1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
80 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
81 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
82 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
83 crate::sign::KeysManager,
87 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
93 use crate::prelude::*;
95 use core::cell::RefCell;
97 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
98 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
99 use core::time::Duration;
100 use core::ops::Deref;
102 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
103 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
104 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
106 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
108 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
109 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
110 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
112 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
113 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
114 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
115 // before we forward it.
117 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
118 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
119 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
120 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
121 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
123 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
126 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
127 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
129 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
130 /// do with the HTLC.
131 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
132 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
134 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
135 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
136 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
137 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
138 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
139 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
141 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
143 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
144 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
146 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
147 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
148 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
149 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
150 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
152 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
153 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
154 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
155 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
156 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
158 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
159 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
160 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
161 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
164 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
166 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
167 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
168 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
169 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
170 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
171 requires_blinded_error: bool,
173 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
174 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
175 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
177 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
178 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
180 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
181 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
182 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
183 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
184 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
185 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
186 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
188 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
189 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
190 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
191 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
193 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
194 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
195 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
197 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
198 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
199 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
204 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
205 pub struct BlindedForward {
206 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
207 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
208 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
209 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
210 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
211 /// the introduction node.
212 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
215 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
216 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
217 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
219 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
220 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
228 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
229 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
230 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
231 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
232 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
233 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
235 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
236 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
237 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
238 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
239 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
241 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
243 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
244 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
245 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
247 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
248 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
249 /// it along another path).
251 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
252 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
253 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
254 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
255 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
256 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
257 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
258 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
259 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
261 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
264 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
266 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
268 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
271 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
272 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
273 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
274 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
277 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
278 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
279 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
280 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
281 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
284 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
285 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
286 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
288 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
289 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
290 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
293 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
294 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
296 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
297 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
302 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
305 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
310 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
314 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
315 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
316 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
317 pub enum BlindedFailure {
318 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
319 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
320 FromIntroductionNode,
321 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
322 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
326 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
327 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
328 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
329 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
330 short_channel_id: u64,
331 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
333 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
334 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
335 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
337 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
338 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
343 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
345 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
346 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
347 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
349 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
350 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
353 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
354 struct ClaimableHTLC {
355 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
357 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
359 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
360 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
361 sender_intended_value: u64,
362 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
364 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
365 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
366 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
367 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
369 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
370 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
373 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
374 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
375 events::ClaimedHTLC {
376 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
377 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
378 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
379 value_msat: val.value,
380 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
385 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
386 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
388 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
389 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
390 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
393 /// Number of bytes in the id.
394 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
397 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
398 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
403 impl Readable for PaymentId {
404 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
405 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
410 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
411 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
412 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
416 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
418 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
419 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
420 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
422 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
423 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
428 impl Readable for InterceptId {
429 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
430 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
435 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
436 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
437 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
438 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
439 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
442 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
444 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
445 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
446 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
448 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
449 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
453 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
454 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
455 (0, short_channel_id, required),
456 (2, htlc_id, required),
458 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
459 (0, session_priv, required),
464 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
465 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
466 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
467 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
468 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
471 session_priv: SecretKey,
472 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
473 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
474 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
475 payment_id: PaymentId,
478 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
479 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
480 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
482 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
484 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
486 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
489 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
490 payment_id.hash(hasher);
491 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
497 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
499 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
500 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
501 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
502 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
503 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
504 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
508 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
509 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
510 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
511 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
512 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
513 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
515 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
521 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
522 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
524 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
525 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
526 pub enum FailureCode {
527 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
528 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
529 TemporaryNodeFailure,
530 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
531 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
532 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
533 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
534 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
535 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
536 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
537 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
538 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
539 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
541 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
542 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
543 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
546 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
547 fn into(self) -> u16 {
549 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
550 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
551 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
552 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
557 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
558 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
559 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
560 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
561 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
563 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
564 err: msgs::LightningError,
565 closes_channel: bool,
566 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
568 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
570 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
572 err: LightningError {
574 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
575 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
581 closes_channel: false,
582 shutdown_finish: None,
586 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
587 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
590 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
591 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
592 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
593 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
594 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
595 // commitment upon reconnecting.
596 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
598 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
601 err: LightningError { err, action },
602 closes_channel: true,
603 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
607 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
610 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
612 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
613 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
617 log_level: Level::Warn,
620 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
622 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
624 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
626 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
627 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
634 closes_channel: false,
635 shutdown_finish: None,
639 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
644 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
645 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
646 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
647 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
648 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
650 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
651 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
652 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
653 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
654 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
655 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
656 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
658 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
662 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
663 struct ClaimingPayment {
665 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
666 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
667 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
668 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
670 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
671 (0, amount_msat, required),
672 (2, payment_purpose, required),
673 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
674 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
675 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
678 struct ClaimablePayment {
679 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
680 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
681 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
684 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
685 struct ClaimablePayments {
686 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
687 /// failed/claimed by the user.
689 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
690 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
692 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
693 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
694 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
696 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
697 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
698 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
699 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
702 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
703 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
704 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
705 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
707 enum BackgroundEvent {
708 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
709 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
710 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
711 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
713 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
714 /// are regenerated on startup.
715 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
717 /// channel to continue normal operation.
719 /// In general this should be used rather than
720 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
721 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
722 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
724 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
725 /// are regenerated on startup.
726 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
727 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
728 funding_txo: OutPoint,
729 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
731 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
732 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
734 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 channel_id: ChannelId,
741 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
742 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
743 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
744 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
745 /// event can be generated.
746 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
747 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
748 /// operation of another channel.
750 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
751 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
752 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
753 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
755 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
756 event: events::Event,
757 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
759 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
760 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
761 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
763 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
764 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
765 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
766 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
767 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
769 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
770 /// stored for later processing.
771 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
772 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
773 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
774 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
778 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
779 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
780 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
781 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
782 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
783 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
784 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
785 (4, blocking_action, required),
787 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
788 (0, event, upgradable_required),
789 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
790 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
791 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
792 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
793 // downgrades to prior versions.
794 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
798 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
799 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
800 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
801 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
802 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
805 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
806 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
807 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
808 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
812 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
813 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
814 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
815 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
816 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
817 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
819 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
820 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
821 channel_id: ChannelId,
822 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
827 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
828 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
829 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
830 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
831 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
836 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
837 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
841 /// State we hold per-peer.
842 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
843 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
845 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
846 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
847 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
849 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
850 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
851 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
852 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
853 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
854 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
855 latest_features: InitFeatures,
856 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
857 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
858 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
859 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
860 /// user but which have not yet completed.
862 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
863 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
864 /// for a missing channel.
865 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
866 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
867 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
869 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
870 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
871 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
872 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
874 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
875 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
876 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
877 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
878 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
879 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
880 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
881 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
882 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
883 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
884 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
885 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
886 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
887 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
888 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
892 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
893 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
894 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
895 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
896 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
897 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
900 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
901 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
902 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
905 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
906 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
907 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
910 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
911 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
912 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
913 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
917 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
918 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
919 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
920 /// The original OpenChannel message.
921 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
922 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
923 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
926 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
927 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
928 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
930 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
931 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
933 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
936 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
937 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
938 struct PendingInboundPayment {
939 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
940 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
941 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
942 /// this payment being removed.
944 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
945 user_payment_id: u64,
946 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
947 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
948 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
951 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
952 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
953 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
954 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
955 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
956 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
957 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
958 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
960 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
961 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
962 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
970 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
972 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
973 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
974 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
979 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
980 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
981 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
982 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
983 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
984 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
985 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
986 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
987 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
989 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
990 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
991 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1000 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1002 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1003 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1004 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1009 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1011 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1013 pub trait AChannelManager {
1014 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1015 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1016 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1017 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1018 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1019 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1020 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1021 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1022 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1023 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1024 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1025 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1026 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1027 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1028 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1029 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1030 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1031 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1032 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1033 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1034 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1035 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1036 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1037 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1038 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1039 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1040 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1041 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1042 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1043 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1044 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1045 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1046 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1047 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1048 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1049 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1052 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1053 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1055 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1056 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1057 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1058 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1059 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1060 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1064 type Watch = M::Target;
1066 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1068 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1070 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1072 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1073 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1075 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1077 type Router = R::Target;
1079 type Logger = L::Target;
1081 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1084 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1085 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1087 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1088 /// to individual Channels.
1090 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1091 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1092 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1093 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1095 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1096 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1097 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1098 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1099 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1100 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1101 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1102 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1103 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1105 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1106 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1107 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1109 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1110 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1111 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1112 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1113 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1115 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1116 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1117 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1118 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1120 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1121 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1122 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1124 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1125 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1126 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1127 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1128 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1130 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1131 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1132 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1133 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1134 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1135 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1136 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1137 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1140 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1141 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1142 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1143 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1144 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1148 // `pending_offers_messages`
1150 // `total_consistency_lock`
1152 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1154 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1156 // |__`per_peer_state`
1158 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1160 // |__`claimable_payments`
1162 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1166 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1168 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1170 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1174 // |__`pending_events`
1176 // |__`pending_background_events`
1178 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1180 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1181 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1182 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1183 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1184 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1185 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1189 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1190 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1191 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1197 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1199 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1201 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1202 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1204 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1205 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1206 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1207 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1209 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1210 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1212 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1213 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1214 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1215 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1216 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1217 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1218 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1219 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1221 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1223 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1224 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1226 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1228 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1229 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1230 /// and via the classic SCID.
1232 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1233 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1235 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1237 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1239 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1240 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1241 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1243 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1244 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1246 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1247 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1249 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1250 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1252 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1253 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1254 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1255 /// active channel list on load.
1257 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1258 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1260 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1262 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1263 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1264 /// the handling of the events.
1266 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1267 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1270 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1271 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1272 /// would break backwards compatability.
1273 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1274 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1275 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1277 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1279 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1281 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1283 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1285 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1286 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1287 /// confirmation depth.
1289 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1290 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1291 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1293 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1295 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1297 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1299 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1301 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1303 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1304 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1305 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1307 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1308 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1310 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1311 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1312 /// keeping additional state.
1313 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1315 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1316 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1317 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1318 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1320 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1321 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1323 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1324 /// are currently open with that peer.
1326 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1327 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1330 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1332 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1333 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1334 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1335 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1336 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1338 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1339 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1340 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1341 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1342 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1344 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1345 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1347 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1348 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1349 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1350 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1351 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1353 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1354 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1356 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1357 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1358 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1359 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1360 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1362 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1364 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1366 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1367 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1368 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1369 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1370 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1371 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1372 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1373 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1374 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1375 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1376 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1378 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1379 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1380 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1382 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1384 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1385 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1387 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1391 signer_provider: SP,
1396 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1398 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1399 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1400 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1401 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1402 pub struct ChainParameters {
1403 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1404 pub network: Network,
1406 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1408 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1409 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1412 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1416 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1417 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1420 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1421 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1422 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1423 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1424 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1425 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1427 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1428 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1429 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1430 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1431 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1432 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1434 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1435 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1438 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1439 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1440 /// events to handle.
1442 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1443 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1445 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1446 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1449 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1450 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1451 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1452 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1454 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1455 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1456 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1457 should_persist: move || {
1458 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1459 // processing and return that.
1460 let notify = persist_check();
1461 match (notify, force_notify) {
1462 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1463 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1464 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1465 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1466 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1469 _read_guard: read_guard,
1473 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1474 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1475 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1476 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1477 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1478 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1480 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1481 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1482 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1483 should_persist: persist_check,
1484 _read_guard: read_guard,
1489 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1490 fn drop(&mut self) {
1491 match (self.should_persist)() {
1492 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1493 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1494 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1496 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1497 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1498 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1503 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1504 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1506 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1508 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1509 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1510 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1511 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1512 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1514 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1515 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1517 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1519 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1520 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1521 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1522 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1523 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1524 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1525 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1526 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1527 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1528 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1529 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1530 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1531 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1533 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1534 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1536 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1537 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1538 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1539 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1541 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1542 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1543 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1544 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1545 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1546 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1548 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1550 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1551 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1553 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1555 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1556 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1558 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1559 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1560 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1562 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1563 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1564 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1566 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1567 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1568 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1569 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1571 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1572 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1573 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1575 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1576 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1577 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1579 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1580 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1581 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1582 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1583 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1584 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1585 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1586 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1587 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1588 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1589 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1592 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1593 /// to better separate parameters.
1594 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1595 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1596 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1597 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1598 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1599 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1600 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1601 pub features: InitFeatures,
1602 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1603 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1604 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1606 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1608 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1609 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1610 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1611 /// payments to us through this channel.
1612 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1613 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1614 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1615 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1616 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1617 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1618 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1621 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1624 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1625 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1626 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1627 /// lifetime of the channel.
1628 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1629 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1630 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1631 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1632 /// our counterparty already.
1634 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1635 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1636 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1637 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1639 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1640 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1641 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1642 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1644 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1645 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1647 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1648 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1650 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1651 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1652 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1653 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1654 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1655 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1656 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1657 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1658 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1661 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1663 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1664 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1665 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1666 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1667 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1668 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1669 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1671 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1672 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1674 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1675 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1676 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1677 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1678 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1679 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1680 /// this value on chain.
1682 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1684 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1686 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1687 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1688 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1689 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1690 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1691 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1692 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1694 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1695 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1696 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1697 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1698 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1699 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1701 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1702 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1703 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1704 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1705 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1707 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1708 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1709 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1710 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1712 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1713 pub balance_msat: u64,
1714 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1715 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1716 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1717 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1719 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1721 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1722 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1723 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1724 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1725 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1726 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1727 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1728 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1730 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1731 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1732 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1733 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1734 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1735 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1736 /// route which is valid.
1737 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1738 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1739 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1740 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1741 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1742 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1744 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1745 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1746 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1747 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1748 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1749 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1750 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1751 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1752 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1754 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1756 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1757 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1758 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1759 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1760 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1762 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1763 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1764 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1765 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1766 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1767 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1768 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1770 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1771 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1772 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1773 pub is_outbound: bool,
1774 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1775 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1776 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1777 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1778 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1780 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1781 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1782 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1783 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1784 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1785 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1786 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1788 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1789 pub is_usable: bool,
1790 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1791 pub is_public: bool,
1792 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1793 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1794 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1795 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1796 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1797 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1799 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1800 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1803 impl ChannelDetails {
1804 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1805 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1806 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1808 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1809 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1810 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1811 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1814 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1815 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1816 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1818 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1819 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1820 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1821 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1824 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1825 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1826 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1829 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1830 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1832 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1833 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1834 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1836 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1837 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1838 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1839 features: latest_features,
1840 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1841 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1842 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1843 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1844 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1845 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1846 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1847 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1848 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1849 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1851 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1852 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1853 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1854 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1855 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1856 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1857 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1858 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1859 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1860 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1861 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1862 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1863 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1864 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1865 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1866 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1867 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1868 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1869 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1870 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1871 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1872 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1873 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1874 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1875 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1876 config: Some(context.config()),
1877 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1882 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1883 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1884 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1885 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1886 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1887 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1888 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1889 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1890 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1892 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1894 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1895 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1897 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1898 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1899 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1900 /// to drop the channel.
1904 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1905 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1906 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1907 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1908 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1910 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1911 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1912 payment_id: PaymentId,
1914 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1916 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1917 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1918 payment_id: PaymentId,
1919 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1921 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1922 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1923 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1926 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1927 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1928 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1930 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1931 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1932 payment_id: PaymentId,
1933 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1934 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1935 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1937 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1938 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1939 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1941 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1942 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1943 payment_id: PaymentId,
1944 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1945 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1949 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1951 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1953 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1954 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1955 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1956 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1958 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1959 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1960 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1963 macro_rules! handle_error {
1964 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1965 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1966 // entering the macro.
1967 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1968 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1972 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1973 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1975 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1976 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1977 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1978 let logger = WithContext::from(
1979 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1981 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1983 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1984 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1985 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1990 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1993 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1995 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1996 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1997 action: err.action.clone()
2001 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2002 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2003 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2004 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2005 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2009 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2016 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2017 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2018 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2019 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2021 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2022 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2023 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2025 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2026 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2027 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2028 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2029 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2031 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2032 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2034 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2038 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2039 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2040 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2042 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2043 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2045 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2046 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2048 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2049 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2050 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2051 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2052 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2053 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2055 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2060 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2061 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2063 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2064 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2066 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2067 match $channel_phase {
2068 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2069 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2071 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2072 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2074 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2075 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2081 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2082 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2086 let key = *$entry.key();
2087 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2089 $entry.remove_entry();
2097 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2098 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2102 let key = *$entry.key();
2103 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2105 $entry.remove_entry();
2113 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2114 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2116 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2117 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2123 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2124 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2125 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2126 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2127 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2129 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2130 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2131 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2132 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2133 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2134 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2135 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2136 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2137 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2138 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2143 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2144 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2145 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2146 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2147 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2148 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2149 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2150 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2151 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2153 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2158 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2159 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2160 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2161 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2162 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2163 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2164 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2165 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2166 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2168 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2173 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2174 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2175 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2176 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2177 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2178 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2179 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2180 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2181 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2182 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2183 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2184 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2186 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2187 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2188 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2194 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2195 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2197 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2198 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2199 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2200 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2201 updates.announcement_sigs);
2202 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2203 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2206 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2207 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2208 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2209 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2211 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2212 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2213 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2214 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2215 let mut batch_completed = false;
2216 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2217 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2218 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2219 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2221 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2222 channel_state.2 = true;
2224 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2226 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2228 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2231 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2232 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2233 if batch_completed {
2234 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2235 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2236 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2237 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2238 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2239 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2240 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2241 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2242 chan.set_batch_ready();
2243 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2244 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2248 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2249 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2250 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2255 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2257 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2258 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2260 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2261 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2262 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2263 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2268 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2269 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2270 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2271 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2273 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2274 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2275 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2276 panic!("{}", err_str);
2278 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2279 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2280 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2283 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2289 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2290 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2291 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2293 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2294 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2295 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2296 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2297 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2298 // filter for uniqueness here.
2299 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2300 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2301 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2302 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2304 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2305 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2307 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2308 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2309 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2315 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2316 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2317 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2318 while !processed_all_events {
2319 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2326 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2327 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2328 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2330 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2331 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2332 result = $self.process_background_events();
2334 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2335 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2336 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2337 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2341 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2342 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2343 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2344 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2347 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2349 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2350 $event_to_handle = event;
2352 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2353 post_event_actions.push(action);
2358 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2359 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2360 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2361 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2362 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2363 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2366 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2367 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2368 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2369 processed_all_events = false;
2373 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2374 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2375 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2377 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2378 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2379 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2385 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2387 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2388 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2389 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2390 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2391 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2392 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2396 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2398 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2400 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2401 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2403 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2405 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2406 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2407 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2410 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2411 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2412 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2414 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2415 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2416 current_timestamp: u32,
2418 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2419 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2420 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2421 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2423 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2424 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2425 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2430 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2432 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2433 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2434 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2435 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2436 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2437 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2438 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2439 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2441 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2444 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2445 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2447 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2449 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2451 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2453 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2454 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2455 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2456 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2457 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2458 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2459 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2460 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2462 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2472 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2473 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2474 &self.default_configuration
2477 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2478 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2479 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2482 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2483 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2485 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2487 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2491 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2496 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2498 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2499 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2500 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2501 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2502 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2504 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2505 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2507 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2508 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2509 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2511 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2512 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2513 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2515 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2516 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2518 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2519 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2520 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2521 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2522 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2523 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2525 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2526 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2527 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2528 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2529 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2530 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2534 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2535 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2539 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2540 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2542 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2544 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2545 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2546 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2551 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2552 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2553 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2554 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2555 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2556 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2560 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2565 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2567 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2568 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2571 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2573 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2579 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2580 node_id: their_network_key,
2583 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2586 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2587 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2588 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2589 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2590 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2591 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2592 // the same channel.
2593 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2595 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2597 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2600 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2601 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2602 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2603 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2607 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2608 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2609 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2617 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2618 /// more information.
2619 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2620 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2621 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2622 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2623 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2624 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2625 // the same channel.
2626 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2628 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2630 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2633 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2634 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2635 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2643 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2644 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2646 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2647 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2649 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2650 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2651 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2652 // really wanted anyway.
2653 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2656 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2657 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2659 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2661 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2664 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2665 let context_to_details = |context| {
2666 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2668 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2670 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2671 .map(context_to_details)
2677 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2678 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2680 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2681 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2682 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2684 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2685 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2686 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2687 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2688 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2689 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2691 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2692 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2693 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2695 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2696 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2697 payment_id: *payment_id,
2698 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2699 total_msat: *total_msat,
2702 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2703 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2705 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2706 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2708 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2713 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2716 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2717 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2722 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2723 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2728 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2730 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2731 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2732 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2733 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2734 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2735 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2737 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2738 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2739 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2741 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2745 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2746 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2748 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2749 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2750 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2751 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2754 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2755 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2759 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2761 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2762 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2769 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2770 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2771 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2772 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2775 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2776 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2782 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2783 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2784 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2786 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2787 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2789 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2790 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2791 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2792 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2794 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2796 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2797 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2798 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2801 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2802 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2803 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2804 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2805 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2806 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2809 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2810 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2811 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2813 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2814 /// the channel being closed or not:
2815 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2816 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2817 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2818 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2819 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2820 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2821 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2823 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2824 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2825 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2826 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2828 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2830 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2831 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2832 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2835 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2836 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2837 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2838 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2839 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2842 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2843 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2844 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2845 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2846 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2849 let logger = WithContext::from(
2850 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2853 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2854 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2855 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2856 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2857 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2858 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2859 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2861 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2862 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2863 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2864 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2865 // ignore the result here.
2866 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2868 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2869 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2870 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2871 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2873 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2874 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2875 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2876 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2877 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2878 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2879 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2882 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2885 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2886 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2891 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2892 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2893 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2894 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2895 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2896 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2897 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2898 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2901 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2902 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2903 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2907 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2908 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2912 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2913 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2914 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2915 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2917 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2918 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2919 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2920 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2921 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2922 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2924 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2926 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2927 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2928 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2929 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2930 mem::drop(peer_state);
2931 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2933 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2934 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2935 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2937 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2938 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2939 // Unfunded channel has no update
2940 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2943 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2944 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2945 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2946 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2948 (None, *peer_node_id)
2950 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2953 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2954 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2955 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2957 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2958 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2959 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2960 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2967 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2970 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2972 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2973 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2975 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2976 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2977 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2978 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2979 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2980 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2981 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2992 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2993 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2994 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2996 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2997 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2998 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3001 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3002 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3003 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3005 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3006 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3007 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3008 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3009 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3012 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3013 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3014 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3015 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3016 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3020 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3021 /// local transaction(s).
3022 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3023 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3024 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3028 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3029 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3031 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3033 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3034 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3037 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3038 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3039 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3040 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3046 macro_rules! return_err {
3047 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3050 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3051 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3053 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3054 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3055 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3056 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3057 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3058 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3059 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3063 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3064 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3065 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3066 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3067 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3068 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3069 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3070 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3076 let NextPacketDetails {
3077 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3078 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3079 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3080 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3081 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3084 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3085 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3086 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3087 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3088 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3089 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3090 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3091 // phantom or an intercept.
3092 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3093 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3094 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3098 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3101 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3103 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3104 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3105 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3106 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3107 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3109 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3110 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3111 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3112 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3115 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3116 // have no consistency guarantees.
3117 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3121 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3122 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3123 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3124 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3125 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3127 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3128 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3129 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3130 // we don't have the channel here.
3131 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3133 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3135 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3136 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3137 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3138 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3139 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3140 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3141 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3142 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3143 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3144 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3145 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3147 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3150 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3151 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3153 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3154 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3161 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3163 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3164 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3166 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3167 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3168 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3169 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3170 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3172 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3173 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3179 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3180 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3181 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3182 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3184 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3185 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3187 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3188 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3189 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3191 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3192 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3193 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3194 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3195 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3196 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3197 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3201 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3203 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3206 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3207 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3208 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3209 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3210 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3211 macro_rules! return_err {
3212 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3214 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3215 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3216 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3217 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3218 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3219 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3220 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3221 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3222 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3226 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3227 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3228 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3229 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3230 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3236 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3238 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3239 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3240 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3241 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3244 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3245 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3246 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3247 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3248 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3250 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3253 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3254 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3255 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3256 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3257 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3263 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3264 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3265 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3267 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3268 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3269 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3271 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3272 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3273 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3274 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3275 return Err(LightningError {
3276 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3280 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3281 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3283 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3284 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3285 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3288 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3289 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3290 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3291 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3293 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3294 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3295 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3297 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3298 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3299 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3300 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3301 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3302 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3303 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3307 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3310 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3311 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3312 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3313 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3315 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3316 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3317 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3318 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3319 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3322 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3323 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3325 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3326 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3327 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3328 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3329 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3330 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3331 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3332 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3334 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3335 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3336 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3338 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3340 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3347 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3348 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3349 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3350 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3355 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3356 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3357 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3360 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3361 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3362 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3363 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3365 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3366 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3367 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3369 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3370 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3374 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3375 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3377 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3378 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3379 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3381 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3384 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3386 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3387 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3389 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3391 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3392 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3393 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3394 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3395 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3396 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3397 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3398 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3400 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3401 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3402 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3403 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3405 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3406 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3408 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3409 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3410 Some(monitor_update) => {
3411 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3413 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3414 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3415 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3416 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3417 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3418 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3419 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3427 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3430 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3431 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3432 // `channel_by_id` map.
3433 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3434 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3438 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3439 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3441 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3446 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3448 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3449 /// fields for more info.
3451 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3452 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3454 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3456 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3457 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3458 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3459 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3460 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3462 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3463 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3464 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3465 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3466 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3468 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3469 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3470 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3471 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3473 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3475 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3476 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3477 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3479 /// In general, a path may raise:
3480 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3481 /// node public key) is specified.
3482 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3483 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3484 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3485 /// relevant updates.
3487 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3488 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3489 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3491 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3492 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3493 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3494 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3495 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3496 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3497 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3498 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3500 self.pending_outbound_payments
3501 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3502 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3503 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3506 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3507 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3508 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3509 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3511 self.pending_outbound_payments
3512 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3513 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3514 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3515 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3519 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3520 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3522 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3523 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3524 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3528 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3529 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3530 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3534 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3535 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3538 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3539 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3541 self.pending_outbound_payments
3542 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3543 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3544 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3545 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3546 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3550 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3551 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3552 /// retries are exhausted.
3554 /// # Event Generation
3556 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3557 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3559 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3560 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3561 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3563 /// # Requested Invoices
3565 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3566 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3567 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3568 /// once the invoice has been received.
3570 /// # Restart Behavior
3572 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3573 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3574 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3576 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3577 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3579 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3582 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3583 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3584 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3585 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3586 /// never reach the recipient.
3588 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3589 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3591 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3592 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3594 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3595 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3596 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3598 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3599 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3600 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3603 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3604 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3606 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3609 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3610 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3611 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3613 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3614 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3615 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3616 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3619 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3620 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3621 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3622 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3623 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3625 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3626 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3627 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3630 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3633 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3634 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3637 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3638 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3640 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3641 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3642 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3643 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3644 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3645 let payment_params =
3646 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3648 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3650 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3653 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3654 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3656 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3657 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3658 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3659 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3661 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3662 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3663 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3664 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3665 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3666 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3667 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3668 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3669 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3670 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3672 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3673 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3674 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3675 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3679 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3681 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3682 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3685 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3687 let mut res = Vec::new();
3689 for mut path in route.paths {
3690 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3691 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3692 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3693 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3694 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3697 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3700 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3701 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3703 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3705 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3706 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3711 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3714 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3719 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3720 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3721 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3723 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3724 let used_liquidity =
3725 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3727 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3728 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3730 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3733 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3738 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3739 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3740 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3747 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3748 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3749 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3750 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3751 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3752 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3754 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3755 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3760 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3761 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3762 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3764 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3765 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3766 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3767 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3768 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3769 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3770 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3771 } else { unreachable!(); });
3773 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3774 Err((chan, err)) => {
3775 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3776 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3777 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3778 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3779 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3785 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3788 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3789 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3792 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3793 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3794 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3798 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3799 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3800 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3804 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3806 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3809 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3810 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3814 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3815 funding_txo, o.get()
3817 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3818 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3819 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3820 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3821 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3822 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3825 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3832 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3833 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3834 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3838 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3840 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3841 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3843 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3844 /// across the p2p network.
3846 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3847 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3849 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3850 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3851 /// keys per-channel).
3853 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3854 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3855 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3857 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3858 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3859 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3861 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3862 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3863 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3864 /// for more details.
3866 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3867 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3868 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3869 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3872 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3874 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3875 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3877 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3878 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3879 /// signature for each channel.
3881 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3882 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3884 let mut result = Ok(());
3886 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3887 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3888 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3889 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3890 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3895 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3896 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3897 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3901 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3902 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3903 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3904 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3905 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3906 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3907 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3908 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3910 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3911 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3916 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3917 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3918 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3919 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3923 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3924 match states.entry(txid) {
3925 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3926 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3927 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3931 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3934 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3935 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3936 temporary_channel_id,
3937 counterparty_node_id,
3938 funding_transaction.clone(),
3941 let mut output_index = None;
3942 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3943 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3944 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3945 if output_index.is_some() {
3946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3947 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3950 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3953 if output_index.is_none() {
3954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3955 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3958 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3959 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3960 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3966 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3967 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3968 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3969 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3970 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3971 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3972 .into_iter().flatten()
3973 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3975 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3976 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3978 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3981 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3982 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3983 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3984 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3986 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3987 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3988 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3992 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
3993 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3994 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4000 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4002 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4003 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4004 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4005 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4007 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4008 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4010 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4011 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4013 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4015 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4016 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4017 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4018 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4019 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4020 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4021 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4022 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4023 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4024 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4025 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4026 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4027 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4033 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4034 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4035 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4036 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4037 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4038 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4039 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4040 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4044 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4045 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4046 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4047 config.apply(config_update);
4048 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4051 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4052 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4053 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4054 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4055 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4056 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4063 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4064 debug_assert!(false);
4065 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4067 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4068 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4075 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4077 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4078 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4079 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4080 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4082 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4083 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4085 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4086 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4088 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4090 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4091 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4092 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4093 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4094 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4095 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4096 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4097 pub fn update_channel_config(
4098 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4099 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4100 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4103 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4104 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4106 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4107 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4109 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4110 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4111 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4112 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4113 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4115 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4116 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4117 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4120 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4123 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4124 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4125 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4126 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4127 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4128 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4131 let next_hop_scid = {
4132 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4133 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4134 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4137 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4138 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4139 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4140 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4141 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4144 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4146 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4147 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4148 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4151 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4152 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4153 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4154 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4155 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4162 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4163 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4164 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4167 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4168 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4169 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4170 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4173 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4175 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4176 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4177 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4178 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4179 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4182 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4183 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4184 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4185 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4186 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4188 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4192 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4193 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4195 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4198 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4199 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4202 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4203 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4204 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4207 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4208 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4209 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4210 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4211 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4212 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4213 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4214 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4215 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4218 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4219 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4220 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4221 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4226 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4228 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4229 /// Will likely generate further events.
4230 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4231 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4233 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4234 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4235 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4237 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4238 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4240 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4241 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4242 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4243 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4245 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4246 match forward_info {
4247 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4248 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4249 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4250 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4251 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4254 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4255 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4256 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4257 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4259 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4260 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4261 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4262 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4263 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4264 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4265 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4266 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4269 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4270 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4272 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4275 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4276 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4282 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4283 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4285 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4289 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4290 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4292 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4296 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4297 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4298 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4299 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4300 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4301 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4302 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4305 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4306 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4307 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4308 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4309 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4311 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4313 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4314 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4318 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4319 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4320 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4321 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4322 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4323 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4325 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4326 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4332 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4335 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4338 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4339 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4340 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4341 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4342 // problem, not ours.
4348 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4349 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4350 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4352 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4356 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4357 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4358 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4359 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4360 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4365 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4366 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4367 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4368 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4369 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4370 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4371 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4372 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4373 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4374 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4375 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4378 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4379 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4380 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4381 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4382 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4383 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4384 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4385 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4386 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4387 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4389 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4390 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4391 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4392 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4393 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4394 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4397 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4398 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4399 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4402 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4403 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4405 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4407 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4408 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4409 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4410 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4416 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4417 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4419 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4420 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4421 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4423 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4424 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4425 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4426 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4428 Some((res, htlc_id))
4431 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4432 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4433 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4434 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4436 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4438 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4439 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4440 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4446 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4450 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4451 match forward_info {
4452 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4453 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4454 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4455 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4456 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4459 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4460 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4461 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4462 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4463 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4465 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4466 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4467 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4468 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4469 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4471 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4472 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4473 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4477 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4478 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4481 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4484 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4485 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4486 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4487 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4488 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4489 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4490 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4491 phantom_shared_secret,
4494 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4495 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4496 // if routing nodes overpay
4497 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4498 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4500 total_value_received: None,
4501 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4504 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4507 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4509 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4510 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4511 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4512 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4513 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4514 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4516 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4517 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4518 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4519 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4520 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4521 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4522 phantom_shared_secret,
4525 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4526 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4528 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4531 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4532 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4533 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4534 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4535 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4538 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4539 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4540 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4541 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4542 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4543 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4545 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4546 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4547 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4549 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4550 .entry(payment_hash)
4551 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4552 .or_insert_with(|| {
4553 committed_to_claimable = true;
4555 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4558 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4559 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4560 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4561 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4563 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4565 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4567 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4568 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4569 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4572 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4574 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4575 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4576 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4577 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4578 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4579 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4580 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4582 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4583 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4585 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4587 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4588 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4589 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4590 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4591 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4594 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4595 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4596 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4597 committed_to_claimable = true;
4599 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4600 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4601 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4602 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4603 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4604 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4605 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4606 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4607 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4608 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4612 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4613 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4614 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4615 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4616 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4618 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4620 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4621 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4623 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4624 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4625 committed_to_claimable = true;
4628 payment_claimable_generated
4632 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4633 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4634 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4635 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4636 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4637 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4638 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4639 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4641 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4642 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4643 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4644 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4645 Ok(result) => result,
4647 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4648 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4651 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4652 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4653 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4655 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4656 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4659 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4660 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4661 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4663 check_total_value!(purpose);
4665 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4666 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4667 check_total_value!(purpose);
4671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4672 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4674 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4676 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4677 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4678 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4679 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4680 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4681 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4682 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4683 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4685 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4686 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4687 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4689 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4690 if payment_claimable_generated {
4691 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4697 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4698 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4706 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4707 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4708 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4709 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4711 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4712 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4714 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4716 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4717 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4718 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4720 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4722 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4723 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4724 events.append(&mut new_events);
4727 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4729 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4730 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4731 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4733 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4735 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4736 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4737 if background_events.is_empty() {
4738 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4741 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4743 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4744 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4745 // monitor updating completing.
4746 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4748 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4749 let mut updated_chan = false;
4751 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4752 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4753 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4754 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4755 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4757 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4758 updated_chan = true;
4759 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4760 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4762 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4765 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4770 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4771 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4774 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4776 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4779 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4780 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4782 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4783 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4784 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4785 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4786 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4792 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4795 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4796 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4797 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4798 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4799 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4802 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4803 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4805 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4807 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4808 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4809 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4810 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4811 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4813 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4815 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4816 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4817 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4818 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4820 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4821 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4823 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4824 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4828 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4829 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4830 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4831 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4832 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4833 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4834 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4836 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4837 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4839 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4840 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4843 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4844 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4846 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4851 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4852 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4860 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4862 /// This currently includes:
4863 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4864 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4865 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4867 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4868 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4869 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4870 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4871 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4872 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4873 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4874 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4876 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4877 /// estimate fetches.
4879 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4880 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4881 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4882 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4883 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4885 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4886 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4888 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4889 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4890 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4891 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4893 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4894 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4895 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4896 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4897 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4898 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4900 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4901 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4902 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4904 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4905 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4906 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4907 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4908 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4909 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4910 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4911 channel_id: *chan_id,
4912 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4923 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4924 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4927 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4928 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4929 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4931 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4932 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4937 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4938 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4940 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4941 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4942 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4943 if needs_close { return false; }
4946 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4947 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4948 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4949 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4950 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4951 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4952 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4953 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4955 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4956 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4957 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4958 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4962 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4964 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4967 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4969 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4970 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4971 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4976 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4978 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4984 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4986 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4987 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4988 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4989 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4990 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4991 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4992 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4993 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4994 channel_id: *chan_id,
4995 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5003 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5004 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5005 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5007 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5008 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5009 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5014 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5015 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5016 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5017 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5018 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5019 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5020 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5021 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5022 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5028 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5030 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5031 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5036 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5037 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5038 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5039 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5040 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5041 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5042 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5043 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5044 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5045 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5046 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5048 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5049 // have no channels to the peer.
5050 let remove_entry = {
5051 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5052 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5055 entry.remove_entry();
5058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5063 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5064 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5065 // This should be unreachable
5066 debug_assert!(false);
5069 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5070 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5071 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5072 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5073 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5074 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5075 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5078 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5079 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5080 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5082 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5083 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5090 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5091 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5092 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5093 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5094 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5097 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5098 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5101 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5102 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5105 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5106 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5107 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5108 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5109 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5110 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5111 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5114 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5115 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5118 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5119 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5120 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5121 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5122 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5129 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5130 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5131 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5133 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5134 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5135 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5136 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5138 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5139 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5140 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5141 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5142 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5143 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5146 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5147 /// reason for the failure.
5149 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5150 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5153 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5154 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5155 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5156 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5157 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5158 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5159 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5164 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5165 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5166 match failure_code {
5167 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5168 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5169 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5170 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5171 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5172 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5174 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5175 let fail_data = match data {
5176 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5179 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5184 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5185 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5187 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5189 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5190 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5191 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5192 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5193 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5194 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5195 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5197 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5199 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5200 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5202 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5207 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5208 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5209 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5210 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5211 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5212 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5213 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5214 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5215 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5216 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5218 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5219 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5220 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5221 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5223 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5224 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5225 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5226 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5227 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5231 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5232 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5233 // be surfaced to the user.
5234 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5235 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5236 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5238 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5239 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5240 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5243 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5245 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5246 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5248 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5249 debug_assert!(false);
5250 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5255 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5258 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5259 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5260 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5265 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5266 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5267 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5268 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5269 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5270 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5271 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5272 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5273 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5274 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5277 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5278 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5279 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5282 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5283 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5284 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5286 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5287 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5288 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5289 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5290 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5292 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5293 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5294 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5297 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5298 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5299 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5301 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5302 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5303 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5304 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5305 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5307 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5309 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5310 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5312 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5313 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5317 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5318 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5320 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5324 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5325 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5326 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5327 push_forward_ev = true;
5329 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5331 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5334 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5337 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5338 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5339 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5340 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5341 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5342 failed_next_destination: destination,
5348 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5349 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5351 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5352 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5353 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5354 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5356 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5357 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5358 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5359 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5361 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5362 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5363 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5365 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5366 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5367 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5368 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5369 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5370 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5371 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5372 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5373 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5376 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5377 /// even type numbers.
5381 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5382 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5384 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5385 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5386 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5389 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5390 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5392 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5395 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5396 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5397 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5398 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5399 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5400 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5401 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5402 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5407 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5408 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5409 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5410 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5411 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5413 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5414 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5415 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5419 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5420 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5421 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5422 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5423 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5424 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5425 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5426 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5427 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5428 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5429 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5438 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5440 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5441 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5442 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5443 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5444 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5445 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5446 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5447 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5448 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5449 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5450 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5451 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5452 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5453 debug_assert!(false);
5457 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5459 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5460 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5461 debug_assert!(false);
5465 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5466 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5468 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5469 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5470 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5471 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5474 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5475 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5476 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5477 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5481 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5482 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5483 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5484 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5485 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5486 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5487 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5490 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5491 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5492 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5493 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5494 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5495 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5500 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5501 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5502 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5503 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5504 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5505 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5506 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5508 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5511 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5512 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5513 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5514 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5518 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5519 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5520 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5521 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5523 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5524 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5525 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5526 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5528 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5529 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5530 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5531 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5535 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5536 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5537 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5541 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5542 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5543 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5546 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5549 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5550 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5551 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5552 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5553 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5556 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5557 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5558 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5560 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5563 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5564 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5566 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5567 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5568 // monitor update as a background event.
5569 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5570 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5571 counterparty_node_id,
5572 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5573 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5577 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5578 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5583 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5585 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5587 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5588 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5589 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5590 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5591 blocking_action: blocker,
5593 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5595 debug_assert!(false,
5596 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5599 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5600 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5601 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5602 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5603 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5605 let mut found_blocker = false;
5606 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5607 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5608 // which case we need to only remove the one
5609 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5610 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5611 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5612 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5614 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5617 debug_assert!(false);
5626 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5627 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5628 counterparty_node_id: None,
5629 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5635 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5636 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5637 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5638 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5639 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5640 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5641 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5642 // again on restart.
5643 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5644 payment_preimage, update_res);
5647 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5648 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5650 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5651 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5652 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5653 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5654 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5655 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5656 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5657 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5658 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5659 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5662 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5663 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5664 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5665 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5666 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5667 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5671 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5672 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5675 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5676 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5677 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5680 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5681 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5682 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5683 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5684 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5686 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5687 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5688 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5690 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5691 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5694 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5695 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5696 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5698 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5699 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5700 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5701 let chan_to_release =
5702 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5703 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5705 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5706 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5707 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5708 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5713 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5714 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5715 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5716 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5717 // in the background.
5718 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5719 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5720 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5721 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5723 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5724 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5725 funding_txo, update, ..
5727 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5728 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5729 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5730 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5732 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5738 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5739 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5740 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5742 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5743 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5745 monitor_update.updates[0],
5746 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5751 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5752 // immediately once we get going.
5753 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5756 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5758 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5761 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5762 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5763 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5764 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5765 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5766 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5770 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5771 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5772 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5775 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5776 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5778 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5779 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5780 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5781 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5783 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5787 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5788 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5789 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5795 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5796 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5797 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5800 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5801 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5802 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5803 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5805 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5807 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5808 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5809 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5811 payment_purpose: purpose,
5814 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5816 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5820 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5822 sender_intended_total_msat,
5826 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5827 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5829 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5830 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5831 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5834 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5835 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5837 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5838 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5839 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5840 Some(blocking_action),
5847 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5848 /// update completion.
5849 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5850 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5851 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5852 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5853 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5854 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5855 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5856 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5857 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5858 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5859 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5860 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5861 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5862 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5864 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5866 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5867 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5868 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5869 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5872 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5873 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5875 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5876 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5877 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5882 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5883 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5885 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5890 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5891 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5892 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5893 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5894 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5899 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5903 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5909 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5910 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5911 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5915 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5916 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5917 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5923 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5924 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5926 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5927 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5929 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5930 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5931 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5932 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5933 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5939 let mut peer_state_lock;
5940 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5941 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5942 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5943 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5945 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5948 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5949 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5950 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5951 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5952 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5955 let remaining_in_flight =
5956 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5957 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5960 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5961 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5962 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5963 remaining_in_flight);
5964 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5967 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5970 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5972 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5973 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5976 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5977 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5978 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5980 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5981 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5982 /// used to accept such channels.
5984 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5985 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5986 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5987 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5990 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5991 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5993 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5994 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5995 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5997 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5998 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6000 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6001 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6003 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6004 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6006 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6007 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6008 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6009 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6012 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6014 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6015 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6017 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6018 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6020 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6022 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6023 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6025 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6029 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6031 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6032 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6033 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6035 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6036 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6037 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6038 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6039 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6040 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6041 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6042 let err_str = e.to_string();
6043 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6045 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6049 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6050 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6052 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6057 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6058 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6059 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6060 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6061 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6062 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6063 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6066 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6067 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6068 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6070 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6072 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6073 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6074 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6075 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6076 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6077 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6078 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6079 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6082 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6083 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6084 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6086 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6090 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6091 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6092 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6094 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6095 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6096 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6099 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6104 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6105 /// or 0-conf channels.
6107 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6108 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6109 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6110 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6111 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6112 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6114 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6115 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6116 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6117 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6118 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6119 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6120 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6124 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6127 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6128 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6130 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6131 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6133 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6134 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6135 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6136 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6137 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6139 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6142 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6143 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6144 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6147 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6148 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6153 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6156 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6157 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6158 // likely to be lost on restart!
6159 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6163 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6167 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6168 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6169 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6170 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6171 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6176 debug_assert!(false);
6177 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6182 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6183 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6184 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6185 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6186 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6187 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6190 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6191 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6194 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6195 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6197 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6198 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6201 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6202 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6207 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6208 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6209 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6210 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6212 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6214 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6215 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6216 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6217 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6218 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6219 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6222 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6223 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6224 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6229 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6230 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6231 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6232 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6233 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6234 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6235 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6243 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6244 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6245 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6247 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6248 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6251 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6252 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6254 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6255 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6256 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6258 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6262 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6263 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6264 // likely to be lost on restart!
6265 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6266 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6267 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6269 debug_assert!(false);
6270 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6272 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6273 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6274 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6276 match phase.get_mut() {
6277 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6278 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6279 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6286 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6290 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6291 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6292 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6293 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6295 user_channel_id: user_id,
6300 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6301 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6304 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6306 debug_assert!(false);
6307 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6312 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6313 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6314 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6315 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6316 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6318 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6319 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6320 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6321 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6322 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6323 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6324 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6325 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6326 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6330 Some(mut phase) => {
6331 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6332 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6333 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6335 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6338 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6340 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6341 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6342 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6343 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6344 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6345 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6347 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6348 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6349 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6352 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6354 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6357 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6358 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6360 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6363 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6364 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6365 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6366 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6368 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6369 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6370 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6371 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6372 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6373 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6374 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6379 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6380 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6381 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6383 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6387 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6388 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6389 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6397 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6398 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6400 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6402 debug_assert!(false);
6403 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6408 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6410 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6411 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6412 let logger = WithContext::from(
6414 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6415 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6418 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6420 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6421 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6422 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6423 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6424 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6425 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6426 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6427 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6428 } else { unreachable!(); }
6431 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6432 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6433 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6434 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6435 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6436 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6437 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6441 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6442 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6443 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6444 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6445 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6446 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6450 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6453 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6457 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6458 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6459 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6461 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6463 debug_assert!(false);
6464 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6468 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6470 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6471 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6472 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6473 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6474 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6475 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6476 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6477 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6478 msg: announcement_sigs,
6480 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6481 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6482 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6483 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6484 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6485 // announcement_signatures.
6486 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6487 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6488 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6489 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6496 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6497 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6502 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6503 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6507 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6512 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6513 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6514 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6516 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6517 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6519 debug_assert!(false);
6520 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6522 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6523 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6524 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6525 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6527 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6528 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6529 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6530 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6532 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6535 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6536 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6537 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6538 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6540 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6541 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6542 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6543 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6544 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6545 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6549 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6550 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6551 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6552 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6555 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6556 let context = phase.context_mut();
6557 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6558 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6559 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6560 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6564 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6567 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6568 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6569 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6570 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6572 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6573 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6579 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6581 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6583 debug_assert!(false);
6584 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6586 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6587 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6588 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6589 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6591 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6592 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6593 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6594 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6595 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6596 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6601 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6602 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6603 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6604 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6605 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6606 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6607 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6609 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6610 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6616 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6617 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6618 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6619 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6621 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6622 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6624 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6625 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6630 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6631 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6632 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6637 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6638 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6639 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6640 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6642 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6643 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6644 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6645 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6647 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6648 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6650 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6651 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6652 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6654 debug_assert!(false);
6655 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6657 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6658 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6659 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6661 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6662 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6663 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6664 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6665 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6666 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6668 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6670 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6671 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6672 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6673 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6674 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6675 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6676 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6677 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6681 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6682 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6683 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6684 match pending_forward_info {
6685 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6686 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6688 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6689 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6690 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6691 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6692 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6694 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6695 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6696 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6697 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6698 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6701 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6703 _ => pending_forward_info
6706 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6707 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6709 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6710 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6718 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6720 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6722 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6724 debug_assert!(false);
6725 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6727 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6728 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6731 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6732 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6733 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6734 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6736 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6738 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6739 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6740 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6742 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6743 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6744 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6745 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6746 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6747 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6748 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6751 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6752 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6758 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6762 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6763 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6764 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6768 debug_assert!(false);
6769 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6773 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6775 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6776 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6778 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6779 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6787 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6788 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6789 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6791 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6793 debug_assert!(false);
6794 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6796 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6800 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6801 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6802 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6804 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6805 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6807 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6808 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6816 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6817 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6818 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6820 debug_assert!(false);
6821 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6825 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6827 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6828 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6829 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6830 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6831 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6832 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6833 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6837 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6838 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6846 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6847 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6848 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6849 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6850 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6851 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6852 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6853 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6854 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6855 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6856 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6858 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6859 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6861 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6862 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6863 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6865 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6866 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6869 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6870 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6872 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6873 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6874 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6876 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6877 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6878 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6879 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6880 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6883 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6884 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6887 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6888 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6889 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6890 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6891 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6892 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6893 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6894 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6895 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6896 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6899 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6900 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6901 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6906 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6907 // payments are being processed.
6908 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6909 push_forward_event = true;
6911 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6912 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6919 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6920 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6923 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6924 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6925 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6927 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6931 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6932 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6933 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6934 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6935 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6937 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6938 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6939 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6940 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6941 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6942 // real by taking more time.
6943 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6944 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6945 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6950 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6951 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6952 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6953 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6954 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6955 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6956 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6958 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6959 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6960 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6961 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6962 channel_funding_outpoint,
6963 counterparty_node_id,
6968 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6969 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6970 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6973 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6974 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6977 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6978 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6979 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6985 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6986 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6988 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6990 debug_assert!(false);
6991 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6992 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6994 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6995 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6996 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6997 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6998 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6999 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7000 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7001 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
7002 *counterparty_node_id)
7004 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7005 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7006 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7007 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7008 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7009 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7010 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7014 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7015 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7021 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7025 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7027 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7029 debug_assert!(false);
7030 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7034 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7036 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7037 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7038 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7040 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7041 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7049 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7050 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7051 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7053 debug_assert!(false);
7054 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7056 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7057 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7058 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7059 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7060 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7061 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7062 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7065 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7066 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7067 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7068 msg, &self.default_configuration
7069 ), chan_phase_entry),
7070 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7071 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7072 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7075 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7076 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7084 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7085 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7086 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7087 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7089 // It's not a local channel
7090 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7094 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7095 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7096 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7100 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7102 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7103 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7104 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7105 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7106 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7107 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7108 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7110 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7112 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7113 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7114 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7115 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7117 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7118 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7119 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7120 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7123 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7127 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7128 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7133 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7136 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7138 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7141 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7143 debug_assert!(false);
7144 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7145 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7149 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7151 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7152 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7154 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7155 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7156 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7157 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7158 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7159 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7160 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7161 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7162 let mut channel_update = None;
7163 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7164 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7165 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7168 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7169 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7170 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7171 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7172 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7173 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7174 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7179 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7180 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7181 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7182 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7183 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7184 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7188 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7189 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7193 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7195 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7196 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7197 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7198 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7199 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7200 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7202 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7203 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7204 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7205 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7206 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7207 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7208 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7209 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7210 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7211 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7212 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7213 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7214 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7215 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7216 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7217 next_funding_txid: None,
7220 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7221 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7222 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7228 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7229 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7230 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7231 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7234 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7235 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7240 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7241 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7242 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7244 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7245 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7246 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7247 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7248 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7249 match monitor_event {
7250 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7251 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7252 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7253 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7254 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7256 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7257 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7258 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7259 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7262 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7263 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7264 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7266 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7267 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7268 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7269 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7272 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7274 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7275 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7276 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7277 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7278 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7279 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7280 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7281 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7286 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7287 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7289 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7297 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7298 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7304 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7305 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7308 has_pending_monitor_events
7311 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7312 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7313 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7315 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7317 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7320 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7321 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7322 /// update was applied.
7323 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7324 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7325 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7327 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7328 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7329 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7330 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7332 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7333 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7335 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7336 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7337 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7338 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7340 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7341 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7342 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7343 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7344 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7345 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7347 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7348 has_monitor_update = true;
7350 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7351 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7352 continue 'peer_loop;
7361 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7362 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7363 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7369 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7370 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7372 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7373 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7375 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7376 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7377 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7380 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7381 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7383 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7384 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7385 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7386 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7391 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7392 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7397 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7398 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7401 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7402 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7403 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7409 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7414 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7415 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7416 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7417 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7418 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7419 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7423 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7424 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7425 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7426 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7427 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7433 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7434 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7435 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7436 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7437 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7438 let mut has_update = false;
7439 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7443 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7446 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7447 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7449 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7450 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7451 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7452 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7453 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7455 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7456 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7459 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7460 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7461 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7463 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7464 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7465 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7472 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7473 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7474 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7480 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7481 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7486 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7492 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7493 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7496 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7497 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7503 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7504 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7506 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7507 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7508 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7509 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7510 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7511 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7512 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7513 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7514 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7515 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7516 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7517 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7518 assert!(should_broadcast);
7519 } else { unreachable!(); }
7520 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7521 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7522 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7525 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7530 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7531 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7532 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7533 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7537 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7538 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7539 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7540 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7541 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7543 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7547 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7552 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7554 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7556 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7557 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7558 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7559 &$self, description: String
7560 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7561 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7562 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7563 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7564 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7566 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7567 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7568 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7570 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7577 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7579 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7581 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7582 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7583 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7588 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7589 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7592 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7594 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7595 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7599 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7600 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7602 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7603 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7604 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7607 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7608 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7609 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7611 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7612 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7616 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7617 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7618 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7619 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7620 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7622 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7626 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7627 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7632 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7633 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7634 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7636 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7638 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7639 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7640 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7641 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7642 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7643 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7644 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7645 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7646 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7647 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7648 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7649 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7651 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7652 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7653 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7655 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7656 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7659 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7660 self.pending_outbound_payments
7661 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7662 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7664 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7669 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7670 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7671 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7673 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7674 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7675 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7676 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7677 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7678 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7679 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7681 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7682 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7686 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7687 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7690 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7691 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7692 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7696 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7697 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7698 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7699 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7703 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7704 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7705 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7710 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7711 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7712 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7715 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7716 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7717 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7718 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7719 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7720 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7721 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7722 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7723 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7724 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7725 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7726 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7727 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7728 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7729 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7732 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7733 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7734 let builder = match quantity {
7736 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7738 let builder = match amount_msats {
7740 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7742 let builder = match payer_note {
7744 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7746 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7747 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7749 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7750 self.pending_outbound_payments
7751 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7752 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7754 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7756 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7757 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7758 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7759 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7760 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7763 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7765 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7766 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7767 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7768 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7769 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7770 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7771 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7772 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7773 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7775 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7782 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7785 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7786 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7787 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7791 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7792 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7793 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7794 /// received and no retries will be made.
7798 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7799 /// path for the invoice.
7801 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7802 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7803 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7804 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7805 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7807 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7808 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7810 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7811 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7812 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7813 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7815 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7816 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7817 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7819 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7820 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7821 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7823 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7824 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7825 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7827 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7828 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7829 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7831 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7832 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7833 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7834 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7835 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7838 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7840 for path in refund.paths() {
7841 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7842 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7843 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7844 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7846 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7852 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7856 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7859 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7860 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7862 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7863 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7864 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7865 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7867 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7869 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7870 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7874 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7875 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7877 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7879 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7880 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7882 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7883 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7884 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7885 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7886 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7887 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7888 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7889 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7890 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7891 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7892 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7895 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7896 /// stored external to LDK.
7898 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7899 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7900 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7902 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7903 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7906 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7907 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7908 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7909 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7911 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7912 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7913 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7914 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7915 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7917 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7918 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7919 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7920 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7921 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7923 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7924 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7926 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7927 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7931 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7932 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7934 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7936 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7937 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7939 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7940 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7941 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7942 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7943 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7944 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7945 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7948 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7949 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7951 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7952 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7953 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7956 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7958 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7959 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7960 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7961 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7962 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7964 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7966 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7967 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7968 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7971 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7972 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7975 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7976 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7977 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7978 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7979 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7980 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7981 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7983 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7984 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7985 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7986 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7987 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7989 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7991 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7994 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7995 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7999 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8000 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8002 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8003 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8004 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8005 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8007 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8008 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8009 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8010 Some(_) => continue,
8011 None => return scid_candidate
8016 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8018 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8019 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8021 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8022 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8023 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8027 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8028 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8029 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8031 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8032 /// times to get a unique scid.
8033 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8034 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8035 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8037 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8038 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8039 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8040 return scid_candidate
8044 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8045 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8046 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8047 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8050 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8051 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8053 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8054 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8056 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8057 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8058 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8067 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8068 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8069 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8070 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8071 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8075 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8076 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8077 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8078 events.push_back((event, None));
8082 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8083 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8084 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8088 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8089 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8093 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8094 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8097 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8098 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8099 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8100 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8101 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8102 let logger = WithContext::from(
8103 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8107 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8108 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8110 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8111 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8112 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8113 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8115 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8119 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8120 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8121 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8122 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8123 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8124 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8125 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8129 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8131 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8132 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8133 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8134 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8135 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8136 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8137 if further_update_exists {
8138 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8143 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8144 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8150 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8151 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8157 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8158 for action in actions {
8160 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8161 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8163 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8169 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8170 /// using the given event handler.
8172 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8173 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8177 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8181 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8183 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8185 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8186 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8187 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8188 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8192 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8193 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8194 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8195 /// is always placed next to each other.
8197 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8198 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8199 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8200 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8202 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8203 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8204 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8205 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8206 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8207 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8208 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8210 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8211 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8212 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8213 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8216 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8217 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8219 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8220 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8223 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8225 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8228 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8229 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8233 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8234 events.replace(pending_events);
8243 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8245 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8246 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8247 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8248 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8249 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8254 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8256 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8257 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8258 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8260 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8264 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8266 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8267 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8268 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8269 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8270 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8271 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8275 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8277 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8278 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8279 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8280 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8281 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8284 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8285 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8288 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8289 let _persistence_guard =
8290 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8291 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8292 let new_height = height - 1;
8294 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8295 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8296 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8297 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8298 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8299 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8302 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8306 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8308 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8309 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8310 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8311 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8312 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8313 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8317 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8318 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8319 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8320 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8322 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8323 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8325 let _persistence_guard =
8326 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8327 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8328 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8329 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8331 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8332 if height < last_best_block_height {
8333 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8334 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8338 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8339 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8340 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8341 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8343 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8344 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8346 let _persistence_guard =
8347 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8348 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8349 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8351 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8353 macro_rules! max_time {
8354 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8356 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8357 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8358 // having an explicit local time source.
8359 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8360 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8361 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8362 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8363 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8369 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8370 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8371 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8372 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8376 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8377 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8378 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8381 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8382 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8383 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8384 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8385 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8386 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8393 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8394 let _persistence_guard =
8395 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8396 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8397 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8398 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8399 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8400 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8401 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8402 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8407 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8409 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8410 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8411 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8412 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8413 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8414 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8418 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8419 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8421 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8422 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8423 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8424 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8425 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8427 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8428 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8430 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8431 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8434 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8435 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8437 // Retain unfunded channels.
8438 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8439 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8440 let res = f(channel);
8441 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8442 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8443 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8444 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8445 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8447 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8448 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8449 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8450 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8451 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8452 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8453 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8454 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8459 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8464 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8465 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8468 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8469 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8470 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8471 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8472 msg: announcement_sigs,
8474 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8475 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8478 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8479 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8480 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8485 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8486 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8487 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8488 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8489 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8490 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8491 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8492 // is always consistent.
8493 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8494 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8495 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8496 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8497 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8500 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8501 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8502 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8503 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8504 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8505 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8506 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8511 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8512 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8513 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8514 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8515 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8516 data: reason_message,
8529 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8530 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8531 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8532 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8533 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8534 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8535 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8536 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8537 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8538 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8540 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8541 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8542 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8546 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8549 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8550 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8551 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8552 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8553 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8554 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8555 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8556 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8557 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8558 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8559 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8562 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8563 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8564 _ => unreachable!(),
8566 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8567 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8568 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8569 let logger = WithContext::from(
8570 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8572 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8578 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8580 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8581 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8585 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8586 /// may have events that need processing.
8588 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8589 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8591 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8592 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8593 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8594 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8597 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8598 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8599 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8602 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8603 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8604 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8607 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8608 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8609 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8610 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8613 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8614 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8615 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8616 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8619 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8620 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8622 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8623 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8624 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8625 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8626 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8629 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8630 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8631 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8632 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8635 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8636 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8637 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8638 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8641 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8642 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8643 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8644 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8647 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8648 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8649 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8650 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8654 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8655 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8657 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8658 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8659 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8660 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8661 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8662 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8666 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8667 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8668 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8669 // change to the contents.
8670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8671 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8672 let persist = match &res {
8673 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8674 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8675 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8677 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8679 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8684 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8685 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8686 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8687 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8690 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8691 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8692 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8693 // change to the contents.
8694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8695 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8696 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8700 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8701 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8702 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8703 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8706 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8708 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8711 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8713 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8716 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8717 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8718 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8719 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8720 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8722 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8723 let persist = match &res {
8724 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8725 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8727 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8732 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8733 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8734 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8735 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8738 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8739 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8740 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8741 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8744 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8745 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8746 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8747 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8750 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8751 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8752 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8753 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8756 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8758 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8761 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8763 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8766 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8767 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8768 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8769 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8771 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8772 let persist = match &res {
8773 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8774 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8775 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8777 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8782 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8783 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8784 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8787 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8788 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8789 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8790 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8791 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8792 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8793 let persist = match &res {
8794 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8795 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8796 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8798 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8803 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8804 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8805 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8806 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8808 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8809 let persist = match &res {
8810 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8811 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8812 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8814 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8819 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8820 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8821 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8824 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8826 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8829 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8830 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8831 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8832 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8834 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8835 let persist = match &res {
8836 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8837 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8838 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8840 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8845 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8846 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8847 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8850 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8851 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8852 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8855 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8860 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8862 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8863 let persist = match &res {
8864 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8865 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8866 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8868 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8873 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8875 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8876 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8877 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8880 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8881 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8882 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8884 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8887 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8888 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8889 let context = match phase {
8890 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8891 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8892 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8893 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8898 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8899 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8902 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8906 // Clean up for removal.
8907 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8908 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8911 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8912 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8913 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8914 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8916 // V1 Channel Establishment
8917 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8918 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8919 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8921 // V2 Channel Establishment
8922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8924 // Common Channel Establishment
8925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8926 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8928 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8933 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8939 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8943 // Channel Operations
8944 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8947 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8948 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8949 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8951 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8952 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8953 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8954 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8957 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8959 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8962 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8963 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8964 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8965 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8968 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8970 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8972 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8973 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8977 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8978 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8979 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8980 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8984 let mut res = Ok(());
8986 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8987 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8988 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8989 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8990 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8991 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8992 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8995 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8996 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8998 if inbound_peer_limited {
9000 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9002 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9003 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9004 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9005 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9006 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9007 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9008 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9009 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9014 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9015 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9017 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9018 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9019 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9020 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9023 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9026 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9027 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9032 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9035 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9036 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9037 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9038 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9040 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9041 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9043 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9044 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9045 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9046 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9051 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9052 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9057 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9060 match &msg.data as &str {
9061 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9062 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9064 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9065 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9066 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9067 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9068 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9069 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9070 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9071 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9073 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9074 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9075 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9076 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9077 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9078 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9079 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9083 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9084 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9085 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9086 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9087 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9088 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9090 log_level: Level::Trace,
9100 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9101 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9103 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9104 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9107 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9108 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9109 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9110 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9112 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9113 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9114 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9118 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9119 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9120 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9121 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9122 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9123 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9124 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9125 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9126 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9127 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9135 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9136 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9140 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9141 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9144 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9145 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9148 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9149 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9152 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9153 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9154 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9155 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9158 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9159 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9160 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9161 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9164 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9165 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9166 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9167 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9170 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9171 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9172 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9173 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9176 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9177 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9178 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9179 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9182 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9183 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9184 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9185 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9188 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9189 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9190 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9191 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9194 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9195 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9196 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9197 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9200 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9201 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9202 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9203 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9207 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9208 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9219 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9220 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9221 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9224 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9225 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9228 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9229 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9231 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9232 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9234 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9235 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9239 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9240 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9241 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9243 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9245 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9246 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9250 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9251 amount_msats, payment_secret
9253 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9255 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9256 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9260 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9261 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9262 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9265 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9266 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9267 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9268 payment_paths, payment_hash
9270 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9271 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9272 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9274 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9275 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9276 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9279 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9280 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9281 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9282 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9283 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9285 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9286 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9288 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9289 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9290 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9291 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9293 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9294 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9298 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9299 Err(error) => Some(error),
9303 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9304 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9306 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9308 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9309 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9312 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9314 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9321 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9328 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9329 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9333 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9334 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9335 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9336 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9337 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9341 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9342 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9344 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9345 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9346 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9347 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9348 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9351 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9352 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9353 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9354 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9357 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9358 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9359 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9360 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9363 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9364 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9365 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9366 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9369 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9370 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9371 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9372 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9373 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9374 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9375 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9376 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9377 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9378 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9379 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9380 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9381 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9382 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9383 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9384 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9385 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9386 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9387 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9388 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9389 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9394 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9395 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9397 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9398 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9399 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9400 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9403 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9404 (2, node_id, required),
9405 (4, features, required),
9406 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9407 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9408 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9409 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9412 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9414 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9415 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9416 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9417 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9418 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9419 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9420 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9421 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9422 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9423 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9424 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9425 (7, self.config, option),
9426 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9427 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9428 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9429 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9430 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9431 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9432 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9433 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9434 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9435 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9436 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9437 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9438 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9439 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9440 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9441 (32, self.is_public, required),
9442 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9443 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9444 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9445 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9446 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9452 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9453 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9454 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9455 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9456 (2, channel_id, required),
9457 (3, channel_type, option),
9458 (4, counterparty, required),
9459 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9460 (6, funding_txo, option),
9461 (7, config, option),
9462 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9463 (9, confirmations, option),
9464 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9465 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9466 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9467 (16, balance_msat, required),
9468 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9469 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9470 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9471 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9472 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9473 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9474 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9475 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9476 (26, is_outbound, required),
9477 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9478 (30, is_usable, required),
9479 (32, is_public, required),
9480 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9481 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9482 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9483 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9484 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9487 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9488 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9489 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9490 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9491 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9495 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9497 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9498 outbound_scid_alias,
9502 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9503 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9505 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9506 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9507 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9508 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9509 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9510 confirmations_required,
9512 force_close_spend_delay,
9513 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9514 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9515 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9516 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9517 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9518 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9519 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9520 channel_shutdown_state,
9525 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9526 (2, channels, required_vec),
9527 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9528 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9531 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9532 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9533 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9536 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9538 (0, onion_packet, required),
9539 (1, blinded, option),
9540 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9543 (0, payment_data, required),
9544 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9545 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9546 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9547 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9548 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9550 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9551 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9552 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9553 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9554 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9555 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9559 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9560 (0, routing, required),
9561 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9562 (4, payment_hash, required),
9563 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9564 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9565 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9566 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9570 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9571 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9573 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9575 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9576 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9577 reason.write(writer)?;
9579 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9580 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9583 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9584 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9585 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9586 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9593 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9594 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9595 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9598 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9599 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9600 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9601 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9605 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9606 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9607 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9608 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9609 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9612 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9613 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9614 // messages contained in the variants.
9615 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9616 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9617 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9619 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9620 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9621 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9622 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9623 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9626 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9627 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9628 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9629 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9630 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9632 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9637 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9642 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9643 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9644 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9647 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9648 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9649 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9650 (2, outpoint, required),
9651 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9652 (4, htlc_id, required),
9653 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9654 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9657 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9658 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9659 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9660 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9661 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9663 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9664 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9665 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9666 (2, self.value, required),
9667 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9668 (4, payment_data, option),
9669 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9670 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9671 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9672 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9678 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9679 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9680 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9681 (0, prev_hop, required),
9682 (1, total_msat, option),
9683 (2, value_ser, required),
9684 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9685 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9686 (5, total_value_received, option),
9687 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9688 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9689 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9691 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9692 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9693 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9695 if payment_data.is_some() {
9696 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9698 if total_msat.is_none() {
9699 total_msat = Some(value);
9701 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9704 if total_msat.is_none() {
9705 if payment_data.is_none() {
9706 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9708 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9710 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9714 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9717 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9718 total_value_received,
9719 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9721 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9722 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9727 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9728 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9729 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9732 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9733 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9734 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9735 let mut payment_id = None;
9736 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9737 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9738 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9739 (0, session_priv, required),
9740 (1, payment_id, option),
9741 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9742 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9743 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9744 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9746 if payment_id.is_none() {
9747 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9749 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9751 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9752 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9753 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9755 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9756 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9757 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9758 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9762 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9763 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9764 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9766 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9769 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9770 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9775 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9776 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9778 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9780 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9781 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9782 (0, session_priv, required),
9783 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9784 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9785 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9786 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9787 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9788 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9791 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9793 field.write(writer)?;
9800 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9801 (0, forward_info, required),
9802 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9803 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9804 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9805 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9808 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9809 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9810 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9812 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9816 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9817 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9818 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9819 (0, htlc_id, required),
9820 (2, err_packet, required),
9823 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9824 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9825 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9826 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9827 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9828 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9829 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9830 (0, htlc_id, required),
9831 (1, failure_code, required),
9832 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9833 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9841 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9842 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9843 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9845 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9847 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9848 (0, htlc_id, required),
9849 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9850 (2, err_packet, required),
9851 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9853 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9854 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9855 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9857 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9861 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9862 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9866 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9871 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9872 (0, payment_secret, required),
9873 (2, expiry_time, required),
9874 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9875 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9876 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9879 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9881 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9882 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9883 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9884 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9885 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9886 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9890 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9891 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9893 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9895 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9897 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9898 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9899 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9902 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9905 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9906 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9909 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9910 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9913 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9914 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9918 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9920 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9923 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9924 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9925 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9928 channel.write(writer)?;
9934 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9935 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9936 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9937 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9938 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9939 for forward in pending_forwards {
9940 forward.write(writer)?;
9945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9947 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9948 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9949 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9951 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9952 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9953 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9954 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9955 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9956 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9957 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9958 htlc.write(writer)?;
9960 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9961 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9964 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9965 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9966 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9967 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9968 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9969 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9970 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9973 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9974 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9975 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9976 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9977 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9979 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9980 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9981 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9982 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9983 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9984 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9985 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9990 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9991 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9992 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9993 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9994 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9995 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9996 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9997 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9998 0u64.write(writer)?;
10000 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10001 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10002 event.write(writer)?;
10006 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10007 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10008 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10009 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10010 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10011 0u64.write(writer)?;
10013 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10014 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10015 // likely to be identical.
10016 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10017 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10019 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10020 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10021 hash.write(writer)?;
10022 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10025 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10026 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10027 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10028 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10029 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10032 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10033 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10035 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10036 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10037 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10038 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10041 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10042 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10043 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10044 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10048 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10049 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10050 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10052 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10053 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10054 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10060 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10061 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10062 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10063 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10066 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10067 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10068 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10069 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10070 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10073 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10074 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10075 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10076 if !updates.is_empty() {
10077 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10078 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10083 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10084 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10085 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10086 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10087 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10088 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10089 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10090 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10091 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10092 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10093 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10094 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10095 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10102 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10104 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10105 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10108 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10109 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10110 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10111 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10112 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10113 // check that the event is sane here.
10114 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10115 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10116 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10117 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10123 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10124 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10125 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10126 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10127 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10128 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10131 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10132 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10133 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10134 events.push_back((ev, action));
10135 } else if action.is_some() {
10136 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10143 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10144 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10145 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10146 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10147 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10148 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10151 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10153 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10155 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10156 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10157 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10158 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10159 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10160 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10161 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10162 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10163 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10164 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10165 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10166 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10167 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10169 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10170 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10172 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10173 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10175 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10176 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10177 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10178 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10179 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10180 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10182 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10183 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10185 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10186 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10187 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10188 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10189 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10190 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10194 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10195 pub entropy_source: ES,
10197 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10198 pub node_signer: NS,
10200 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10201 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10203 pub signer_provider: SP,
10205 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10207 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10208 pub fee_estimator: F,
10209 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10211 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10212 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10213 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10214 pub chain_monitor: M,
10216 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10217 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10218 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10219 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10220 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10221 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10223 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10225 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10226 /// deserialization.
10228 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10229 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10230 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10232 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10233 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10235 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10236 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10237 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10238 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10240 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10243 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10244 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10247 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10248 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10250 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10251 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10252 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10253 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10254 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10255 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10259 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10260 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10261 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10262 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10263 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10265 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10266 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10271 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10272 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10273 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10274 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10276 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10277 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10278 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10279 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10280 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10281 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10285 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10286 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10287 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10291 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10292 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10294 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10295 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10296 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10297 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10298 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10299 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10303 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10304 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10306 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10307 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10308 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10310 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10312 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10313 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10314 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10315 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10316 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10317 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10318 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10319 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10320 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10321 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10323 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10324 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10325 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10326 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10327 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10328 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10329 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10330 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10331 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10332 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10333 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10334 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10335 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10336 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10338 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10339 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10340 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10342 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10343 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10344 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10346 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10347 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10348 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10350 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10351 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10354 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10355 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10356 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10359 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10360 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10361 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10362 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10363 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10364 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10365 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10366 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10368 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10369 let mut found_htlc = false;
10370 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10371 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10374 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10375 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10376 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10377 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10378 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10379 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10380 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10382 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10383 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10384 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10388 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10389 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10390 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10391 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10392 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10394 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10395 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10397 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10399 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10400 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10403 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10404 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10405 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10409 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10410 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10411 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10412 // safely discard the channel.
10413 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10414 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10415 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10416 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10417 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10418 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10419 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10420 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10423 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10424 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10425 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10426 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10427 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10428 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10432 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10433 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10434 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10435 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10436 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10437 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10438 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10439 counterparty_node_id: None,
10440 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10442 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10446 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10447 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10448 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10449 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10450 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10451 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10452 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10453 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10454 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10456 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10459 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10460 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10461 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10462 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10463 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10464 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10465 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10466 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10468 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10471 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10474 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10475 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10476 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10477 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10478 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10479 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10480 is_connected: false,
10484 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10485 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10486 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10487 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10488 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10489 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10490 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10491 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10494 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10495 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10496 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10497 for _ in 0..event_count {
10498 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10499 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10504 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10505 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10506 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10508 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10509 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10510 // on-startup monitor updates.
10511 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10512 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10514 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10518 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10519 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10521 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10522 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10523 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10524 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10529 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10530 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10531 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10532 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10533 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10534 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10535 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10537 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10538 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10542 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10543 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10544 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10545 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10546 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10547 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10548 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10549 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10550 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10551 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10552 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10553 let mut events_override = None;
10554 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10555 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10556 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10557 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10558 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10559 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10560 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10561 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10562 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10563 (8, events_override, option),
10564 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10565 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10566 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10567 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10569 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10570 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10573 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10574 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10577 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10578 pending_events_read = events;
10581 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10582 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10585 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10586 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10587 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10588 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10589 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10590 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10592 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10594 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10595 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10596 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10599 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10600 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10601 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10602 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10603 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10605 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10606 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10607 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10609 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10610 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10611 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10612 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10613 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10615 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10616 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10617 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10618 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10619 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10620 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10621 pending_background_events.push(
10622 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10623 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10624 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10625 update: update.clone(),
10628 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10629 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10630 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10631 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10632 pending_background_events.push(
10633 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10634 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10635 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10638 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10639 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10640 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10642 max_in_flight_update_id
10646 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10647 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10648 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10649 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10650 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10651 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10653 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10655 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10656 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10657 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10658 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10659 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10660 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10661 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10662 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10663 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10666 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10667 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10668 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10669 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10670 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10671 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10672 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10673 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10674 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10675 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10676 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10679 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10680 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10681 debug_assert!(false);
10682 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10687 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10688 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10689 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10690 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10691 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10692 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10693 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10694 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10695 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10697 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10698 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10699 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10701 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10702 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10703 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10704 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10705 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10706 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10707 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10708 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10713 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10714 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10716 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10717 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10718 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10719 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10722 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10723 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10724 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10725 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10726 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10727 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10728 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10730 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10731 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10732 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10733 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10734 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10735 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10736 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10737 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10741 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10742 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10743 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10744 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10746 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10747 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10748 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10751 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10752 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10753 retry_strategy: None,
10754 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10755 payment_params: None,
10756 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10757 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10758 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10759 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10760 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10761 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10762 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10763 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10764 total_msat: path_amt,
10765 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10766 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10768 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10769 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10774 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10775 match htlc_source {
10776 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10777 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10778 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10779 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10781 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10782 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10783 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10784 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10785 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10786 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10787 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10788 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10789 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10790 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10791 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10796 !forwards.is_empty()
10798 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10799 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10800 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10801 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10802 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10803 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10804 intercepted_id != ev_id
10811 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10812 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10813 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10814 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10815 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10816 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10817 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10818 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10819 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10820 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10821 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10823 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10824 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10825 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10827 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10828 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10829 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10836 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10837 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10839 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10841 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10842 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10843 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10844 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10845 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10846 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10847 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10848 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10849 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10850 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10853 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10854 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10855 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10856 // channel still live case here.
10860 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10861 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10866 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10867 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10868 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10869 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10870 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10871 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10872 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10873 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10877 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10878 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10880 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10881 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10882 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10883 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10885 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10886 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10887 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10889 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10890 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10892 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10893 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10895 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10898 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10899 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10900 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10902 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10906 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10907 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10908 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10909 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10912 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10913 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10914 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10915 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10916 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10917 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10918 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10919 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10921 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10922 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10926 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10928 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10930 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10931 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10933 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10934 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10939 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10940 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10942 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10944 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10946 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10947 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10948 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10953 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10954 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10957 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10958 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10959 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10960 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10961 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10963 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10964 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10965 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10967 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10968 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10969 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10970 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10971 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10974 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10975 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10976 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10977 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10978 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10979 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10983 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10984 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10985 debug_assert!(false);
10986 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10991 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10993 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10994 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10995 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10996 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10997 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10998 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10999 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11000 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11001 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11002 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11003 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11005 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11006 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11008 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11009 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11010 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11011 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11013 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11014 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11015 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11016 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11018 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11019 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11020 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11021 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11023 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
11024 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11025 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11028 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11029 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11030 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11033 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11034 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11037 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11040 purpose: payment.purpose,
11041 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11042 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11043 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11049 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11050 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11051 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11052 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11053 for action in actions.iter() {
11054 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11055 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11056 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11058 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11060 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11061 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11062 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11063 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11064 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11066 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11067 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11068 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11069 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11073 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11074 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11078 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11080 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11081 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11085 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11087 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11088 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11089 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11090 router: args.router,
11092 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11094 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11095 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11096 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11097 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11099 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11100 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11101 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11102 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11103 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11104 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11106 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11108 our_network_pubkey,
11111 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11113 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11115 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11116 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11117 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11118 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11119 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11121 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11122 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11124 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11126 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11128 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11129 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11130 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11132 logger: args.logger,
11133 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11136 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11137 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11138 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11139 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11140 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11143 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11144 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11145 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11146 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11147 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11148 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11151 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11152 //connection or two.
11154 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11160 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11161 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11162 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11163 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11164 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11165 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11166 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11167 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11168 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11169 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11170 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11171 use crate::prelude::*;
11172 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11173 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11174 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11175 use crate::util::test_utils;
11176 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11177 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11180 fn test_notify_limits() {
11181 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11182 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11183 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11186 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11188 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11189 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11190 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11191 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11192 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11194 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11196 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11197 // to connect messages with new values
11198 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11199 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11200 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11201 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11202 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11203 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11205 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11206 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11207 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11208 // ... but the last node should not.
11209 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11210 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11211 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11212 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11214 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11215 // about the channel.
11216 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11217 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11218 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11220 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11222 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11223 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11224 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11225 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11226 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11227 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11229 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11230 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11231 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11233 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11234 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11235 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11236 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11237 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11238 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11240 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11241 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11242 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11243 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11244 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11245 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11246 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11247 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11249 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11250 // the channel info has updated.
11251 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11252 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11253 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11254 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11255 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11256 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11260 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11261 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11266 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11267 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11269 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11270 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11271 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11272 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11274 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11275 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11276 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11277 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11278 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11279 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11280 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11281 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11283 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11285 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11287 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11288 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11289 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11291 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11293 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11294 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11295 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11297 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11298 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11299 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11301 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11302 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11303 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11304 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11305 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11306 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11307 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11308 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11309 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11311 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11312 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11313 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11315 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11317 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11319 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11320 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11321 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11322 // lightning messages manually.
11323 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11324 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11327 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11328 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11329 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11330 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11332 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11333 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11335 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11336 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11338 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11339 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11340 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11342 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11343 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11344 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11346 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11348 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11350 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11351 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11354 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11355 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11356 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11359 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11360 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11361 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11362 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11367 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11368 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11369 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11370 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11377 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11378 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11379 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11382 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11383 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11384 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11385 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11386 // fails as expected.
11387 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11388 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11389 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11390 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11391 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11392 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11395 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11396 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11399 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11400 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11401 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11403 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11404 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11405 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11407 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11408 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11409 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11410 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11411 let route = find_route(
11412 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11413 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11415 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11416 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11418 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11419 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11420 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11421 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11424 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11425 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11426 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11427 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11428 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11430 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11431 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11432 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11433 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11434 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11435 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11436 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11437 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11438 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11440 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11441 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11443 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11444 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11445 let route = find_route(
11446 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11447 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11449 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11450 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11452 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11454 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11455 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11456 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11458 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11459 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11460 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11461 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11463 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11464 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11465 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11466 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11467 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11469 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11470 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11471 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11473 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11474 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11475 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11476 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11477 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11478 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11479 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11480 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11481 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11483 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11484 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11486 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11487 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11488 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11489 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11491 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11493 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11494 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11495 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11497 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11498 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11499 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11502 let route = find_route(
11503 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11504 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11506 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11507 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11508 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11510 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11512 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11513 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11516 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11517 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11518 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11520 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11521 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11522 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11523 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11524 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11525 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11526 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11527 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11528 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11530 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11531 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11535 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11536 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11537 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11543 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11544 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11546 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11547 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11548 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11549 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11550 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11551 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11552 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11553 let route = find_route(
11554 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11555 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11558 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11559 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11560 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11561 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11562 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11563 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11566 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11567 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11568 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11569 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11570 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11571 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11572 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11574 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11578 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11579 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11580 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11581 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11582 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11588 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11589 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11591 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11592 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11593 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11594 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11595 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11596 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11597 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11598 let route = find_route(
11599 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11600 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11603 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11604 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11605 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11606 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11607 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11608 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11609 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11610 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11613 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11614 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11615 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11616 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11617 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11618 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11619 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11621 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11625 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11629 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11631 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11632 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11633 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11634 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11636 // Marshall an MPP route.
11637 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11638 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11639 route.paths.push(path);
11640 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11641 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11642 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11643 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11644 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11645 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11647 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11648 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11650 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11651 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11653 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11658 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11662 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11664 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11666 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11667 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11669 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11670 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11672 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11675 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11676 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11677 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11678 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11679 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11680 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11683 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11686 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11687 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11692 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11693 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11697 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11699 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11700 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11702 total_msat: 100_000,
11705 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11706 // payment verification fails as expected.
11707 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11708 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11709 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11710 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11712 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11716 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11717 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11721 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11722 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11723 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11724 // the channel is successfully closed.
11725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11728 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11730 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11731 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11732 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11733 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11734 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11736 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11737 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11739 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11740 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11741 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11742 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11745 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11747 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11748 // as it has the funding transaction.
11749 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11750 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11751 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11754 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11756 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11758 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11760 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11761 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11762 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11764 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11767 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11768 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11769 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11770 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11771 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11774 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11775 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11777 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11778 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11779 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11780 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11782 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11783 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11784 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11785 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11787 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11788 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11790 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11791 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11792 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11793 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11794 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11795 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11796 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11800 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11801 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11802 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11803 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11804 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11805 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11806 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11809 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11811 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11812 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11813 // closing transaction).
11814 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11815 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11816 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11818 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11819 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11820 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11821 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11822 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11825 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11827 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11829 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11830 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11831 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11833 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11835 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11836 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11839 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11840 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11841 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11844 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11845 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11846 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11849 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11850 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11851 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11854 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11855 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11856 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11859 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11861 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11862 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11864 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11865 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11867 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11868 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11873 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11874 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11875 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11876 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11877 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11878 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11879 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11880 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11883 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11884 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11885 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11887 // Test the API functions.
11888 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11890 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11892 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11894 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11896 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11898 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11900 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11904 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11905 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11906 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11907 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11908 // the given `channel_id`.
11909 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11910 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11911 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11912 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11914 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11917 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11919 // Test the API functions.
11920 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11922 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11924 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11926 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11928 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11930 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11934 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11935 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11936 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11937 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11938 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11939 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11941 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11943 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11944 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11946 let mut funding_tx = None;
11947 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11948 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11949 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11952 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11953 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11954 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11955 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11956 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11958 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11960 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11962 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11964 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11966 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11968 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11971 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11972 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11973 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11974 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11975 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11977 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11978 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11980 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11981 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11982 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11983 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11984 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11985 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11986 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11989 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11990 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11991 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11992 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11993 }, true).unwrap_err();
11995 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11996 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11997 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11998 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11999 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12000 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12001 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12003 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12004 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12006 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12007 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12008 }, true).unwrap_err();
12010 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12011 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12012 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12013 }, false).unwrap();
12014 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12016 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12017 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12019 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12020 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12021 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12022 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12023 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12025 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12026 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12027 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12029 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12030 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12031 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12033 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12034 // "protected" and can connect again.
12035 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12036 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12037 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12039 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12041 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12043 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12044 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12048 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12049 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12050 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12051 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12052 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12053 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12055 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12057 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12058 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12060 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12062 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12063 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12066 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12068 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12069 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12070 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12072 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12073 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12074 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12076 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12077 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12078 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12079 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12083 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12084 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12085 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12088 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12089 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12090 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12091 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12093 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12095 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12096 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12098 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12099 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12100 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12101 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12102 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12103 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12106 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12107 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12109 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12110 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12114 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12115 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12118 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12119 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12120 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12121 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12122 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12124 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12125 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12127 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12128 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12129 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12130 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12136 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12137 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12139 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12141 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12143 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12144 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12148 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12152 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12153 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12154 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12155 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12156 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12157 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12158 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12159 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12160 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12161 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12162 payment_metadata: None,
12163 keysend_preimage: None,
12164 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12165 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12167 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12169 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12170 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12171 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12172 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12173 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12174 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12175 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12177 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12178 } else { panic!(); }
12180 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12181 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12182 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12183 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12184 payment_metadata: None,
12185 keysend_preimage: None,
12186 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12187 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12189 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12191 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12192 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12193 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12194 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12198 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12199 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12200 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12201 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12202 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12204 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12205 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12206 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12207 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12208 payment_metadata: None,
12209 keysend_preimage: None,
12210 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12211 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12213 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12214 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12215 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12217 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12218 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12219 // is not satisfied.
12220 assert!(result.is_ok());
12224 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12225 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12226 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12227 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12228 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12230 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12231 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12233 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12234 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12235 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12236 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12237 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12239 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12240 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12242 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12243 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12244 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12245 match &msg_events[0] {
12246 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12247 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12249 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12250 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12251 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12257 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12258 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12260 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12261 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12264 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12268 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12269 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12270 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12271 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12274 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12275 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12276 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12278 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12280 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12281 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12282 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12284 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12285 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12287 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12288 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12293 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12294 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12296 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12297 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12299 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12300 // not have generated any events.
12301 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12305 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12306 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12307 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12308 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12309 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12310 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12311 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12312 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12314 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12315 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12318 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12319 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12320 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12321 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12324 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12325 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12328 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12329 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12332 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12333 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12334 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12335 ..Default::default()
12337 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12338 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12339 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12341 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12342 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12345 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12346 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12347 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12348 ..Default::default()
12350 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12351 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12352 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12355 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12356 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12359 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12360 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12361 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12362 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12363 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12366 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12367 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12368 ..Default::default()
12370 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12373 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12374 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12375 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12376 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12380 fn test_payment_display() {
12381 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12382 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12383 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12384 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12385 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12386 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12390 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12391 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12392 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12393 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12394 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12397 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12398 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12399 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12400 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12401 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12402 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12403 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12404 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12406 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12407 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12408 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12411 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12412 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12414 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12415 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12417 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12418 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12419 }, false).unwrap();
12420 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12421 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12422 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12424 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12426 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12427 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12428 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12429 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12430 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12431 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12432 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12433 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12434 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12435 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12436 } else { panic!() };
12437 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12438 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12439 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12440 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12442 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12444 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12445 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12446 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12451 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12452 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12453 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12454 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12457 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12458 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12459 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12461 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12462 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12464 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12465 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12468 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12469 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12470 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12472 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12476 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12477 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12478 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12480 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12485 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12486 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12487 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12488 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12490 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12491 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12492 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12494 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12496 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12497 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12498 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12499 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12501 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12502 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12504 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12510 use crate::chain::Listen;
12511 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12512 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12513 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12514 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12515 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12516 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12517 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12518 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12519 use crate::util::test_utils;
12520 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12522 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12523 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12524 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12525 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12527 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12529 use criterion::Criterion;
12531 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12532 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12533 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12534 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12535 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12536 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12537 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12539 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12540 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12542 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12543 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12545 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12547 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12550 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12551 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12554 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12555 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12556 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12558 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12559 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12561 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12562 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12563 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12564 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12565 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12567 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12568 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12569 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12571 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12572 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12573 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12574 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12576 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12577 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12578 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12580 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12581 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12582 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12583 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12584 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12586 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12587 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12588 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12590 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12591 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12593 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12594 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12595 }, false).unwrap();
12596 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12597 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12598 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12601 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12602 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12603 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12605 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12606 } else { panic!(); }
12608 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12609 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12610 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12611 match events_b[0] {
12612 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12613 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12618 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12619 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12620 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12621 match events_a[0] {
12622 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12623 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12628 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12630 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12631 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12632 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12634 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12635 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12636 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12637 match msg_events[0] {
12638 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12639 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12640 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12644 match msg_events[1] {
12645 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12649 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12650 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12651 match events_a[0] {
12652 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12653 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12658 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12659 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12660 match events_b[0] {
12661 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12662 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12667 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12668 macro_rules! send_payment {
12669 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12670 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12671 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12672 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12673 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12674 payment_count += 1;
12675 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12676 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12678 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12679 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12680 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12681 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12682 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12683 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12684 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12685 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12686 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12687 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12688 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12691 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12692 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12693 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12695 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12696 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12697 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12698 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12699 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12701 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12704 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12705 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12706 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12707 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12709 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12713 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12714 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12715 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);