1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
68 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
69 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
70 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
71 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
72 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
73 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
74 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
75 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
78 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
79 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
80 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
81 crate::sign::KeysManager,
84 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
87 use crate::prelude::*;
89 use core::cell::RefCell;
91 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
92 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
93 use core::time::Duration;
96 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
97 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
98 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
100 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
102 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
103 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
104 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
106 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
107 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
108 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
109 // before we forward it.
111 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
112 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
113 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
114 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
115 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
117 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
120 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
121 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
123 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
124 /// do with the HTLC.
125 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
126 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
128 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
129 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
130 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
131 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
132 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
133 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
135 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
137 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
138 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
140 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
141 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
142 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
143 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
144 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
146 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
147 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
148 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
149 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
150 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
152 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
153 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
154 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
155 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
157 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
158 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
160 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
161 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
162 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
163 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
164 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
165 requires_blinded_error: bool,
167 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
168 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
169 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
171 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
172 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
174 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
175 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
176 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
178 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
179 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
180 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
182 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
183 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
184 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
185 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
187 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
188 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
189 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
193 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
197 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
198 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
199 pub struct BlindedForward {
200 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
201 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
202 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
203 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
204 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
207 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
208 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
209 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
210 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
212 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
213 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
219 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
221 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
222 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
223 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
224 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
225 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
226 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
228 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
229 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
230 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
231 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
234 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
236 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
237 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
238 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
240 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
241 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
242 /// it along another path).
244 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
245 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
246 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
247 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
248 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
249 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
250 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
251 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
252 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
254 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
257 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
259 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
261 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
264 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
265 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
266 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
267 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
270 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
271 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
272 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
273 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
274 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
277 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
278 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
279 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
281 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
282 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
283 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
286 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
287 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
289 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
290 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
293 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
294 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
295 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
298 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
303 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
307 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
309 enum BlindedFailure {
310 FromIntroductionNode,
314 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
315 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
316 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
317 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
318 short_channel_id: u64,
319 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
321 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
322 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
323 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
325 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
326 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
331 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
333 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
334 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
335 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
337 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
338 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
341 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
342 struct ClaimableHTLC {
343 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
345 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
347 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
348 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
349 sender_intended_value: u64,
350 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
352 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
353 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
354 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
355 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
357 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
358 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
361 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
362 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
363 events::ClaimedHTLC {
364 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
365 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
366 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
367 value_msat: val.value,
368 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
373 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
374 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
376 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
377 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
378 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
381 /// Number of bytes in the id.
382 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
385 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
386 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
391 impl Readable for PaymentId {
392 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
393 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
398 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
399 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
400 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
404 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
406 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
407 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
408 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
410 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
411 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
416 impl Readable for InterceptId {
417 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
418 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
423 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
424 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
425 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
426 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
427 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
430 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
432 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
433 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
434 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
436 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
437 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
441 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
442 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
443 (0, short_channel_id, required),
444 (2, htlc_id, required),
446 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
447 (0, session_priv, required),
452 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
453 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
454 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
455 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
456 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
459 session_priv: SecretKey,
460 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
461 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
462 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
463 payment_id: PaymentId,
466 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
467 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
468 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
470 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
472 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
474 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
477 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
478 payment_id.hash(hasher);
479 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
485 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
487 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
488 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
489 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
490 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
491 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
492 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
496 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
497 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
498 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
499 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
500 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
501 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
503 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
509 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
510 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
512 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
513 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
514 pub enum FailureCode {
515 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
516 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
517 TemporaryNodeFailure,
518 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
519 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
520 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
521 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
522 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
523 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
524 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
525 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
526 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
527 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
529 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
530 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
531 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
534 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
535 fn into(self) -> u16 {
537 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
538 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
539 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
540 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
545 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
546 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
547 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
548 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
549 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
551 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
552 err: msgs::LightningError,
553 closes_channel: bool,
554 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
556 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
558 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
560 err: LightningError {
562 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
563 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
569 closes_channel: false,
570 shutdown_finish: None,
574 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
575 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
578 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
579 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
580 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
581 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
582 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
583 // commitment upon reconnecting.
584 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
586 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
589 err: LightningError { err, action },
590 closes_channel: true,
591 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
595 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
598 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
601 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
605 log_level: Level::Warn,
608 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
610 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
612 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
614 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
615 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
622 closes_channel: false,
623 shutdown_finish: None,
627 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
632 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
633 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
634 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
635 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
636 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
638 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
639 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
640 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
641 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
642 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
643 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
644 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
646 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
650 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
651 struct ClaimingPayment {
653 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
654 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
655 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
656 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
658 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
659 (0, amount_msat, required),
660 (2, payment_purpose, required),
661 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
662 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
663 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
666 struct ClaimablePayment {
667 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
668 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
669 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
672 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
673 struct ClaimablePayments {
674 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
675 /// failed/claimed by the user.
677 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
678 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
680 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
681 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
682 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
684 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
685 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
686 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
687 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
690 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
691 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
692 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
693 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
695 enum BackgroundEvent {
696 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
697 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
698 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
699 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
701 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
702 /// are regenerated on startup.
703 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
704 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
705 /// channel to continue normal operation.
707 /// In general this should be used rather than
708 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
709 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
710 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
712 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
713 /// are regenerated on startup.
714 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
715 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
716 funding_txo: OutPoint,
717 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
719 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
720 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
722 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
723 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
724 channel_id: ChannelId,
729 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
730 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
731 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
732 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
733 /// event can be generated.
734 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
735 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
736 /// operation of another channel.
738 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
739 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
740 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
741 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
743 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
744 event: events::Event,
745 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
747 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
748 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
749 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
751 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
752 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
753 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
754 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
755 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
757 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
758 /// stored for later processing.
759 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
760 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
761 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
762 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
766 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
767 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
768 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
769 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
770 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
771 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
772 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
773 (4, blocking_action, required),
775 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
776 (0, event, upgradable_required),
777 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
778 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
779 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
780 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
781 // downgrades to prior versions.
782 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
786 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
787 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
788 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
789 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
790 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
793 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
794 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
795 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
796 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
800 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
801 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
802 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
803 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
804 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
805 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
807 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
808 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
809 channel_id: ChannelId,
810 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
815 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
816 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
817 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
818 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
819 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
824 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
825 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
829 /// State we hold per-peer.
830 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
831 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
833 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
834 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
835 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
837 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
838 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
839 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
840 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
841 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
842 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
843 latest_features: InitFeatures,
844 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
845 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
846 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
847 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
848 /// user but which have not yet completed.
850 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
851 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
852 /// for a missing channel.
853 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
854 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
855 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
857 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
858 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
859 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
860 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
862 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
863 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
864 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
865 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
866 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
867 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
868 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
869 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
870 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
871 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
872 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
873 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
874 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
875 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
876 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
880 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
881 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
882 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
883 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
884 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
885 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
888 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
889 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
890 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
893 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
894 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
895 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
898 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
899 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
900 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
901 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
905 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
906 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
907 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
908 /// The original OpenChannel message.
909 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
910 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
911 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
914 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
915 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
916 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
918 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
919 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
921 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
924 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
925 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
926 struct PendingInboundPayment {
927 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
928 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
929 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
930 /// this payment being removed.
932 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
933 user_payment_id: u64,
934 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
935 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
936 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
939 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
940 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
941 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
942 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
943 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
944 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
945 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
946 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
948 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
949 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
950 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
958 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
960 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
961 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
962 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
967 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
968 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
969 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
970 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
971 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
972 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
973 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
974 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
975 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
977 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
978 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
979 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
988 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
990 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
991 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
992 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
997 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
999 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1001 pub trait AChannelManager {
1002 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1003 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1004 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1005 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1006 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1007 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1008 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1009 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1010 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1011 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1012 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1013 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1014 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1015 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1016 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1017 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1018 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1019 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1020 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1021 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1022 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1023 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1024 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1025 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1026 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1027 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1028 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1029 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1030 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1031 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1032 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1033 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1034 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1035 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1036 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1037 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1040 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1041 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1043 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1044 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1045 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1046 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1047 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1048 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1052 type Watch = M::Target;
1054 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1056 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1058 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1060 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1061 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1063 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1065 type Router = R::Target;
1067 type Logger = L::Target;
1069 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1072 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1073 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1075 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1076 /// to individual Channels.
1078 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1079 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1080 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1081 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1083 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1084 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1085 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1086 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1087 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1088 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1089 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1090 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1091 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1093 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1094 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1095 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1097 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1098 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1099 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1100 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1101 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1103 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1104 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1105 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1106 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1108 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1109 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1110 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1112 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1113 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1114 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1115 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1116 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1118 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1119 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1120 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1121 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1122 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1123 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1124 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1125 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1128 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1129 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1130 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1131 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1132 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1136 // `pending_offers_messages`
1138 // `total_consistency_lock`
1140 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1142 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1144 // |__`per_peer_state`
1146 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1148 // |__`claimable_payments`
1150 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1154 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1156 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1158 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1162 // |__`pending_events`
1164 // |__`pending_background_events`
1166 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1168 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1169 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1170 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1171 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1172 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1173 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1177 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1178 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1179 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1185 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1187 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1189 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1190 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1192 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1193 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1194 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1195 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1197 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1198 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1200 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1201 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1202 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1203 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1204 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1205 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1206 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1207 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1209 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1211 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1212 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1214 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1216 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1217 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1218 /// and via the classic SCID.
1220 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1221 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1223 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1225 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1227 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1228 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1229 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1231 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1232 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1234 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1235 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1237 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1238 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1240 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1241 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1242 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1243 /// active channel list on load.
1245 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1246 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1248 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1250 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1251 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1252 /// the handling of the events.
1254 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1255 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1258 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1259 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1260 /// would break backwards compatability.
1261 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1262 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1263 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1265 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1269 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1271 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1273 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1274 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1275 /// confirmation depth.
1277 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1278 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1279 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1281 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1283 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1285 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1287 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1289 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1291 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1292 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1293 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1295 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1296 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1298 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1299 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1300 /// keeping additional state.
1301 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1303 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1304 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1305 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1306 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1308 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1309 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1311 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1312 /// are currently open with that peer.
1314 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1315 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1318 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1320 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1322 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1323 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1324 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1326 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1327 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1328 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1329 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1330 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1332 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1333 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1336 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1337 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1338 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1339 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1341 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1342 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1344 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1345 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1346 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1347 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1348 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1350 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1352 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1354 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1355 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1356 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1357 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1358 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1359 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1360 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1361 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1362 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1363 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1364 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1366 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1367 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1368 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1370 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1372 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1373 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1375 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1379 signer_provider: SP,
1384 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1386 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1387 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1388 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1389 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1390 pub struct ChainParameters {
1391 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1392 pub network: Network,
1394 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1396 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1397 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1400 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1404 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1405 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1408 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1409 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1410 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1411 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1412 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1413 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1415 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1416 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1417 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1418 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1419 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1420 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1422 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1423 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1426 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1427 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1428 /// events to handle.
1430 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1431 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1433 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1434 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1437 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1438 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1439 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1440 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1442 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1443 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1444 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1445 should_persist: move || {
1446 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1447 // processing and return that.
1448 let notify = persist_check();
1449 match (notify, force_notify) {
1450 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1451 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1452 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1453 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1454 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1457 _read_guard: read_guard,
1461 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1462 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1463 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1464 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1465 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1466 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1468 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1469 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1470 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1471 should_persist: persist_check,
1472 _read_guard: read_guard,
1477 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1478 fn drop(&mut self) {
1479 match (self.should_persist)() {
1480 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1481 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1482 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1484 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1485 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1486 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1491 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1492 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1494 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1496 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1497 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1498 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1499 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1500 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1502 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1503 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1505 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1507 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1508 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1509 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1510 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1511 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1512 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1513 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1514 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1515 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1516 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1517 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1518 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1519 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1521 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1522 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1524 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1525 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1526 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1527 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1529 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1530 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1531 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1532 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1533 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1534 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1536 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1538 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1539 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1541 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1543 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1544 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1546 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1547 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1548 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1550 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1551 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1552 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1554 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1555 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1556 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1557 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1559 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1560 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1561 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1563 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1564 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1565 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1567 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1568 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1569 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1570 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1571 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1572 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1573 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1574 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1575 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1576 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1577 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1580 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1581 /// to better separate parameters.
1582 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1583 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1584 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1585 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1586 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1587 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1588 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1589 pub features: InitFeatures,
1590 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1591 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1592 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1594 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1596 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1597 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1598 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1599 /// payments to us through this channel.
1600 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1601 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1602 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1603 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1604 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1605 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1606 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1609 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1610 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1611 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1612 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1613 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1614 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1615 /// lifetime of the channel.
1616 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1617 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1618 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1619 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1620 /// our counterparty already.
1622 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1623 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1624 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1625 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1627 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1628 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1629 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1630 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1632 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1633 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1635 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1636 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1638 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1639 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1640 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1641 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1642 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1643 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1644 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1645 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1646 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1649 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1651 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1652 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1653 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1654 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1655 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1656 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1657 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1659 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1660 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1662 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1663 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1664 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1665 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1666 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1667 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1668 /// this value on chain.
1670 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1672 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1674 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1675 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1676 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1677 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1678 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1679 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1680 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1682 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1683 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1684 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1685 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1686 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1687 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1689 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1690 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1691 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1692 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1693 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1695 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1696 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1697 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1698 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1700 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1701 pub balance_msat: u64,
1702 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1703 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1704 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1705 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1707 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1709 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1710 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1711 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1712 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1713 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1714 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1715 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1716 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1718 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1719 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1720 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1721 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1722 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1723 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1724 /// route which is valid.
1725 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1726 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1727 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1728 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1729 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1730 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1732 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1733 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1734 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1735 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1736 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1737 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1738 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1739 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1740 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1742 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1744 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1747 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1748 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1750 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1751 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1752 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1753 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1754 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1755 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1756 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1758 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1759 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1760 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1761 pub is_outbound: bool,
1762 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1763 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1764 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1765 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1766 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1768 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1769 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1770 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1771 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1772 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1773 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1774 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1776 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1777 pub is_usable: bool,
1778 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1779 pub is_public: bool,
1780 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1781 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1782 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1783 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1784 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1785 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1787 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1788 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1791 impl ChannelDetails {
1792 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1793 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1794 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1796 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1797 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1798 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1799 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1802 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1803 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1804 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1806 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1807 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1808 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1809 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1812 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1813 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1814 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1817 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1818 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1820 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1821 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1822 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1824 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1825 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1826 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1827 features: latest_features,
1828 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1829 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1830 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1831 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1832 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1833 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1834 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1835 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1836 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1837 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1839 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1840 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1841 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1842 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1843 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1844 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1845 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1846 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1847 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1848 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1849 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1850 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1851 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1852 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1853 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1854 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1855 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1856 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1857 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1858 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1859 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1860 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1861 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1862 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1863 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1864 config: Some(context.config()),
1865 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1870 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1871 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1872 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1873 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1874 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1875 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1876 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1877 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1878 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1880 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1882 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1883 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1885 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1886 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1887 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1888 /// to drop the channel.
1892 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1893 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1894 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1895 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1896 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1898 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1899 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1900 payment_id: PaymentId,
1902 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1904 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1905 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1906 payment_id: PaymentId,
1907 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1909 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1910 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1911 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1914 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1915 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1916 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1918 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1919 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1920 payment_id: PaymentId,
1921 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1922 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1923 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1925 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1926 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1927 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1929 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1930 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1931 payment_id: PaymentId,
1932 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1933 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1937 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1939 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1941 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1942 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1943 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1944 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1946 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1947 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1948 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1951 macro_rules! handle_error {
1952 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1953 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1954 // entering the macro.
1955 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1956 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1960 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1961 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1963 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1964 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1965 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1966 let logger = WithContext::from(
1967 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1969 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1971 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1972 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1973 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1978 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1981 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1983 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1984 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1985 action: err.action.clone()
1989 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1990 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1991 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1992 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1993 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1997 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2004 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2005 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2006 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2007 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2009 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2010 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2011 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2013 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2014 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2015 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2016 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2017 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2019 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2020 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2022 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2026 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2027 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2028 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2030 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2031 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2033 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2034 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2036 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2037 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2038 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2039 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2040 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2041 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2043 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2048 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2049 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2051 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2052 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2054 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2055 match $channel_phase {
2056 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2057 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2059 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2060 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2062 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2063 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2069 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2070 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2074 let key = *$entry.key();
2075 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2077 $entry.remove_entry();
2085 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2086 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2090 let key = *$entry.key();
2091 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2093 $entry.remove_entry();
2101 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2102 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2104 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2105 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2111 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2112 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2113 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2114 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2115 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2117 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2118 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2119 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2120 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2121 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2122 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2123 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2124 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2125 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2126 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2131 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2132 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2133 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2134 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2135 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2136 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2137 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2138 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2139 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2141 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2146 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2147 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2148 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2149 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2150 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2151 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2152 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2153 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2154 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2156 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2161 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2162 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2163 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2164 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2165 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2166 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2167 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2168 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2169 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2170 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2171 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2172 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2174 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2175 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2176 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2182 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2183 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2185 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2186 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2187 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2188 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2189 updates.announcement_sigs);
2190 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2191 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2194 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2195 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2196 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2197 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2199 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2200 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2201 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2202 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2203 let mut batch_completed = false;
2204 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2205 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2206 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2207 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2209 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2210 channel_state.2 = true;
2212 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2214 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2216 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2219 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2220 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2221 if batch_completed {
2222 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2223 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2224 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2225 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2226 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2227 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2228 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2229 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2230 chan.set_batch_ready();
2231 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2232 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2236 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2237 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2238 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2243 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2245 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2246 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2248 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2249 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2250 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2251 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2256 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2257 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2258 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2259 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2261 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2262 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2263 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2264 panic!("{}", err_str);
2266 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2267 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2268 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2271 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2277 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2278 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2279 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2281 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2282 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2283 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2284 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2285 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2286 // filter for uniqueness here.
2287 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2288 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2289 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2290 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2292 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2293 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2295 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2296 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2297 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2303 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2304 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2305 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2306 while !processed_all_events {
2307 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2314 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2315 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2316 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2318 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2319 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2320 result = $self.process_background_events();
2322 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2323 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2324 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2325 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2329 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2330 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2331 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2332 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2335 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2337 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2338 $event_to_handle = event;
2340 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2341 post_event_actions.push(action);
2346 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2347 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2348 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2349 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2350 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2351 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2354 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2355 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2356 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2357 processed_all_events = false;
2361 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2362 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2363 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2365 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2366 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2367 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2373 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2375 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2376 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2377 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2378 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2379 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2380 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2384 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2386 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2388 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2389 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2391 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2393 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2394 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2395 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2398 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2399 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2400 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2402 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2403 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2404 current_timestamp: u32,
2406 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2407 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2408 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2409 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2411 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2412 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2413 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2418 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2420 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2421 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2422 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2423 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2424 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2425 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2426 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2427 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2429 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2432 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2433 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2435 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2437 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2439 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2441 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2442 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2443 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2444 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2445 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2446 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2447 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2448 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2450 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2460 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2461 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2462 &self.default_configuration
2465 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2466 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2467 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2470 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2471 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2473 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2475 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2479 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2484 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2486 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2487 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2488 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2489 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2490 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2492 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2493 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2495 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2496 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2497 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2499 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2500 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2501 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2503 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2504 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2506 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2507 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2508 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2509 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2510 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2511 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2513 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2514 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2515 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2516 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2517 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2518 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2522 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2523 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2527 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2528 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2530 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2532 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2533 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2534 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2539 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2540 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2541 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2542 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2543 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2544 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2548 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2553 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2555 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2556 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2559 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2561 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2568 node_id: their_network_key,
2571 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2574 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2575 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2576 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2577 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2578 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2579 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2580 // the same channel.
2581 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2583 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2585 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2586 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2587 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2588 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2589 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2590 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2591 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2595 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2596 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2597 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2605 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2606 /// more information.
2607 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2608 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2609 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2610 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2611 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2612 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2613 // the same channel.
2614 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2616 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2617 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2618 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2619 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2620 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2621 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2622 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2623 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2631 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2632 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2634 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2635 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2637 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2638 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2639 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2640 // really wanted anyway.
2641 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2644 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2645 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2646 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2649 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2652 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2653 let context_to_details = |context| {
2654 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2656 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2658 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2659 .map(context_to_details)
2665 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2666 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2668 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2669 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2670 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2672 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2673 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2674 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2675 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2676 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2677 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2679 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2680 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2681 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2683 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2684 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2685 payment_id: *payment_id,
2686 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2687 total_msat: *total_msat,
2690 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2691 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2693 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2694 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2696 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2701 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2702 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2704 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2705 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2708 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2710 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2711 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2716 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2718 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2719 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2720 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2721 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2722 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2723 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2725 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2726 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2727 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2728 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2729 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2733 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2734 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2736 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2737 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2738 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2739 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2742 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2743 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2747 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2749 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2750 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2757 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2758 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2759 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2760 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2763 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2764 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2770 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2771 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2772 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2774 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2775 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2777 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2778 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2779 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2780 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2782 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2784 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2785 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2786 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2789 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2790 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2791 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2792 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2793 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2794 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2797 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2798 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2799 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2801 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2802 /// the channel being closed or not:
2803 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2804 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2805 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2806 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2807 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2808 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2809 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2811 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2812 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2813 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2814 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2816 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2818 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2819 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2820 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2823 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2824 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2825 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2826 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2827 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2830 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2831 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2832 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2833 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2834 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2837 let logger = WithContext::from(
2838 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2841 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2842 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2843 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2844 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2845 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2846 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2847 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2849 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2850 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2851 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2852 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2853 // ignore the result here.
2854 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2856 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2857 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2858 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2859 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2861 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2862 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2863 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2864 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2865 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2866 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2867 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2870 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2873 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2874 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2879 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2880 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2881 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2882 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2883 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2884 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2885 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2888 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2889 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2890 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2894 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2895 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2899 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2900 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2901 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2902 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2905 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2906 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2907 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2908 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2909 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2911 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2913 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2914 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2915 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2916 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2917 mem::drop(peer_state);
2918 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2920 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2921 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2922 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2925 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2926 // Unfunded channel has no update
2927 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2930 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2931 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2932 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2933 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2935 (None, *peer_node_id)
2937 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2940 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2941 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2942 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2944 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2945 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2946 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2947 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2948 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2954 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2957 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2959 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2960 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2962 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2963 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2964 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2965 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2966 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2967 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2968 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2979 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2980 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2981 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2983 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2984 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2985 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2988 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2989 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2990 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2992 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2993 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2994 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2995 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2996 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2999 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3000 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3001 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3002 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3003 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3007 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3008 /// local transaction(s).
3009 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3010 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3011 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3015 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3016 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3018 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3020 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3021 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3024 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3025 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3026 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3027 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3032 macro_rules! return_err {
3033 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3036 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3037 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3039 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3040 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3041 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3042 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3043 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3044 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3045 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3049 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3050 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3051 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3052 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3053 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3054 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3055 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3056 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3062 let NextPacketDetails {
3063 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3064 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3065 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3066 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3067 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3070 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3071 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3072 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3073 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3074 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3075 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3076 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3077 // phantom or an intercept.
3078 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3079 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3080 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3084 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3087 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3089 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3090 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3091 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3092 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3093 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3097 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3098 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3101 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3102 // have no consistency guarantees.
3103 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3107 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3108 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3109 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3110 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3111 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3114 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3115 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3116 // we don't have the channel here.
3117 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3119 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3121 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3122 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3123 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3124 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3125 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3126 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3127 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3128 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3129 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3130 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3131 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3133 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3136 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3137 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3139 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3140 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3147 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3149 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3150 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3152 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3153 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3154 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3155 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3156 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3158 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3159 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3165 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3166 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3167 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3168 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3170 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3171 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3173 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3174 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3175 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3177 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3178 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3179 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3180 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3181 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3182 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3183 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3187 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3189 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3192 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3193 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3194 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3195 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3196 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3197 macro_rules! return_err {
3198 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3200 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3201 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3202 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3203 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3204 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3205 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3206 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3207 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3208 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3212 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3213 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3214 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3215 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3216 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3222 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3224 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3225 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3226 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3227 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3230 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3231 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3232 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3233 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3234 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3236 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3239 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3240 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3241 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3242 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3243 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3249 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3250 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3251 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3253 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3254 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3255 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3257 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3258 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3259 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3260 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3261 return Err(LightningError {
3262 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3263 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3266 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3267 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3269 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3270 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3271 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3274 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3275 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3276 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3277 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3279 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3280 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3281 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3283 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3284 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3285 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3286 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3287 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3288 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3289 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3293 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3296 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3297 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3298 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3299 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3301 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3302 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3303 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3304 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3305 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3308 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3309 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3311 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3312 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3313 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3314 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3315 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3316 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3317 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3318 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3320 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3321 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3322 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3324 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3326 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3333 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3334 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3335 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3336 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3341 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3342 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3343 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3346 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3347 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3348 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3349 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3351 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3352 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3353 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3355 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3356 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3360 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3361 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3363 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3364 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3365 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3367 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3370 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3372 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3373 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3376 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3377 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3380 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3381 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3382 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3383 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3384 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3386 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3387 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3388 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3389 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3391 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3392 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3394 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3395 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3396 Some(monitor_update) => {
3397 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3399 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3400 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3401 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3402 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3403 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3404 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3405 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3413 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3416 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3417 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3418 // `channel_by_id` map.
3419 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3420 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3424 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3425 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3427 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3432 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3434 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3435 /// fields for more info.
3437 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3438 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3440 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3442 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3443 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3444 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3445 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3446 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3448 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3449 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3450 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3451 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3452 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3454 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3455 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3456 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3457 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3459 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3461 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3462 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3463 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3465 /// In general, a path may raise:
3466 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3467 /// node public key) is specified.
3468 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3469 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3470 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3471 /// relevant updates.
3473 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3474 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3475 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3477 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3478 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3479 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3480 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3481 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3482 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3483 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3484 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3486 self.pending_outbound_payments
3487 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3488 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3489 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3492 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3493 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3494 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3495 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3496 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3497 self.pending_outbound_payments
3498 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3499 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3500 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3501 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3505 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3506 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3508 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3509 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3510 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3514 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3515 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3516 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3520 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3521 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3524 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3525 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3527 self.pending_outbound_payments
3528 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3529 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3530 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3531 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3532 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3536 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3537 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3538 /// retries are exhausted.
3540 /// # Event Generation
3542 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3543 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3545 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3546 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3547 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3549 /// # Requested Invoices
3551 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3552 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3553 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3554 /// once the invoice has been received.
3556 /// # Restart Behavior
3558 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3559 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3560 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3562 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3563 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3565 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3568 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3569 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3570 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3571 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3572 /// never reach the recipient.
3574 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3575 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3577 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3578 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3580 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3581 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3582 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3584 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3585 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3586 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3589 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3590 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3592 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3595 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3596 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3597 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3599 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3600 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3601 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3602 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3605 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3606 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3607 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3608 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3609 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3611 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3612 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3613 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3616 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3619 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3620 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3623 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3624 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3626 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3627 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3628 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3629 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3630 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3631 let payment_params =
3632 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3634 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3636 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3639 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3640 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3642 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3643 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3644 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3645 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3647 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3648 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3649 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3650 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3651 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3652 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3653 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3654 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3655 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3656 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3658 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3659 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3660 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3661 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3665 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3667 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3668 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3671 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3673 let mut res = Vec::new();
3675 for mut path in route.paths {
3676 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3677 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3678 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3679 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3680 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3683 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3686 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3687 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3689 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3691 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3692 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3697 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3700 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3705 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3706 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3707 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3709 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3710 let used_liquidity =
3711 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3713 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3714 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3716 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3719 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3724 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3725 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3726 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3733 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3734 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3735 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3736 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3737 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3738 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3740 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3741 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3743 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3744 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3746 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3747 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3748 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3750 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3751 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3752 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3753 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3754 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3755 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3756 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3757 } else { unreachable!(); });
3759 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3760 Err((chan, err)) => {
3761 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3762 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3763 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3764 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3765 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3771 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3774 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3775 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3778 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3779 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3780 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3784 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3785 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3786 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3792 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3794 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3795 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3796 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3798 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3800 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3801 funding_txo, o.get()
3803 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3804 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3805 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3806 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3807 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3808 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3811 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3818 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3819 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3820 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3824 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3826 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3827 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3829 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3830 /// across the p2p network.
3832 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3833 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3835 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3836 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3837 /// keys per-channel).
3839 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3840 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3841 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3843 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3844 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3845 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3847 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3848 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3849 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3850 /// for more details.
3852 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3853 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3854 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3855 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3858 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3860 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3861 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3863 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3864 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3865 /// signature for each channel.
3867 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3868 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3870 let mut result = Ok(());
3872 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3873 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3874 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3875 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3876 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3881 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3882 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3883 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3887 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3888 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3889 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3890 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3891 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3892 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3893 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3894 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3896 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3897 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3902 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3903 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3904 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3905 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3909 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3910 match states.entry(txid) {
3911 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3912 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3913 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3917 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3920 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3921 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3922 temporary_channel_id,
3923 counterparty_node_id,
3924 funding_transaction.clone(),
3927 let mut output_index = None;
3928 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3929 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3930 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3931 if output_index.is_some() {
3932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3933 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3936 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3939 if output_index.is_none() {
3940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3941 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3944 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3945 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3946 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3952 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3953 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3954 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3955 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3956 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3957 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3958 .into_iter().flatten()
3959 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3961 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3962 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3964 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3967 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3968 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3969 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3970 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3972 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3973 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3974 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3978 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3979 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3985 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3987 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3988 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3989 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3990 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3992 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3993 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3995 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3996 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3998 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4000 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4001 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4002 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4003 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4004 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4005 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4006 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4007 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4008 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4009 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4010 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4011 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4012 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4018 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4019 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4022 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4023 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4024 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4025 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4029 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4030 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4031 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4032 config.apply(config_update);
4033 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4036 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4037 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4038 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4039 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4040 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4041 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4048 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4049 debug_assert!(false);
4050 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4052 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4053 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4060 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4062 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4063 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4064 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4065 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4067 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4068 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4070 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4071 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4073 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4075 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4076 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4077 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4078 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4079 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4080 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4081 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4082 pub fn update_channel_config(
4083 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4084 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4085 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4088 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4089 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4091 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4092 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4094 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4095 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4096 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4097 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4098 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4100 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4101 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4102 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4105 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4108 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4109 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4110 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4111 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4112 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4113 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4116 let next_hop_scid = {
4117 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4118 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4119 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4122 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4123 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4124 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4125 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4126 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4129 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4131 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4132 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4133 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4136 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4137 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4138 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4139 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4140 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4147 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4148 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4149 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4152 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4153 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4154 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4155 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4158 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4160 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4161 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4162 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4163 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4164 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4167 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4168 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4169 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4170 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4171 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4173 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4177 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4178 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4180 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4183 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4184 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4187 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4188 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4189 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4192 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4193 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4194 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4195 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4196 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4197 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4198 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4199 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4200 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4203 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4204 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4205 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4206 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4211 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4213 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4214 /// Will likely generate further events.
4215 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4218 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4219 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4220 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4222 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4223 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4225 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4226 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4227 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4228 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4230 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4231 match forward_info {
4232 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4233 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4234 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4235 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4236 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4239 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4240 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4241 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4242 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4244 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4246 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4247 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4248 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4249 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4250 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4251 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4254 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4255 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4257 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4260 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4261 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4267 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4268 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4270 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4274 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4275 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4277 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4281 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4282 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4283 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4284 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4285 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4286 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4287 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4290 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4291 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4292 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4293 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4294 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4296 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4298 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4299 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4303 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4304 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4305 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4306 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4307 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4308 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4310 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4311 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4317 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4320 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4323 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4324 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4325 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4326 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4327 // problem, not ours.
4333 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4334 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4335 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4337 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4341 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4342 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4343 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4344 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4345 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4348 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4349 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4350 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4351 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4352 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4353 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4354 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4355 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4356 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4357 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4358 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4359 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4360 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4363 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4364 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4365 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4366 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4367 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4368 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4369 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4370 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4371 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4372 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4374 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4375 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4376 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4377 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4378 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4379 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4382 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4383 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4384 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4387 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4388 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4390 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4392 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4393 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4394 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4395 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4401 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4402 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4404 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4405 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4406 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4408 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4409 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4410 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4411 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4413 Some((res, htlc_id))
4416 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4417 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4418 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4419 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4421 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4423 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4424 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4425 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4431 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4435 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4436 match forward_info {
4437 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4438 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4439 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4440 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4441 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4444 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4445 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4446 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4447 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4448 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4450 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4451 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4452 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4453 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4454 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4456 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4457 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4458 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4462 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4463 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4466 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4469 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4470 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4471 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4472 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4473 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4474 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4475 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4476 phantom_shared_secret,
4479 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4480 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4481 // if routing nodes overpay
4482 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4483 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4485 total_value_received: None,
4486 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4489 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4492 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4494 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4495 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4496 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4497 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4498 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4499 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4501 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4502 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4503 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4504 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4505 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4506 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4507 phantom_shared_secret,
4510 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4511 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4513 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4516 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4517 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4518 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4519 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4520 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4523 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4524 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4525 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4526 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4527 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4528 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4530 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4531 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4532 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4534 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4535 .entry(payment_hash)
4536 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4537 .or_insert_with(|| {
4538 committed_to_claimable = true;
4540 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4543 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4544 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4546 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4548 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4549 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4550 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4552 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4553 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4554 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4557 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4559 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4560 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4561 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4562 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4563 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4564 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4565 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4566 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4567 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4568 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4570 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4572 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4573 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4574 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4575 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4576 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4579 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4580 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4581 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4582 committed_to_claimable = true;
4584 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4585 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4586 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4587 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4588 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4589 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4590 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4591 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4592 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4593 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4597 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4598 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4599 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4600 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4601 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4603 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4605 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4606 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4608 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4609 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4610 committed_to_claimable = true;
4613 payment_claimable_generated
4617 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4618 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4619 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4620 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4621 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4622 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4623 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4624 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4626 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4627 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4628 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4629 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4630 Ok(result) => result,
4632 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4633 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4636 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4637 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4638 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4639 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4640 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4641 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4644 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4645 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4646 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4648 check_total_value!(purpose);
4650 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4651 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4652 check_total_value!(purpose);
4656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4657 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4659 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4661 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4662 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4664 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4665 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4667 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4668 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4670 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4671 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4672 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4674 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4675 if payment_claimable_generated {
4676 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4682 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4683 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4691 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4692 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4693 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4694 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4696 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4697 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4699 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4701 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4702 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4703 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4705 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4707 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4708 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4709 events.append(&mut new_events);
4712 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4714 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4715 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4716 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4718 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4720 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4721 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4722 if background_events.is_empty() {
4723 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4726 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4728 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4729 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4730 // monitor updating completing.
4731 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4733 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4734 let mut updated_chan = false;
4736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4737 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4740 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4742 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4743 updated_chan = true;
4744 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4745 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4747 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4755 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4756 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4759 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4761 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4764 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4765 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4767 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4768 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4769 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4770 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4771 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4777 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4780 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4781 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4782 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4783 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4784 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4787 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4788 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4790 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4792 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4793 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4794 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4795 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4796 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4798 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4800 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4801 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4802 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4803 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4805 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4806 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4808 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4809 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4813 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4814 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4815 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4816 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4817 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4818 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4819 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4821 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4822 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4824 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4825 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4826 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4827 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4828 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4829 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4831 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4836 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4837 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4845 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4847 /// This currently includes:
4848 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4849 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4850 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4852 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4853 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4854 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4855 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4856 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4857 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4858 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4859 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4861 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4862 /// estimate fetches.
4864 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4865 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4866 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4867 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4868 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4870 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4871 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4873 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4874 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4875 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4876 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4878 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4879 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4880 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4881 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4882 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4883 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4885 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4886 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4887 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4889 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4890 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4891 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4892 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4893 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4894 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4895 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4896 channel_id: *chan_id,
4897 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4909 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4912 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4913 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4914 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4916 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4917 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4922 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4923 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4925 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4926 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4927 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4928 if needs_close { return false; }
4931 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4932 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4933 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4934 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4935 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4936 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4937 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4938 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4940 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4941 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4942 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4943 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4947 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4949 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4952 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4954 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4955 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4956 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4957 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4961 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4963 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4969 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4971 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4972 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4973 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4974 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4975 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4976 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4977 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4978 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4979 channel_id: *chan_id,
4980 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4988 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4989 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4990 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4992 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4993 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4994 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4999 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5000 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5001 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5002 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5003 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5004 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5005 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5006 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5007 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5013 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5015 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5016 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5021 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5022 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5023 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5024 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5025 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5026 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5027 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5028 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5029 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5030 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5031 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5033 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5034 // have no channels to the peer.
5035 let remove_entry = {
5036 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5037 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5040 entry.remove_entry();
5043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5048 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5049 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5050 // This should be unreachable
5051 debug_assert!(false);
5054 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5055 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5056 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5057 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5058 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5059 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5060 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5063 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5064 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5065 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5067 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5068 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5075 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5076 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5077 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5078 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5079 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5082 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5083 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5086 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5087 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5090 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5091 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5092 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5093 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5094 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5095 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5096 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5099 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5100 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5103 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5104 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5105 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5106 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5107 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5114 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5115 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5116 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5118 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5119 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5120 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5121 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5123 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5124 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5125 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5126 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5127 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5128 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5131 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5132 /// reason for the failure.
5134 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5135 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5138 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5139 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5140 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5141 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5142 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5143 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5149 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5150 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5151 match failure_code {
5152 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5153 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5154 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5155 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5156 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5157 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5159 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5160 let fail_data = match data {
5161 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5164 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5169 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5170 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5172 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5174 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5175 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5176 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5177 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5178 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5179 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5180 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5182 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5184 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5185 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5187 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5192 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5193 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5194 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5195 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5196 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5197 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5198 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5199 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5200 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5201 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5203 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5204 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5205 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5206 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5208 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5209 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5210 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5211 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5212 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5216 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5217 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5218 // be surfaced to the user.
5219 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5220 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5221 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5223 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5225 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5228 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5230 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5231 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5233 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5234 debug_assert!(false);
5235 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5240 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5243 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5244 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5245 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5246 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5250 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5251 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5252 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5253 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5254 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5255 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5256 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5257 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5258 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5259 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5262 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5263 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5264 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5267 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5268 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5269 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5272 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5273 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5274 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5275 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5277 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5278 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5279 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5282 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5283 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5284 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5286 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5287 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5288 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5289 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5290 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5292 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5294 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5295 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5297 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5298 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5302 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5303 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5305 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5309 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5310 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5311 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5312 push_forward_ev = true;
5314 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5316 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5319 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5322 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5323 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5324 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5325 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5326 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5327 failed_next_destination: destination,
5333 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5334 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5336 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5337 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5338 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5339 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5341 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5342 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5343 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5344 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5346 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5347 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5348 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5350 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5351 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5352 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5353 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5354 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5355 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5356 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5357 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5358 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5361 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5362 /// even type numbers.
5366 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5367 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5369 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5370 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5371 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5374 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5375 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5377 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5380 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5381 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5382 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5383 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5384 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5385 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5386 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5387 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5392 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5393 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5394 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5395 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5396 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5398 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5399 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5400 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5404 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5405 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5406 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5407 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5408 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5409 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5410 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5411 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5412 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5413 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5414 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5423 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5425 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5426 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5427 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5428 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5429 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5430 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5431 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5432 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5433 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5435 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5436 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5437 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5438 debug_assert!(false);
5442 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5444 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5445 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5446 debug_assert!(false);
5450 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5451 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5453 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5454 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5455 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5456 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5459 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5460 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5461 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5462 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5466 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5467 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5468 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5469 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5470 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5471 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5472 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5475 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5476 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5477 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5478 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5479 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5480 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5485 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5486 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5487 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5488 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5489 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5490 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5491 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5493 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5496 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5497 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5498 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5499 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5503 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5504 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5505 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5506 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5508 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5509 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5510 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5511 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5513 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5514 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5515 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5516 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5520 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5521 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5522 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5526 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5527 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5528 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5531 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5534 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5535 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5536 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5537 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5538 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5541 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5542 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5543 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5545 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5548 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5549 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5551 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5552 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5553 // monitor update as a background event.
5554 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5555 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5556 counterparty_node_id,
5557 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5558 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5562 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5563 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5568 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5570 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5572 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5573 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5574 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5575 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5576 blocking_action: blocker,
5578 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5580 debug_assert!(false,
5581 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5584 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5585 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5586 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5587 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5588 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5590 let mut found_blocker = false;
5591 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5592 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5593 // which case we need to only remove the one
5594 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5595 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5596 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5597 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5599 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5602 debug_assert!(false);
5611 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5612 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5613 counterparty_node_id: None,
5614 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5620 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5621 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5622 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5623 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5624 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5625 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5626 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5627 // again on restart.
5628 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5629 payment_preimage, update_res);
5632 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5633 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5635 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5636 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5637 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5638 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5639 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5640 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5641 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5642 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5643 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5644 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5647 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5648 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5649 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5650 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5651 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5652 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5656 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5657 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5660 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5661 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5662 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5665 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5666 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5667 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5668 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5669 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5671 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5672 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5673 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5675 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5676 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5679 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5680 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5681 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5682 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5683 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5684 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5685 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5686 let chan_to_release =
5687 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5688 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5690 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5691 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5692 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5693 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5698 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5699 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5700 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5701 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5702 // in the background.
5703 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5704 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5705 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5706 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5708 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5709 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5710 funding_txo, update, ..
5712 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5713 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5714 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5715 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5717 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5723 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5724 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5725 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5727 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5728 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5730 monitor_update.updates[0],
5731 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5736 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5737 // immediately once we get going.
5738 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5741 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5743 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5746 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5747 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5748 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5749 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5750 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5751 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5755 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5756 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5757 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5760 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5761 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5763 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5764 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5765 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5766 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5768 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5772 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5773 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5774 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5780 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5781 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5782 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5785 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5786 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5787 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5788 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5790 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5792 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5793 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5794 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5796 payment_purpose: purpose,
5799 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5801 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5805 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5807 sender_intended_total_msat,
5811 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5812 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5814 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5815 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5816 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5819 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5820 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5822 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5823 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5824 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5825 Some(blocking_action),
5832 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5833 /// update completion.
5834 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5835 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5836 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5837 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5838 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5839 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5840 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5841 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5842 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5843 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5844 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5845 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5846 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5847 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5849 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5851 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5852 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5853 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5854 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5857 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5858 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5860 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5861 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5862 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5867 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5868 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5869 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5870 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5875 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5876 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5877 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5878 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5879 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5884 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5888 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5894 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5895 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5896 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5900 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5901 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5902 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5908 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5909 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5911 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5912 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5914 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5915 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5916 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5917 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5918 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5923 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5924 let mut peer_state_lock;
5925 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5926 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5927 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5928 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5930 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5933 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5934 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5935 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5936 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5937 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5940 let remaining_in_flight =
5941 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5942 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5945 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5946 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5947 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5948 remaining_in_flight);
5949 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5952 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5955 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5957 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5958 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5961 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5962 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5963 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5965 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5966 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5967 /// used to accept such channels.
5969 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5970 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5971 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5972 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5975 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5976 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5978 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5979 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5980 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5982 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5983 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5985 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5986 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5988 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5989 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5991 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5992 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5993 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5994 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5997 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5999 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6002 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6003 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6005 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6007 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6008 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6010 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6012 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6013 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6014 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6016 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6017 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6018 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6020 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6021 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6022 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6023 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6024 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6025 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6026 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6027 let err_str = e.to_string();
6028 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6030 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6034 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6035 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6037 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6042 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6043 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6044 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6045 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6046 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6047 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6048 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6051 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6052 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6053 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6055 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6057 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6058 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6059 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6060 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6061 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6062 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6063 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6064 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6067 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6068 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6069 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6071 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6075 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6076 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6077 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6079 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6080 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6081 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6084 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6089 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6090 /// or 0-conf channels.
6092 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6093 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6094 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6095 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6096 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6097 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6099 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6100 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6101 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6102 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6103 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6104 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6105 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6109 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6112 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6113 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6115 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6116 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6118 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6119 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6120 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6121 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6122 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6124 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6127 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6128 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6129 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6132 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6133 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6138 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6141 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6142 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6143 // likely to be lost on restart!
6144 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6148 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6149 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6152 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6153 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6154 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6155 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6156 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6159 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6161 debug_assert!(false);
6162 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6164 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6165 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6167 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6168 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6169 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6170 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6171 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6172 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6175 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6176 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6179 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6180 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6182 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6183 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6186 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6187 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6192 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6193 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6194 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6195 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6197 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6199 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6200 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6201 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6202 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6203 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6204 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6207 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6208 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6209 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6214 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6215 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6216 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6217 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6218 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6219 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6220 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6228 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6229 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6232 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6236 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6237 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6239 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6240 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6241 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6243 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6247 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6248 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6249 // likely to be lost on restart!
6250 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6254 debug_assert!(false);
6255 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6259 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6261 match phase.get_mut() {
6262 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6263 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6264 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6267 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6274 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6275 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6276 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6277 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6278 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6280 user_channel_id: user_id,
6285 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6286 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6291 debug_assert!(false);
6292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6297 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6298 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6299 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6300 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6301 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6303 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6304 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6305 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6306 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6307 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6308 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6309 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6310 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6311 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6315 Some(mut phase) => {
6316 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6317 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6318 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6320 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6323 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6325 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6326 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6327 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6328 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6329 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6330 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6332 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6333 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6334 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6337 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6339 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6342 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6343 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6345 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6348 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6349 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6350 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6351 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6353 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6354 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6355 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6356 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6357 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6358 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6359 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6364 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6365 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6366 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6368 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6372 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6373 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6374 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6382 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6383 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6385 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6387 debug_assert!(false);
6388 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6391 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6392 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6393 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6395 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6396 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6397 let logger = WithContext::from(
6399 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6400 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6403 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6405 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6406 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6407 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6408 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6409 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6410 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6411 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6412 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6413 } else { unreachable!(); }
6416 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6417 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6418 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6419 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6420 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6421 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6422 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6426 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6427 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6428 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6429 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6430 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6431 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6442 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6443 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6444 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6446 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6448 debug_assert!(false);
6449 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6453 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6455 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6456 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6457 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6458 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6459 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6460 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6461 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6462 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6463 msg: announcement_sigs,
6465 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6466 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6467 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6468 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6469 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6470 // announcement_signatures.
6471 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6472 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6473 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6474 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6481 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6482 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6487 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6488 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6492 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6497 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6498 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6499 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6501 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6502 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6504 debug_assert!(false);
6505 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6509 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6510 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6512 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6513 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6514 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6515 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6517 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6520 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6521 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6522 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6523 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6525 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6526 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6527 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6528 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6529 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6530 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6534 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6535 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6536 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6537 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6540 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6541 let context = phase.context_mut();
6542 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6543 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6544 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6545 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6552 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6553 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6554 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6555 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6557 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6558 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6564 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6565 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6566 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6568 debug_assert!(false);
6569 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6571 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6572 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6573 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6574 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6576 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6577 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6578 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6579 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6580 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6581 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6586 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6587 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6588 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6589 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6590 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6591 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6592 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6594 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6595 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6601 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6602 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6603 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6604 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6606 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6607 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6610 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6615 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6616 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6617 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6622 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6623 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6624 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6625 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6627 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6628 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6629 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6630 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6632 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6633 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6635 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6637 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6639 debug_assert!(false);
6640 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6642 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6643 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6644 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6646 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6647 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6648 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6649 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6650 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6651 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6653 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6655 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6656 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6657 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6658 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6659 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6660 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6661 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6662 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6666 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6667 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6668 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6669 match pending_forward_info {
6670 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6671 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6673 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6674 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6675 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6676 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6677 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6679 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6680 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6681 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6682 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6683 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6686 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6688 _ => pending_forward_info
6691 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6692 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6694 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6695 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6703 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6705 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6706 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6707 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6709 debug_assert!(false);
6710 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6714 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6716 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6717 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6718 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6719 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6721 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6723 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6724 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6725 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6727 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6728 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6729 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6730 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6731 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6732 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6733 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6736 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6737 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6743 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6747 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6748 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6749 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6751 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6753 debug_assert!(false);
6754 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6756 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6757 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6758 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6760 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6761 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6763 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6764 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6772 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6773 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6774 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6776 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6778 debug_assert!(false);
6779 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6781 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6782 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6783 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6785 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6786 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6787 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6789 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6790 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6792 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6793 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6801 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6803 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6805 debug_assert!(false);
6806 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6808 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6810 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6811 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6812 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6813 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6814 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6815 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6816 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6817 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6818 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6822 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6823 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6831 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6832 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6833 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6834 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6835 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6836 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6837 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6838 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6839 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6840 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6841 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6843 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6844 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6846 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6847 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6848 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6850 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6851 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6854 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6855 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6857 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6858 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6859 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6861 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6862 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6863 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6864 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6865 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6868 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6869 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6872 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6873 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6874 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6875 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6876 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6877 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6878 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6879 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6880 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6881 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6884 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6885 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6886 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6891 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6892 // payments are being processed.
6893 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6894 push_forward_event = true;
6896 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6897 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6904 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6905 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6908 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6909 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6910 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6912 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6916 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6918 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6919 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6920 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6922 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6923 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6924 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6925 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6926 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6927 // real by taking more time.
6928 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6929 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6930 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6935 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6936 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6937 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6938 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6939 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6940 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6941 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6943 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6944 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6945 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6946 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6947 channel_funding_outpoint,
6948 counterparty_node_id,
6953 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6954 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6955 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6958 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6959 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6962 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6963 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6964 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6970 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6971 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6973 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6975 debug_assert!(false);
6976 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6977 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6979 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6981 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6982 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6983 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6984 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6985 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6986 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6987 *counterparty_node_id)
6989 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6990 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6991 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6992 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6993 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6994 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6995 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6999 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7000 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7003 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7006 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7010 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7012 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7014 debug_assert!(false);
7015 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7019 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7021 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7022 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7023 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7025 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7026 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7034 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7036 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7038 debug_assert!(false);
7039 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7041 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7042 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7043 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7045 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7046 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7050 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7051 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7052 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7053 msg, &self.default_configuration
7054 ), chan_phase_entry),
7055 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7056 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7057 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7060 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7061 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7064 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7069 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7070 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7071 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7072 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7074 // It's not a local channel
7075 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7079 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7080 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7085 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7087 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7088 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7089 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7090 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7091 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7092 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7093 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7097 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7098 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7099 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7100 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7102 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7103 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7104 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7105 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7108 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7112 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7113 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7118 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7121 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7123 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7124 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7126 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7128 debug_assert!(false);
7129 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7130 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7134 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7137 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7139 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7140 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7141 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7142 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7143 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7144 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7145 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7146 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7147 let mut channel_update = None;
7148 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7149 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7150 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7153 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7154 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7155 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7156 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7157 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7158 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7159 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7164 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7165 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7166 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7167 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7168 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7169 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7173 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7174 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7178 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7180 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7181 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7182 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7183 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7184 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7185 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7187 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7188 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7189 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7190 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7191 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7192 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7193 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7194 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7195 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7196 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7197 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7198 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7199 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7200 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7201 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7202 next_funding_txid: None,
7205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7206 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7207 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7213 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7214 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7215 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7216 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7219 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7220 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7225 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7226 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7227 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7229 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7230 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7231 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7232 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7233 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7234 match monitor_event {
7235 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7236 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7237 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7238 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7239 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7241 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7242 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7243 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7244 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7247 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7248 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7249 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7251 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7252 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7253 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7254 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7257 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7259 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7260 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7261 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7262 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7263 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7264 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7265 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7266 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7267 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7271 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7272 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7274 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7282 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7283 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7289 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7290 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7293 has_pending_monitor_events
7296 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7297 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7298 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7300 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7302 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7305 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7306 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7307 /// update was applied.
7308 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7309 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7310 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7312 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7313 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7314 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7315 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7317 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7318 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7321 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7322 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7323 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7325 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7326 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7327 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7328 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7329 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7330 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7332 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7333 has_monitor_update = true;
7335 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7336 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7337 continue 'peer_loop;
7346 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7347 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7348 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7354 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7355 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7357 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7358 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7360 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7361 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7362 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7365 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7366 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7368 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7369 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7370 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7371 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7376 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7377 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7382 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7383 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7386 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7387 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7388 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7394 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7399 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7400 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7403 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7404 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7408 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7411 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7412 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7418 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7419 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7420 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7421 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7422 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7423 let mut has_update = false;
7424 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7428 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7429 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7430 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7431 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7432 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7434 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7435 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7436 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7437 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7438 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7441 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7444 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7445 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7446 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7448 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7449 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7450 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7451 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7452 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7457 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7458 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7459 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7465 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7466 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7471 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7477 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7478 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7481 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7482 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7488 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7489 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7491 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7492 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7493 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7494 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7495 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7496 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7497 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7498 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7499 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7500 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7501 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7502 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7503 assert!(should_broadcast);
7504 } else { unreachable!(); }
7505 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7506 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7507 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7510 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7514 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7515 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7516 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7520 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7521 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7522 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7523 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7524 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7526 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7530 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7535 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7537 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7539 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7540 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7541 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7542 &self, description: String
7543 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7544 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7545 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7546 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7547 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7549 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7550 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7551 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7553 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7559 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7560 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7564 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7565 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7567 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7568 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7569 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7572 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7573 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7574 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7576 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7577 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7581 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7582 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7583 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7584 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7585 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7587 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7591 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7592 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7597 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7598 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7599 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7601 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7603 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7604 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7605 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7606 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7607 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7608 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7609 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7610 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7611 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7612 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7613 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7614 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7616 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7617 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7618 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7620 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7621 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7624 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7625 self.pending_outbound_payments
7626 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7627 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7629 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7634 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7635 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7636 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7638 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7639 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7640 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7641 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7642 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7643 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7644 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7646 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7647 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7651 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7652 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7655 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7656 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7657 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7661 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7662 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7663 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7664 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7668 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7669 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7670 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7675 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7676 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7677 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7680 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7681 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7682 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7683 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7684 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7685 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7686 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7687 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7688 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7689 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7690 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7691 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7692 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7693 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7694 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7697 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7698 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7699 let builder = match quantity {
7701 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7703 let builder = match amount_msats {
7705 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7707 let builder = match payer_note {
7709 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7711 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7712 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7714 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7715 self.pending_outbound_payments
7716 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7717 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7719 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7721 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7722 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7723 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7724 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7725 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7728 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7730 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7731 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7732 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7733 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7734 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7735 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7736 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7737 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7738 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7740 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7747 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7750 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7751 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7752 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7756 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7757 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7758 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7759 /// received and no retries will be made.
7763 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7764 /// path for the invoice.
7766 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7767 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7768 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7769 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7770 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7772 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7773 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7775 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7776 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7777 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7778 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7780 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7781 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7782 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7784 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7785 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7786 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7788 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7789 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7790 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7792 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7793 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7794 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7796 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7797 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7798 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7799 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7800 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7803 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7805 for path in refund.paths() {
7806 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7807 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7808 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7809 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7811 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7817 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7821 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7824 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7825 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7827 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7828 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7829 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7830 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7832 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7834 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7835 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7839 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7840 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7842 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7844 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7845 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7847 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7848 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7849 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7850 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7851 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7852 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7853 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7854 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7855 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7856 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7857 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7860 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7861 /// stored external to LDK.
7863 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7864 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7865 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7867 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7868 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7871 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7872 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7873 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7874 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7876 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7877 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7878 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7879 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7880 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7882 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7883 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7884 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7885 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7886 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7888 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7889 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7891 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7892 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7896 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7897 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7899 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7901 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7902 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7904 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7905 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7906 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7907 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7908 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7909 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7910 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7913 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7914 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7916 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7917 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7918 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7921 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7923 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7924 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7925 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7926 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7927 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7929 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7931 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7932 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7933 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7936 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7937 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7940 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7941 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7942 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7943 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7944 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7945 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7946 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7948 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7949 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7950 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7951 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7952 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7954 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7956 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7959 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7960 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7964 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7965 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7967 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7968 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7969 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7970 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7972 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7973 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7974 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7975 Some(_) => continue,
7976 None => return scid_candidate
7981 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7983 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7984 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7986 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7987 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7988 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7992 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7993 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7994 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7996 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7997 /// times to get a unique scid.
7998 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7999 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8000 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8002 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8003 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8004 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8005 return scid_candidate
8009 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8010 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8011 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8012 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8015 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8018 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8019 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8021 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8022 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8023 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8032 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8033 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8034 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8035 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8036 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8040 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8041 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8042 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8043 events.push_back((event, None));
8047 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8048 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8049 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8053 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8054 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8058 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8059 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8062 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8063 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8064 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8065 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8066 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8067 let logger = WithContext::from(
8068 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8072 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8073 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8075 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8076 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8077 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8078 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8080 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8084 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8085 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8086 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8087 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8088 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8089 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8090 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8094 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8095 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8096 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8097 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8098 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8099 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8100 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8101 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8102 if further_update_exists {
8103 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8108 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8109 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8115 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8116 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8122 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8123 for action in actions {
8125 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8126 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8128 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8134 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8135 /// using the given event handler.
8137 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8138 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8142 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8146 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8148 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8149 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8150 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8151 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8152 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8153 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8157 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8158 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8159 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8160 /// is always placed next to each other.
8162 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8163 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8164 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8165 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8167 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8168 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8169 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8170 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8171 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8172 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8173 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8175 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8176 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8177 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8178 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8181 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8182 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8184 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8185 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8188 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8190 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8193 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8194 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8198 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8199 events.replace(pending_events);
8208 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8219 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8221 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8222 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8223 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8225 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8229 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8231 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8232 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8233 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8234 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8235 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8236 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8240 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8242 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8243 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8244 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8245 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8246 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8249 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8250 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8253 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8254 let _persistence_guard =
8255 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8256 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8257 let new_height = height - 1;
8259 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8260 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8261 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8262 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8263 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8264 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8267 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8271 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8273 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8274 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8275 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8276 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8277 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8278 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8282 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8283 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8284 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8285 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8287 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8288 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8290 let _persistence_guard =
8291 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8292 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8293 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8294 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8296 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8297 if height < last_best_block_height {
8298 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8299 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8303 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8304 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8305 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8306 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8308 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8309 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8311 let _persistence_guard =
8312 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8313 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8314 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8316 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8318 macro_rules! max_time {
8319 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8321 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8322 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8323 // having an explicit local time source.
8324 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8325 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8326 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8327 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8328 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8334 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8335 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8336 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8337 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8341 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8342 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8343 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8346 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8347 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8348 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8349 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8350 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8351 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8358 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8359 let _persistence_guard =
8360 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8361 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8362 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8363 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8364 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8365 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8366 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8367 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8372 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8374 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8375 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8376 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8377 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8378 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8379 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8383 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8384 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8386 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8387 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8388 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8389 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8390 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8392 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8393 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8395 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8396 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8397 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8398 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8399 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8400 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8402 // Retain unfunded channels.
8403 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8404 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8405 let res = f(channel);
8406 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8407 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8408 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8409 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8410 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8412 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8413 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8414 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8415 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8416 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8417 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8419 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8424 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8429 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8430 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8433 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8434 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8436 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8437 msg: announcement_sigs,
8439 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8440 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8443 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8444 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8445 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8450 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8451 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8452 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8453 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8454 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8455 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8456 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8457 // is always consistent.
8458 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8459 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8460 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8461 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8462 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8465 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8466 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8467 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8468 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8469 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8470 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8471 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8472 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8477 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8478 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8479 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8480 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8481 data: reason_message,
8494 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8495 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8496 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8497 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8498 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8499 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8500 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8501 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8502 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8503 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8505 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8506 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8507 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8511 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8514 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8515 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8516 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8517 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8518 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8519 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8520 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8521 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8522 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8523 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8524 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8527 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8528 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8529 _ => unreachable!(),
8531 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8532 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8533 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8534 let logger = WithContext::from(
8535 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8537 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8543 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8545 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8546 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8550 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8551 /// may have events that need processing.
8553 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8554 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8556 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8557 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8558 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8559 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8562 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8563 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8564 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8567 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8568 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8569 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8572 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8573 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8574 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8575 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8578 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8579 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8580 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8581 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8584 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8585 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8587 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8588 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8589 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8590 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8591 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8594 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8595 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8596 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8597 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8600 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8601 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8602 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8603 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8606 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8607 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8608 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8609 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8612 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8613 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8614 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8615 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8619 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8620 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8622 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8623 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8624 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8625 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8626 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8627 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8631 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8632 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8633 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8634 // change to the contents.
8635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8636 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8637 let persist = match &res {
8638 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8639 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8640 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8642 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8644 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8649 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8650 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8651 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8652 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8655 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8656 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8657 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8658 // change to the contents.
8659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8660 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8661 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8665 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8666 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8667 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8668 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8671 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8672 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8673 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8676 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8678 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8681 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8682 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8683 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8684 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8685 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8687 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8688 let persist = match &res {
8689 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8690 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8692 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8697 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8698 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8699 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8700 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8703 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8704 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8705 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8706 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8709 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8710 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8711 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8712 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8715 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8716 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8717 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8718 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8721 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8723 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8726 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8728 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8731 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8732 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8733 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8734 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8736 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8737 let persist = match &res {
8738 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8739 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8740 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8742 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8747 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8749 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8752 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8753 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8754 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8755 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8756 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8757 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8758 let persist = match &res {
8759 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8760 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8761 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8763 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8768 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8769 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8770 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8771 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8773 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8774 let persist = match &res {
8775 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8776 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8777 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8779 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8784 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8786 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8789 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8791 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8794 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8795 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8796 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8797 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8799 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8800 let persist = match &res {
8801 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8802 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8803 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8805 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8810 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8811 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8812 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8815 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8816 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8817 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8820 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8825 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8826 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8827 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8828 let persist = match &res {
8829 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8830 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8831 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8833 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8838 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8840 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8841 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8842 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8845 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8846 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8847 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8849 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8852 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8853 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8854 let context = match phase {
8855 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8856 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8857 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8858 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8863 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8864 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8867 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8871 // Clean up for removal.
8872 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8873 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8876 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8877 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8878 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8879 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8881 // V1 Channel Establishment
8882 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8883 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8884 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8885 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8886 // V2 Channel Establishment
8887 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8888 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8889 // Common Channel Establishment
8890 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8891 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8895 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8898 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8900 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8901 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8902 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8903 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8907 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8908 // Channel Operations
8909 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8911 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8914 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8917 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8918 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8919 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8921 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8923 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8924 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8927 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8928 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8929 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8930 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8933 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8935 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8937 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8938 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8942 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8943 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8944 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8945 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8949 let mut res = Ok(());
8951 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8952 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8953 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8954 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8955 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8956 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8957 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8960 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8961 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8963 if inbound_peer_limited {
8965 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8967 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8968 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8969 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8970 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8971 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8972 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8973 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8974 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8979 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8980 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8982 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8983 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8984 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8985 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8988 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8991 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8992 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8997 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8999 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9000 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9003 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9005 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9006 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9008 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9009 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9010 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9011 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9016 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9017 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9022 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9025 match &msg.data as &str {
9026 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9027 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9029 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9030 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9031 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9032 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9033 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9034 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9035 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9036 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9038 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9039 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9040 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9041 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9042 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9043 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9044 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9048 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9049 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9050 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9051 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9052 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9053 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9055 log_level: Level::Trace,
9065 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9066 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9067 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9068 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9069 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9070 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9071 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9072 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9073 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9074 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9075 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9077 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9078 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9079 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9083 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9084 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9085 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9086 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9087 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9089 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9090 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9091 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9092 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9100 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9101 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9105 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9106 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9109 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9110 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9113 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9114 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9117 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9118 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9119 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9120 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9123 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9124 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9125 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9126 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9129 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9130 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9131 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9132 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9135 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9136 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9137 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9138 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9141 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9142 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9143 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9144 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9147 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9148 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9149 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9150 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9153 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9154 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9155 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9156 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9159 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9160 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9161 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9162 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9165 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9166 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9167 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9168 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9172 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9173 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9175 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9176 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9177 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9178 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9179 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9180 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9184 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9185 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9186 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9189 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9190 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9193 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9194 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9196 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9197 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9199 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9200 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9204 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9205 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9206 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9208 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9210 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9211 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9215 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9216 amount_msats, payment_secret
9218 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9220 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9221 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9225 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9226 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9227 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9230 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9231 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9232 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9233 payment_paths, payment_hash
9235 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9236 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9237 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9239 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9240 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9241 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9244 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9245 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9246 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9247 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9248 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9250 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9251 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9253 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9254 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9255 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9256 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9258 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9259 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9263 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9264 Err(error) => Some(error),
9268 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9269 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9271 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9273 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9274 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9277 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9279 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9286 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9293 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9294 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9298 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9299 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9300 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9301 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9302 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9306 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9307 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9309 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9310 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9311 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9312 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9313 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9316 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9317 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9318 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9319 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9322 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9323 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9324 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9325 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9328 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9329 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9330 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9331 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9334 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9335 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9336 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9337 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9338 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9339 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9340 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9341 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9342 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9343 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9344 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9345 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9346 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9347 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9348 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9349 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9350 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9351 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9352 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9353 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9358 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9359 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9361 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9362 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9363 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9364 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9367 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9368 (2, node_id, required),
9369 (4, features, required),
9370 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9371 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9372 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9373 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9376 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9377 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9378 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9379 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9380 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9381 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9382 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9383 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9384 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9385 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9386 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9387 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9388 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9389 (7, self.config, option),
9390 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9391 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9392 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9393 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9394 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9395 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9396 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9397 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9398 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9399 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9400 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9401 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9402 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9403 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9404 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9405 (32, self.is_public, required),
9406 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9407 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9408 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9409 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9410 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9416 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9417 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9418 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9419 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9420 (2, channel_id, required),
9421 (3, channel_type, option),
9422 (4, counterparty, required),
9423 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9424 (6, funding_txo, option),
9425 (7, config, option),
9426 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9427 (9, confirmations, option),
9428 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9429 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9430 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9431 (16, balance_msat, required),
9432 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9433 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9434 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9435 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9436 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9437 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9438 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9439 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9440 (26, is_outbound, required),
9441 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9442 (30, is_usable, required),
9443 (32, is_public, required),
9444 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9445 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9446 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9447 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9448 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9451 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9452 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9453 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9454 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9455 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9459 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9461 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9462 outbound_scid_alias,
9466 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9467 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9469 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9470 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9471 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9472 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9473 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9474 confirmations_required,
9476 force_close_spend_delay,
9477 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9478 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9479 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9480 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9481 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9482 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9483 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9484 channel_shutdown_state,
9489 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9490 (2, channels, required_vec),
9491 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9492 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9495 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9496 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9499 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9501 (0, onion_packet, required),
9502 (1, blinded, option),
9503 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9506 (0, payment_data, required),
9507 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9508 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9509 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9510 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9511 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9513 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9514 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9515 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9516 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9517 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9518 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9522 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9523 (0, routing, required),
9524 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9525 (4, payment_hash, required),
9526 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9527 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9528 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9529 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9533 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9534 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9536 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9538 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9539 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9540 reason.write(writer)?;
9542 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9543 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9546 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9547 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9548 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9549 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9556 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9557 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9558 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9561 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9562 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9563 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9564 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9568 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9569 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9570 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9571 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9572 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9575 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9576 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9577 // messages contained in the variants.
9578 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9579 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9580 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9582 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9583 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9584 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9585 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9586 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9589 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9590 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9591 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9592 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9593 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9595 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9600 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9605 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9606 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9607 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9610 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9611 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9612 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9613 (2, outpoint, required),
9614 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9615 (4, htlc_id, required),
9616 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9617 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9620 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9621 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9622 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9623 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9624 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9626 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9627 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9628 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9629 (2, self.value, required),
9630 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9631 (4, payment_data, option),
9632 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9633 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9634 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9635 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9641 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9642 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9643 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9644 (0, prev_hop, required),
9645 (1, total_msat, option),
9646 (2, value_ser, required),
9647 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9648 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9649 (5, total_value_received, option),
9650 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9651 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9652 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9654 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9655 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9656 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9658 if payment_data.is_some() {
9659 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9661 if total_msat.is_none() {
9662 total_msat = Some(value);
9664 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9667 if total_msat.is_none() {
9668 if payment_data.is_none() {
9669 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9671 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9673 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9677 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9680 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9681 total_value_received,
9682 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9684 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9685 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9690 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9691 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9692 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9695 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9696 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9697 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9698 let mut payment_id = None;
9699 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9700 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9701 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9702 (0, session_priv, required),
9703 (1, payment_id, option),
9704 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9705 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9706 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9707 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9709 if payment_id.is_none() {
9710 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9712 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9714 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9715 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9718 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9719 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9720 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9721 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9725 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9726 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9727 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9729 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9732 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9733 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9738 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9739 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9741 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9743 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9744 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9745 (0, session_priv, required),
9746 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9747 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9748 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9749 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9750 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9751 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9754 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9756 field.write(writer)?;
9763 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9764 (0, forward_info, required),
9765 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9766 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9767 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9768 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9771 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9772 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9773 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9775 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9779 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9780 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9781 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9782 (0, htlc_id, required),
9783 (2, err_packet, required),
9786 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9787 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9788 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9789 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9790 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9791 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9792 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9793 (0, htlc_id, required),
9794 (1, failure_code, required),
9795 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9796 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9804 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9805 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9806 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9808 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9810 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9811 (0, htlc_id, required),
9812 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9813 (2, err_packet, required),
9814 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9816 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9817 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9818 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9820 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9824 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9825 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9829 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9834 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9835 (0, payment_secret, required),
9836 (2, expiry_time, required),
9837 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9838 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9839 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9842 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9844 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9845 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9846 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9847 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9848 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9849 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9853 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9854 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9856 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9858 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9860 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9861 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9862 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9865 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9867 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9868 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9869 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9872 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9873 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9876 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9877 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9881 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9883 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9884 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9885 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9886 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9887 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9888 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9891 channel.write(writer)?;
9897 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9898 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9899 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9900 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9901 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9902 for forward in pending_forwards {
9903 forward.write(writer)?;
9908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9910 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9911 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9912 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9914 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9915 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9916 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9917 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9918 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9919 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9920 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9921 htlc.write(writer)?;
9923 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9924 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9927 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9928 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9929 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9930 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9931 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9932 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9933 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9936 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9937 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9938 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9939 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9940 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9942 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9943 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9944 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9945 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9946 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9947 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9948 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9953 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9954 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9955 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9956 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9957 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9958 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9959 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9960 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9961 0u64.write(writer)?;
9963 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9964 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9965 event.write(writer)?;
9969 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9970 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9971 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9972 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9973 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9974 0u64.write(writer)?;
9976 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9977 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9978 // likely to be identical.
9979 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9980 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9982 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9983 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9984 hash.write(writer)?;
9985 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9988 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9989 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9990 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9991 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9992 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9995 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9996 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9998 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9999 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10000 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10001 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10004 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10005 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10006 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10007 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10011 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10012 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10013 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10015 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10016 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10017 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10023 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10024 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10025 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10026 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10029 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10030 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10031 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10032 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10033 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10036 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10037 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10038 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10039 if !updates.is_empty() {
10040 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10041 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10046 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10047 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10048 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10049 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10050 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10051 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10052 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10053 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10054 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10055 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10056 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10057 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10058 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10065 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10066 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10067 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10068 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10071 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10072 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10073 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10074 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10075 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10076 // check that the event is sane here.
10077 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10078 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10079 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10080 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10086 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10087 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10088 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10089 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10090 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10091 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10094 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10095 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10096 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10097 events.push_back((ev, action));
10098 } else if action.is_some() {
10099 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10106 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10107 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10108 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10109 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10110 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10111 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10114 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10116 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10118 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10119 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10120 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10121 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10122 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10123 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10124 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10125 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10126 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10127 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10128 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10129 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10130 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10132 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10133 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10135 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10136 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10138 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10139 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10140 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10141 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10142 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10143 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10145 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10146 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10148 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10149 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10150 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10151 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10152 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10153 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10157 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10158 pub entropy_source: ES,
10160 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10161 pub node_signer: NS,
10163 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10164 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10166 pub signer_provider: SP,
10168 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10170 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10171 pub fee_estimator: F,
10172 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10174 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10175 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10176 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10177 pub chain_monitor: M,
10179 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10180 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10181 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10182 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10183 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10184 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10186 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10188 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10189 /// deserialization.
10191 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10192 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10193 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10195 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10196 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10198 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10199 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10200 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10201 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10203 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10206 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10207 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10210 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10211 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10213 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10214 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10215 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10216 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10217 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10222 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10223 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10224 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10225 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10226 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10228 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10229 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10234 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10235 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10236 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10237 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10239 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10240 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10241 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10242 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10243 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10244 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10248 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10249 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10250 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10254 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10255 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10257 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10258 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10259 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10260 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10261 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10266 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10267 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10269 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10270 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10271 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10273 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10275 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10276 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10277 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10278 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10279 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10280 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10281 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10282 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10283 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10284 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10286 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10287 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10288 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10289 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10290 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10291 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10292 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10293 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10294 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10295 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10296 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10297 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10298 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10299 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10301 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10302 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10303 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10305 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10306 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10307 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10309 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10310 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10311 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10313 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10314 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10317 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10318 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10319 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10322 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10323 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10324 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10325 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10326 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10327 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10328 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10330 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10331 let mut found_htlc = false;
10332 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10333 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10336 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10337 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10338 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10339 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10340 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10341 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10342 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10344 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10345 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10346 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10350 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10351 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10352 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10353 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10354 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10356 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10357 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10359 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10361 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10362 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10365 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10366 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10367 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10371 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10372 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10373 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10374 // safely discard the channel.
10375 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10376 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10377 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10378 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10379 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10380 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10381 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10384 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10385 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10386 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10387 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10388 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10389 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10393 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10394 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10395 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10396 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10397 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10398 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10399 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10400 counterparty_node_id: None,
10401 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10403 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10407 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10408 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10409 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10410 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10411 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10412 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10413 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10414 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10415 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10417 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10420 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10421 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10422 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10423 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10424 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10425 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10426 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10427 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10429 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10432 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10435 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10436 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10437 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10438 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10439 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10440 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10441 is_connected: false,
10445 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10446 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10447 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10448 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10449 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10450 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10451 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10452 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10455 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10456 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10457 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10458 for _ in 0..event_count {
10459 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10460 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10465 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10466 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10467 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10469 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10470 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10471 // on-startup monitor updates.
10472 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10473 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10475 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10479 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10480 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10482 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10483 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10484 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10485 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10486 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10490 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10491 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10492 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10493 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10494 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10495 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10496 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10498 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10499 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10503 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10504 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10505 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10506 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10507 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10508 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10509 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10510 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10511 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10512 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10513 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10514 let mut events_override = None;
10515 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10516 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10517 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10518 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10519 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10520 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10521 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10522 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10523 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10524 (8, events_override, option),
10525 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10526 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10527 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10528 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10530 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10531 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10534 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10535 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10538 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10539 pending_events_read = events;
10542 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10543 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10546 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10547 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10548 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10549 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10550 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10551 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10553 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10555 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10556 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10557 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10560 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10561 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10562 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10563 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10564 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10566 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10567 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10568 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10570 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10571 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10572 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10573 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10574 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10576 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10577 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10578 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10579 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10580 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10581 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10582 pending_background_events.push(
10583 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10584 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10585 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10586 update: update.clone(),
10589 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10590 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10591 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10592 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10593 pending_background_events.push(
10594 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10595 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10596 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10599 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10600 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10601 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10603 max_in_flight_update_id
10607 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10610 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10611 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10612 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10614 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10616 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10617 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10618 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10619 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10620 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10621 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10622 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10623 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10624 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10627 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10628 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10629 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10630 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10631 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10632 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10633 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10634 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10635 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10636 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10637 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10640 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10641 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10642 debug_assert!(false);
10643 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10648 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10649 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10650 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10651 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10652 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10653 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10654 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10655 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10656 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10658 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10659 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10660 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10662 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10663 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10664 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10665 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10666 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10667 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10668 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10669 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10674 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10675 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10677 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10678 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10679 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10680 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10683 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10684 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10685 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10686 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10687 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10688 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10689 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10691 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10692 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10693 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10694 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10695 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10696 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10697 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10698 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10699 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10702 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10703 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10704 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10705 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10707 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10708 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10709 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10712 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10713 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10714 retry_strategy: None,
10715 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10716 payment_params: None,
10717 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10718 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10719 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10720 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10721 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10722 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10723 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10724 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10725 total_msat: path_amt,
10726 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10727 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10729 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10730 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10735 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10736 match htlc_source {
10737 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10738 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10739 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10740 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10742 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10743 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10744 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10745 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10746 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10747 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10748 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10749 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10750 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10751 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10752 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10757 !forwards.is_empty()
10759 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10760 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10761 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10762 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10763 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10764 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10765 intercepted_id != ev_id
10772 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10773 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10774 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10775 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10776 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10777 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10778 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10779 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10780 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10781 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10782 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10784 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10785 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10786 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10788 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10789 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10790 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10797 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10798 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10800 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10802 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10803 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10804 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10805 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10806 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10807 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10808 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10809 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10810 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10811 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10814 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10815 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10816 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10817 // channel still live case here.
10821 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10822 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10827 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10828 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10829 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10830 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10831 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10832 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10833 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10834 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10838 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10839 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10841 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10842 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10843 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10844 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10846 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10847 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10848 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10850 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10851 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10853 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10854 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10856 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10859 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10860 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10861 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10863 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10867 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10868 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10869 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10870 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10871 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10873 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10874 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10875 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10876 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10877 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10878 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10879 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10880 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10882 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10883 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10887 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10889 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10891 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10892 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10894 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10895 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10900 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10901 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10903 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10905 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10907 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10908 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10909 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10914 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10915 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10918 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10919 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10920 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10921 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10922 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10924 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10925 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10926 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10928 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10929 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10930 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10931 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10932 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10933 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10935 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10936 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10937 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10938 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10939 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10940 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10944 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10945 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10946 debug_assert!(false);
10947 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10952 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10954 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10955 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10956 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10957 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10958 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10959 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10960 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10961 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10962 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10963 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10964 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10966 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10967 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10969 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10970 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10971 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10972 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10974 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10975 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10976 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10977 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10979 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10980 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10981 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10982 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10984 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10985 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10986 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10987 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10988 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10989 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10990 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10991 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10994 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10995 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10998 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11001 purpose: payment.purpose,
11002 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11003 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11004 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11010 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11011 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11012 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11013 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11014 for action in actions.iter() {
11015 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11016 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11017 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11019 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11021 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11022 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11023 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11024 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11025 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11027 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11028 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11029 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11030 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11034 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11035 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11039 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11041 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11042 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11046 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11048 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11049 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11050 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11051 router: args.router,
11053 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11055 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11056 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11057 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11058 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11060 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11061 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11062 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11063 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11064 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11065 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11067 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11069 our_network_pubkey,
11072 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11074 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11076 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11077 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11078 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11079 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11080 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11082 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11083 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11085 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11087 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11089 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11090 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11091 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11093 logger: args.logger,
11094 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11097 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11098 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11099 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11100 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11101 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11104 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11105 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11106 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11107 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11108 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11109 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11112 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11113 //connection or two.
11115 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11121 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11122 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11123 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11124 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11125 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11126 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11127 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11128 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11129 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11130 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11131 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11132 use crate::prelude::*;
11133 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11134 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11135 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11136 use crate::util::test_utils;
11137 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11138 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11141 fn test_notify_limits() {
11142 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11143 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11146 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11147 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11149 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11150 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11151 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11152 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11153 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11155 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11157 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11158 // to connect messages with new values
11159 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11160 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11161 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11162 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11163 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11164 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11166 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11167 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11168 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11169 // ... but the last node should not.
11170 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11171 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11172 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11173 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11175 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11176 // about the channel.
11177 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11178 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11179 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11181 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11183 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11184 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11185 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11186 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11187 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11188 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11190 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11191 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11192 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11194 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11195 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11196 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11197 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11198 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11199 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11201 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11202 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11203 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11204 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11205 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11206 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11207 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11208 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11210 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11211 // the channel info has updated.
11212 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11213 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11214 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11215 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11216 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11217 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11221 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11222 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11228 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11230 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11231 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11232 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11233 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11235 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11236 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11237 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11238 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11239 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11240 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11241 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11242 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11244 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11246 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11248 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11249 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11250 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11252 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11254 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11255 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11258 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11259 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11260 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11262 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11263 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11264 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11265 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11266 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11267 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11269 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11270 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11272 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11273 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11274 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11276 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11278 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11280 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11281 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11282 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11283 // lightning messages manually.
11284 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11285 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11288 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11289 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11290 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11291 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11293 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11294 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11296 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11297 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11299 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11300 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11301 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11303 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11304 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11305 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11307 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11309 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11311 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11312 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11315 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11316 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11317 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11320 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11321 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11322 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11323 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11328 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11329 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11330 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11331 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11338 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11339 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11340 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11343 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11344 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11345 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11346 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11347 // fails as expected.
11348 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11349 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11350 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11351 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11352 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11353 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11356 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11357 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11359 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11360 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11361 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11362 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11364 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11365 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11366 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11368 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11369 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11370 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11371 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11372 let route = find_route(
11373 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11374 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11376 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11377 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11379 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11380 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11381 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11382 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11383 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11385 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11386 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11387 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11388 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11389 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11391 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11392 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11393 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11394 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11395 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11396 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11397 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11399 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11401 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11402 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11404 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11405 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11406 let route = find_route(
11407 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11408 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11410 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11411 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11413 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11415 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11416 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11417 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11419 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11420 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11421 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11422 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11424 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11425 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11426 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11427 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11428 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11430 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11431 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11432 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11434 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11435 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11436 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11437 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11438 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11439 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11440 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11441 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11442 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11444 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11445 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11447 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11448 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11449 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11450 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11452 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11454 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11455 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11456 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11458 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11459 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11460 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11463 let route = find_route(
11464 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11465 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11467 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11468 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11469 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11471 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11472 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11473 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11474 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11475 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11477 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11478 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11479 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11481 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11482 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11483 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11484 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11485 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11486 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11487 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11488 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11489 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11491 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11492 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11496 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11497 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11498 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11502 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11504 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11505 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11507 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11508 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11509 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11510 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11511 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11512 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11513 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11514 let route = find_route(
11515 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11516 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11519 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11520 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11521 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11522 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11523 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11524 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11527 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11528 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11529 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11530 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11531 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11532 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11535 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11539 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11540 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11541 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11542 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11543 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11549 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11550 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11552 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11553 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11554 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11555 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11556 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11557 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11558 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11559 let route = find_route(
11560 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11561 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11564 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11565 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11566 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11567 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11568 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11569 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11570 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11571 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11574 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11575 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11576 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11577 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11578 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11579 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11582 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11586 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11590 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11592 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11593 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11594 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11595 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11597 // Marshall an MPP route.
11598 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11599 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11600 route.paths.push(path);
11601 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11602 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11603 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11604 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11605 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11606 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11608 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11609 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11611 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11612 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11614 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11619 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11620 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11621 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11622 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11623 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11625 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11627 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11628 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11630 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11631 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11633 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11636 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11637 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11638 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11639 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11640 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11641 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11644 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11647 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11648 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11653 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11654 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11655 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11656 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11657 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11658 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11660 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11661 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11663 total_msat: 100_000,
11666 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11667 // payment verification fails as expected.
11668 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11669 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11670 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11671 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11673 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11677 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11678 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11682 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11683 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11684 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11685 // the channel is successfully closed.
11686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11689 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11691 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11692 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11693 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11694 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11695 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11697 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11698 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11700 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11701 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11702 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11703 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11706 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11708 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11709 // as it has the funding transaction.
11710 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11711 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11712 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11715 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11717 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11719 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11721 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11722 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11723 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11725 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11728 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11729 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11730 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11731 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11732 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11735 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11736 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11738 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11739 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11740 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11741 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11743 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11744 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11745 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11746 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11748 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11749 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11751 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11752 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11753 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11754 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11755 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11756 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11757 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11761 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11762 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11763 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11764 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11765 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11766 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11767 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11770 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11772 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11773 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11774 // closing transaction).
11775 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11776 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11777 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11779 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11780 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11781 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11782 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11783 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11786 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11788 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11790 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11791 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11792 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11794 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11796 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11797 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11800 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11801 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11802 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11805 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11806 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11807 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11810 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11811 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11812 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11815 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11816 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11817 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11820 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11822 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11823 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11825 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11826 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11828 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11829 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11834 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11835 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11836 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11837 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11838 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11839 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11840 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11841 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11844 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11845 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11846 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11848 // Test the API functions.
11849 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11851 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11853 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11855 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11857 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11859 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11861 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11865 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11866 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11867 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11868 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11869 // the given `channel_id`.
11870 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11871 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11872 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11873 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11875 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11878 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11880 // Test the API functions.
11881 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11883 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11885 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11887 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11889 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11891 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11895 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11896 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11897 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11898 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11899 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11900 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11902 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11904 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11905 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11907 let mut funding_tx = None;
11908 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11909 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11910 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11913 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11914 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11915 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11916 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11917 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11919 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11921 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11923 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11925 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11927 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11929 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11932 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11933 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11934 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11935 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11936 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11938 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11939 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11941 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11942 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11943 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11944 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11945 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11946 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11947 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11950 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11951 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11952 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11953 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11954 }, true).unwrap_err();
11956 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11957 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11958 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11959 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11960 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11961 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11962 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11964 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11965 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11967 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11968 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11969 }, true).unwrap_err();
11971 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11972 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11973 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11974 }, false).unwrap();
11975 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11977 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11978 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11980 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11981 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11982 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11983 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11984 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11986 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11987 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11988 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11990 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11991 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11992 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11994 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11995 // "protected" and can connect again.
11996 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11997 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11998 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12000 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12002 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12004 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12005 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12009 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12010 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12014 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12016 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12018 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12019 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12021 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12022 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12023 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12024 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12027 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12029 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12030 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12031 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12033 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12034 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12035 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12037 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12038 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12039 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12040 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12044 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12045 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12046 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12049 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12050 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12052 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12054 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12056 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12057 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12059 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12060 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12061 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12062 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12063 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12064 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12067 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12068 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12070 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12071 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12075 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12076 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12079 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12080 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12081 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12083 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12085 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12086 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12088 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12089 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12090 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12091 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12097 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12098 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12100 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12101 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12102 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12104 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12105 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12109 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12113 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12114 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12115 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12116 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12117 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12118 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12119 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12120 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12122 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12123 payment_metadata: None,
12124 keysend_preimage: None,
12125 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12126 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12128 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12130 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12131 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12132 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12133 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12134 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12135 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12136 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12138 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12139 } else { panic!(); }
12141 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12142 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12144 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12145 payment_metadata: None,
12146 keysend_preimage: None,
12147 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12148 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12150 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12152 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12153 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12154 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12155 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12159 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12160 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12161 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12162 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12163 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12165 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12166 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12168 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12169 payment_metadata: None,
12170 keysend_preimage: None,
12171 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12172 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12174 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12175 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12176 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12178 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12179 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12180 // is not satisfied.
12181 assert!(result.is_ok());
12185 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12186 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12187 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12188 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12189 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12191 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12192 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12194 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12197 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12198 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12200 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12201 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12203 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12204 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12205 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12206 match &msg_events[0] {
12207 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12208 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12210 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12211 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12212 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12218 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12219 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12221 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12222 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12225 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12229 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12230 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12231 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12232 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12233 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12234 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12235 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12236 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12237 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12241 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12242 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12243 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12245 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12246 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12248 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12249 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12254 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12255 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12257 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12258 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12260 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12261 // not have generated any events.
12262 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12266 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12267 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12268 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12269 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12270 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12271 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12272 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12273 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12275 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12276 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12279 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12280 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12281 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12282 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12285 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12286 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12289 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12290 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12293 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12294 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12295 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12296 ..Default::default()
12298 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12299 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12302 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12303 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12306 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12307 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12308 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12309 ..Default::default()
12311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12312 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12313 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12317 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12320 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12321 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12322 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12323 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12324 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12327 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12328 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12329 ..Default::default()
12331 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12334 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12335 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12336 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12337 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12341 fn test_payment_display() {
12342 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12343 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12344 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12345 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12346 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12347 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12351 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12352 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12353 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12354 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12355 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12358 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12359 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12360 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12361 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12362 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12363 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12364 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12365 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12367 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12368 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12369 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12372 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12373 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12375 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12376 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12378 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12379 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12380 }, false).unwrap();
12381 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12382 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12383 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12385 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12387 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12388 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12389 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12390 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12391 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12392 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12393 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12394 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12395 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12396 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12397 } else { panic!() };
12398 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12399 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12400 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12401 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12403 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12405 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12406 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12407 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12412 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12413 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12414 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12415 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12418 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12419 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12420 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12422 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12423 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12425 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12426 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12429 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12430 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12431 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12433 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12437 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12438 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12439 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12441 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12446 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12447 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12448 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12449 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12451 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12452 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12453 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12455 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12457 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12458 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12459 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12460 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12462 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12463 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12465 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12471 use crate::chain::Listen;
12472 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12473 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12474 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12475 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12476 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12477 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12478 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12479 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12480 use crate::util::test_utils;
12481 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12483 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12484 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12485 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12486 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12488 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12490 use criterion::Criterion;
12492 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12493 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12494 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12495 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12496 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12497 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12498 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12500 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12501 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12503 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12504 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12506 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12508 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12511 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12512 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12515 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12516 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12517 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12519 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12520 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12522 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12523 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12524 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12525 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12526 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12528 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12529 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12530 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12532 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12533 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12534 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12535 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12537 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12538 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12539 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12541 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12542 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12543 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12544 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12545 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12547 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12548 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12549 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12551 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12552 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12554 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12555 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12556 }, false).unwrap();
12557 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12558 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12559 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12562 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12563 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12564 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12566 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12567 } else { panic!(); }
12569 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12570 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12571 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12572 match events_b[0] {
12573 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12574 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12579 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12580 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12581 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12582 match events_a[0] {
12583 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12584 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12589 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12591 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12592 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12593 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12595 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12596 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12597 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12598 match msg_events[0] {
12599 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12600 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12601 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12605 match msg_events[1] {
12606 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12610 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12611 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12612 match events_a[0] {
12613 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12614 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12619 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12620 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12621 match events_b[0] {
12622 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12623 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12628 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12629 macro_rules! send_payment {
12630 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12631 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12632 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12633 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12634 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12635 payment_count += 1;
12636 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12637 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12639 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12640 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12641 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12642 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12643 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12644 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12645 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12646 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12647 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12648 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12649 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12652 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12653 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12654 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12656 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12657 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12658 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12659 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12660 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12662 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12665 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12666 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12667 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12668 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12670 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12674 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12675 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12676 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);