9565 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9566 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9568 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9569 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9570 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9571 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9572 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9574 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9575 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9576 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9577 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9578 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9579 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9580 pending_background_events.push(
9581 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9582 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9583 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9584 update: update.clone(),
9587 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9588 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9589 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9590 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9591 pending_background_events.push(
9592 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9593 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9594 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9597 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9598 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9601 max_in_flight_update_id
9605 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9608 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9609 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9610 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9612 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9613 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9614 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9615 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9616 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9617 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9618 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9619 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9620 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9623 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9624 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9625 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9626 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9627 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9628 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9629 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9630 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9631 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9632 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9633 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9636 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9637 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9638 debug_assert!(false);
9639 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9644 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9645 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9646 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9647 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9648 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9649 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9650 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9651 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9653 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9654 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9655 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9657 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9658 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9659 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9660 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9661 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9662 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9663 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9669 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9670 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9672 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9673 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9674 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9675 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9678 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9679 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9680 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9681 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9682 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9683 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9684 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9686 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9687 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9688 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9689 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9690 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9691 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9692 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9693 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9696 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9697 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9698 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9699 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9701 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9702 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9703 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9706 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9707 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9708 retry_strategy: None,
9709 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9710 payment_params: None,
9711 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9712 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9713 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9714 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9715 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9716 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9717 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9718 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9719 total_msat: path_amt,
9720 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9721 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9723 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9724 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9729 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9731 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9732 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9733 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9734 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9736 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9737 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9738 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9739 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9740 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9741 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9742 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9743 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9744 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9745 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9746 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9751 !forwards.is_empty()
9753 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9754 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9755 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9756 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9757 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9758 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9759 intercepted_id != ev_id
9766 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9767 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9768 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9769 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9770 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9771 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9772 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9773 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9774 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9775 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9776 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9778 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9779 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9780 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9782 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9783 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9784 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9791 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9792 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9794 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9796 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9797 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9798 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9799 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9800 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9801 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9802 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9803 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9804 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9805 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9808 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9809 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9810 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9811 // channel still live case here.
9815 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9816 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9821 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9822 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9823 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9824 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9825 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9826 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9827 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9828 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9832 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9833 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9835 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9836 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9837 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9838 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9840 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9841 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9842 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9844 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9845 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9847 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9848 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9850 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9853 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9854 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9855 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9857 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9861 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9862 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9863 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9864 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9865 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9867 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9868 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9869 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9870 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9871 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9872 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9873 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9874 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9876 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9877 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9881 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9883 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9885 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9886 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9888 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9889 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9894 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9895 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9897 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9899 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9901 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9902 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9903 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9904 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9908 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9909 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9912 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9913 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9914 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9915 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9917 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9918 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9919 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9921 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9922 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9923 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9924 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9925 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9926 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9928 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9929 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9930 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9931 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9932 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9933 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9937 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9938 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9939 debug_assert!(false);
9940 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9945 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9947 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9948 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9949 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9950 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9951 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9952 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9953 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9954 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9955 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9956 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9957 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9959 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9960 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9962 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9963 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9964 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9965 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9967 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9968 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9969 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9970 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9972 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9973 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9974 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9975 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9977 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9978 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9982 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9983 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9986 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9987 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9990 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9993 purpose: payment.purpose,
9994 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9995 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9996 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10002 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10003 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10004 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10005 for action in actions.iter() {
10006 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10007 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10008 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10010 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10011 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10012 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10013 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10015 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10016 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10017 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10018 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10024 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10026 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10027 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10031 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10033 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10034 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10035 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10036 router: args.router,
10038 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10040 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10041 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10042 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10043 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10045 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10046 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10047 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10048 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10049 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10050 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10052 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10054 our_network_pubkey,
10057 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10059 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10061 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10062 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10063 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10064 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10065 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10067 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10068 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10070 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10072 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10073 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10074 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10076 logger: args.logger,
10077 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10080 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10081 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10082 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10083 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10084 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10087 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10088 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10089 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10090 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10091 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10092 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10095 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10096 //connection or two.
10098 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10104 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10105 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10106 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10107 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10108 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10109 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10110 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10111 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10112 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10113 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10114 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10115 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10116 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10117 use crate::util::test_utils;
10118 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10119 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10122 fn test_notify_limits() {
10123 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10124 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10128 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10130 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10131 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10132 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10133 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10134 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10136 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10138 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10139 // to connect messages with new values
10140 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10141 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10142 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10143 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10144 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10145 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10147 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10148 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10150 // ... but the last node should not.
10151 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10152 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10153 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10154 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10156 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10157 // about the channel.
10158 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10159 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10160 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10162 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10164 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10165 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10166 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10167 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10168 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10169 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10171 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10172 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10173 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10175 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10176 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10177 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10178 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10179 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10180 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10182 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10183 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10184 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10185 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10186 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10187 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10188 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10189 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10191 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10192 // the channel info has updated.
10193 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10194 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10195 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10196 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10197 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10198 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10202 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10203 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10208 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10211 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10212 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10213 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10214 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10216 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10217 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10218 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10219 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10220 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10221 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10222 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10223 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10227 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10229 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10230 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10231 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10233 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10235 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10236 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10237 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10239 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10240 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10241 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10243 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10244 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10245 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10246 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10247 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10248 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10250 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10251 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10253 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10254 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10255 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10257 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10258 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10259 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10261 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10262 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10263 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10264 // lightning messages manually.
10265 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10266 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10269 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10270 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10271 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10274 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10275 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10277 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10280 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10281 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10282 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10284 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10285 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10286 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10290 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10292 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10293 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10296 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10297 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10301 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10302 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10303 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10304 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10309 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10310 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10311 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10312 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10319 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10320 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10321 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10324 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10325 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10326 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10327 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10328 // fails as expected.
10329 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10330 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10331 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10332 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10333 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10334 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10337 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10338 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10339 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10340 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10341 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10342 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10343 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10345 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10346 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10347 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10349 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10350 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10351 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10352 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10353 let route = find_route(
10354 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10355 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10357 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10358 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10360 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10361 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10362 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10363 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10364 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10366 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10367 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10368 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10369 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10370 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10372 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10373 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10374 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10375 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10376 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10377 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10378 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10379 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10380 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10382 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10383 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10385 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10386 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10387 let route = find_route(
10388 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10389 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10391 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10392 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10394 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10396 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10397 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10398 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10400 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10401 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10402 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10403 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10405 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10407 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10408 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10409 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10411 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10412 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10413 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10415 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10416 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10417 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10418 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10419 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10420 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10421 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10422 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10423 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10425 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10426 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10428 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10429 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10430 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10431 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10433 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10435 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10436 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10437 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10439 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10440 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10441 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10444 let route = find_route(
10445 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10446 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10448 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10449 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10450 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10452 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10454 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10455 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10456 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10458 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10459 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10460 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10462 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10463 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10464 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10465 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10466 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10467 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10468 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10469 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10470 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10472 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10473 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10477 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10478 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10479 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10485 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10486 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10488 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10489 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10490 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10491 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10492 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10493 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10494 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10495 let route = find_route(
10496 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10497 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10500 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10501 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10502 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10503 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10504 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10505 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10508 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10509 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10510 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10511 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10512 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10513 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10516 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10520 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10521 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10522 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10523 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10524 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10528 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10530 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10531 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10533 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10534 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10535 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10536 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10537 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10538 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10539 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10540 let route = find_route(
10541 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10542 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10545 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10546 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10547 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10548 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10549 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10550 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10551 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10552 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10555 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10556 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10557 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10558 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10559 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10560 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10563 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10567 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10568 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10571 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10573 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10574 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10575 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10576 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10578 // Marshall an MPP route.
10579 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10580 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10581 route.paths.push(path);
10582 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10583 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10584 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10585 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10586 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10587 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10589 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10590 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10592 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10593 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10595 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10600 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10604 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10606 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10608 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10609 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10611 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10612 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10614 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10617 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10618 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10619 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10620 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10621 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10622 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10625 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10628 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10629 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10634 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10635 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10636 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10637 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10638 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10639 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10641 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10642 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10644 total_msat: 100_000,
10647 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10648 // payment verification fails as expected.
10649 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10650 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10651 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10652 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10654 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10658 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10659 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10663 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10664 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10665 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10666 // the channel is successfully closed.
10667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10672 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10673 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10674 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10675 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10676 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10678 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10679 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10681 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10682 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10683 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10684 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10687 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10689 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10690 // as it has the funding transaction.
10691 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10692 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10693 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10696 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10698 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10700 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10702 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10703 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10704 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10706 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10709 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10710 // as it has the funding transaction.
10711 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10712 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10713 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10716 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10717 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10719 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10720 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10721 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10722 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10724 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10725 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10726 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10727 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10729 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10730 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10732 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10733 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10734 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10735 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10736 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10737 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10738 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10742 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10743 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10744 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10745 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10746 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10747 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10748 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10751 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10753 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10754 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10755 // closing transaction).
10756 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10757 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10758 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10760 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10761 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10762 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10763 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10764 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10767 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10769 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10771 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10772 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10773 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10775 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10777 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10778 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10781 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10782 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10783 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10786 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10787 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10788 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10791 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10793 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10794 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10796 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10797 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10799 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10800 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10805 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10806 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10807 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10808 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10809 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10810 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10811 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10812 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10815 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10816 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10817 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10819 // Test the API functions.
10820 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10822 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10824 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10826 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10828 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10830 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10832 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10836 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10837 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10838 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10840 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10841 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10843 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10845 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10846 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10848 let mut funding_tx = None;
10849 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10850 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10851 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10854 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10855 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10856 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10857 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10858 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10860 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10862 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10864 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10866 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10868 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10870 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10873 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10874 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10875 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10876 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10877 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10879 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10880 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10882 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10883 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10884 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10885 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10886 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10887 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10888 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10891 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10892 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10893 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10894 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10895 }, true).unwrap_err();
10897 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10898 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10899 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10900 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10901 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10902 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10903 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10905 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10906 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10908 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10909 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10910 }, true).unwrap_err();
10912 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10913 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10914 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10915 }, false).unwrap();
10916 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10918 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10919 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10921 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10922 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10923 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10924 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10925 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10927 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10928 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10929 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10931 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10932 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10933 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10935 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10936 // "protected" and can connect again.
10937 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10938 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10939 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10941 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10943 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10945 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10946 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10950 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10951 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10955 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10957 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10959 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10960 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10962 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10963 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10964 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10965 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10968 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10970 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10971 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10972 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10974 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10975 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10976 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10978 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10979 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10980 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10981 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10985 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10986 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10987 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10990 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10991 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10992 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10993 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10995 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10997 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10998 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11000 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11001 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11002 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11003 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11004 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11005 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11008 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11009 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11011 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11012 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11016 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11017 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11020 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11021 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11022 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11023 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11024 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11026 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11027 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11029 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11030 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11031 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11032 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11038 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11039 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11041 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11042 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11043 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11045 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11046 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11050 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11054 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11055 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11056 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11057 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11058 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11059 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11060 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11061 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11063 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11064 payment_metadata: None,
11065 keysend_preimage: None,
11066 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11067 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11069 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11071 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11072 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11073 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11074 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11075 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11077 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11078 } else { panic!(); }
11080 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11081 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11083 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11084 payment_metadata: None,
11085 keysend_preimage: None,
11086 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11087 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11089 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11091 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11092 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11096 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11097 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11098 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11099 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11100 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11102 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11103 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11108 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11109 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11111 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11112 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11114 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11115 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11116 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11117 match &msg_events[0] {
11118 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11119 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11121 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11122 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11123 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11129 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11130 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11132 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11133 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11136 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11140 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11141 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11142 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11143 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11146 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11147 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11148 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11152 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11153 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11154 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11156 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11157 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11159 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11160 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11165 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11166 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11168 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11169 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11171 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11172 // not have generated any events.
11173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11177 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11178 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11179 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11180 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11181 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11183 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11184 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11186 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11187 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11188 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11190 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11191 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11192 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11193 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11196 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11197 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11200 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11201 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11204 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11205 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11206 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11207 ..Default::default()
11209 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11210 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11211 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11213 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11214 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11217 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11218 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11219 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11220 ..Default::default()
11222 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11223 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11224 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11227 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11228 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11231 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11232 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11233 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11234 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11235 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11238 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11239 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11240 ..Default::default()
11242 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11245 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11246 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11247 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11252 fn test_payment_display() {
11253 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11254 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11255 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11256 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11257 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11258 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11262 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11263 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11264 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11265 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11266 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11267 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11269 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11270 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11271 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11272 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11273 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11274 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11275 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11276 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11278 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11279 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11280 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11283 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11284 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11286 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11287 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11289 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11290 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11291 }, false).unwrap();
11292 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11293 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11294 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11296 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11298 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11299 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11300 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11301 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11302 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11303 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11304 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11305 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11306 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11307 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11308 } else { panic!() };
11309 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11310 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11311 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11312 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11314 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11316 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11317 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11318 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11325 use crate::chain::Listen;
11326 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11327 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11328 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11329 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11330 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11331 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11332 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11333 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11334 use crate::util::test_utils;
11335 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11337 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11338 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11339 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11341 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11343 use criterion::Criterion;
11345 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11346 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11347 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11348 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11349 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11350 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11351 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11353 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11354 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11356 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11357 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11359 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11361 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11364 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11365 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11368 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11369 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11370 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11372 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11373 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11375 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11376 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11377 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11378 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11379 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11381 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11382 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11383 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11385 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11386 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11387 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11388 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11390 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11391 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11392 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11394 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11395 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11396 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11397 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11398 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11400 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11401 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11402 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11404 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11405 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11407 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11408 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11409 }, false).unwrap();
11410 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11411 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11412 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11415 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11416 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11417 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11419 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11420 } else { panic!(); }
11422 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11423 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11424 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11425 match events_b[0] {
11426 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11427 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11432 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11433 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11434 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11435 match events_a[0] {
11436 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11437 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11442 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11444 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11445 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11446 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11448 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11449 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11450 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11451 match msg_events[0] {
11452 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11453 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11454 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11458 match msg_events[1] {
11459 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11463 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11464 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11465 match events_a[0] {
11466 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11467 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11472 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11473 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11474 match events_b[0] {
11475 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11476 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11478 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11481 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11482 macro_rules! send_payment {
11483 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11484 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11485 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11486 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11487 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11488 payment_count += 1;
11489 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11490 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11492 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11493 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11494 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11495 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11496 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11497 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11498 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11499 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11500 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11501 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11502 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11504 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11505 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11506 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11507 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11509 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11510 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11511 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11512 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11513 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11515 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11518 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11519 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11520 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11521 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11523 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11527 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11528 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11529 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);