1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
186 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
189 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
194 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
197 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
198 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
201 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
204 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
205 struct ClaimableHTLC {
206 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
211 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
212 sender_intended_value: u64,
213 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
216 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
217 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
218 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
221 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
224 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
226 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
227 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
228 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
230 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 impl Readable for PaymentId {
237 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
238 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
243 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
245 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
246 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
247 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
249 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
250 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
255 impl Readable for InterceptId {
256 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
257 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
262 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
263 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
264 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
265 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
266 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
269 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
272 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
273 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
276 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
281 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
283 (2, htlc_id, required),
285 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
286 (0, session_priv, required),
291 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
295 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
298 session_priv: SecretKey,
299 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
300 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
301 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
302 payment_id: PaymentId,
305 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
306 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
307 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
309 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
311 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
316 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
317 payment_id.hash(hasher);
318 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
324 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
326 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
328 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
329 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
331 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
336 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
337 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
338 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
339 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
340 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
342 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
348 struct InboundOnionErr {
354 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
355 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
357 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
358 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
359 pub enum FailureCode {
360 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
361 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
362 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
363 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
364 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
365 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
366 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
367 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
368 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
369 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
370 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
373 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
374 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
375 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
376 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
377 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
379 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
380 err: msgs::LightningError,
381 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
382 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
384 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
386 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
388 err: LightningError {
390 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
391 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
398 shutdown_finish: None,
402 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
403 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
406 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
408 err: LightningError {
410 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
411 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
417 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
418 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
422 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
425 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
428 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
432 log_level: Level::Warn,
435 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
439 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
450 shutdown_finish: None,
455 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
456 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
457 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
458 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
459 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
461 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
462 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
463 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
464 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
465 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
466 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
467 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
469 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
473 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
474 struct ClaimingPayment {
476 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
479 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
480 (0, amount_msat, required),
481 (2, payment_purpose, required),
482 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
485 struct ClaimablePayment {
486 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
487 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
488 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
491 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
492 struct ClaimablePayments {
493 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
494 /// failed/claimed by the user.
496 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
497 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
499 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
500 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
501 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
503 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
504 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
505 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
506 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
509 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
510 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
511 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
512 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
513 enum BackgroundEvent {
514 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
515 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
516 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
517 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
519 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
520 /// are regenerated on startup.
521 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
522 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
523 /// channel to continue normal operation.
525 /// In general this should be used rather than
526 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
527 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
528 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
530 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
531 /// are regenerated on startup.
532 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
533 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
534 funding_txo: OutPoint,
535 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
537 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
538 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
540 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
541 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
542 channel_id: [u8; 32],
547 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
548 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
549 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
550 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
551 /// event can be generated.
552 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
553 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
554 /// operation of another channel.
556 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
557 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
558 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
559 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
561 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
562 event: events::Event,
563 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
567 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
568 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
569 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
570 (0, event, upgradable_required),
571 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
572 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
573 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
574 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
575 // downgrades to prior versions.
576 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
580 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
581 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
582 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
583 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
584 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
587 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
588 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
589 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
590 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
594 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
595 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
596 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
597 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
598 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
599 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
601 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
602 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
603 channel_id: [u8; 32],
604 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
609 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
611 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
612 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
613 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
614 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
619 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
620 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
624 /// State we hold per-peer.
625 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
626 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
628 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
629 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
630 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
632 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
633 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
635 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
636 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
638 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
639 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
641 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
642 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
643 latest_features: InitFeatures,
644 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
645 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
646 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
647 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
648 /// user but which have not yet completed.
650 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
651 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
652 /// for a missing channel.
653 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
654 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
655 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
657 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
658 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
659 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
660 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
662 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
663 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
664 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
665 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
666 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
667 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
668 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
669 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
670 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
671 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
672 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
673 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
674 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
675 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
676 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
680 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
681 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
682 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
683 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
684 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
685 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
688 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
689 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
692 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
693 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
694 self.channel_by_id.len() +
695 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
696 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
699 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
700 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
701 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
702 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
703 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
707 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
708 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
710 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
713 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
714 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
715 struct PendingInboundPayment {
716 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
717 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
718 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
719 /// this payment being removed.
721 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
722 user_payment_id: u64,
723 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
724 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
725 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
728 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
729 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
730 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
731 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
732 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
733 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
734 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
735 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
737 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
738 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
746 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
748 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
749 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
750 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
755 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
756 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
757 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
758 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
759 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
760 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
761 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
762 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
763 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
765 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
766 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
775 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
777 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
778 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
779 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
784 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
785 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
786 $vis trait AChannelManager {
787 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
788 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
789 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
790 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
791 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
792 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
793 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
794 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
795 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
796 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
797 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
798 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
799 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
800 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
801 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
802 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
803 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
804 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
807 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
808 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
809 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
810 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
811 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
812 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
814 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
819 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
823 type Watch = M::Target;
825 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
827 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
829 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
831 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
832 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
834 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
836 type Router = R::Target;
838 type Logger = L::Target;
840 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
843 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
844 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
846 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
847 /// to individual Channels.
849 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
850 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
851 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
852 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
854 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
855 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
856 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
857 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
858 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
859 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
860 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
862 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
863 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
864 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
866 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
867 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
868 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
869 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
870 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
872 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
873 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
874 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
875 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
877 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
878 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
879 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
881 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
882 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
883 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
884 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
885 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
887 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
888 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
889 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
890 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
891 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
892 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
893 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
894 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
897 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
898 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
899 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
900 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
901 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
905 // `total_consistency_lock`
907 // |__`forward_htlcs`
909 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
911 // |__`per_peer_state`
913 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
915 // | |__`claimable_payments`
917 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
923 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
925 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
929 // | |__`pending_events`
931 // | |__`pending_background_events`
933 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
935 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
936 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
937 ES::Target: EntropySource,
938 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
939 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
944 default_configuration: UserConfig,
945 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
946 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
952 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
954 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
956 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
957 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
959 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
960 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
961 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
962 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
964 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
965 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
967 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
968 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
969 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
970 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
971 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
972 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
973 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
974 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
976 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
978 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
979 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
981 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
983 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
984 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
985 /// and via the classic SCID.
987 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
988 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
990 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
992 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
994 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
995 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
996 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
998 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
999 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1001 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1002 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1004 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1005 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1007 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1008 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1009 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1010 /// active channel list on load.
1012 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1013 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1015 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1017 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1018 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1019 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1021 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1022 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1023 /// the handling of the events.
1025 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1026 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1029 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1030 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1031 /// would break backwards compatability.
1032 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1033 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1034 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1036 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1037 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1039 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1041 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1042 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1043 /// confirmation depth.
1045 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1046 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1047 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1049 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1051 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1053 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1055 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1057 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1059 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1060 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1061 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1063 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1064 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1066 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1067 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1068 /// keeping additional state.
1069 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1071 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1072 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1073 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1074 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1076 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1077 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1079 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1080 /// are currently open with that peer.
1082 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1083 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1086 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1088 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1089 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1090 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1091 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1092 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1094 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1095 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1096 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1097 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1098 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1100 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1101 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1103 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1104 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1105 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1106 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1108 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1109 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1110 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1111 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1112 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1114 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1116 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1118 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1119 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1120 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1121 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1122 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1123 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1124 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1125 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1126 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1128 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1130 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1134 signer_provider: SP,
1139 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1141 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1142 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1143 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1144 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1145 pub struct ChainParameters {
1146 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1147 pub network: Network,
1149 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1151 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1152 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1155 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1162 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1163 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1164 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1165 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1166 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1167 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1169 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1170 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1171 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1172 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1173 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1175 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1176 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1179 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1180 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1181 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1182 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1184 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1185 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1186 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1187 _read_guard: read_guard,
1192 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1193 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1194 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1195 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1197 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1198 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1199 should_persist: persist_check,
1200 _read_guard: read_guard,
1205 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1206 fn drop(&mut self) {
1207 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1208 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1213 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1214 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1216 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1218 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1219 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1220 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1221 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1222 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1224 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1225 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1227 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1229 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1230 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1231 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1232 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1233 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1234 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1235 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1236 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1237 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1238 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1239 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1240 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1241 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1243 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1244 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1246 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1247 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1248 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1249 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1251 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1252 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1253 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1254 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1255 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1256 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1259 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1261 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1262 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1265 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1267 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1268 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1270 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1271 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1272 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1273 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1275 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1276 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1277 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1279 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1280 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1281 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1283 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1284 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1285 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1286 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1288 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1289 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1290 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1292 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1293 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1294 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1296 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1297 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1298 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1299 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1300 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1301 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1302 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1303 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1304 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1305 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1306 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1309 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1310 /// to better separate parameters.
1311 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1312 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1313 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1314 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1315 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1316 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1317 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1318 pub features: InitFeatures,
1319 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1320 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1321 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1323 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1325 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1326 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1327 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1328 /// payments to us through this channel.
1329 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1330 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1331 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1332 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1333 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1334 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1335 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1338 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1339 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1340 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1341 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1342 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1343 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1344 /// lifetime of the channel.
1345 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1346 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1347 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1348 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1349 /// our counterparty already.
1351 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1352 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1353 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1354 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1356 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1357 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1358 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1359 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1361 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1362 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1364 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1365 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1367 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1368 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1369 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1370 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1371 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1372 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1373 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1374 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1375 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1378 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1380 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1381 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1382 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1383 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1384 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1385 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1386 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1388 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1389 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1391 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1392 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1393 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1394 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1395 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1396 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1397 /// this value on chain.
1399 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1401 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1403 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1404 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1405 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1406 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1408 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1409 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1410 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1412 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1413 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1414 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1415 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1416 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1418 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1419 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1420 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1421 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1423 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1424 pub balance_msat: u64,
1425 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1426 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1427 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1428 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1430 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1432 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1433 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1434 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1435 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1436 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1437 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1438 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1439 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1441 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1442 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1443 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1444 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1445 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1446 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1447 /// route which is valid.
1448 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1449 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1450 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1451 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1452 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1453 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1455 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1456 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1457 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1458 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1459 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1460 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1461 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1462 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1463 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1465 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1467 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1468 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1469 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1470 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1471 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1473 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1474 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1475 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1476 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1477 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1478 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1479 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1481 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1482 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1483 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1484 pub is_outbound: bool,
1485 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1486 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1487 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1488 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1489 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1491 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1492 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1493 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1494 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1495 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1496 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1497 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1499 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1500 pub is_usable: bool,
1501 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1502 pub is_public: bool,
1503 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1504 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1505 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1506 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1507 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1508 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1510 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1511 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1514 impl ChannelDetails {
1515 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1516 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1517 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1519 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1520 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1521 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1522 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1525 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1526 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1527 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1529 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1530 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1531 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1532 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1535 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1536 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1537 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1539 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1541 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1542 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1543 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1545 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1546 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1547 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1548 features: latest_features,
1549 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1550 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1551 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1552 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1553 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1554 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1555 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1556 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1557 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1558 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1560 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1561 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1562 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1563 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1564 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1565 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1566 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1567 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1568 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1569 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1570 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1571 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1572 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1573 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1574 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1575 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1576 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1577 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1578 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1579 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1580 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1581 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1582 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1583 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1584 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1585 config: Some(context.config()),
1586 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1591 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1592 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1593 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1594 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1595 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1596 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1597 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1598 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1599 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1601 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1603 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1604 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1606 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1607 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1608 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1609 /// to drop the channel.
1613 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1614 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1615 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1616 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1617 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1619 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1621 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1622 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1623 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1626 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1627 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1628 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1630 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1631 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1632 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1634 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1635 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1636 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1638 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1639 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1643 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1645 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1647 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1648 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1649 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1650 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1652 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1653 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1654 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1657 macro_rules! handle_error {
1658 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1659 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1660 // entering the macro.
1661 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1662 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1666 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1667 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1669 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1670 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1671 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1672 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1676 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1677 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1678 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1679 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1684 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1685 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1687 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1688 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1689 action: err.action.clone()
1693 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1694 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1695 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1696 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1697 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1701 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1706 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1709 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1710 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1711 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1717 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1718 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1719 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1720 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1721 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1722 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1724 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1725 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1726 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1727 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1728 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1730 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1731 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1733 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1737 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1738 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1739 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1741 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1742 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1744 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1745 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1747 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1748 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1749 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1750 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1751 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1752 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1756 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1758 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1759 // In any case, just close the channel.
1760 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1761 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1762 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1763 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1764 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1765 shutdown_res, None))
1771 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1772 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1776 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1778 $entry.remove_entry();
1786 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1787 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1791 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1793 $entry.remove_entry();
1801 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1802 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1806 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1808 $entry.remove_entry();
1816 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1817 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1819 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1820 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1826 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1827 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1828 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1829 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1830 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1832 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1833 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1834 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1835 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1836 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1837 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1838 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1839 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1840 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1841 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1846 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1847 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1848 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1849 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1850 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1851 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1852 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1853 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1854 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1856 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1861 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1862 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1863 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1864 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1865 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1866 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1867 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1868 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1869 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1871 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1876 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1877 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1878 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1879 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1880 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1881 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1882 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1883 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1884 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1885 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1886 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1888 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1889 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1890 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1896 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1897 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1899 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1900 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1901 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1902 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1903 updates.announcement_sigs);
1904 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1905 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1908 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1909 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1910 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1912 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1914 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1915 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1917 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1918 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1919 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1920 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1925 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1926 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1927 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1928 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1929 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1930 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1932 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1933 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1934 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1937 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1938 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1939 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1940 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1941 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1942 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1943 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1944 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1948 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1954 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1955 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1956 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1957 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1959 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1960 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1962 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1963 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1964 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1965 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1966 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1967 // filter for uniqueness here.
1968 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1969 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1970 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1971 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1973 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1974 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1975 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1977 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1978 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1979 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1983 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1984 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1988 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1989 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1990 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1991 while !processed_all_events {
1992 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1996 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1999 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2000 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2001 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2003 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2004 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2005 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2007 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2008 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2009 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2010 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2014 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2015 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2016 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2017 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2020 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2022 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2023 $event_to_handle = event;
2025 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2026 post_event_actions.push(action);
2031 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2032 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2033 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2034 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2035 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2036 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2039 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2040 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2041 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2042 processed_all_events = false;
2045 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2046 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2052 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2054 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2055 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2056 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2057 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2058 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2059 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2063 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2065 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2067 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2068 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2070 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2072 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2073 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2074 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2077 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2078 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2079 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2081 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2082 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2083 current_timestamp: u32,
2085 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2086 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2087 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2088 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2090 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2091 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2092 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2097 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2099 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2100 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2101 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2102 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2103 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2104 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2105 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2106 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2108 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2111 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2112 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2114 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2116 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2118 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2120 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2121 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2122 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2123 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2124 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2125 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2135 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2136 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2137 &self.default_configuration
2140 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2141 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2142 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2145 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2146 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2148 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2150 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2154 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2159 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2161 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2162 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2163 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2164 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2165 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2167 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2168 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2170 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2171 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2172 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2174 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2175 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2176 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2178 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2179 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2180 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2181 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2182 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2183 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2185 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2186 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2187 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2188 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2189 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2190 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2194 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2195 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2197 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2199 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2200 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2202 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2204 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2205 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2206 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2207 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2208 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2209 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2213 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2218 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2220 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2221 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2224 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2226 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2232 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2233 node_id: their_network_key,
2236 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2239 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2240 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2241 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2242 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2243 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2244 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2245 // the same channel.
2246 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2248 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2250 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2251 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2252 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2253 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2254 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2255 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2256 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2264 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2265 /// more information.
2266 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2267 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2268 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2269 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2270 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2271 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2272 // the same channel.
2273 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2275 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2276 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2277 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2278 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2280 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2281 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2282 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2285 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2286 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2287 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2290 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2291 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2292 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2300 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2301 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2303 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2304 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2306 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2307 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2308 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2309 // really wanted anyway.
2310 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2313 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2314 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2315 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2318 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2319 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2320 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2321 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2322 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2323 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2325 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2327 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2328 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2329 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2330 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2336 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2337 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2339 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2340 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2341 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2343 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2344 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2345 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2346 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2347 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2348 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2349 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2350 total_msat: *total_msat,
2353 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2354 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2356 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2357 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2359 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2364 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2365 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2366 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2367 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2368 Some(transaction) => {
2369 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2370 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2375 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2376 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2377 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2378 reason: closure_reason
2382 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2383 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2385 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2386 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2388 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2391 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2396 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2397 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2398 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2399 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2400 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2401 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2402 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2404 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2405 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2406 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2408 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2412 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2413 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2414 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2415 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2418 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2419 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2420 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2421 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2425 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2432 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2433 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2435 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2436 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2437 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2438 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2441 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2442 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2443 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2444 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2447 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2451 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2452 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2453 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2455 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2456 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2458 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2459 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2460 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2461 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2463 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2465 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2466 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2467 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2470 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2471 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2472 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2473 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2474 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2475 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2478 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2479 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2480 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2482 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2483 /// the channel being closed or not:
2484 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2485 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2486 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2487 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2488 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2489 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2490 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2492 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2493 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2494 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2495 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2497 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2499 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2500 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2501 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2504 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2505 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2506 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2507 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2508 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2509 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2513 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2514 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2515 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2516 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2517 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2518 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2519 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2520 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2522 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2523 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2524 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2525 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2526 // ignore the result here.
2527 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2531 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2532 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2533 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2534 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2536 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2537 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2538 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2539 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2540 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2541 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2542 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2544 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2546 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2547 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2548 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2549 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2550 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2551 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2552 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2553 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2554 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2555 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2556 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2557 // Unfunded channel has no update
2558 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2559 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2560 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2561 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2562 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2563 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2564 // Unfunded channel has no update
2565 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2567 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2570 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2571 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2572 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2577 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2580 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2582 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2583 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2585 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2586 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2587 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2588 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2589 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2590 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2591 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2602 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2603 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2604 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2606 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2607 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2608 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2611 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2612 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2613 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2615 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2616 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2617 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2618 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2619 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2622 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2623 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2624 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2625 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2626 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2630 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2631 /// local transaction(s).
2632 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2633 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2634 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2638 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2639 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2640 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2641 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2642 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2643 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2644 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2646 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2647 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2651 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2652 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2653 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2654 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2655 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2656 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2657 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2658 err_data: Vec::new(),
2662 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2663 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2664 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2667 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2668 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2669 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2670 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2671 outgoing_cltv_value,
2672 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2676 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2677 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2678 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2679 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2680 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2681 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2682 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2683 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2685 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2687 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2688 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2689 err_data: Vec::new(),
2690 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2693 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2694 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2695 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2696 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2698 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2701 // final_expiry_too_soon
2702 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2703 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2705 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2706 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2707 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2708 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2709 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2710 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2711 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2712 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2713 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2714 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2715 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2718 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2719 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2720 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2722 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2724 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2725 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2729 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2730 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2731 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2732 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2733 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2734 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2735 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2736 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2737 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2738 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2739 err_data: Vec::new(),
2740 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2743 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2744 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2745 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2746 err_data: Vec::new(),
2747 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2750 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2754 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2757 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2758 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2761 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2762 phantom_shared_secret,
2766 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2767 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2768 err_data: Vec::new(),
2769 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2772 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2775 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2776 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2777 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2778 outgoing_cltv_value,
2779 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2783 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2784 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2785 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2786 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2787 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2789 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2790 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2791 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2792 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2793 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2794 failure_code: $err_code,
2800 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2801 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2804 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2805 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2806 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2808 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2809 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2810 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2811 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2812 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2813 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2814 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2815 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2817 macro_rules! return_err {
2818 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2820 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2821 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2822 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2823 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2824 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2825 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2831 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2833 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2834 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2836 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2837 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2840 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2841 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2842 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2843 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2846 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2847 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2848 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2850 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2851 // inbound channel's state.
2852 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2853 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2854 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2858 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2859 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2860 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2861 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2862 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2863 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2864 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2865 // phantom or an intercept.
2866 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2867 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2868 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2872 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2875 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2877 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2878 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2879 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2880 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2881 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2885 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2887 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2888 // have no consistency guarantees.
2889 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2893 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2894 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2895 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2896 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2897 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2899 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2900 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2901 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2902 // we don't have the channel here.
2903 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2905 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2907 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2908 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2909 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2910 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2911 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2912 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2913 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2914 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2915 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2916 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2917 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2919 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2922 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2923 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2925 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2926 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2930 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2931 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2932 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2933 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2935 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2942 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2943 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2944 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2945 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2946 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2947 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2949 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2950 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2952 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2953 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2954 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2955 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2956 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2957 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2958 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2959 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2960 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2961 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2967 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2968 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2969 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2970 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2972 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2973 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2975 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2976 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2977 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2979 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2980 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2981 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2982 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2983 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2984 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2985 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2989 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2991 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2994 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2995 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2996 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2997 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2998 macro_rules! return_err {
2999 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3001 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3002 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3003 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3004 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3005 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3006 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3012 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3014 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3015 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3018 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3019 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3020 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3021 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3022 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3024 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3027 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3028 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3029 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3030 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3031 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3037 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3038 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3039 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3041 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3042 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3043 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3045 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3046 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3047 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3048 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3049 return Err(LightningError {
3050 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3051 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3054 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3055 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3057 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3058 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3061 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3062 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3063 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3064 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3066 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3067 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3068 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3070 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3071 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3072 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3073 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3074 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3075 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3079 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3082 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3084 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3086 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3087 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3088 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3089 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3090 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3093 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3094 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3096 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3097 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3098 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3099 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3100 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3101 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3102 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3103 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3105 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3106 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3107 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3109 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3111 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3118 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3119 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3120 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3121 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3126 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3127 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3128 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3131 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3132 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3135 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3136 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3138 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3139 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3140 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3142 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3143 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3145 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3146 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3147 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3148 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3152 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3153 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3154 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3155 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3156 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3157 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3158 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3160 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3161 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3162 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3164 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3165 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3167 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3168 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3169 Some(monitor_update) => {
3170 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3171 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3173 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3174 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3175 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3176 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3177 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3178 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3179 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3187 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3188 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3189 // `channel_by_id` map.
3190 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3191 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3196 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3197 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3199 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3204 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3206 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3207 /// fields for more info.
3209 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3210 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3212 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3214 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3215 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3216 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3217 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3218 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3220 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3221 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3222 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3223 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3224 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3226 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3227 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3228 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3229 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3231 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3233 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3234 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3235 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3237 /// In general, a path may raise:
3238 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3239 /// node public key) is specified.
3240 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3241 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3243 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3244 /// relevant updates.
3246 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3247 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3248 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3250 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3251 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3252 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3253 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3254 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3255 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3256 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3257 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3259 self.pending_outbound_payments
3260 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3261 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3262 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3265 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3266 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3267 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3268 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3270 self.pending_outbound_payments
3271 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3272 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3273 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3274 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3278 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3279 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3281 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3282 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3283 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3287 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3288 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3289 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3293 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3294 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3298 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3299 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3300 /// retries are exhausted.
3302 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3303 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3305 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3306 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3307 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3309 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3310 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3312 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3313 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3314 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3316 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3319 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3320 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3321 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3322 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3323 /// never reach the recipient.
3325 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3326 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3328 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3329 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3331 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3332 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3333 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3335 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3336 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3337 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3340 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3341 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3343 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3346 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3347 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3348 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3350 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3351 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3352 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3353 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3356 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3357 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3358 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3359 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3360 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3362 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3363 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3364 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3367 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3370 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3371 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3374 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3375 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3376 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3377 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3378 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3380 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3381 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3383 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3384 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3385 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3387 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3389 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3390 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3391 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3392 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3393 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3394 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3395 } else { unreachable!(); });
3397 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3398 Err((chan, err)) => {
3399 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3400 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3402 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3403 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3404 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3410 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3412 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3413 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3418 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3419 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3422 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3424 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3427 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3428 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3429 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3438 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3439 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3440 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3444 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3446 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3447 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3449 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3450 /// across the p2p network.
3452 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3453 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3455 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3456 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3457 /// keys per-channel).
3459 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3460 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3461 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3463 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3464 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3465 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3467 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3468 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3469 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3470 /// for more details.
3472 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3473 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3474 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3477 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3478 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3480 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3485 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3486 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3487 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3488 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3489 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3490 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3491 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3492 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3496 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3497 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3498 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3499 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3503 let mut output_index = None;
3504 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3505 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3506 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3507 if output_index.is_some() {
3508 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3509 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3512 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3515 if output_index.is_none() {
3516 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3517 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3520 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3524 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3526 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3527 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3528 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3529 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3531 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3532 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3534 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3535 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3537 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3539 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3540 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3541 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3542 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3543 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3544 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3545 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3546 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3547 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3548 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3549 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3550 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3551 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3557 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3558 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3559 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3560 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3561 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3562 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3563 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3564 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3568 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3569 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3570 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3571 config.apply(config_update);
3572 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3575 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3576 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3577 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3578 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3579 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3586 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3587 &mut channel.context
3588 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3589 &mut channel.context
3591 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3592 debug_assert!(false);
3593 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3595 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3596 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3599 let mut config = context.config();
3600 config.apply(config_update);
3601 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3602 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3603 context.update_config(&config);
3608 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3610 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3611 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3612 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3613 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3615 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3616 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3618 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3619 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3621 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3623 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3624 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3625 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3626 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3627 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3628 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3629 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3630 pub fn update_channel_config(
3631 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3632 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3633 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3636 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3637 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3639 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3640 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3642 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3643 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3644 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3645 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3646 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3648 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3649 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3650 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3653 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3656 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3657 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3658 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3659 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3660 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3661 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3664 let next_hop_scid = {
3665 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3666 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3667 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3668 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3669 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3670 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3672 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3673 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3674 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3677 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3679 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3680 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3681 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3686 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3687 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3688 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3691 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3692 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3693 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3695 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3697 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3698 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3699 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3700 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3701 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3704 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3705 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3706 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3707 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3708 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3710 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3714 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3715 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3717 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3720 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3721 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3724 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3725 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3726 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3729 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3730 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3731 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3732 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3733 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3734 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3735 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3738 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3739 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3740 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3741 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3746 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3748 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3749 /// Will likely generate further events.
3750 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3753 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3754 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3755 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3757 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3758 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3760 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3761 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3762 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3764 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3765 match forward_info {
3766 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3767 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3768 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3769 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3770 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3773 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3774 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3775 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3777 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3778 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3779 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3780 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3781 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3782 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3785 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3786 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3788 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3791 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3792 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3798 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3799 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3801 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3805 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3806 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3808 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3812 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3813 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3814 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3815 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3816 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3818 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3819 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3820 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3821 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3822 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3824 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3826 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3827 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3831 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3832 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3833 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3834 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3836 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3837 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3843 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3846 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3849 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3850 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3851 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3852 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3853 // problem, not ours.
3859 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3860 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3862 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3867 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3868 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3869 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3874 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3876 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3880 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3881 match forward_info {
3882 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3883 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3884 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3885 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3886 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3889 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3890 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3891 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3892 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3893 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3894 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3895 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3896 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3898 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3899 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3900 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3903 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3904 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3906 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3908 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3909 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3910 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3911 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3916 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3917 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3919 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3920 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3921 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3922 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3924 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3927 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3929 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3930 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3931 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3940 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3941 match forward_info {
3942 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3943 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3944 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3945 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3946 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3949 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3950 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
3951 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3952 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
3953 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
3954 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3955 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3957 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
3958 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3959 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3963 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3964 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3967 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3970 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3971 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3972 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3973 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3974 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3975 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3976 phantom_shared_secret,
3978 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3979 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3980 // if routing nodes overpay
3981 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3982 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3984 total_value_received: None,
3985 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3988 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3991 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3993 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3994 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3995 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3996 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3997 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3998 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4000 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4001 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4002 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4003 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4004 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4005 phantom_shared_secret,
4007 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4008 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4010 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4013 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4014 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4015 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4016 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4017 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4020 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4021 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4022 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4023 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4024 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4025 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4027 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4028 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4029 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4031 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4032 .entry(payment_hash)
4033 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4034 .or_insert_with(|| {
4035 committed_to_claimable = true;
4037 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4040 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4041 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4042 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4043 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4045 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4046 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4047 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4049 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4050 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4051 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4054 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4056 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4057 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4058 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4059 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4060 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4061 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4062 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4064 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4065 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4067 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4069 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4070 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4071 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4072 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4073 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4075 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4076 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4077 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4078 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4079 committed_to_claimable = true;
4081 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4082 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4083 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4084 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4085 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4086 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4087 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4088 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4089 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4090 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4094 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4095 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4096 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4097 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4098 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4100 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4102 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4103 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4105 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4106 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4107 committed_to_claimable = true;
4110 payment_claimable_generated
4114 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4115 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4116 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4117 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4118 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4119 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4120 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4121 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4123 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4124 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4125 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4126 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4127 Ok(result) => result,
4129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4130 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4133 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4134 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4135 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4137 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4138 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4141 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4142 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4143 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4145 check_total_value!(purpose);
4147 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4148 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4149 check_total_value!(purpose);
4153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4154 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4156 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4158 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4159 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4161 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4162 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4163 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4164 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4165 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4167 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4168 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4169 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4171 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4172 if payment_claimable_generated {
4173 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4179 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4180 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4188 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4189 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4190 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4191 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4193 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4194 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4196 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4198 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4199 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4200 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4202 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4204 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4205 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4206 events.append(&mut new_events);
4209 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4211 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4212 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4213 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4215 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4217 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4218 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4219 if background_events.is_empty() {
4220 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4223 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4225 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4226 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4227 // monitor updating completing.
4228 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4230 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4231 let mut updated_chan = false;
4233 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4234 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4235 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4236 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4237 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4239 updated_chan = true;
4240 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4241 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4248 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4249 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4251 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4252 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4253 // however, ensure that.
4255 log_error!(self.logger,
4256 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4258 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4260 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4261 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4262 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4265 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4266 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4268 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4269 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4270 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4271 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4272 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4278 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4281 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4282 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4283 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4284 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4285 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4288 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4289 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4290 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4291 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4293 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4294 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4296 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4298 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4299 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4302 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4304 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4305 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4309 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4310 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4311 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4312 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4313 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4314 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4315 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4317 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4318 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4320 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4321 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4323 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4324 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4325 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4330 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4331 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4339 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4341 /// This currently includes:
4342 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4343 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4344 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4346 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4347 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4348 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4349 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4351 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4352 /// estimate fetches.
4354 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4355 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4356 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4357 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4358 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4360 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4361 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4363 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4364 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4365 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4368 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4369 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4370 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4371 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4372 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4373 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4374 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4379 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4380 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4382 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4383 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4384 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4385 if needs_close { return false; }
4388 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4389 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4390 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4391 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4392 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4393 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4394 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4395 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4397 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4398 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4399 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4404 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4406 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4409 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4411 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4412 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4413 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4418 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4420 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4426 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4428 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4429 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4430 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4431 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4432 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4434 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4435 channel_id: *chan_id,
4436 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4445 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4447 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4448 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4450 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4451 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4452 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing pending outbound channel {} for not establishing in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4453 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4454 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4455 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4461 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4462 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4464 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4465 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4470 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4471 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4472 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4473 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4474 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4475 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4476 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4477 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4478 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4479 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4480 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4482 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4483 // have no channels to the peer.
4484 let remove_entry = {
4485 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4486 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4489 entry.remove_entry();
4492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4497 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4498 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4499 // This should be unreachable
4500 debug_assert!(false);
4503 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4504 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4505 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4506 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4507 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4508 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4509 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4512 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4513 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4514 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4516 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4517 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4524 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4525 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4526 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4527 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4528 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4531 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4532 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4535 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4537 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4538 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4539 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4540 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4541 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4548 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4549 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4550 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4552 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4553 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4554 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4555 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4557 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4558 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4559 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4560 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4561 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4562 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4565 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4566 /// reason for the failure.
4568 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4569 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4572 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4573 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4574 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4575 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4576 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4577 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4578 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4583 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4584 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4585 match failure_code {
4586 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4587 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4588 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4589 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4590 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4591 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4596 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4597 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4599 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4601 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4602 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4603 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4604 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4605 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4606 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4607 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4609 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4611 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4612 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4614 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4619 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4620 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4621 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4622 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4623 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4624 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4625 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4626 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4627 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4628 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4630 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4631 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4632 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4633 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4635 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4636 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4637 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4638 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4639 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4643 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4644 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4645 // be surfaced to the user.
4646 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4647 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4648 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4650 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4651 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4652 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4657 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4661 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4664 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4665 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4666 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4667 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4671 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4672 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4673 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4674 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4675 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4676 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4677 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4678 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4679 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4682 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4683 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4684 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4687 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4688 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4689 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4691 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4692 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4693 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4694 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4695 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4697 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4699 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4701 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4702 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4703 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4704 push_forward_ev = true;
4706 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4708 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4711 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4714 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4715 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4716 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4717 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4718 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4719 failed_next_destination: destination,
4725 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4726 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4728 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4729 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4730 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4731 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4733 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4734 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4735 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4736 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4738 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4739 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4740 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4741 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4742 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4743 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4744 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4745 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4750 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4751 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4752 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4753 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4754 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4755 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4756 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4757 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4762 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4763 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4764 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4766 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4767 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4768 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4769 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4774 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4776 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4777 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4778 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4779 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4780 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4781 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4782 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4783 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4784 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4785 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4786 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4787 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4788 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4789 debug_assert!(false);
4793 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4795 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4796 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4797 debug_assert!(false);
4801 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4802 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4804 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4805 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4806 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4807 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4810 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4811 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4812 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4813 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4817 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4818 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4819 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4820 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4822 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4823 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4824 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4825 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4826 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4831 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4832 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4833 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4834 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4835 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4836 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4837 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4839 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4842 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4843 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4844 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4845 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4849 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4850 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4851 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4852 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4854 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4855 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4856 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4857 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4861 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4862 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4863 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4867 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4868 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4869 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4872 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4873 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4875 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4876 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4877 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4879 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4880 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4881 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4882 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4883 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4886 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4887 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4888 if let Err(e) = res {
4889 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4890 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4891 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4892 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4893 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4896 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4897 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4898 // monitor update as a background event.
4899 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4900 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4901 counterparty_node_id,
4902 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4903 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4911 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4912 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4913 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4919 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4920 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4921 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4922 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4923 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4924 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4925 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4926 // again on restart.
4927 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4928 payment_preimage, update_res);
4931 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
4932 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
4934 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
4935 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
4936 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
4937 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
4938 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
4939 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
4940 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
4941 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4942 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
4943 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
4946 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4947 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4948 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4949 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4950 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4951 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4955 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4956 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4959 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4961 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4962 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
4963 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
4964 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4966 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4967 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4968 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4969 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4970 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4971 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4972 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4975 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4976 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4978 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4979 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4980 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4981 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4983 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4987 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4988 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4989 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4995 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4996 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4997 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5000 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5001 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5003 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5004 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5005 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
5006 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5007 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5011 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5012 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5014 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5015 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5016 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5023 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5024 /// update completion.
5025 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5026 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5027 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5028 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5029 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5030 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5032 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5033 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5034 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5035 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5036 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5037 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5039 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5041 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5042 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5043 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5044 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5047 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5048 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5050 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5051 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5052 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5057 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5058 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5059 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5060 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5065 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5066 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5067 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5068 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5069 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5074 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5078 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5084 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5085 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5086 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5090 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5091 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5092 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5098 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5099 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5101 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5102 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5104 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5105 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5106 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5107 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5108 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5113 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5114 let mut peer_state_lock;
5115 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5116 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5117 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5120 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5123 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5124 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5125 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5126 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5127 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5130 let remaining_in_flight =
5131 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5132 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5135 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5136 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5137 remaining_in_flight);
5138 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5141 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5144 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5146 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5147 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5150 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5151 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5152 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5154 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5155 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5156 /// used to accept such channels.
5158 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5159 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5160 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5161 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5164 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5165 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5167 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5168 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5169 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5171 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5172 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5174 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5175 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5177 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5178 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5180 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5181 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5182 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5183 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5186 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5189 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5190 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5192 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5193 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5194 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5195 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5196 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5197 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5199 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5200 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5203 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5204 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5205 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5206 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5207 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5208 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5211 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5212 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5213 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5215 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5216 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5217 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5218 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5219 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5220 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5221 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5222 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5225 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5226 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5227 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5231 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5232 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5233 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5237 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5243 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5244 /// or 0-conf channels.
5246 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5247 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5248 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5249 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5250 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5251 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5253 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5254 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5255 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5256 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5257 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5258 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5259 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5263 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5266 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5267 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5269 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5270 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5271 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5272 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5273 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5274 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5276 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5279 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5280 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5281 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5284 num_unfunded_channels
5287 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5288 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5289 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5292 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5296 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5297 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5298 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5299 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5301 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5302 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5303 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5304 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5305 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5308 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5310 debug_assert!(false);
5311 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5316 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5317 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5318 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5319 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5320 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5321 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5324 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5325 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5328 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5329 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5330 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5331 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5332 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5335 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5336 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5337 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5340 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5345 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5346 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5348 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5351 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5352 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5353 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5354 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5356 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5357 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5359 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5360 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5361 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5364 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5365 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5366 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5367 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5368 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5369 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5370 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5373 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5378 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5379 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5381 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5383 debug_assert!(false);
5384 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5388 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5389 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5390 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5391 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5396 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5397 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5398 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5399 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5400 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5402 user_channel_id: user_id,
5407 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5408 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5411 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5413 debug_assert!(false);
5414 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5419 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5420 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5421 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5422 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5424 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5425 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5426 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5427 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5428 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5429 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5430 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5431 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5432 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5436 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5439 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5440 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5441 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5444 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5446 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5447 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5448 funding_msg.channel_id))
5450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5451 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5455 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5456 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5457 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5458 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5459 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5460 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5461 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5465 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5467 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5468 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5469 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5470 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5472 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5473 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5474 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5475 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5476 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5477 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5478 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5479 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5487 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5488 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5490 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5492 debug_assert!(false);
5493 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5496 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5497 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5498 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5500 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5501 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5502 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5503 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5504 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5505 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5506 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5507 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5508 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5509 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5518 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5522 debug_assert!(false);
5523 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5527 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5529 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5530 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5531 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5533 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5534 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5535 msg: announcement_sigs,
5537 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5538 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5539 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5540 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5541 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5542 // announcement_signatures.
5543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5544 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5545 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5546 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5553 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5554 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5563 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5564 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5565 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5567 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5569 debug_assert!(false);
5570 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5572 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5573 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5574 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5575 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5576 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5577 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5578 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5579 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5580 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5582 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5583 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5584 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5585 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5586 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5588 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5589 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5590 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5591 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5592 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5595 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5596 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5597 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5598 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5600 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5601 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5602 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5603 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5604 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5605 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5610 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5611 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5612 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5613 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5620 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5621 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5622 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5623 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5629 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5631 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5633 debug_assert!(false);
5634 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5636 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5639 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5641 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5642 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5643 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5644 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5649 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5650 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5651 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5652 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5653 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5654 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5655 } else { (tx, None) }
5657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5660 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5661 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5662 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5664 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5665 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5668 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5672 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5677 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5678 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5679 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5680 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5682 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5683 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5684 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5685 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5687 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5688 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5689 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5691 debug_assert!(false);
5692 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5696 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5699 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5700 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5701 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5702 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5703 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5705 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5706 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5707 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5708 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5709 match pending_forward_info {
5710 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5711 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5712 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5713 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5715 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5716 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5717 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5718 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5719 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5722 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5724 _ => pending_forward_info
5727 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5734 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5735 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5737 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5739 debug_assert!(false);
5740 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5742 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5743 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5744 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5746 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5751 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5755 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5759 debug_assert!(false);
5760 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5764 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5766 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5773 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5775 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5777 debug_assert!(false);
5778 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5782 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5784 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5785 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5786 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5788 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5795 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5797 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5799 debug_assert!(false);
5800 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5804 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5806 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5807 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5808 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5809 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5810 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5818 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5819 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5820 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5821 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5822 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5823 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5824 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5825 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5826 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5827 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5828 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5830 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5831 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5833 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5834 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5835 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5837 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5838 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5841 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5842 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5844 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5845 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5846 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5848 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5849 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5850 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5851 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5852 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5855 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5856 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5859 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5860 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5861 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5862 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5863 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5864 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5865 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5868 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5869 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5870 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5875 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5876 // payments are being processed.
5877 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5878 push_forward_event = true;
5880 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5881 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5888 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5889 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5892 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5893 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5894 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5896 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5900 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5901 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5902 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5903 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
5904 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
5906 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
5907 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
5908 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
5909 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
5910 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
5911 // real by taking more time.
5912 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
5913 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5914 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5919 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5920 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
5921 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5922 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5923 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5924 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5925 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5927 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5928 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5929 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5930 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5931 channel_funding_outpoint,
5932 counterparty_node_id,
5937 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5938 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5940 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5942 debug_assert!(false);
5943 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5944 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5946 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5948 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5949 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5950 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5951 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5952 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5954 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5959 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5963 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5965 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5967 debug_assert!(false);
5968 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5972 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5974 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5981 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5983 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5985 debug_assert!(false);
5986 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5988 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5989 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5990 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5991 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5992 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5993 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5997 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5998 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5999 msg, &self.default_configuration
6001 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6002 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6003 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6011 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6012 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6013 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6014 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6016 // It's not a local channel
6017 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6021 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6022 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6023 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6025 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6027 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6029 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6030 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6031 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6032 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6033 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6034 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6036 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6038 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6039 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6040 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6041 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6043 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6044 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6047 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6049 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6052 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6054 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6055 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6057 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6059 debug_assert!(false);
6060 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6062 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6063 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6064 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6066 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6067 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6068 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6069 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6070 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6071 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6072 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6073 let mut channel_update = None;
6074 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6075 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6076 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6079 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6080 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6081 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6082 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6083 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6084 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6085 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6090 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6091 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6092 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6093 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6094 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6095 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6099 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6103 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6104 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6107 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6108 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6113 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6114 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6115 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6117 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6118 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6119 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6120 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6121 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6122 match monitor_event {
6123 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6124 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6126 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6128 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6129 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6130 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6131 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6134 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6135 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6136 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6137 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6139 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6140 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6141 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6142 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6145 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6146 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6147 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6150 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6151 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6152 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6153 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6154 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6155 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6159 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6160 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6162 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6164 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6165 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6166 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6167 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6168 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6175 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6176 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6182 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6183 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6186 has_pending_monitor_events
6189 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6190 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6191 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6193 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6195 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6198 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6199 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6200 /// update was applied.
6201 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6202 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6203 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6204 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6206 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6207 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6208 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6209 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6212 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6215 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6216 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6217 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6218 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6219 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6220 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6221 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6222 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6224 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6225 has_monitor_update = true;
6227 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6228 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6229 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6230 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6232 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6234 continue 'peer_loop;
6243 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6244 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6245 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6248 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6249 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6255 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6256 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6257 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6258 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6259 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6260 let mut has_update = false;
6262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6264 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6265 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6266 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6267 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6268 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6269 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6270 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6271 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6274 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6277 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6278 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6279 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6280 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6281 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6286 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6288 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6289 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6290 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6296 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6297 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6305 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6306 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6312 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6313 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6315 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6316 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6317 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6318 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6319 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6320 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6321 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6322 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6323 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6324 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6325 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6326 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6327 assert!(should_broadcast);
6328 } else { unreachable!(); }
6329 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6330 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6331 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6334 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6338 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6341 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6342 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6344 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6345 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6346 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6347 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6349 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6351 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6352 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6356 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6357 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6359 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6361 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6362 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6364 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6365 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6366 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6367 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6368 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6369 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6370 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6371 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6372 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6373 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6374 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6377 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6378 /// stored external to LDK.
6380 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6381 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6382 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6384 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6385 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6388 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6389 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6390 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6391 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6393 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6394 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6395 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6396 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6397 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6399 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6400 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6401 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6402 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6403 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6405 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6406 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6408 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6409 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6413 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6414 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6416 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6418 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6419 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6421 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6422 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6423 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6424 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6425 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6426 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6427 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6430 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6431 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6433 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6434 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6435 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6438 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6439 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6441 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6442 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6443 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6444 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6446 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6447 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6448 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6449 Some(_) => continue,
6450 None => return scid_candidate
6455 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6457 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6458 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6460 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6461 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6462 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6466 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6467 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6468 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6470 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6471 /// times to get a unique scid.
6472 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6473 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6474 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6476 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6477 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6478 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6479 return scid_candidate
6483 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6484 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6485 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6486 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6489 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6492 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6493 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6494 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6495 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6504 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6505 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6506 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6507 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6508 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6512 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6513 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6514 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6515 events.push_back((event, None));
6519 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6520 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6521 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6525 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6526 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6530 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6531 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6534 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6535 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6536 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6537 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6538 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6539 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6541 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6542 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6543 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6546 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6547 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6548 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6549 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6551 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6555 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6556 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6557 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6558 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6559 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6560 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6561 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6565 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6566 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6567 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6568 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6569 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6570 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6571 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6573 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6575 if further_update_exists {
6576 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6582 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6586 log_debug!(self.logger,
6587 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6588 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6592 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6593 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6594 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6598 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6599 for action in actions {
6601 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6602 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6604 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6610 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6611 /// using the given event handler.
6613 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6614 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6618 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6622 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6624 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6625 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6626 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6627 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6628 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6629 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6633 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6634 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6635 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6636 /// is always placed next to each other.
6638 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6639 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6640 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6641 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6643 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6644 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6645 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6646 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6647 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6648 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6649 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6651 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6652 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6653 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6654 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6657 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6658 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6660 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6661 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6664 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6666 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6667 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6668 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6669 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6670 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6674 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6675 events.replace(pending_events);
6684 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6686 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6687 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6688 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6689 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6690 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6691 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6695 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6697 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6698 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6699 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6701 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6705 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6707 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6708 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6709 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6710 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6711 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6712 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6716 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6718 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6719 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6720 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6721 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6722 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6725 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6726 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6729 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6731 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6732 let new_height = height - 1;
6734 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6735 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6736 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6737 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6738 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6739 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6742 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6746 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6748 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6750 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6751 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6752 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6757 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6758 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6759 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6760 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6762 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6763 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6766 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6767 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6768 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6770 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6771 if height < last_best_block_height {
6772 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6773 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6777 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6778 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6779 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6780 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6782 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6783 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6786 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6787 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6789 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6791 macro_rules! max_time {
6792 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6794 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6795 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6796 // having an explicit local time source.
6797 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6798 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6799 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6800 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6801 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6807 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6808 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6809 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6810 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6814 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6815 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6816 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6817 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6818 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6819 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6820 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6821 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6828 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6830 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6831 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6832 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6833 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6834 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6835 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6836 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6841 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6843 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6844 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6845 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6846 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6847 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6848 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6852 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6853 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6855 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6856 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6857 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6858 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6859 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6861 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6862 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6865 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6868 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6869 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6870 let res = f(channel);
6871 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6872 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6873 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6874 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6875 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6877 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6878 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6879 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6880 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6881 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6882 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6883 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6893 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6894 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6897 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6898 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6899 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6900 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6901 msg: announcement_sigs,
6903 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6904 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6905 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6907 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6908 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6909 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6914 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6915 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6916 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6917 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6918 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6919 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6920 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6921 // is always consistent.
6922 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6923 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6924 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6925 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6926 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6929 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6930 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6931 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6932 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6933 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6934 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6935 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6939 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6940 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6941 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6942 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6943 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6944 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6945 data: reason_message,
6955 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6956 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6957 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6958 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6959 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6960 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6961 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6962 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6963 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6964 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6966 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6967 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6968 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6972 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6975 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6976 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6977 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6978 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6979 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6980 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6981 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6982 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6983 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6986 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6987 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6988 _ => unreachable!(),
6990 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6991 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6992 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6993 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6999 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7001 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7002 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7006 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7008 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7009 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7011 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7012 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7015 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7016 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7017 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7020 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7021 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7022 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7023 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7026 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7027 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7028 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7029 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7032 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7033 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7035 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7036 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7037 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7038 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7039 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7042 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7043 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7044 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7045 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7048 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7049 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7050 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7051 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7054 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7055 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7056 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7057 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7061 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7062 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7064 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7065 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7066 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7067 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7068 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7069 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7073 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7075 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7078 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7079 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7080 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7081 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7084 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7086 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7089 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7090 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7091 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7092 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7095 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7097 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7100 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7105 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7107 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7110 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7112 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7115 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7117 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7120 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7122 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7125 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7127 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7130 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7132 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7135 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7137 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7140 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7142 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7145 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7147 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7150 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7152 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7155 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7157 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7160 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7161 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7162 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7163 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7164 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7166 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7171 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7176 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7178 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7179 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7181 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7182 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7183 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7186 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7187 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7188 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7189 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7190 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7191 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7196 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7197 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7198 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7201 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7202 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7203 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7206 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7208 // V1 Channel Establishment
7209 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7210 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7213 // V2 Channel Establishment
7214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7215 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7216 // Common Channel Establishment
7217 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7218 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7219 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7222 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7223 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7229 // Channel Operations
7230 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7232 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7233 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7235 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7238 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7239 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7240 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7241 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7242 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7243 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7244 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7245 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7248 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7249 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7250 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7251 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7254 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7256 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7258 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7259 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7263 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7264 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7265 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7271 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7272 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7273 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7274 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7275 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7276 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7279 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7280 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7282 if inbound_peer_limited {
7285 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7286 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7287 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7288 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7289 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7290 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7291 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7292 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7293 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7298 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7299 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7301 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7302 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7303 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7304 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7309 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7310 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7315 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7317 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7318 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7319 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7320 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7321 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7323 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7324 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7325 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7326 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7327 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7328 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7329 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7330 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7334 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7338 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7339 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7341 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7342 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7344 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7345 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7346 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7347 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7348 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7349 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7350 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7352 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7353 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7354 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7358 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7359 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7360 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7361 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7362 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7363 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7364 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7365 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7367 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7375 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7376 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7380 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7381 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7384 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7385 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7388 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7389 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7392 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7393 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7394 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7395 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7398 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7399 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7400 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7401 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7404 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7405 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7406 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7407 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7410 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7411 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7412 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7413 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7416 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7417 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7418 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7419 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7422 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7423 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7424 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7425 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7428 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7429 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7430 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7431 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7434 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7435 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7436 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7437 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7440 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7441 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7442 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7443 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7447 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7448 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7449 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7450 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7451 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7455 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7456 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7458 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7459 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7460 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7461 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7462 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7465 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7466 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7467 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7468 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7471 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7472 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7473 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7474 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7477 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7478 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7479 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7480 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7481 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7482 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7483 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7484 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7485 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7486 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7487 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7488 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7489 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7490 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7491 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7492 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7493 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7494 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7495 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7496 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7501 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7502 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7504 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7505 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7506 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7507 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7510 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7511 (2, node_id, required),
7512 (4, features, required),
7513 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7514 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7515 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7516 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7519 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7520 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7521 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7522 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7523 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7524 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7525 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7526 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7527 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7528 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7529 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7530 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7531 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7532 (7, self.config, option),
7533 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7534 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7535 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7536 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7537 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7538 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7539 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7540 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7541 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7542 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7543 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7544 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7545 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7546 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7547 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7548 (32, self.is_public, required),
7549 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7550 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7551 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7552 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7553 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7559 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7560 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7561 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7562 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7563 (2, channel_id, required),
7564 (3, channel_type, option),
7565 (4, counterparty, required),
7566 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7567 (6, funding_txo, option),
7568 (7, config, option),
7569 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7570 (9, confirmations, option),
7571 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7572 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7573 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7574 (16, balance_msat, required),
7575 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7576 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7577 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7578 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7579 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7580 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7581 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7582 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7583 (26, is_outbound, required),
7584 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7585 (30, is_usable, required),
7586 (32, is_public, required),
7587 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7588 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7589 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7590 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7591 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7594 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7595 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7596 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7597 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7598 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7602 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7604 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7605 outbound_scid_alias,
7609 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7610 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7612 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7613 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7614 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7615 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7616 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7617 confirmations_required,
7619 force_close_spend_delay,
7620 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7621 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7622 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7623 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7624 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7625 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7626 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7627 channel_shutdown_state,
7632 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7633 (2, channels, required_vec),
7634 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7635 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7638 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7640 (0, onion_packet, required),
7641 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7644 (0, payment_data, required),
7645 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7646 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7647 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7648 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7650 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7651 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7652 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7653 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7654 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7655 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7659 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7660 (0, routing, required),
7661 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7662 (4, payment_hash, required),
7663 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7664 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7665 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7666 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7670 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7671 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7673 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7675 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7676 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7677 reason.write(writer)?;
7679 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7680 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7683 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7684 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7685 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7686 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7693 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7694 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7695 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7698 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7699 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7700 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7701 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7705 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7706 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7707 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7708 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7709 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7712 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7713 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7714 // messages contained in the variants.
7715 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7716 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7717 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7719 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7720 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7721 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7722 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7723 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7726 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7727 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7728 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7729 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7730 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7732 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7737 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7742 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7743 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7744 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7745 (2, outpoint, required),
7746 (4, htlc_id, required),
7747 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7750 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7751 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7752 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7753 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7754 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7757 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7758 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7759 (2, self.value, required),
7760 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7761 (4, payment_data, option),
7762 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7763 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7764 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7765 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7771 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7772 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7773 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7774 (0, prev_hop, required),
7775 (1, total_msat, option),
7776 (2, value_ser, required),
7777 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7778 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7779 (5, total_value_received, option),
7780 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7781 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7782 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7784 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7785 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7786 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7788 if payment_data.is_some() {
7789 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7791 if total_msat.is_none() {
7792 total_msat = Some(value);
7794 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7797 if total_msat.is_none() {
7798 if payment_data.is_none() {
7799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7801 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7803 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7807 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7810 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7811 total_value_received,
7812 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7814 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7815 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7820 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7821 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7822 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7825 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7826 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7827 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
7828 let mut payment_id = None;
7829 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7830 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7831 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7832 (0, session_priv, required),
7833 (1, payment_id, option),
7834 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7835 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
7836 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7837 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7839 if payment_id.is_none() {
7840 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7842 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7844 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
7845 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7846 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7848 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7849 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7850 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7851 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7855 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7856 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7857 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7859 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7862 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7863 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7868 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7869 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7871 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7873 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7874 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7875 (0, session_priv, required),
7876 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7877 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7878 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7879 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
7880 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7881 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7884 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7886 field.write(writer)?;
7893 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7894 (0, forward_info, required),
7895 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7896 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7897 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7898 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7901 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7903 (0, htlc_id, required),
7904 (2, err_packet, required),
7909 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7910 (0, payment_secret, required),
7911 (2, expiry_time, required),
7912 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7913 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7914 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7917 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7919 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7920 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7921 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7922 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7923 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7924 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7928 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7929 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7931 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7933 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7935 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7936 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7937 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7940 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7943 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7944 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7945 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7946 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7948 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7949 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7951 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7952 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7953 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7954 unfunded_channels += 1;
7959 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7961 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7964 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7965 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7966 channel.write(writer)?;
7973 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7974 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7975 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7976 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7977 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7978 for forward in pending_forwards {
7979 forward.write(writer)?;
7984 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7986 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7987 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7988 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7990 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7991 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7992 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7993 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7994 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7995 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7996 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7997 htlc.write(writer)?;
7999 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8000 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8003 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8004 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8005 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8006 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8007 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8008 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8009 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8012 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8013 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8014 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8015 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8016 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8018 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8019 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8020 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8021 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8022 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8023 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8024 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8029 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8030 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8031 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8032 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8033 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8034 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8035 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8036 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8037 0u64.write(writer)?;
8039 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8040 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8041 event.write(writer)?;
8045 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8046 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8047 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8048 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8049 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8050 0u64.write(writer)?;
8052 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8053 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8054 // likely to be identical.
8055 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8056 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8058 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8059 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8060 hash.write(writer)?;
8061 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8064 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8065 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8066 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8067 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8068 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8071 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8072 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8074 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8075 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8076 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8077 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8080 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8081 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8085 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8086 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8087 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8089 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8090 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8091 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8097 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8098 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8099 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8100 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8103 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8104 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8105 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8106 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8107 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8110 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8111 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8112 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8113 if !updates.is_empty() {
8114 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8115 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8120 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8121 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8122 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8123 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8124 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8125 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8126 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8127 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8128 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8129 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8130 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8131 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8132 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8139 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8140 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8141 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8142 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8145 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8146 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8147 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8148 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8149 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8150 // check that the event is sane here.
8151 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8152 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8153 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8154 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8160 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8161 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8162 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8163 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8164 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8165 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8168 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8169 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8170 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8171 events.push_back((ev, action));
8172 } else if action.is_some() {
8173 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8180 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8181 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8182 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8183 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8184 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8185 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8188 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8190 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8192 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8193 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8194 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8195 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8196 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8197 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8198 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8199 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8200 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8201 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8202 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8203 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8204 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8206 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8207 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8209 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8210 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8212 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8213 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8214 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8215 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8216 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8217 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8219 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8220 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8222 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8223 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8224 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8225 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8226 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8227 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8231 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8232 pub entropy_source: ES,
8234 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8235 pub node_signer: NS,
8237 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8238 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8240 pub signer_provider: SP,
8242 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8244 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8245 pub fee_estimator: F,
8246 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8248 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8249 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8250 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8251 pub chain_monitor: M,
8253 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8254 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8255 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8256 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8257 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8258 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8260 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8262 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8263 /// deserialization.
8265 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8266 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8267 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8269 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8270 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8272 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8273 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8274 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8275 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8277 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8280 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8281 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8284 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8285 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8287 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8288 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8289 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8290 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8291 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8292 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8296 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8297 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8298 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8299 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8300 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8302 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8303 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8308 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8309 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8310 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8311 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8313 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8314 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8315 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8316 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8317 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8322 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8323 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8324 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8328 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8329 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8331 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8332 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8333 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8334 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8335 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8336 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8340 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8341 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8343 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8344 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8345 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8347 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8349 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8350 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8351 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8352 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8353 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8354 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8355 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8356 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8357 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8358 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8360 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8361 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8362 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8363 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8364 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8365 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8366 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8367 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8368 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8369 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8370 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8371 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8372 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8373 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8374 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8375 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8378 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8379 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8380 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8381 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8382 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8384 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8385 let mut found_htlc = false;
8386 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8387 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8390 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8391 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8392 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8393 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8394 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8395 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8396 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8397 log_info!(args.logger,
8398 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8399 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8400 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8404 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8405 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8406 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8407 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8408 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8410 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8411 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8413 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8415 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8416 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8419 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8420 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8421 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8425 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8426 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8427 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8428 // safely discard the channel.
8429 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8430 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8431 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8432 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8433 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8436 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8437 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8438 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8439 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8440 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8441 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8445 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8446 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8447 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8448 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8449 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8450 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8451 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8453 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8457 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8458 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8459 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8460 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8461 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8462 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8463 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8464 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8465 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8467 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8470 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8471 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8472 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8473 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8474 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8475 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8476 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8477 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8479 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8482 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8485 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8486 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8487 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8488 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8489 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8490 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8491 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8492 is_connected: false,
8496 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8497 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8498 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8499 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8500 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8501 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8502 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8503 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8506 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8507 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8508 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8509 for _ in 0..event_count {
8510 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8511 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8516 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8517 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8518 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8520 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8521 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8522 // on-startup monitor updates.
8523 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8524 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8526 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8530 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8531 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8533 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8534 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8535 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8536 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8537 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8541 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8542 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8543 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8544 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8545 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8546 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8547 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8549 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8550 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8554 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8555 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8556 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8557 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8558 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8559 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8560 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8561 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8562 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8563 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8564 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8565 let mut events_override = None;
8566 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8567 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8568 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8569 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8570 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8571 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8572 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8573 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8574 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8575 (8, events_override, option),
8576 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8577 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8578 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8579 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8581 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8582 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8585 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8586 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8589 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8590 pending_events_read = events;
8593 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8594 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8597 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8598 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8599 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8600 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8601 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8602 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8604 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8606 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8607 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8608 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8611 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8612 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8613 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8614 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8615 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8617 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8618 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8619 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8621 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8622 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8623 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8624 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8625 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8627 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8628 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8629 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8630 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8631 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8632 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8633 pending_background_events.push(
8634 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8635 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8636 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8637 update: update.clone(),
8640 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8641 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8642 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8643 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8644 pending_background_events.push(
8645 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8646 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8647 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8650 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8651 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8652 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8654 max_in_flight_update_id
8658 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8661 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8662 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8664 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8665 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8666 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8667 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8668 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8669 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8670 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8671 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8672 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8675 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8676 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8677 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8678 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8679 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8680 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8681 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8682 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8683 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8684 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8685 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8690 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8691 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8692 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8693 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8694 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8695 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8696 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8697 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8699 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8700 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8701 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8703 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8704 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8705 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8706 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8707 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8708 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8709 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8710 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8715 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8716 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8718 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8719 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8720 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8721 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8724 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8725 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8726 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8727 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8728 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8729 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8730 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8732 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8733 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8734 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8735 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8736 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8737 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8738 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8739 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8742 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8743 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8744 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8745 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8747 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8748 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8749 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8752 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8753 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8754 retry_strategy: None,
8755 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8756 payment_params: None,
8757 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8758 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8759 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8760 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8761 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8762 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8763 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8764 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8765 total_msat: path_amt,
8766 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8768 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8769 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8774 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8776 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8777 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8778 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8779 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8781 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8782 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8783 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8784 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8785 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8786 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8787 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8788 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8789 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8790 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8791 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8796 !forwards.is_empty()
8798 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8799 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8800 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8801 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8802 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8803 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8804 intercepted_id != ev_id
8811 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8812 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8813 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8814 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8815 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8816 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8817 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8818 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8819 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8820 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8821 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8822 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8823 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8830 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8831 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8833 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8835 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8836 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8837 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8838 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8839 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8840 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8841 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8842 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8843 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8846 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8847 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8848 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8849 // channel still live case here.
8853 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8854 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8859 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8860 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8861 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8862 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8863 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8864 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8865 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8866 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8870 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8871 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8873 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8874 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8875 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8876 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8878 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8879 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8880 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8882 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8883 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8885 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8886 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8888 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8891 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8892 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8893 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8895 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8899 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8900 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8901 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8902 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8905 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8906 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8907 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8908 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8909 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8910 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8911 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8912 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8914 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8915 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8919 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8921 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8923 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8924 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8926 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8927 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8932 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8933 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8935 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8937 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8939 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8940 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8941 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8942 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8946 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8947 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8950 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8951 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8952 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8954 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8955 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8956 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8958 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8959 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8960 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8961 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8962 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8963 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8965 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8966 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8967 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8968 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8969 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8976 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8978 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8979 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8980 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8981 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8982 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8983 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8984 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8985 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8986 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8987 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8988 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8990 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8991 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8993 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8994 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8995 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8996 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8998 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8999 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9000 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9001 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9003 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9004 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9005 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9006 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9008 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9009 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9010 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9013 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9014 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9017 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9018 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9021 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9024 purpose: payment.purpose,
9025 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9031 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9032 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9033 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9034 for action in actions.iter() {
9035 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9036 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9037 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9039 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9040 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9041 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9042 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9044 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9045 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9046 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9047 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9053 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9055 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9056 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9060 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9062 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9063 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9064 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9065 router: args.router,
9067 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9069 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9070 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9071 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9072 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9074 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9075 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9076 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9077 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9078 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9079 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9081 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9086 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9088 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9090 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9091 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9092 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9093 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9094 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9095 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9097 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9098 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9099 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9101 logger: args.logger,
9102 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9105 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9106 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9107 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9108 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9109 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9112 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9113 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9114 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9115 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9116 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9117 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9120 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9121 //connection or two.
9123 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9129 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9130 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9131 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9132 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9133 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9134 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9135 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9136 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9137 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9138 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9139 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9140 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9141 use crate::util::test_utils;
9142 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9143 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9146 fn test_notify_limits() {
9147 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9148 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9152 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9154 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9155 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9156 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9157 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9158 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9160 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9162 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9163 // to connect messages with new values
9164 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9165 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9166 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9167 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9168 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9169 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9171 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9172 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9174 // ... but the last node should not.
9175 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9176 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9177 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9178 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9180 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9181 // about the channel.
9182 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9183 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9184 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9186 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9188 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9189 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9190 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9191 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9192 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9193 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9195 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9196 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9197 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9199 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9200 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9201 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9202 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9203 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9204 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9206 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9207 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9208 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9209 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9210 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9211 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9212 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9213 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9215 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9216 // the channel info has updated.
9217 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9218 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9219 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9220 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9221 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9222 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9226 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9227 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9229 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9230 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9231 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9233 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9235 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9236 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9237 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9238 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9240 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9241 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9242 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9243 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9244 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9245 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9246 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9247 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9249 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9250 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9251 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9253 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9254 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9255 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9257 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9258 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9259 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9260 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9261 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9263 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9264 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9265 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9267 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9268 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9269 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9270 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9271 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9272 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9273 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9274 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9275 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9277 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9278 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9279 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9281 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9282 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9283 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9285 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9286 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9287 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9288 // lightning messages manually.
9289 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9290 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9293 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9294 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9295 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9297 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9298 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9300 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9301 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9303 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9304 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9305 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9307 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9308 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9309 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9311 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9313 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9315 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9316 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9319 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9320 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9321 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9324 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9325 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9326 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9327 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9332 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9333 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9334 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9335 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9340 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9341 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9342 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9343 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9350 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9351 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9352 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9355 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9356 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9357 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9358 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9359 // fails as expected.
9360 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9361 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9362 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9363 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9364 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9365 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9366 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9367 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9368 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9369 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9371 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9372 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9373 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9374 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9376 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9377 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9378 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9380 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9381 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9382 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9383 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9385 let route = find_route(
9386 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9387 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9389 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9390 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9392 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9393 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9394 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9395 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9396 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9399 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9400 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9401 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9402 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9404 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9405 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9406 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9407 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9408 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9409 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9410 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9411 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9412 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9414 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9415 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9417 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9418 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9419 let route = find_route(
9420 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9421 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9423 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9424 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9426 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9428 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9429 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9430 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9432 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9433 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9434 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9435 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9437 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9439 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9440 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9441 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9443 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9444 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9445 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9447 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9448 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9449 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9450 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9451 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9452 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9453 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9454 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9455 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9457 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9458 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9460 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9461 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9462 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9463 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9465 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9467 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9468 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9469 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9471 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9472 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9473 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9474 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9476 let route = find_route(
9477 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9478 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9480 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9481 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9482 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9484 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9485 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9486 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9487 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9488 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9490 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9491 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9494 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9495 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9496 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9497 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9498 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9499 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9500 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9501 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9502 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9504 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9505 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9509 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9510 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9511 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9517 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9518 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9520 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9521 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9522 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9523 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9525 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9526 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9527 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9528 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9529 let route = find_route(
9530 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9531 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9534 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9535 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9536 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9537 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9538 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9539 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9542 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9543 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9544 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9545 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9546 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9547 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9548 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9550 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9554 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9555 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9556 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9557 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9558 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9562 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9564 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9565 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9567 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9568 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9569 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9570 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9572 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9573 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9574 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9575 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9576 let route = find_route(
9577 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9578 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9581 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9582 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9583 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9584 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9585 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9586 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9587 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9588 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9591 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9592 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9593 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9594 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9595 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9596 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9597 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9599 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9603 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9607 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9609 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9610 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9611 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9612 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9614 // Marshall an MPP route.
9615 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9616 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9617 route.paths.push(path);
9618 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9619 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9620 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9621 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9622 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9623 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9625 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9626 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9628 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9629 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9631 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9636 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9642 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9644 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9645 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9647 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9648 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9650 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9653 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9654 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9655 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9656 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9657 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9658 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9661 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9664 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9670 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9671 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9672 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9673 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9675 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9677 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9678 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9680 total_msat: 100_000,
9683 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9684 // payment verification fails as expected.
9685 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9686 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9687 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9688 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9690 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9694 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9695 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9699 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9700 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9701 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9702 // the channel is successfully closed.
9703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9708 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9709 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9710 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9711 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9712 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9714 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9715 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9717 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9718 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9719 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9720 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9723 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9725 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9726 // as it has the funding transaction.
9727 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9728 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9729 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9732 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9734 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9736 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9738 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9739 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9740 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9742 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9745 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9746 // as it has the funding transaction.
9747 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9748 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9749 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9752 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9753 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9755 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9756 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9757 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9758 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9760 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9761 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9762 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9763 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9765 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9766 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9768 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9769 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9770 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9771 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9772 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9773 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9774 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9778 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9779 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9780 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9781 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9782 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9783 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9784 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9787 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9789 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9790 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9791 // closing transaction).
9792 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9793 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9794 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9796 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9797 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9798 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9799 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9800 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9803 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9805 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9807 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9808 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9809 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9811 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9813 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9814 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9817 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9818 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9819 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9822 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9823 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9824 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9827 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9829 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9830 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9832 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9833 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9835 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9836 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9841 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9842 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9843 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9844 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9845 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9846 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9847 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9851 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9852 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9853 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9855 // Test the API functions.
9856 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9858 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9860 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9862 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9864 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9866 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9868 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9872 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9873 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9874 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9875 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9876 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9877 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9879 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9881 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9882 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9884 let mut funding_tx = None;
9885 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9886 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9887 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9890 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9891 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9892 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9893 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9894 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9896 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9898 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9900 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9902 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9904 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9906 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9909 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9910 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9911 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9912 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9913 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9915 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9916 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9918 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9919 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9920 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9921 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9922 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9923 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9924 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9927 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9928 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9929 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9930 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9931 }, true).unwrap_err();
9933 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9934 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9935 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9936 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9937 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9938 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9939 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9941 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9942 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9944 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9945 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9946 }, true).unwrap_err();
9948 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9949 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9950 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9952 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9954 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9955 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9957 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9958 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9959 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9960 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9961 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9963 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9964 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9965 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9967 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9968 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9969 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9971 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9972 // "protected" and can connect again.
9973 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9974 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9975 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9977 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9979 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9981 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9982 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9986 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9987 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9991 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9993 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9995 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9996 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9998 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9999 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10000 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10001 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10004 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10006 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10007 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10008 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10010 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10011 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10012 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10014 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10015 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10016 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10017 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10021 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10022 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10023 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10026 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10027 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10029 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10031 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10033 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10034 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10036 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10037 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10038 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10039 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10040 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10041 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10044 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10045 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10047 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10048 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10052 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10053 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10056 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10057 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10058 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10059 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10060 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10062 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10063 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10065 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10066 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10067 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10068 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10072 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10074 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10075 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10077 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10078 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10079 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10081 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10082 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10086 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10090 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10091 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10092 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10093 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10094 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10095 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10096 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10097 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10099 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10100 payment_metadata: None,
10101 keysend_preimage: None,
10102 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10103 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10105 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10107 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10108 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10109 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10110 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10111 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10113 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10114 } else { panic!(); }
10116 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10117 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10119 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10120 payment_metadata: None,
10121 keysend_preimage: None,
10122 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10123 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10125 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10127 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10128 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10132 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10133 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10134 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10135 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10136 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10138 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10139 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10141 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10142 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10143 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10144 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10145 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10147 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10148 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10150 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10152 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10153 match &msg_events[0] {
10154 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10155 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10157 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10158 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10159 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10165 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10166 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10168 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10169 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10172 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10176 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10177 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10178 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10179 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10182 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10183 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10184 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10186 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10188 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10189 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10190 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10192 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10193 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10195 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10196 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10201 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10202 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10204 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10205 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10207 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
10211 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10212 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10213 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10214 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10215 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10216 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10217 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10218 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10220 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10221 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10224 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10225 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10226 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10227 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10228 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10230 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10231 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10234 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10235 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10238 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10239 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10240 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10241 ..Default::default()
10243 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10244 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10247 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10248 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10251 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10252 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10253 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10254 ..Default::default()
10256 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10257 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10258 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10261 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10262 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10265 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10266 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10267 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10268 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10269 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10272 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10273 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10274 ..Default::default()
10276 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10279 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10280 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10281 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10282 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10288 use crate::chain::Listen;
10289 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10290 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10291 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10292 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10293 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10294 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10295 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10296 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10297 use crate::util::test_utils;
10298 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10300 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10301 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10302 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10304 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10306 use criterion::Criterion;
10308 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10309 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10310 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10311 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10312 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10313 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10314 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10316 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10317 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10319 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10320 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10322 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10324 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10327 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10328 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10331 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10332 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10333 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10335 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10336 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10338 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10339 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10340 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10341 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10342 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10344 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10345 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10346 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10348 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10349 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10350 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10351 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10353 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10354 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10355 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10357 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10358 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10359 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10360 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10361 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10363 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10364 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10365 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10367 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10368 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10370 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10371 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10372 }, false).unwrap();
10373 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10374 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10375 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10378 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10379 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10380 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10382 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10383 } else { panic!(); }
10385 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10386 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10387 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10388 match events_b[0] {
10389 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10390 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10395 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10396 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10397 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10398 match events_a[0] {
10399 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10400 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10405 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10407 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10408 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10409 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10411 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10412 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10413 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10414 match msg_events[0] {
10415 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10416 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10417 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10421 match msg_events[1] {
10422 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10426 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10427 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10428 match events_a[0] {
10429 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10430 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10432 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10435 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10436 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10437 match events_b[0] {
10438 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10439 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10444 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10445 macro_rules! send_payment {
10446 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10447 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10448 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10449 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10450 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10451 payment_count += 1;
10452 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10453 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10455 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10456 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10457 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10458 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10459 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10460 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10461 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10462 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10463 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10464 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10465 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10467 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10468 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10469 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10470 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10472 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10473 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10474 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10475 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10476 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10478 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10481 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10482 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10483 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10484 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10486 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10490 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10491 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10492 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);