1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 /// A forwarded HTLC.
114 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
115 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
116 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
117 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
118 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
120 /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated.
122 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
123 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
124 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
125 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
126 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
127 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
128 /// Optional shared secret for phantom node.
129 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
130 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
131 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
133 /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
135 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
136 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
137 /// Preimage for this onion payment.
138 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
139 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
140 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
141 /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC.
142 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
143 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
144 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
148 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
149 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
150 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
151 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
152 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
153 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
154 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
158 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
159 /// may overshoot this in either case)
160 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
161 /// Outgoing CLTV height.
162 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
163 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
164 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
165 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
168 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
169 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
170 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
171 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
174 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
175 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
176 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
177 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
178 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
181 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
182 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
184 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
185 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
186 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
189 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
190 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
192 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
193 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
196 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
197 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
200 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
204 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
205 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
206 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
207 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
208 short_channel_id: u64,
209 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
211 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
212 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
214 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
215 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
220 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
222 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
223 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
224 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
226 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
227 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
230 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
231 struct ClaimableHTLC {
232 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
234 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
236 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
237 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
238 sender_intended_value: u64,
239 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
241 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
242 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
243 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
244 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
246 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
247 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
250 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
251 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
252 events::ClaimedHTLC {
253 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
254 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
255 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
256 value_msat: val.value,
261 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
262 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
264 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
265 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
266 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
269 /// Number of bytes in the id.
270 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
273 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for PaymentId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
287 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
288 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
292 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
294 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
295 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
296 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
298 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
299 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
304 impl Readable for InterceptId {
305 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
306 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
311 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
312 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
313 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
314 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
315 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
318 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
320 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
321 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
322 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
324 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
325 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
329 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
330 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
331 (0, short_channel_id, required),
332 (2, htlc_id, required),
334 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
335 (0, session_priv, required),
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
342 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
343 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
344 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
347 session_priv: SecretKey,
348 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
349 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
350 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
351 payment_id: PaymentId,
354 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
355 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
356 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
358 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
360 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
362 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
365 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
366 payment_id.hash(hasher);
367 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
373 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
375 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
376 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
377 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
378 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
379 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
380 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
384 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
385 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
386 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
387 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
388 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
389 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
391 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
397 /// Invalid inbound onion payment.
398 pub struct InboundOnionErr {
399 /// BOLT 4 error code.
401 /// Data attached to this error.
402 pub err_data: Vec<u8>,
403 /// Error message text.
404 pub msg: &'static str,
407 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
408 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
410 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
411 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
412 pub enum FailureCode {
413 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
414 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
415 TemporaryNodeFailure,
416 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
417 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
418 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
419 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
420 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
421 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
422 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
423 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
424 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
425 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
427 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
428 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
429 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
432 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
433 fn into(self) -> u16 {
435 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
436 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
437 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
438 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
443 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
444 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
445 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
446 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
447 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
449 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
450 err: msgs::LightningError,
451 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
452 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
453 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
455 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
457 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
459 err: LightningError {
461 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
462 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
469 shutdown_finish: None,
470 channel_capacity: None,
474 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
475 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
478 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
479 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
480 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
481 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
482 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
483 // commitment upon reconnecting.
484 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
486 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
489 err: LightningError { err, action },
490 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
491 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
492 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
496 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
499 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
501 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
502 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
506 log_level: Level::Warn,
509 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
511 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
513 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
515 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
516 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
524 shutdown_finish: None,
525 channel_capacity: None,
529 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
530 self.chan_id.is_some()
534 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
535 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
536 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
537 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
538 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
540 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
541 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
542 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
543 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
544 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
545 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
546 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
548 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
552 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
553 struct ClaimingPayment {
555 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
556 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
557 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
558 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
560 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
561 (0, amount_msat, required),
562 (2, payment_purpose, required),
563 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
564 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
565 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
568 struct ClaimablePayment {
569 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
570 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
571 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
574 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
575 struct ClaimablePayments {
576 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
577 /// failed/claimed by the user.
579 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
580 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
582 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
583 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
584 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
586 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
587 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
588 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
589 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
592 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
593 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
594 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
595 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
597 enum BackgroundEvent {
598 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
599 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
600 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
601 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
603 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
604 /// are regenerated on startup.
605 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
606 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
607 /// channel to continue normal operation.
609 /// In general this should be used rather than
610 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
611 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
612 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
614 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
615 /// are regenerated on startup.
616 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
617 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
618 funding_txo: OutPoint,
619 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
621 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
622 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
624 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
625 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
626 channel_id: ChannelId,
631 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
632 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
633 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
634 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
635 /// event can be generated.
636 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
637 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
638 /// operation of another channel.
640 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
641 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
642 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
643 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
645 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
646 event: events::Event,
647 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
649 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
650 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
651 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
653 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
654 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
655 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
656 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
657 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
659 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
660 /// stored for later processing.
661 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
662 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
663 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
664 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
669 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
670 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
671 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
672 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
673 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
674 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
675 (4, blocking_action, required),
677 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
678 (0, event, upgradable_required),
679 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
680 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
681 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
682 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
683 // downgrades to prior versions.
684 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
688 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
689 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
690 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
691 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
692 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
695 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
696 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
697 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
698 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
702 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
703 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
704 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
705 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
706 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
707 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
709 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
710 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
711 channel_id: ChannelId,
712 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
717 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
718 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
719 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
720 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
721 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
726 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
727 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
731 /// State we hold per-peer.
732 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
733 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
735 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
736 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
737 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
739 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
740 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
741 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
742 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
743 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
744 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
745 latest_features: InitFeatures,
746 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
747 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
748 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
749 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
750 /// user but which have not yet completed.
752 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
753 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
754 /// for a missing channel.
755 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
756 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
757 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
759 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
760 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
761 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
762 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
764 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
765 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
766 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
767 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
768 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
769 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
770 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
771 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
772 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
773 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
774 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
775 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
776 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
777 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
778 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
782 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
783 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
784 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
785 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
786 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
787 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
790 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
791 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
792 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
795 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
796 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
797 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
800 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
801 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
802 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
803 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
807 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
808 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
809 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
810 /// The original OpenChannel message.
811 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
812 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
813 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
816 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
817 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
818 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
820 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
821 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
823 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
826 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
827 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
828 struct PendingInboundPayment {
829 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
830 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
831 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
832 /// this payment being removed.
834 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
835 user_payment_id: u64,
836 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
837 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
838 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
841 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
842 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
843 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
844 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
845 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
846 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
847 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
848 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
850 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
851 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
852 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
860 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
862 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
863 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
864 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
869 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
870 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
871 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
872 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
873 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
874 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
875 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
876 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
877 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
879 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
880 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
881 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
890 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
892 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
893 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
894 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
899 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
901 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
903 pub trait AChannelManager {
904 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
905 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
906 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
907 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
908 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
909 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
910 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
911 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
912 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
913 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
914 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
915 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
916 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
917 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
918 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
919 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
920 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
921 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
922 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
923 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
924 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
925 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
926 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
927 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
928 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
929 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
930 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
931 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
932 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
933 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
934 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
935 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
936 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
937 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
938 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
939 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
942 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
943 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
945 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
946 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
947 ES::Target: EntropySource,
948 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
949 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
950 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
954 type Watch = M::Target;
956 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
958 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
960 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
962 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
963 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
965 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
967 type Router = R::Target;
969 type Logger = L::Target;
971 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
974 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
975 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
977 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
978 /// to individual Channels.
980 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
981 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
982 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
983 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
985 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
986 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
987 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
988 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
989 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
990 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
991 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
992 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
993 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
995 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
996 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
997 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
999 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1000 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1001 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1002 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1003 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1005 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1006 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1007 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1008 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1010 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1011 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1012 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1014 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1015 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1016 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1017 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1018 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1020 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1021 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1022 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1023 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1024 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1025 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1026 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1027 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1030 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1031 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1032 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1033 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1034 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1038 // `pending_offers_messages`
1040 // `total_consistency_lock`
1042 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1044 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1046 // |__`per_peer_state`
1048 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1050 // |__`claimable_payments`
1052 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1058 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1060 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1064 // |__`pending_events`
1066 // |__`pending_background_events`
1068 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1070 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1071 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1072 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1073 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1074 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1075 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1079 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1080 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1081 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1087 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1089 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1091 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1092 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1094 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1095 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1096 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1097 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1099 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1100 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1102 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1103 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1104 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1105 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1106 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1107 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1108 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1109 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1111 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1113 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1116 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1118 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1119 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1120 /// and via the classic SCID.
1122 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1123 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1125 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1127 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1129 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1130 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1131 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1133 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1134 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1136 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1137 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1139 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1140 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1142 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1143 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1144 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1145 /// active channel list on load.
1147 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1148 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1150 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1152 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1153 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1154 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1156 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1157 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1158 /// the handling of the events.
1160 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1161 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1164 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1165 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1166 /// would break backwards compatability.
1167 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1168 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1169 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1171 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1172 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1174 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1176 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1177 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1178 /// confirmation depth.
1180 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1181 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1182 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1184 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1188 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1190 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1192 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1194 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1195 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1196 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1198 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1199 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1201 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1202 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1203 /// keeping additional state.
1204 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1206 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1207 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1208 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1209 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1211 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1212 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1214 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1215 /// are currently open with that peer.
1217 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1218 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1221 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1223 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1224 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1225 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1226 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1227 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1229 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1230 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1231 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1232 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1233 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1235 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1236 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1238 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1239 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1240 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1241 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1242 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1244 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1245 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1247 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1248 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1249 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1250 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1251 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1253 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1255 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1257 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1258 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1259 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1260 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1261 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1262 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1263 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1264 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1265 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1266 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1267 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1269 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1270 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1271 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1273 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1275 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1276 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1278 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1282 signer_provider: SP,
1287 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1289 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1290 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1291 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1292 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1293 pub struct ChainParameters {
1294 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1295 pub network: Network,
1297 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1299 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1300 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1303 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1307 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1308 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1311 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1312 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1313 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1314 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1315 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1316 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1318 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1319 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1320 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1321 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1322 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1323 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1325 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1326 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1329 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1330 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1331 /// events to handle.
1333 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1334 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1336 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1337 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1340 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1341 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1342 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1343 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1345 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1346 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1347 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1348 should_persist: move || {
1349 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1350 // processing and return that.
1351 let notify = persist_check();
1352 match (notify, force_notify) {
1353 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1354 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1355 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1356 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1357 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1360 _read_guard: read_guard,
1364 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1365 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1366 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1367 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1368 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1369 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1371 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1372 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1373 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1374 should_persist: persist_check,
1375 _read_guard: read_guard,
1380 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1381 fn drop(&mut self) {
1382 match (self.should_persist)() {
1383 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1384 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1385 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1387 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1388 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1389 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1394 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1395 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1397 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1399 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1400 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1401 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1402 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1403 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1405 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1406 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1408 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1410 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1411 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1412 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1413 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1414 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1415 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1416 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1417 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1418 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1419 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1420 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1421 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1422 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1424 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1425 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1427 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1428 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1429 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1430 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1432 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1433 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1434 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1435 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1436 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1437 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1440 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1442 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1443 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1446 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1448 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1449 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1451 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1452 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1453 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1455 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1456 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1457 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1459 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1460 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1461 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1462 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1464 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1465 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1466 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1468 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1469 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1470 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1472 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1473 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1474 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1475 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1476 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1477 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1478 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1479 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1480 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1481 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1482 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1485 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1486 /// to better separate parameters.
1487 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1488 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1489 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1490 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1491 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1492 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1493 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1494 pub features: InitFeatures,
1495 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1496 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1497 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1499 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1501 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1502 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1503 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1504 /// payments to us through this channel.
1505 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1506 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1507 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1508 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1509 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1510 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1511 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1514 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1515 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1516 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1517 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1518 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1519 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1520 /// lifetime of the channel.
1521 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1522 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1523 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1524 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1525 /// our counterparty already.
1527 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1528 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1529 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1530 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1532 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1533 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1534 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1535 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1537 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1538 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1540 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1541 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1543 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1544 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1545 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1546 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1547 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1548 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1549 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1550 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1551 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1554 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1556 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1557 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1558 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1559 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1560 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1561 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1562 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1564 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1565 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1567 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1568 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1569 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1570 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1571 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1572 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1573 /// this value on chain.
1575 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1577 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1579 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1580 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1581 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1582 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1583 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1584 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1585 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1587 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1588 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1589 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1590 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1591 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1592 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1594 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1595 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1596 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1597 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1598 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1600 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1601 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1602 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1603 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1605 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1606 pub balance_msat: u64,
1607 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1608 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1609 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1610 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1612 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1614 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1615 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1616 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1617 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1618 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1619 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1620 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1621 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1623 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1624 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1625 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1626 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1627 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1628 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1629 /// route which is valid.
1630 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1631 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1632 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1633 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1634 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1635 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1637 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1638 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1639 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1640 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1641 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1642 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1643 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1644 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1645 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1647 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1649 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1650 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1651 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1652 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1653 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1655 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1656 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1657 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1658 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1659 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1660 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1661 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1663 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1664 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1665 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1666 pub is_outbound: bool,
1667 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1668 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1669 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1670 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1671 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1673 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1674 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1675 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1676 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1677 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1678 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1679 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1681 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1682 pub is_usable: bool,
1683 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1684 pub is_public: bool,
1685 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1686 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1687 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1688 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1689 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1690 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1692 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1693 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1696 impl ChannelDetails {
1697 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1698 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1699 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1701 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1702 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1703 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1704 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1707 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1708 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1709 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1711 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1712 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1713 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1714 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1717 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1718 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1719 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1722 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1723 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1725 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1726 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1727 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1729 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1730 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1731 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1732 features: latest_features,
1733 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1734 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1735 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1736 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1737 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1738 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1739 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1740 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1741 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1742 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1744 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1745 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1746 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1747 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1748 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1749 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1750 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1751 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1752 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1753 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1754 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1755 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1756 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1757 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1758 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1759 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1760 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1761 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1762 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1763 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1764 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1765 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1766 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1767 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1768 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1769 config: Some(context.config()),
1770 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1775 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1776 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1777 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1778 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1779 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1780 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1781 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1782 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1783 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1785 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1787 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1788 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1790 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1791 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1792 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1793 /// to drop the channel.
1797 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1798 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1799 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1800 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1801 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1803 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1804 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1805 payment_id: PaymentId,
1807 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1809 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1810 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1811 payment_id: PaymentId,
1812 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1814 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1815 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1816 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1819 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1820 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1821 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1823 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1824 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1825 payment_id: PaymentId,
1826 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1827 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1828 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1830 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1831 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1832 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1834 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1835 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1836 payment_id: PaymentId,
1837 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1838 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1842 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1844 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1846 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1847 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1848 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1849 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1851 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1852 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1853 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1856 macro_rules! handle_error {
1857 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1858 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1859 // entering the macro.
1860 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1861 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1865 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1866 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1868 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1869 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1870 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1871 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1875 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1876 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1877 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1878 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1879 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1880 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1885 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1886 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1888 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1889 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1890 action: err.action.clone()
1894 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1895 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1896 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1897 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1898 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1902 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1907 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1910 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1911 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1912 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1918 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1919 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1920 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1921 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1922 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1923 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1925 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1926 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1927 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1928 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1929 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1931 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1932 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1934 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1938 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1939 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1940 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1942 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1943 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1945 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1946 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1948 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1949 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1950 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1951 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1952 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1953 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1955 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1956 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1960 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1961 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1963 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1964 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1966 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1967 match $channel_phase {
1968 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1969 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1971 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1972 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1974 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1975 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1981 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1982 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1986 let key = *$entry.key();
1987 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1989 $entry.remove_entry();
1997 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1998 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2002 let key = *$entry.key();
2003 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2005 $entry.remove_entry();
2013 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2014 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2016 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2017 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2023 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2024 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2025 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2026 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2027 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2029 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2030 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2031 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2032 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2033 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2034 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2035 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2036 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2037 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2038 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2043 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2044 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2045 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2046 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2047 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2048 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2049 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2050 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2051 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2053 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2058 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2059 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2060 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2061 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2062 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2063 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2064 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2065 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2066 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2068 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2073 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2074 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2075 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2076 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2077 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2078 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2079 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2080 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2081 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2082 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2083 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2085 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2086 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2087 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2093 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2094 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2096 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2097 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2098 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2099 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2100 updates.announcement_sigs);
2101 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2102 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2105 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2106 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2107 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2108 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2110 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2111 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2112 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2113 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2114 let mut batch_completed = false;
2115 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2116 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2117 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2118 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2120 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2121 channel_state.2 = true;
2123 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2125 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2127 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2130 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2131 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2132 if batch_completed {
2133 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2134 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2135 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2136 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2137 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2138 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2139 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2140 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2141 chan.set_batch_ready();
2142 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2143 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2147 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2148 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2149 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2154 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2156 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2157 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2159 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2160 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2161 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2162 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2167 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2168 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2169 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2171 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2172 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2173 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2174 panic!("{}", err_str);
2176 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2177 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2178 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2181 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2187 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2188 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2189 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2191 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2192 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2193 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2194 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2195 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2196 // filter for uniqueness here.
2197 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2198 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2199 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2200 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2202 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2203 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2205 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2206 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2207 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2213 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2214 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2215 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2216 while !processed_all_events {
2217 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2224 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2225 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2226 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2228 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2229 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2230 result = $self.process_background_events();
2232 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2233 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2234 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2235 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2239 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2240 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2241 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2242 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2245 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2247 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2248 $event_to_handle = event;
2250 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2251 post_event_actions.push(action);
2256 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2257 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2258 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2259 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2260 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2261 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2264 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2265 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2266 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2267 processed_all_events = false;
2271 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2272 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2273 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2275 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2276 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2277 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2283 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2285 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2286 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2287 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2288 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2289 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2290 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2294 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2296 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2298 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2299 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2301 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2303 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2304 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2305 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2308 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2309 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2310 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2312 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2313 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2314 current_timestamp: u32,
2316 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2317 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2318 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2319 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2321 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2322 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2323 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2328 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2330 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2331 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2332 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2333 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2334 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2335 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2336 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2337 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2339 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2342 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2343 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2345 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2347 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2349 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2351 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2352 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2353 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2354 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2355 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2356 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2357 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2358 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2360 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2370 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2371 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2372 &self.default_configuration
2375 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2376 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2377 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2380 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2381 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2383 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2385 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2389 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2394 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2396 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2397 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2398 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2399 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2400 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2402 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2403 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2405 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2406 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2407 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2409 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2410 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2411 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2413 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2414 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2415 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2416 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2417 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2418 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2420 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2421 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2422 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2423 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2424 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2425 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2429 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2430 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2434 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2435 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2437 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2439 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2440 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2441 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2442 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2443 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2444 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2448 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2453 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2455 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2456 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2459 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2461 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2467 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2468 node_id: their_network_key,
2471 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2474 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2475 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2476 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2477 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2478 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2479 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2480 // the same channel.
2481 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2483 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2485 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2486 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2487 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2488 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2489 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2490 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2491 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2495 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2496 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2497 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2505 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2506 /// more information.
2507 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2508 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2509 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2510 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2511 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2512 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2513 // the same channel.
2514 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2516 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2518 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2519 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2520 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2521 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2522 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2523 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2531 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2532 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2534 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2535 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2537 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2538 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2539 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2540 // really wanted anyway.
2541 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2544 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2545 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2546 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2547 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2549 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2550 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2551 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2552 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2553 let context_to_details = |context| {
2554 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2556 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2558 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2559 .map(context_to_details)
2565 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2566 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2568 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2569 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2570 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2572 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2573 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2574 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2575 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2576 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2577 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2579 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2580 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2581 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2583 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2584 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2585 payment_id: *payment_id,
2586 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2587 total_msat: *total_msat,
2590 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2591 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2593 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2594 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2596 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2601 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2602 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2603 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2604 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2605 Some(transaction) => {
2606 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2607 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2612 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2613 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2614 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2615 reason: closure_reason,
2616 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2617 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2621 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2624 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2625 let shutdown_result;
2627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2629 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2630 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2635 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2637 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2638 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2639 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2640 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2641 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2642 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2643 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2644 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2646 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2647 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2648 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2649 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2650 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2654 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2655 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2657 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2658 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2659 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2660 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2664 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2665 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2666 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2671 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2678 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2679 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2681 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2682 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2683 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2684 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2689 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2690 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2691 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2692 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2695 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2696 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2702 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2703 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2704 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2706 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2707 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2709 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2710 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2711 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2712 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2714 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2716 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2717 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2718 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2721 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2722 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2723 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2724 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2725 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2726 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2729 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2730 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2731 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2733 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2734 /// the channel being closed or not:
2735 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2736 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2737 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2738 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2739 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2740 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2741 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2743 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2744 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2745 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2746 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2748 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2750 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2751 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2752 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2755 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2756 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2757 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2758 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2759 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2762 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2763 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2764 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2765 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2766 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2769 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2770 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2771 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2772 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2773 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2776 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2777 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2778 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2779 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2780 // ignore the result here.
2781 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2783 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2784 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2785 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2786 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2788 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2789 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2790 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2791 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2792 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2793 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2794 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2795 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2798 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2801 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2802 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2805 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2806 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2810 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2811 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2812 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2813 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2815 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2816 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2817 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2818 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2819 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2820 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2822 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2824 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2825 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2826 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2827 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2828 mem::drop(peer_state);
2829 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2831 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2832 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2833 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2835 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2836 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2837 // Unfunded channel has no update
2838 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2841 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2842 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2843 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2844 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2846 (None, *peer_node_id)
2848 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2851 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2852 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2853 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2854 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2855 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2856 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2857 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2858 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2859 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2865 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2868 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2870 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2871 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2873 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2874 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2876 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2877 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2878 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2879 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2890 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2891 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2892 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2894 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2895 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2896 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2899 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2900 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2901 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2903 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2904 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2905 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2906 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2907 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2910 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2911 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2912 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2913 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2914 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2918 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2919 /// local transaction(s).
2920 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2921 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2922 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2926 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2927 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2929 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2931 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2932 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2935 macro_rules! return_err {
2936 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2938 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2939 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2940 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2941 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2942 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2943 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2949 let NextPacketDetails {
2950 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
2951 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
2952 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
2953 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
2954 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2957 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2958 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2959 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2960 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2961 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2962 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2963 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2964 // phantom or an intercept.
2965 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2966 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
2967 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
2971 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2974 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2976 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2978 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2979 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2980 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2984 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2985 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
2988 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2989 // have no consistency guarantees.
2990 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2994 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2995 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2996 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2997 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2998 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3000 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3001 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3002 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3003 // we don't have the channel here.
3004 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3006 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3008 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3009 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3010 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3011 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3012 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3013 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3014 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3015 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3016 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3017 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3018 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3020 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3023 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3024 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3026 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3027 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3034 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3036 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3037 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3039 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3040 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3041 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3042 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3043 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3045 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3046 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3052 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3053 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3054 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3055 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3057 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3058 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3060 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3061 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3062 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3064 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3065 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3066 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3067 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3068 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3069 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3070 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3074 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3076 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3079 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3080 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3081 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3082 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3083 macro_rules! return_err {
3084 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3086 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3087 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3088 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3089 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3090 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3091 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3097 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3099 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3100 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3101 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3102 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3105 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3106 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3107 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3108 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3109 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3111 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3114 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3115 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3116 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3117 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3118 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3124 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3125 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3126 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3128 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3129 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3130 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3132 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3133 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3134 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3135 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3136 return Err(LightningError {
3137 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3138 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3141 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3142 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3145 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3148 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3149 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3150 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3151 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3153 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3154 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3155 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3157 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3158 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3159 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3161 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3162 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3166 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3169 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3171 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3173 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3174 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3175 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3176 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3177 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3180 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3181 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3183 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3184 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3185 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3186 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3187 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3188 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3189 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3190 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3192 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3193 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3194 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3196 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3198 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3205 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3206 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3207 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3208 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3213 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3214 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3215 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3218 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3219 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3221 log_trace!(self.logger,
3222 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3223 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3224 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3225 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3227 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3228 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3229 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3231 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3232 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3234 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3235 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3236 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3237 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3241 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3242 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3245 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3246 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3247 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3248 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3249 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3251 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3252 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3253 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3255 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3256 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3258 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3259 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3260 Some(monitor_update) => {
3261 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3263 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3264 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3265 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3266 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3267 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3268 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3269 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3277 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3280 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3281 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3282 // `channel_by_id` map.
3283 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3284 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3289 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3290 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3292 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3297 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3299 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3300 /// fields for more info.
3302 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3303 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3305 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3307 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3308 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3309 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3310 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3311 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3313 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3314 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3315 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3316 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3317 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3319 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3320 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3321 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3322 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3324 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3326 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3327 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3328 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3330 /// In general, a path may raise:
3331 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3332 /// node public key) is specified.
3333 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3334 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3335 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3336 /// relevant updates.
3338 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3339 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3340 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3342 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3343 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3344 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3345 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3346 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3347 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3348 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3349 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3351 self.pending_outbound_payments
3352 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3353 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3354 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3357 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3358 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3359 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3360 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3362 self.pending_outbound_payments
3363 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3364 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3365 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3366 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3370 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3371 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3373 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3374 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3375 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3379 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3380 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3381 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3385 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3386 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3389 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3390 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3392 self.pending_outbound_payments
3393 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3394 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3395 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3396 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3397 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3401 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3402 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3403 /// retries are exhausted.
3405 /// # Event Generation
3407 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3408 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3410 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3411 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3412 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3414 /// # Requested Invoices
3416 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3417 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3418 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3419 /// once the invoice has been received.
3421 /// # Restart Behavior
3423 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3424 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3425 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3427 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3428 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3430 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3433 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3434 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3435 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3436 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3437 /// never reach the recipient.
3439 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3440 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3442 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3443 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3445 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3446 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3447 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3449 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3450 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3451 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3454 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3455 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3457 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3460 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3461 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3462 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3463 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3464 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3465 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3466 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3467 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3470 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3471 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3472 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3473 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3474 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3476 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3477 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3478 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3481 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3484 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3485 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3488 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3489 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3491 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3492 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3493 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3494 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3495 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3496 let payment_params =
3497 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3499 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3501 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3504 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3505 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3507 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3508 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3509 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3510 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3512 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3513 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3514 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3515 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3516 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3517 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3518 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3519 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3520 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3521 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3523 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3524 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3525 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3526 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3530 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3532 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3533 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3536 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3538 let mut res = Vec::new();
3540 for mut path in route.paths {
3541 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3542 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3543 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3544 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3545 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3548 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3551 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3552 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3554 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3556 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3557 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3562 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3565 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3570 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3571 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3572 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3574 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3575 let used_liquidity =
3576 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3578 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3579 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3581 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3584 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3589 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3590 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3591 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3598 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3599 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3600 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3601 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3602 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3603 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3605 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3606 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3610 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3611 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3612 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3614 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3615 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3616 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3617 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3618 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3619 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3620 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3621 } else { unreachable!(); });
3623 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3624 Err((chan, err)) => {
3625 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3626 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3628 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3629 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3630 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3636 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3637 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3639 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3640 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3643 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3644 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3645 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3649 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3650 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3653 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3655 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3658 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3659 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3660 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3662 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3669 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3670 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3671 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3675 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3677 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3678 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3680 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3681 /// across the p2p network.
3683 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3684 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3686 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3687 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3688 /// keys per-channel).
3690 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3691 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3692 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3694 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3695 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3696 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3698 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3699 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3700 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3701 /// for more details.
3703 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3704 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3705 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3706 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3709 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3711 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3712 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3714 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3715 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3716 /// signature for each channel.
3718 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3719 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3721 let mut result = Ok(());
3723 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3724 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3725 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3726 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3727 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3732 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3733 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3734 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3738 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3739 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3740 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3741 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3742 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3743 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3744 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3745 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3750 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3751 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3752 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3753 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3757 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3758 match states.entry(txid) {
3759 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3760 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3761 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3765 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3768 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3769 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3770 temporary_channel_id,
3771 counterparty_node_id,
3772 funding_transaction.clone(),
3775 let mut output_index = None;
3776 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3777 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3778 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3779 if output_index.is_some() {
3780 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3781 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3784 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3787 if output_index.is_none() {
3788 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3789 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3792 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3793 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3794 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3800 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3801 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3802 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3803 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3804 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3805 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3806 .into_iter().flatten()
3807 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3809 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3810 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3812 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3815 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3816 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3817 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3818 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3820 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3821 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3822 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3826 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3827 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3833 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3835 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3836 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3837 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3838 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3840 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3841 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3843 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3844 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3846 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3848 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3849 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3850 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3851 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3852 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3853 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3854 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3855 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3856 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3857 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3858 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3859 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3860 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3866 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3867 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3870 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3871 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3872 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3873 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3877 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3878 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3879 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3880 config.apply(config_update);
3881 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3884 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3885 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3886 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3887 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3888 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3889 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3896 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3897 debug_assert!(false);
3898 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3900 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3901 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3908 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3910 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3911 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3912 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3913 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3915 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3916 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3918 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3919 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3921 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3923 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3924 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3925 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3926 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3927 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3928 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3929 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3930 pub fn update_channel_config(
3931 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3932 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3933 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3936 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3937 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3939 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3940 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3942 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3943 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3944 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3945 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3946 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3948 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3949 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3950 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3953 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3956 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3957 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3958 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3959 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3960 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3961 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3964 let next_hop_scid = {
3965 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3966 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3967 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3970 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3971 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3972 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3973 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3974 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3977 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3979 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3980 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3981 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3983 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3984 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3985 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3990 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3991 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3992 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3995 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3996 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3997 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3999 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4001 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4002 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4003 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4004 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4005 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4008 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4009 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4010 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4011 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4012 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4014 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4018 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4019 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4021 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4024 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4025 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4028 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4029 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4030 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4033 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4034 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4035 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4036 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4037 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4038 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4039 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4040 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4043 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4044 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4045 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4046 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4051 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4053 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4054 /// Will likely generate further events.
4055 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4058 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4059 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4060 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4062 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4063 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4065 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4066 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4067 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4069 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4070 match forward_info {
4071 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4072 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4073 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4074 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4075 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4078 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4079 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4080 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4082 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4083 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4084 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4085 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4086 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4087 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4088 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4091 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4092 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4094 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4097 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4098 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4104 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4105 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4107 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4111 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4112 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4114 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4118 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4119 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4120 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4121 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4122 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4123 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4124 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4127 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4128 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4129 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4130 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4131 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4133 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4135 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4136 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4140 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4141 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4142 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4143 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4144 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4145 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4147 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4148 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4154 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4157 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4160 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4161 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4162 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4163 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4164 // problem, not ours.
4170 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4171 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4172 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4174 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4178 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4179 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4180 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4181 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4186 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4187 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4188 match forward_info {
4189 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4190 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4191 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4192 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4193 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4197 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4198 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4199 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4200 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4201 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4203 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4204 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4206 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4207 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4208 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4211 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4214 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4216 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4217 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4218 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4219 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4224 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4225 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4227 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4229 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4230 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4232 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4235 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4237 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4238 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4239 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4246 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4250 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4251 match forward_info {
4252 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4253 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4254 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4255 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4256 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4259 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4260 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4261 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4262 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4263 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4264 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4265 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4267 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4268 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4269 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4273 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4274 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4277 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4280 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4281 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4282 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4283 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4284 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4285 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4286 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4287 phantom_shared_secret,
4289 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4290 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4291 // if routing nodes overpay
4292 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4293 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4295 total_value_received: None,
4296 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4299 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4302 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4304 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4305 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4306 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4307 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4308 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4309 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4311 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4312 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4313 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4314 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4315 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4317 phantom_shared_secret,
4319 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4320 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4322 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4325 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4326 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4327 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4328 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4329 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4332 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4333 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4334 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4335 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4336 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4337 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4339 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4340 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4341 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4343 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4344 .entry(payment_hash)
4345 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4346 .or_insert_with(|| {
4347 committed_to_claimable = true;
4349 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4352 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4353 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4355 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4357 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4359 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4361 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4362 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4363 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4366 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4368 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4369 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4370 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4371 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4372 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4373 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4374 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4375 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4376 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4377 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4379 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4381 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4382 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4383 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4384 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4385 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4389 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4390 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4391 committed_to_claimable = true;
4393 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4394 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4395 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4396 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4397 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4398 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4399 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4400 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4401 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4402 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4406 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4407 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4408 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4409 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4410 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4412 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4414 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4415 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4417 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4418 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4419 committed_to_claimable = true;
4422 payment_claimable_generated
4426 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4427 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4428 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4429 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4430 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4431 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4432 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4433 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4435 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4436 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4437 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4438 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4439 Ok(result) => result,
4441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4442 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4445 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4446 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4447 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4449 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4450 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4453 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4454 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4455 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4457 check_total_value!(purpose);
4459 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4460 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4461 check_total_value!(purpose);
4465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4466 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4467 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4468 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4470 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4471 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4473 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4474 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4475 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4476 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4477 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4479 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4480 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4481 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4483 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4484 if payment_claimable_generated {
4485 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4491 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4492 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4500 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4501 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4502 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4503 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4505 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4506 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4508 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4510 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4511 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4512 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4514 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4516 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4517 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4518 events.append(&mut new_events);
4521 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4523 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4524 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4525 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4527 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4529 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4530 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4531 if background_events.is_empty() {
4532 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4535 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4537 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4538 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4539 // monitor updating completing.
4540 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4542 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4543 let mut updated_chan = false;
4545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4546 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4551 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4552 updated_chan = true;
4553 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4554 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4556 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4564 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4565 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4568 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4569 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4570 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4571 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4572 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4573 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4574 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4576 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4577 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4578 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4579 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4580 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4586 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4589 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4590 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4591 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4592 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4593 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4596 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4597 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4598 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4599 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4600 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4602 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4604 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4606 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4608 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4609 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4612 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4614 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4615 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4619 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4620 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4621 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4622 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4623 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4624 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4625 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4627 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4628 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4631 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4634 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4635 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4637 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4642 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4643 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4651 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4653 /// This currently includes:
4654 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4655 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4656 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4658 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4659 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4660 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4661 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4662 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4663 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4664 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4665 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4667 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4668 /// estimate fetches.
4670 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4671 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4672 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4673 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4674 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4676 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4677 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4679 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4680 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4681 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4682 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4684 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4685 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4686 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4687 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4688 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4689 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4691 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4692 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4693 log_error!(self.logger,
4694 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4695 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4696 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4697 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4698 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4699 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4700 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4701 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4702 channel_id: *chan_id,
4703 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4714 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4715 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4718 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4719 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4720 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4722 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4723 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4728 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4729 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4731 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4732 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4733 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4734 if needs_close { return false; }
4737 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4738 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4739 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4740 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4741 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4742 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4743 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4744 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4746 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4747 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4748 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4749 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4753 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4755 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4758 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4760 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4761 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4762 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4767 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4769 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4775 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4777 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4778 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4779 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4780 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4781 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4782 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4783 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4784 channel_id: *chan_id,
4785 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4793 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4794 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4795 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4797 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4798 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4799 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4804 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4805 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4806 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4808 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4809 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4810 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4811 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4817 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4819 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4820 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4825 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4826 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4827 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4828 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4829 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4830 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4831 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4832 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4833 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4834 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4835 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4837 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4838 // have no channels to the peer.
4839 let remove_entry = {
4840 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4841 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4844 entry.remove_entry();
4847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4852 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4853 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4854 // This should be unreachable
4855 debug_assert!(false);
4858 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4859 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4860 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4861 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4862 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4863 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4864 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4867 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4868 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4869 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4871 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4872 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4879 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4880 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4881 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4882 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4886 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4887 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4890 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4891 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4894 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4895 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4896 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4897 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4898 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4899 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4900 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4903 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4904 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4907 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4908 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4909 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4910 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4911 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4918 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4919 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4920 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4922 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4923 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4924 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4925 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4927 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4928 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4929 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4930 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4931 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4932 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4935 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4936 /// reason for the failure.
4938 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4939 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4942 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4943 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4944 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4945 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4946 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4947 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4948 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4953 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4954 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4955 match failure_code {
4956 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4957 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4958 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4959 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4960 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4961 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4963 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4964 let fail_data = match data {
4965 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4968 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4973 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4974 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4976 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4978 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4979 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4980 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4981 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4982 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4983 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4984 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4986 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4988 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4989 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4991 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4996 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4997 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4998 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4999 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5000 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5001 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5002 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5003 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5004 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5005 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5007 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5008 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5009 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5010 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5012 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5013 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5014 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5015 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5016 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5020 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5021 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5022 // be surfaced to the user.
5023 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5024 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5025 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5027 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5029 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5032 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5034 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5035 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5037 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5038 debug_assert!(false);
5039 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5044 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5047 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5048 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5049 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5050 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5054 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5055 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5056 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5057 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5058 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5059 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5060 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5061 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5062 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5063 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5066 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5067 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5068 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5071 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5072 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5073 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5075 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5076 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5077 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5078 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5079 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5081 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5083 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5085 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5086 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5087 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5088 push_forward_ev = true;
5090 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5092 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5095 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5098 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5099 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5100 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5101 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5102 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5103 failed_next_destination: destination,
5109 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5110 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5112 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5113 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5114 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5115 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5117 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5118 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5119 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5120 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5122 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5123 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5124 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5126 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5127 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5128 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5129 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5130 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5131 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5132 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5133 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5134 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5137 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5138 /// even type numbers.
5142 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5143 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5145 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5146 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5147 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5150 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5151 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5156 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5157 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5158 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5159 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5160 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5161 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5162 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5163 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5168 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5169 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5170 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5171 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5172 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5174 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5175 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5176 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5180 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5181 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5182 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5183 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5184 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5185 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5186 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5187 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5188 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5189 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5190 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5199 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5201 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5202 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5203 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5204 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5205 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5206 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5207 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5208 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5209 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5210 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5211 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5212 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5213 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5214 debug_assert!(false);
5218 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5220 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5221 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5222 debug_assert!(false);
5226 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5227 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5229 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5230 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5231 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5232 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5235 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5236 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5237 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5238 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5242 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5243 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5244 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5245 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5246 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5247 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5250 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5251 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5252 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5253 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5254 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5259 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5260 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5261 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5262 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5263 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5264 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5265 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5267 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5270 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5271 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5272 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5273 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5277 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5278 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5279 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5280 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5282 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5283 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5284 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5285 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5287 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5288 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5289 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5290 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5294 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5295 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5296 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5300 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5301 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5302 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5305 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5306 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5307 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5308 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5309 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5310 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5311 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5314 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5315 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5318 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5321 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5322 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5324 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5325 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5326 // monitor update as a background event.
5327 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5328 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5329 counterparty_node_id,
5330 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5331 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5335 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5336 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5341 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5345 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5346 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5347 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5348 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5349 blocking_action: blocker,
5351 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5353 debug_assert!(false,
5354 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5357 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5358 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5359 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5360 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5361 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5363 let mut found_blocker = false;
5364 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5365 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5366 // which case we need to only remove the one
5367 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5368 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5369 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5370 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5372 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5375 debug_assert!(false);
5384 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5385 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5386 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5392 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5393 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5394 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5395 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5396 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5397 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5398 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5399 // again on restart.
5400 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5401 payment_preimage, update_res);
5404 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5405 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5407 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5408 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5409 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5410 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5411 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5412 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5413 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5414 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5415 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5416 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5419 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5420 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5421 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5422 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5423 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5424 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5428 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5429 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5432 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5433 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5434 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5437 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5438 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5439 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5440 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5441 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5443 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5444 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5445 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5447 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5448 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5451 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5452 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5453 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5454 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5455 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5456 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5457 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5458 let chan_to_release =
5459 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5460 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5462 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5463 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5464 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5465 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5470 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5471 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5472 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5473 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5474 // in the background.
5475 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5476 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5477 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5478 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5480 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5481 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5482 funding_txo, update, ..
5484 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5485 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5486 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5487 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5489 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5495 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5496 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5497 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5499 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5500 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5502 monitor_update.updates[0],
5503 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5508 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5509 // immediately once we get going.
5510 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5513 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5515 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5518 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5519 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5520 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5521 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5522 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5523 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5527 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5528 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5529 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5532 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5533 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5535 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5536 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5537 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5538 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5540 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5544 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5545 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5546 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5552 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5553 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5554 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5557 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5558 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5559 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5560 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5562 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5564 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5565 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5566 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5568 payment_purpose: purpose,
5571 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5573 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5577 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5579 sender_intended_total_msat,
5583 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5584 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5586 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5587 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5588 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5591 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5592 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5594 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5595 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5596 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5597 Some(blocking_action),
5604 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5605 /// update completion.
5606 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5607 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5608 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5609 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5610 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5611 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5612 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5613 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5614 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5615 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5616 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5617 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5618 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5620 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5622 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5623 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5624 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5625 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5628 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5629 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5631 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5632 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5633 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5638 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5639 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5641 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5646 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5647 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5649 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5650 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5655 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5659 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5665 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5666 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5667 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5671 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5672 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5673 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5679 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5680 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5682 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5683 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5685 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5686 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5687 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5688 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5689 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5694 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5695 let mut peer_state_lock;
5696 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5697 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5698 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5701 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5704 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5705 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5706 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5707 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5708 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5711 let remaining_in_flight =
5712 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5713 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5716 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5717 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5718 remaining_in_flight);
5719 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5722 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5725 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5727 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5728 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5731 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5732 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5733 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5735 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5736 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5737 /// used to accept such channels.
5739 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5740 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5741 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5742 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5745 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5746 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5748 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5750 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5752 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5753 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5755 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5756 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5758 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5759 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5761 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5762 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5763 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5764 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5767 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5770 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5771 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5773 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5774 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5777 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5779 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5780 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5781 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5783 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5784 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5785 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5786 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5787 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5788 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5789 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5791 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5795 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5796 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5797 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5798 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5799 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5800 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5801 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5804 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5805 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5807 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5808 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5809 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5810 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5811 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5812 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5813 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5814 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5817 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5818 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5822 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5823 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5824 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5826 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5827 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5828 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5831 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5836 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5837 /// or 0-conf channels.
5839 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5840 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5841 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5842 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5843 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5844 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5846 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5847 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5848 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5849 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5850 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5851 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5852 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5856 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5859 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5860 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5862 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5863 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5865 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5866 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5867 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5868 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5869 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5871 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5874 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5875 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5876 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5879 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5880 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5885 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5888 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5889 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5890 // likely to be lost on restart!
5891 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5895 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5899 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5900 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5901 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5902 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5903 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5906 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5908 debug_assert!(false);
5909 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5911 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5912 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5914 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5915 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5916 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5917 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5918 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5919 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5921 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5922 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5923 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5926 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5927 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5928 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5929 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5930 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5933 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5934 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5936 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5939 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5940 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5941 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5942 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5943 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5944 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5945 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5946 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5947 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5949 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5950 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5951 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5956 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5957 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5958 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5959 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5960 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5961 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5962 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5970 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5971 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5972 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5974 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5978 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5979 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5981 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5982 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5983 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5985 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5989 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5990 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5991 // likely to be lost on restart!
5992 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5994 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5996 debug_assert!(false);
5997 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6001 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6003 match phase.get_mut() {
6004 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6005 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6006 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6009 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6016 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6017 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6018 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6019 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6020 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6022 user_channel_id: user_id,
6027 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6028 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6031 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6033 debug_assert!(false);
6034 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6039 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6040 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6041 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6042 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6044 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6045 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6046 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6047 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6048 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6049 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6050 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6052 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6056 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6057 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6059 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6062 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6063 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6064 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6067 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6068 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6069 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6071 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6072 funding_msg.channel_id))
6074 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6075 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6076 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6077 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6078 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6080 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6081 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6082 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6083 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6084 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6085 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6089 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6090 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6091 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6093 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6097 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6099 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6100 funding_msg.channel_id));
6108 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6109 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6111 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6113 debug_assert!(false);
6114 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6119 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6121 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6122 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6123 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6124 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6125 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6126 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6129 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6133 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6137 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6141 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6142 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6143 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6144 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6145 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6147 debug_assert!(false);
6148 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6151 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6152 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6154 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6155 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6156 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6157 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6159 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6160 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6161 msg: announcement_sigs,
6163 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6164 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6165 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6166 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6167 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6168 // announcement_signatures.
6169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6170 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6171 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6172 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6179 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6180 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6185 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6186 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6189 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6190 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6195 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6196 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6197 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6200 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6202 debug_assert!(false);
6203 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6207 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6208 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6210 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6211 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6212 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6214 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6217 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6218 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6219 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6220 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6222 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6223 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6224 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6225 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6226 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6227 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6231 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6232 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6233 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6234 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6237 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6238 let context = phase.context_mut();
6239 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6240 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6241 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6242 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6249 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6250 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6251 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6252 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6254 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6255 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6261 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6263 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6265 debug_assert!(false);
6266 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6268 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6271 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6273 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6274 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6275 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6276 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6277 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6278 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6283 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6284 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6285 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6286 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6287 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6288 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6289 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6291 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6292 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6298 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6299 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6300 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6302 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6303 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6304 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6305 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6306 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6310 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6312 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6313 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6314 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6319 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6320 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6321 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6322 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6324 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6325 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6326 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6327 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6329 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6330 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6332 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6333 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6334 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6336 debug_assert!(false);
6337 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6341 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6342 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6343 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6344 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6345 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6346 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6347 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6348 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6350 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6351 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6352 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6353 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6354 match pending_forward_info {
6355 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6356 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6357 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6358 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6360 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6361 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6362 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6363 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6364 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6367 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6369 _ => pending_forward_info
6372 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6374 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6375 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6383 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6385 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6387 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6389 debug_assert!(false);
6390 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6392 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6393 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6394 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6396 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6397 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6398 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6399 log_trace!(self.logger,
6400 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6402 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6403 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6404 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6406 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6407 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6408 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6409 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6410 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6411 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6412 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6415 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6416 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6422 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6426 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6427 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6428 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6430 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6432 debug_assert!(false);
6433 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6437 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6439 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6440 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6442 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6443 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6451 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6452 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6453 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6455 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6457 debug_assert!(false);
6458 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6460 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6461 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6462 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6464 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6465 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6466 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6468 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6469 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6471 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6472 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6480 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6482 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6484 debug_assert!(false);
6485 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6489 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6490 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6491 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6492 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6493 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6494 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6495 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6496 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6500 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6501 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6509 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6510 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6511 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6512 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6513 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6514 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6515 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6516 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6517 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6518 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6519 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6521 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6522 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6524 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6525 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6526 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6528 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6529 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6531 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6532 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6533 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6535 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6536 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6537 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6539 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6540 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6541 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6542 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6543 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6546 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6547 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6550 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6551 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6552 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6553 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6554 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6555 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6556 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6557 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6560 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6561 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6562 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6567 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6568 // payments are being processed.
6569 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6570 push_forward_event = true;
6572 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6573 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6580 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6581 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6584 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6585 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6586 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6588 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6592 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6593 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6594 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6595 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6596 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6598 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6599 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6600 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6601 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6602 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6603 // real by taking more time.
6604 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6605 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6606 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6611 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6612 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6613 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6614 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6615 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6616 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6617 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6619 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6620 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6621 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6622 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6623 channel_funding_outpoint,
6624 counterparty_node_id,
6629 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6630 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6631 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6634 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6635 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6638 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6639 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6640 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6646 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6647 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6648 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6649 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6651 debug_assert!(false);
6652 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6653 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6657 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6658 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6659 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6660 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6661 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6662 *counterparty_node_id)
6664 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6665 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6666 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6667 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6668 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6669 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6670 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6674 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6675 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6681 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6685 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6687 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6689 debug_assert!(false);
6690 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6692 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6693 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6694 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6696 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6697 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6699 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6700 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6708 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6710 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6712 debug_assert!(false);
6713 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6717 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6719 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6720 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6721 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6724 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6725 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6726 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6727 msg, &self.default_configuration
6728 ), chan_phase_entry),
6729 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6730 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6731 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6734 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6735 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6743 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6744 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6745 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6746 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6748 // It's not a local channel
6749 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6753 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6754 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6755 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6759 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6761 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6762 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6763 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6764 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6765 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6766 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6767 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6771 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6772 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6773 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6774 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6776 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6777 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6778 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6781 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6785 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6786 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6791 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6794 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6796 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6799 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6801 debug_assert!(false);
6802 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6803 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6809 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6811 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6812 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6813 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6814 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6815 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6816 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6817 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6818 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6819 let mut channel_update = None;
6820 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6821 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6822 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6825 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6826 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6827 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6828 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6829 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6830 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6831 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6836 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6837 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6838 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6839 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6840 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6841 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6845 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6846 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6850 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6851 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6852 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6853 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6854 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6855 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6856 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6857 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6859 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6860 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6861 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6862 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6863 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6864 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6865 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6866 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6867 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6868 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6869 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6870 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6871 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6872 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6873 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6874 next_funding_txid: None,
6877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6878 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6879 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6885 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6886 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6887 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6888 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6891 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6892 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6897 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6898 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6899 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6901 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6902 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6903 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6904 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6905 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6906 match monitor_event {
6907 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6908 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6909 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6910 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6912 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6913 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6914 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6915 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6918 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6919 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6920 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6922 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6923 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6924 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6925 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6928 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6930 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6933 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6934 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6935 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6936 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6937 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6942 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6943 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6944 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6945 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6946 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6954 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6955 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6961 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6962 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6965 has_pending_monitor_events
6968 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6969 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6970 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6972 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6974 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6977 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6978 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6979 /// update was applied.
6980 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6981 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6982 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6984 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6985 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6986 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6987 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6990 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6993 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6994 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6995 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6997 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6998 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6999 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7000 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7001 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7002 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7004 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7005 has_monitor_update = true;
7007 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7008 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7009 continue 'peer_loop;
7018 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7019 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7020 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7026 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7027 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7028 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7029 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7030 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7031 let mut has_update = false;
7032 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7036 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7039 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7040 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7042 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7043 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7044 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7045 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7047 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7048 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7051 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7052 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7053 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7055 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7056 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7057 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7058 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7059 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7064 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7066 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7067 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7068 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7074 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7075 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7080 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7086 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7087 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7090 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7091 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7097 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7098 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7100 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7101 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7102 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7103 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7104 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7105 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7106 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7107 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7108 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7109 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7110 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7111 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7112 assert!(should_broadcast);
7113 } else { unreachable!(); }
7114 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7115 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7116 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7119 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7123 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7124 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7125 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7129 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7130 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7131 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7132 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7136 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7139 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7141 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7142 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7143 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7144 &self, description: String
7145 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7146 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7147 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7148 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7149 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7150 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7152 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7153 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7157 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7158 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7162 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7163 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7165 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7166 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7167 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7170 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7171 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7172 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7174 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7175 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7179 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7180 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7181 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7182 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7186 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7187 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7191 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7192 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7194 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7196 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7197 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7198 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7199 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7200 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7201 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7202 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7203 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7204 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7205 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7206 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7207 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7209 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7210 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7212 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7213 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7216 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7217 self.pending_outbound_payments
7218 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7219 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7221 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7226 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7227 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7228 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7230 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7231 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7232 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7233 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7234 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7235 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7236 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7238 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7239 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7243 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7244 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7247 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7248 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7249 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7253 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7254 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7255 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7256 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7260 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7261 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7262 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7266 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7267 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7269 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7270 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7271 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7272 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7273 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7274 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7275 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7276 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7277 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7278 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7279 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7280 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7281 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7282 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7283 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7286 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7287 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7288 let builder = match quantity {
7290 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7292 let builder = match amount_msats {
7294 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7296 let builder = match payer_note {
7298 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7301 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7302 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7304 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7305 self.pending_outbound_payments
7306 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7307 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7309 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7311 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7312 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7313 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7314 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7315 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7318 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7320 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7321 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7322 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7323 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7324 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7325 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7326 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7327 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7328 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7330 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7337 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7340 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7341 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7342 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7346 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7347 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7348 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7349 /// received and no retries will be made.
7351 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7352 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7353 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7354 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7355 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7357 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7358 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7360 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7361 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7362 let payment_paths = vec![
7363 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7365 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7366 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7367 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7369 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7370 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7371 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7373 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7374 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7375 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7377 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7378 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7380 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7381 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7382 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7383 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7384 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7387 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7389 for path in refund.paths() {
7390 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7391 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7392 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7393 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7395 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7401 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7405 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7408 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7409 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7411 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7412 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7413 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7414 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7416 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7418 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7419 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7423 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7424 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7426 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7428 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7429 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7431 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7432 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7433 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7434 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7435 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7436 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7437 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7438 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7439 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7440 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7441 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7444 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7445 /// stored external to LDK.
7447 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7448 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7449 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7451 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7452 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7455 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7456 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7457 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7458 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7460 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7461 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7462 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7463 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7464 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7466 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7467 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7468 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7469 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7470 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7472 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7473 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7475 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7476 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7480 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7481 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7483 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7485 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7486 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7488 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7489 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7490 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7491 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7492 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7493 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7494 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7497 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7498 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7500 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7501 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7502 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7505 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7507 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7508 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7509 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7510 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7513 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7515 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7516 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7517 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7518 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7519 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7521 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7522 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7523 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7525 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7527 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7530 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7531 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7532 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7536 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7537 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7539 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7540 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7541 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7542 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7544 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7545 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7546 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7547 Some(_) => continue,
7548 None => return scid_candidate
7553 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7555 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7556 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7558 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7559 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7560 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7564 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7565 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7566 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7568 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7569 /// times to get a unique scid.
7570 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7571 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7572 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7574 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7575 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7576 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7577 return scid_candidate
7581 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7582 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7583 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7584 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7586 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7587 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7590 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7591 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7593 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7594 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7595 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7604 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7605 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7606 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7607 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7608 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7612 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7613 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7614 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7615 events.push_back((event, None));
7619 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7620 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7621 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7625 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7626 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7630 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7631 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7634 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7635 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7636 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7637 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7638 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7641 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7642 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7643 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7645 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7646 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7647 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7648 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7650 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7654 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7655 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7656 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7657 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7658 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7660 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7664 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7665 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7666 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7667 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7668 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7669 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7670 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7671 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7672 if further_update_exists {
7673 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7678 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7679 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7684 log_debug!(self.logger,
7685 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7686 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7692 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7693 for action in actions {
7695 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7696 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7698 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7704 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7705 /// using the given event handler.
7707 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7708 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7712 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7716 fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
7717 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
7718 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
7719 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
7720 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7721 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
7722 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
7724 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
7725 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
7729 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
7730 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
7731 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
7732 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
7733 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7734 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
7735 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7736 err_data: Vec::new(),
7740 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7741 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
7742 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
7745 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
7746 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7747 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
7748 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
7749 outgoing_cltv_value,
7750 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7754 fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
7755 hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
7756 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
7757 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7758 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
7759 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
7760 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
7761 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
7763 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
7764 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
7765 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
7767 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
7768 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
7770 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
7771 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7772 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7773 err_data: Vec::new(),
7774 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
7778 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
7779 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
7780 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7781 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
7783 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
7786 // final_expiry_too_soon
7787 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
7788 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
7790 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
7791 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
7792 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
7793 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
7794 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
7795 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
7796 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
7797 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7798 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
7799 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
7802 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
7803 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
7804 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
7806 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7808 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
7809 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
7813 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
7814 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
7815 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
7816 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
7817 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
7818 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
7819 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
7820 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
7821 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7822 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7823 err_data: Vec::new(),
7824 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
7827 if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
7828 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7829 err_code: 0x4000|22,
7830 err_data: Vec::new(),
7831 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
7834 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
7838 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7841 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
7842 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
7845 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
7846 phantom_shared_secret,
7850 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7851 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
7852 err_data: Vec::new(),
7853 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
7856 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
7859 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
7860 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
7861 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
7862 outgoing_cltv_value,
7863 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7867 /// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive).
7868 /// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or
7869 /// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for
7870 /// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the
7871 /// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
7872 pub fn peel_payment_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
7873 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
7874 cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
7875 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr>
7877 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7880 let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) =
7881 decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx
7883 let (err_code, err_data) = match e {
7884 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()),
7885 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data),
7887 let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion";
7888 InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data }
7891 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
7892 let NextPacketDetails {
7893 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value
7894 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
7895 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
7896 // Forward should always include the next hop details
7897 None => return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7898 msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion",
7899 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
7900 err_data: Vec::new(),
7904 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
7905 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
7907 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
7910 err_data: Vec::new(),
7913 create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
7914 msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret,
7915 Some(next_packet_pubkey)
7918 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => {
7919 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
7920 received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry,
7921 None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend,
7927 struct NextPacketDetails {
7928 next_packet_pubkey: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
7930 outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
7931 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
7934 fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
7935 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
7936 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<NextPacketDetails>), HTLCFailureMsg>
7938 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7941 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
7942 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
7944 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
7945 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7946 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7947 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7948 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
7949 failure_code: $err_code,
7955 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
7956 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
7959 let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh(
7960 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
7961 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
7963 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
7964 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
7965 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
7966 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
7967 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
7968 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
7969 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
7970 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
7972 macro_rules! return_err {
7973 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
7975 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
7976 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7977 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7978 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7979 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
7980 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
7986 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
7987 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
7988 msg.payment_hash, node_signer
7991 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
7992 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
7994 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
7995 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
7999 let next_packet_details = match next_hop {
8000 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
8001 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
8002 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8005 let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx,
8006 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
8008 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id,
8009 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
8012 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
8013 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
8014 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
8016 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
8020 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details)))
8023 fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
8024 cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32
8025 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
8026 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
8028 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
8029 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
8032 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
8033 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
8034 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
8035 if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
8036 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14));
8038 if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
8039 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21));
8041 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
8042 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
8043 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
8044 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
8045 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
8046 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
8047 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
8048 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
8049 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
8050 return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14));
8056 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8058 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8059 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8060 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8061 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8062 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8063 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8067 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8068 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8069 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8070 /// is always placed next to each other.
8072 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8073 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8074 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8075 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8077 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8078 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8079 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8080 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8081 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8082 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8083 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8085 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8086 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8087 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8088 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8091 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8092 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8094 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8095 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8098 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8100 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8103 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8104 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8108 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8109 events.replace(pending_events);
8118 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8120 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8121 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8122 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8123 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8124 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8125 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8129 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8131 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8132 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8133 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8135 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8139 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8141 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8142 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8143 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8144 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8145 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8150 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8152 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8153 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8154 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8155 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8156 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8159 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8160 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8163 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8164 let _persistence_guard =
8165 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8166 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8167 let new_height = height - 1;
8169 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8170 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8171 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8172 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8173 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8174 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8177 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8181 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8183 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8185 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8186 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8187 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8188 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8192 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8193 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8194 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8195 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8197 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8198 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8200 let _persistence_guard =
8201 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8202 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8203 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8204 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8206 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8207 if height < last_best_block_height {
8208 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8209 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8213 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8214 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8215 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8216 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8218 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8219 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8221 let _persistence_guard =
8222 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8223 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8224 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8226 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8228 macro_rules! max_time {
8229 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8231 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8232 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8233 // having an explicit local time source.
8234 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8235 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8236 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8237 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8238 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8244 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8245 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8246 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8247 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8251 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8252 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8253 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8254 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8255 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8256 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8257 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8258 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8265 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8266 let _persistence_guard =
8267 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8268 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8269 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8270 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8271 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8272 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8273 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8274 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8279 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8281 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8283 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8284 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8285 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8290 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8291 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8293 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8294 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8295 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8296 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8297 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8299 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8300 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8302 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8303 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8304 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8305 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8306 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8307 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8309 // Retain unfunded channels.
8310 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8311 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8312 let res = f(channel);
8313 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8314 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8315 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8316 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8317 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8319 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8320 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8321 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8323 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8324 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8325 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8330 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8335 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8336 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8339 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8341 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8342 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8343 msg: announcement_sigs,
8345 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8346 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8347 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8349 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8350 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8351 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8356 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8357 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8358 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8359 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8360 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8361 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8362 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8363 // is always consistent.
8364 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8365 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8366 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8367 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8368 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8371 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8372 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8373 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8374 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8375 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8376 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8377 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8381 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8382 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8384 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8385 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8386 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8387 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8388 data: reason_message,
8401 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8402 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8403 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8404 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8405 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8406 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8407 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8408 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8409 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8410 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8412 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8413 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8414 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8418 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8421 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8422 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8423 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8424 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8425 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8426 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8427 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8428 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8429 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8430 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8433 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8434 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8435 _ => unreachable!(),
8437 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8438 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8439 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8446 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8448 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8449 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8453 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8454 /// may have events that need processing.
8456 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8457 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8459 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8460 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8461 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8462 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8465 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8466 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8467 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8470 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8471 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8472 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8475 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8476 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8477 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8478 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8481 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8482 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8483 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8484 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8487 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8488 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8490 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8491 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8492 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8493 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8494 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8497 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8498 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8499 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8500 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8503 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8504 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8505 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8506 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8509 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8510 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8511 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8512 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8515 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8516 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8517 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8518 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8522 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8523 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8525 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8526 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8527 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8528 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8529 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8530 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8534 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8535 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8536 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8537 // change to the contents.
8538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8539 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8540 let persist = match &res {
8541 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8542 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8543 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8545 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8547 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8552 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8553 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8554 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8555 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8558 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8559 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8560 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8561 // change to the contents.
8562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8563 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8564 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8568 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8569 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8570 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8571 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8574 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8576 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8579 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8581 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8584 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8585 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8586 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8587 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8588 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8590 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8591 let persist = match &res {
8592 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8593 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8595 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8600 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8602 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8605 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8607 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8610 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8611 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8612 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8613 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8615 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8616 let persist = match &res {
8617 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8618 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8619 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8621 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8626 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8628 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8631 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8632 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8633 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8634 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8636 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8637 let persist = match &res {
8638 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8639 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8640 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8642 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8647 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8648 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8649 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8650 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8652 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8653 let persist = match &res {
8654 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8655 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8656 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8658 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8663 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8665 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8668 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8670 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8673 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8674 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8675 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8676 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8678 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8679 let persist = match &res {
8680 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8681 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8682 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8684 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8689 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8691 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8694 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8695 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8696 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8699 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8704 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8706 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8707 let persist = match &res {
8708 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8709 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8710 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8712 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8717 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8719 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8720 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8721 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8723 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8724 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8725 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8728 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8729 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8730 let context = match phase {
8731 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8732 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8733 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8738 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8739 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8742 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8746 // Clean up for removal.
8747 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8748 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8749 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8752 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8753 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8754 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8755 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8757 // V1 Channel Establishment
8758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8759 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8761 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8762 // V2 Channel Establishment
8763 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8764 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8765 // Common Channel Establishment
8766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8767 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8768 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8771 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8774 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8776 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8777 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8778 // Channel Operations
8779 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8780 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8783 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8784 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8786 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8787 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8788 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8789 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8793 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8794 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8797 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8798 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8799 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8800 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8803 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8805 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8807 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8808 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8812 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8813 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8814 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8818 let mut res = Ok(());
8820 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8821 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8822 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8823 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8824 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8825 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8826 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8829 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8830 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8832 if inbound_peer_limited {
8834 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8836 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8837 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8838 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8839 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8840 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8841 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8842 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8843 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8848 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8849 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8851 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8852 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8853 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8854 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8857 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8860 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8861 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8866 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8869 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8872 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8874 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8875 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8876 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8877 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8878 // worry about closing and removing them.
8879 debug_assert!(false);
8883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8884 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8885 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8890 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8891 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8896 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8899 match &msg.data as &str {
8900 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8901 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8903 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8904 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8905 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8906 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8907 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8908 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8909 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8910 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8912 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8913 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8914 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8915 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8916 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8917 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8918 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8922 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8923 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8924 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8925 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8926 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8927 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8929 log_level: Level::Trace,
8939 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8940 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8942 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8943 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8946 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8947 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8948 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8949 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8951 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8952 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8953 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8957 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8958 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8959 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8960 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8963 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8964 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8965 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8966 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8974 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8975 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8979 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8980 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8983 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8984 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8987 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8988 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8991 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8992 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8993 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8994 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8997 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8998 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8999 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9000 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9003 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9004 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9005 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9006 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9009 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9010 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9011 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9012 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9015 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9016 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9017 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9018 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9021 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9022 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9023 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9024 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9027 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9028 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9029 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9030 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9033 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9034 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9035 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9036 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9039 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9040 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9041 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9042 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9046 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9047 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9049 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9050 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9051 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9052 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9053 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9054 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9058 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9059 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9060 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9063 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9064 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9067 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9068 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9070 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9071 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9073 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9074 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9077 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9079 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9080 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9081 let payment_paths = vec![
9082 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9084 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9085 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9086 payment_paths, payment_hash
9088 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9089 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9090 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9092 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9093 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9094 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9096 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9097 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9098 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9101 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9102 let payment_paths = vec![
9103 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9105 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9106 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9107 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9108 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9109 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9111 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9112 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9113 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9115 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9116 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9118 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9119 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9120 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9121 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9123 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9124 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9128 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9129 Err(error) => Some(error),
9133 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9137 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9138 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9140 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9142 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9143 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9146 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9148 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9155 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9162 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9163 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9167 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9168 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9169 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9170 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9171 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9175 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9176 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9178 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9179 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9180 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9181 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9182 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9185 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9186 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9187 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9188 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9191 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9192 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9193 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9194 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9197 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9198 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9199 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9200 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9203 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9204 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9205 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9206 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9207 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9208 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9209 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9210 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9211 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9212 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9213 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9214 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9215 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9216 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9217 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9218 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9219 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9220 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9221 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9222 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9227 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9228 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9230 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9231 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9232 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9233 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9236 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9237 (2, node_id, required),
9238 (4, features, required),
9239 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9240 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9241 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9242 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9245 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9247 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9248 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9249 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9250 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9251 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9252 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9253 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9254 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9255 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9256 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9257 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9258 (7, self.config, option),
9259 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9260 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9261 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9262 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9263 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9264 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9265 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9266 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9267 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9268 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9269 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9270 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9271 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9272 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9273 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9274 (32, self.is_public, required),
9275 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9276 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9277 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9278 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9279 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9285 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9286 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9287 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9288 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9289 (2, channel_id, required),
9290 (3, channel_type, option),
9291 (4, counterparty, required),
9292 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9293 (6, funding_txo, option),
9294 (7, config, option),
9295 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9296 (9, confirmations, option),
9297 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9298 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9299 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9300 (16, balance_msat, required),
9301 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9302 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9303 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9304 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9305 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9306 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9307 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9308 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9309 (26, is_outbound, required),
9310 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9311 (30, is_usable, required),
9312 (32, is_public, required),
9313 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9314 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9315 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9316 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9317 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9320 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9321 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9322 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9323 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9324 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9328 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9330 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9331 outbound_scid_alias,
9335 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9336 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9338 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9339 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9340 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9341 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9342 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9343 confirmations_required,
9345 force_close_spend_delay,
9346 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9347 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9348 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9349 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9350 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9351 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9352 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9353 channel_shutdown_state,
9358 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9359 (2, channels, required_vec),
9360 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9361 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9364 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9366 (0, onion_packet, required),
9367 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9370 (0, payment_data, required),
9371 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9372 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9373 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9374 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9376 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9377 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9378 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9379 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9380 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9381 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9385 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9386 (0, routing, required),
9387 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9388 (4, payment_hash, required),
9389 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9390 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9391 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9392 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9396 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9397 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9399 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9401 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9402 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9403 reason.write(writer)?;
9405 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9406 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9409 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9410 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9411 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9412 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9419 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9420 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9421 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9424 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9425 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9426 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9427 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9431 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9432 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9433 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9434 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9435 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9438 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9439 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9440 // messages contained in the variants.
9441 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9442 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9443 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9445 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9446 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9447 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9448 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9449 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9452 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9453 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9454 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9455 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9456 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9458 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9463 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9469 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9470 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9471 (2, outpoint, required),
9472 (4, htlc_id, required),
9473 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9474 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9477 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9478 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9479 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9480 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9481 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9483 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9484 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9485 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9486 (2, self.value, required),
9487 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9488 (4, payment_data, option),
9489 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9490 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9491 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9492 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9498 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9499 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9500 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9501 (0, prev_hop, required),
9502 (1, total_msat, option),
9503 (2, value_ser, required),
9504 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9505 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9506 (5, total_value_received, option),
9507 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9508 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9509 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9511 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9512 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9513 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9515 if payment_data.is_some() {
9516 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9518 if total_msat.is_none() {
9519 total_msat = Some(value);
9521 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9524 if total_msat.is_none() {
9525 if payment_data.is_none() {
9526 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9528 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9530 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9534 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9537 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9538 total_value_received,
9539 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9541 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9542 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9547 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9548 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9549 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9552 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9553 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9554 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9555 let mut payment_id = None;
9556 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9557 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9558 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9559 (0, session_priv, required),
9560 (1, payment_id, option),
9561 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9562 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9563 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9564 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9566 if payment_id.is_none() {
9567 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9569 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9571 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9572 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9573 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9575 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9576 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9577 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9578 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9582 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9583 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9584 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9586 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9589 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9590 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9595 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9596 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9598 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9600 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9601 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9602 (0, session_priv, required),
9603 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9604 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9605 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9606 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9607 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9608 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9611 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9613 field.write(writer)?;
9620 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9621 (0, forward_info, required),
9622 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9623 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9624 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9625 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9628 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9630 (0, htlc_id, required),
9631 (2, err_packet, required),
9636 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9637 (0, payment_secret, required),
9638 (2, expiry_time, required),
9639 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9640 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9641 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9644 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9646 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9647 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9648 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9649 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9650 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9651 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9655 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9656 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9658 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9660 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9662 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9663 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9664 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9667 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9670 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9671 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9674 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9675 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9678 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9679 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9683 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9685 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9686 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9687 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9688 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9689 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9690 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9693 channel.write(writer)?;
9699 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9700 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9701 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9702 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9703 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9704 for forward in pending_forwards {
9705 forward.write(writer)?;
9710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9712 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9713 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9714 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9716 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9717 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9718 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9719 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9720 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9721 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9722 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9723 htlc.write(writer)?;
9725 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9726 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9729 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9730 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9731 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9732 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9733 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9734 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9735 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9738 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9739 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9740 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9741 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9742 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9744 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9745 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9746 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9747 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9748 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9749 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9750 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9755 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9756 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9757 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9758 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9759 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9760 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9761 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9762 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9763 0u64.write(writer)?;
9765 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9766 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9767 event.write(writer)?;
9771 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9772 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9773 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9774 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9775 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9776 0u64.write(writer)?;
9778 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9779 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9780 // likely to be identical.
9781 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9782 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9784 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9785 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9786 hash.write(writer)?;
9787 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9790 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9791 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9792 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9793 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9794 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9797 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9798 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9800 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9801 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9802 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9803 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9806 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9807 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9808 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9809 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9813 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9814 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9815 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9817 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9818 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9819 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9825 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9826 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9827 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9828 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9831 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9832 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9833 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9834 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9835 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9838 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9839 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9840 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9841 if !updates.is_empty() {
9842 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9843 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9848 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9849 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9850 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9851 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9852 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9853 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9854 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9855 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9856 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9857 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9858 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9859 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9860 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9867 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9868 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9869 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9870 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9873 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9874 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9875 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9876 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9877 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9878 // check that the event is sane here.
9879 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9880 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9881 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9882 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9888 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9889 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9890 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9891 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9892 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9893 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9896 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9897 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9898 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9899 events.push_back((ev, action));
9900 } else if action.is_some() {
9901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9908 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9909 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9910 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9911 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9912 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9913 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9916 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9918 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9920 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9921 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9922 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9923 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9924 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9925 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9926 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9927 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9928 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9929 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9930 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9931 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9932 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9934 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9935 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9937 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9938 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9940 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9941 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9942 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9943 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9944 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9945 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9947 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9948 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9950 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9951 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9952 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9953 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9954 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9955 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9959 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9960 pub entropy_source: ES,
9962 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9963 pub node_signer: NS,
9965 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9966 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9968 pub signer_provider: SP,
9970 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9972 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9973 pub fee_estimator: F,
9974 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9976 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9977 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9978 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9979 pub chain_monitor: M,
9981 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9982 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9983 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9984 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9985 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9986 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9988 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9990 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9991 /// deserialization.
9993 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9994 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9995 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9997 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9998 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10000 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10001 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10002 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10003 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10005 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10008 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10009 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
10012 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10013 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10015 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10016 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10017 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10018 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10019 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10020 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10024 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10025 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10026 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10027 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10028 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
10030 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10031 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10036 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10037 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10038 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10039 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10041 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10042 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10043 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10044 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10045 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10046 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10050 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10051 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10052 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10056 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10057 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10059 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10060 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10061 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10062 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10063 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10064 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10068 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10069 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10071 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10072 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10073 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10075 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10077 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10078 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10079 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10080 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10081 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10082 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10083 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10084 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10085 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10086 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10088 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10089 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10090 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10091 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10092 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10093 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10094 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10095 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10096 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10097 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10098 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10099 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10100 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10102 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10103 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10104 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10106 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10107 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10108 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10110 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10111 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10112 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10114 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10115 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10116 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10118 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10119 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10120 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10123 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10124 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10125 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10126 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10127 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10128 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10129 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10131 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10132 let mut found_htlc = false;
10133 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10134 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10137 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10138 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10139 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10140 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10141 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10142 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10143 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10144 log_info!(args.logger,
10145 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10146 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10147 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10151 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10152 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10153 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10154 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10155 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10157 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10158 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10160 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10162 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10163 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10166 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10167 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10168 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10172 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10173 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10174 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10175 // safely discard the channel.
10176 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10177 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10178 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10179 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10180 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10181 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10182 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10185 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10186 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10187 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10188 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10189 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10190 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10194 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10195 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10196 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10197 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10199 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10202 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10206 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10207 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10208 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10209 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10210 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10211 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10212 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10213 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10214 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10216 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10219 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10220 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10221 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10222 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10223 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10224 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10225 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10226 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10228 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10231 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10234 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10235 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10236 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10237 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10238 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10239 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10240 is_connected: false,
10244 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10245 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10246 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10247 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10248 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10249 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10250 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10251 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10254 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10255 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10256 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10257 for _ in 0..event_count {
10258 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10259 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10264 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10265 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10266 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10268 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10269 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10270 // on-startup monitor updates.
10271 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10272 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10274 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10278 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10279 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10281 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10282 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10283 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10284 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10285 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10289 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10290 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10291 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10292 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10293 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10294 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10295 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10297 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10302 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10303 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10304 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10305 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10306 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10307 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10308 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10309 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10310 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10311 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10312 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10313 let mut events_override = None;
10314 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10315 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10316 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10317 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10318 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10319 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10320 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10321 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10322 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10323 (8, events_override, option),
10324 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10325 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10326 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10327 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10329 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10330 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10333 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10334 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10337 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10338 pending_events_read = events;
10341 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10342 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10345 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10346 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10347 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10348 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10349 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10350 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10352 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10354 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10355 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10356 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10359 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10360 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10361 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10362 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10363 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10365 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10366 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10367 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10369 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10370 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10371 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10372 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10373 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10375 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10376 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10377 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10378 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10379 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10380 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10381 pending_background_events.push(
10382 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10383 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10384 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10385 update: update.clone(),
10388 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10389 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10390 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10391 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10392 pending_background_events.push(
10393 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10394 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10395 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10398 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10399 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10402 max_in_flight_update_id
10406 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10409 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10410 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10411 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10413 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10414 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10415 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10416 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10417 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10418 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10419 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10420 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10421 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10424 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10425 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10426 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10427 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10428 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10429 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10430 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10431 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10432 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10433 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10434 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10437 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10438 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10439 debug_assert!(false);
10440 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10445 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10446 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10447 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10448 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10449 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10450 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10451 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10452 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10454 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10455 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10456 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10458 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10459 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10460 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10461 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10462 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10463 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10464 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10465 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10470 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10471 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10473 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10474 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10475 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10476 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10479 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10480 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10481 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10482 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10483 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10484 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10485 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10487 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10488 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10489 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10490 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10491 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10492 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10493 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10494 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10497 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10498 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10499 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10500 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10501 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10502 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10503 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10504 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10507 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10508 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10509 retry_strategy: None,
10510 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10511 payment_params: None,
10512 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10513 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10514 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10515 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10516 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10517 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10518 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10519 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10520 total_msat: path_amt,
10521 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10522 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10524 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10525 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10530 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10531 match htlc_source {
10532 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10533 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10534 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10535 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10537 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10538 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10539 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10540 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10541 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10542 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10543 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10544 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10545 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10546 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10547 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10552 !forwards.is_empty()
10554 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10555 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10556 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10557 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10558 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10559 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10560 intercepted_id != ev_id
10567 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10568 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10569 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10570 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10571 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10572 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10573 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10574 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10575 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10576 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10577 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10579 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10580 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10581 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10583 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10584 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10585 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10592 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10593 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10595 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10597 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10598 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10599 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10600 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10601 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10602 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10603 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10604 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10605 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10606 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10609 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10610 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10611 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10612 // channel still live case here.
10616 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10617 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10622 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10623 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10624 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10625 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10626 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10627 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10628 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10629 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10633 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10634 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10636 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10637 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10638 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10639 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10641 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10642 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10643 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10645 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10646 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10648 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10649 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10651 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10654 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10655 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10656 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10658 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10662 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10663 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10664 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10665 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10666 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10668 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10669 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10670 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10671 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10672 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10673 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10674 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10675 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10677 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10682 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10684 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10686 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10687 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10689 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10690 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10695 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10696 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10698 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10700 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10702 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10703 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10704 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10705 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10709 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10710 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10713 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10714 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10715 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10716 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10718 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10719 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10720 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10722 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10723 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10724 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10725 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10726 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10727 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10729 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10730 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10731 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10732 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10733 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10738 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10739 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10740 debug_assert!(false);
10741 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10746 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10748 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10749 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10750 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10751 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10752 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10753 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10754 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10755 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10756 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10757 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10758 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10760 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10761 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10763 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10764 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10765 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10766 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10768 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10769 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10770 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10771 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10773 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10774 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10775 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10776 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10778 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10779 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10780 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10781 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10782 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10783 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10784 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10787 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10788 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10791 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10794 purpose: payment.purpose,
10795 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10796 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10797 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10803 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10804 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10805 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10806 for action in actions.iter() {
10807 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10808 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10809 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10811 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10812 log_trace!(args.logger,
10813 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10814 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10815 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10816 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10817 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10819 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10820 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10821 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10822 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10826 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10827 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10831 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10833 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10838 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10840 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10841 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10842 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10843 router: args.router,
10845 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10847 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10848 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10849 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10850 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10852 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10853 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10854 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10855 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10856 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10857 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10859 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10861 our_network_pubkey,
10864 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10866 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10868 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10869 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10870 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10871 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10872 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10874 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10875 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10877 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10879 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10881 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10882 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10883 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10885 logger: args.logger,
10886 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10889 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10890 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10891 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10892 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10893 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10896 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10897 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10898 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10899 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10900 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10901 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10904 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10905 //connection or two.
10907 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10913 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10914 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10915 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10916 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10917 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10918 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10919 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10920 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10921 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
10922 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10923 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10924 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10925 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route};
10926 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10927 use crate::util::test_utils;
10928 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10929 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10932 fn test_notify_limits() {
10933 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10934 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10938 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10940 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10941 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10942 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10943 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10944 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10946 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10948 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10949 // to connect messages with new values
10950 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10951 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10952 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10953 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10954 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10955 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10957 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10958 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10959 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10960 // ... but the last node should not.
10961 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10962 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10963 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10964 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10966 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10967 // about the channel.
10968 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10969 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10970 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10972 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10974 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10975 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10976 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10977 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10978 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10979 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10981 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10982 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10983 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10985 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10986 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10987 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10988 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10989 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10990 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10992 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10993 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10994 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10995 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10996 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10997 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10998 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10999 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11001 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11002 // the channel info has updated.
11003 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11004 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11005 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11006 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11007 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11008 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11012 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11013 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11019 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11021 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11022 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11023 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11024 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11026 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11027 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11028 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11029 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11030 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11031 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11032 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11033 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11035 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11037 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11039 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11040 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11041 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11043 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11045 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11046 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11047 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11051 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11053 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11054 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11055 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11056 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11057 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11058 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11059 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11060 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11061 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11063 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11064 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11065 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11067 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11069 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11071 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11072 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11073 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11074 // lightning messages manually.
11075 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11076 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11079 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11080 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11081 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11082 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11084 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11085 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11087 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11088 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11090 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11091 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11092 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11094 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11095 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11096 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11098 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11100 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11102 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11103 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11106 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11107 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11108 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11111 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11112 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11113 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11114 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11119 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11120 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11121 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11122 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11124 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11129 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11130 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11131 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11134 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11135 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11136 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11137 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11138 // fails as expected.
11139 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11140 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11141 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11142 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11143 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11144 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11147 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11148 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11151 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11152 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11153 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11155 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11156 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11157 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11159 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11160 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11161 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11162 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11163 let route = find_route(
11164 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11165 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11167 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11168 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11170 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11172 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11173 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11174 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11176 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11177 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11178 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11180 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11182 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11183 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11184 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11185 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11186 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11187 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11188 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11189 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11190 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11192 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11193 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11195 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11196 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11197 let route = find_route(
11198 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11199 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11201 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11202 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11204 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11206 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11207 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11208 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11210 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11211 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11212 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11213 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11215 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11216 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11217 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11218 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11221 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11223 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11225 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11226 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11227 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11228 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11229 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11230 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11232 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11233 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11235 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11236 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11238 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11239 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11240 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11241 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11243 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11245 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11246 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11247 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11249 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11250 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11251 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11254 let route = find_route(
11255 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11256 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11258 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11259 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11260 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11262 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11264 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11265 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11268 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11269 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11272 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11273 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11274 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11275 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11276 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11277 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11278 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11279 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11280 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11282 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11283 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11287 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11288 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11289 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11292 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11293 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11295 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11296 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11298 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11299 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11300 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11301 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11302 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11303 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11304 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11305 let route = find_route(
11306 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11307 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11310 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11311 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11312 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11313 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11314 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11315 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11318 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11319 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11320 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11321 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11322 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11323 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11326 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11330 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11331 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11332 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11333 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11334 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11338 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11340 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11341 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11343 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11344 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11345 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11346 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11347 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11348 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11349 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11350 let route = find_route(
11351 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11352 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11355 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11356 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11357 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11358 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11359 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11360 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11361 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11362 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11365 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11366 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11367 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11368 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11369 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11370 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11371 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11373 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11377 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11381 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11383 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11384 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11385 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11386 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11388 // Marshall an MPP route.
11389 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11390 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11391 route.paths.push(path);
11392 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11393 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11394 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11395 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11396 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11397 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11399 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11400 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11402 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11403 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11405 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11410 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11411 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11412 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11413 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11414 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11416 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11418 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11419 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11421 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11422 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11424 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11427 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11428 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11429 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11430 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11431 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11432 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11435 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11438 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11439 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11444 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11445 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11446 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11447 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11449 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11451 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11452 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11454 total_msat: 100_000,
11457 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11458 // payment verification fails as expected.
11459 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11460 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11461 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11462 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11464 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11468 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11469 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11473 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11474 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11475 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11476 // the channel is successfully closed.
11477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11480 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11482 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11483 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11484 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11485 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11486 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11488 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11489 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11491 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11492 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11493 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11494 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11497 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11499 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11500 // as it has the funding transaction.
11501 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11502 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11503 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11506 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11508 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11510 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11512 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11513 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11514 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11516 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11519 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11520 // as it has the funding transaction.
11521 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11522 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11523 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11526 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11527 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11529 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11530 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11531 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11532 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11534 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11535 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11536 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11537 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11539 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11540 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11542 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11543 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11544 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11545 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11546 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11547 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11548 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11552 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11553 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11554 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11555 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11556 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11557 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11558 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11561 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11563 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11564 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11565 // closing transaction).
11566 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11567 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11568 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11570 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11571 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11572 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11573 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11574 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11577 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11579 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11581 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11582 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11583 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11585 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11587 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11588 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11591 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11592 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11593 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11596 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11597 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11598 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11601 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11602 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11603 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11606 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11607 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11608 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11611 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11613 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11614 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11616 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11617 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11619 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11620 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11625 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11626 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11627 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11628 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11629 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11630 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11631 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11632 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11635 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11636 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11637 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11639 // Test the API functions.
11640 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11642 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11644 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11646 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11648 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11650 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11652 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11656 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11657 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11658 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11659 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11660 // the given `channel_id`.
11661 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11662 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11663 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11664 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11666 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11669 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11671 // Test the API functions.
11672 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11674 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11676 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11678 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11680 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11682 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11686 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11687 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11691 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11693 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11695 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11696 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11698 let mut funding_tx = None;
11699 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11701 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11704 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11705 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11706 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11707 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11708 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11710 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11712 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11714 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11716 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11718 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11720 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11723 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11724 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11725 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11726 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11727 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11729 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11730 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11732 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11733 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11734 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11735 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11736 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11737 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11738 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11741 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11742 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11743 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11744 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11745 }, true).unwrap_err();
11747 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11748 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11749 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11750 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11751 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11752 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11753 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11755 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11756 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11758 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11759 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11760 }, true).unwrap_err();
11762 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11763 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11764 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11765 }, false).unwrap();
11766 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11768 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11769 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11771 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11772 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11773 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11774 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11775 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11777 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11778 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11779 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11781 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11782 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11783 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11785 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11786 // "protected" and can connect again.
11787 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11788 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11789 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11791 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11793 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11795 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11796 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11800 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11801 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11805 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11807 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11809 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11810 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11812 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11813 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11814 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11815 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11818 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11820 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11821 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11822 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11824 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11825 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11826 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11828 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11829 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11830 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11831 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11835 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11836 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11837 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11838 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11840 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11841 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11843 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11845 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11847 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11848 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11850 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11851 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11852 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11853 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11854 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11855 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11858 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11859 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11861 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11862 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11866 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11867 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11870 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11871 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11872 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11873 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11874 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11876 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11877 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11879 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11880 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11881 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11882 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11886 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11888 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11889 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11891 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11892 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11893 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11895 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11896 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11900 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11904 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11905 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11906 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11907 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11908 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11909 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11910 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11911 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11913 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11914 payment_metadata: None,
11915 keysend_preimage: None,
11916 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11917 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11919 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11921 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11922 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11923 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11924 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11925 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11926 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11927 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11929 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11930 } else { panic!(); }
11932 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11933 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11935 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11936 payment_metadata: None,
11937 keysend_preimage: None,
11938 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11939 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11941 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11943 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11944 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11945 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11946 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11950 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11951 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11952 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11953 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11954 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11956 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11957 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11959 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11960 payment_metadata: None,
11961 keysend_preimage: None,
11962 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11963 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11965 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11966 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11967 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11969 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11970 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11971 // is not satisfied.
11972 assert!(result.is_ok());
11976 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11977 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11978 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11979 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11980 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11982 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11983 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11985 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11986 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11988 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11989 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11991 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11992 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11994 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11995 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11996 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11997 match &msg_events[0] {
11998 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11999 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12001 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12002 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12003 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12009 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12010 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12012 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12013 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12016 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12020 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12021 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12022 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12023 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12026 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12027 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12028 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12029 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12030 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12032 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
12033 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12034 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12036 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12037 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12039 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12040 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12045 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12046 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12048 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12049 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12051 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12052 // not have generated any events.
12053 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12057 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12058 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12059 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12060 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12061 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12062 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12063 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12064 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12066 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12067 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12070 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12071 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12072 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12073 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12076 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12077 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12080 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12081 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12084 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12085 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12086 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12087 ..Default::default()
12089 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12090 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12093 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12094 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12097 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12098 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12099 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12100 ..Default::default()
12102 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12103 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12104 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12107 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12108 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12111 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12112 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12113 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12114 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12115 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12118 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12119 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12120 ..Default::default()
12122 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12125 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12126 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12127 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12132 fn test_payment_display() {
12133 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12134 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12135 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12136 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12137 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12138 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12142 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12143 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12144 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12145 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12146 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12147 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12149 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12150 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12151 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12152 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12153 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12154 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12155 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12156 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12158 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12159 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12160 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12163 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12164 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12166 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12167 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12169 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12170 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12171 }, false).unwrap();
12172 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12173 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12174 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12176 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12178 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12179 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12180 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12181 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12182 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12183 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12184 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12185 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12186 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12187 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12188 } else { panic!() };
12189 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12190 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12191 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12192 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12194 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12196 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12197 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12198 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12203 fn test_peel_payment_onion() {
12205 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12207 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
12208 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
12209 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
12210 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
12212 let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12213 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
12217 blinded_tail: None,
12220 let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion(
12221 &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height,
12222 payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed
12225 let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion);
12226 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string());
12228 let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12229 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12231 let next_onion = match peeled.routing {
12232 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => {
12235 _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"),
12238 let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion);
12239 let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true)
12240 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
12242 match peeled2.routing {
12243 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => {
12244 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage);
12245 assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount);
12246 assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value);
12247 let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap();
12248 assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat);
12249 assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret);
12251 _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"),
12255 fn make_update_add_msg(
12256 amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12257 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket
12258 ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12259 msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
12260 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]),
12265 onion_routing_packet,
12266 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
12270 fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> (
12271 SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32],
12272 Vec<RouteHop>, u64, PaymentSecret,
12274 let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32];
12275 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap();
12276 let total_amt_msat = 1000;
12277 let cur_height = 1000;
12278 let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]);
12279 let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
12280 let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
12281 let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
12282 let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).into_inner();
12283 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
12284 let prng_seed = [44; 32];
12286 // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie
12288 let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee;
12293 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12294 short_channel_id: 1,
12295 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12296 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12297 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12300 pubkey: recipient_pk,
12301 fee_msat: recipient_amount,
12302 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
12303 short_channel_id: 2,
12304 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
12305 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
12306 maybe_announced_channel: false,
12310 (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
12311 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret)
12314 pub fn create_payment_onion<T: bitcoin::secp256k1::Signing>(
12315 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64,
12316 recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
12317 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]
12318 ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> {
12319 let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?;
12320 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
12324 best_block_height + 1,
12326 ).map_err(|_| ())?;
12327 let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(
12328 onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash
12330 Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet))
12336 use crate::chain::Listen;
12337 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12338 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12339 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12340 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12341 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12342 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12343 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12344 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12345 use crate::util::test_utils;
12346 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12348 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12349 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12350 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12352 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12354 use criterion::Criterion;
12356 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12357 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12358 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12359 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12360 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12361 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12362 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12364 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12365 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12367 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12368 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12370 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12372 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12375 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12376 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12379 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12380 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12381 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12383 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12384 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12386 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12387 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12388 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12389 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12390 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12392 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12393 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12394 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12396 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12397 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12398 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12399 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12401 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12402 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12403 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12405 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12406 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12407 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12408 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12409 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12411 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12412 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12413 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12415 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12416 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12418 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12419 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12420 }, false).unwrap();
12421 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12422 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12423 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12426 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12427 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12428 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12430 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12431 } else { panic!(); }
12433 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12434 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12435 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12436 match events_b[0] {
12437 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12438 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12443 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12444 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12445 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12446 match events_a[0] {
12447 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12448 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12453 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12455 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12456 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12457 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12459 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12460 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12461 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12462 match msg_events[0] {
12463 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12464 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12465 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12469 match msg_events[1] {
12470 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12474 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12475 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12476 match events_a[0] {
12477 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12478 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12483 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12484 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12485 match events_b[0] {
12486 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12487 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12492 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12493 macro_rules! send_payment {
12494 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12495 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12496 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12497 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12498 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12499 payment_count += 1;
12500 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12501 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12503 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12504 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12505 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12506 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12507 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12508 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12509 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12510 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12511 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12512 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12513 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12515 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12516 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12517 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12518 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12520 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12521 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12522 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12523 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12524 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12526 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12529 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12530 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12531 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12532 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12534 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12538 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12539 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12540 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);